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Strategic alliances, buyer-supplier relationships, joint ventures and
other forms of interorganizational cooperation increasingly stand at
the basis of the competitive advantage of organizations. Although
formalization – in the form of contracts, rules and procedures – is
considered to be of significant importance for these relationships, an
integrative framework of its role has hitherto remained absent in
the literature. Drawing on conceptual developments, an in-depth
case study and survey data, this study provides such a framework. Six
main research findings emerge. First, tensions between the need and
the ability to formalize can be reduced by investing in information
processing and sensemaking. Second, formalization has functions
beyond coordination and control, such as increasing legitimacy and
enabling sensemaking. Third, managers are not only occupied with
the “right” degree of formalization, but also with managing tensions
between its functions and dysfunctions. Fourth, the contribution of
formalization to interorganizational performance declines, when it
is accompanied by standardization, due to a reduction in the degree
of “mindfulness” by contracting parties. Fifth, levels of formalization
and trust in early stages of cooperation have a large impact on the
evolution and performance of interorganizational relationships,
with intermediary levels of both governance forms exhibiting more
positive effects than extreme levels. Finally, decisions on formalization
are contingent upon the use of other governance mechanisms, which
may substitute or complement each other. These findings and the
integral framework to which they are connected promise to enrich
the understanding that researchers and practitioners have of the
role of formalization in interorganizational relationships, and enable
them to utilize formalization so that it contributes to performance.
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PREFACE 
 
Often, we do not realize that contracts, rules and procedures constitute a large 
part of our daily lives. When we discuss issues among colleagues, we use rules of 
speech; when we travel to work, we observe formal traffic rules; and, when 
handing in a dissertation to obtain a doctorate, we follow formal procedures. 
Moreover, various memorable moments in a person’s life, many of which I have 
been so fortunate to experience during the last four years, are accompanied by 
formalities. The purchase of a house involves formal bidding procedures, signing 
of a sales contract, handing in formal writings for the land register, and proceeding 
through formal procedures at the conveyance. Marriage entails responsibilities 
and commitments of partners, which are laid down in marriage registers and 
marriage certificates. Finally, the birth of a baby is recorded in a register of births, 
and formal notifications have to be sent to insurance companies, day-care centres 
and social-security agencies.  
  
It was not until I had experienced these events myself, that I realized that some of 
the formalities associated with these events meant more than appeared at first 
sight. I became aware of the fact that developing contracts, rules and procedures 
is frequently hardest when you need them most, eventuates in tensions with which 
people have to cope, and makes sense in the literal sense of the word. Moreover, 
I realized that acts of formalization are hard to study in isolation, frequently 
possess a standard format, and interact with relational and other governance 
mechanisms. When attempting to further develop and investigate these insights, it 
became obvious that a tough job lay ahead. Research on formalization in 
interorganizational relationships has been dominated for decades by theories that 
have taken up an almost paradigmatic status. The challenge lay in 
accommodating and cherishing these existing perspectives on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships, while at the same time attending 
to and developing new ideas that could possibly result in scientific progression. I 
believe this manuscript gives testimony as to how such an endeavor can enrich 
our thinking on interorganizational governance. I wish to thank Margret and Sam, 
my family, friends, promotors and colleagues in Rotterdam and in many other 
places around the world for their tremendous support during the journey that has 
eventuated in this manuscript. They are the ones who made my voyage a precious 
intellectual and personal experience. 
 
Paul Vlaar 
 
Alkmaar, January 2006
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1  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
‘Managers take one narrow perspective or another […]. Much of this writing and advising 
has been decidedly dysfunctional, simply because managers have no choice but to cope 
with the entire beast.’ 
Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999: 21 
 
‘Several competing lines of reasoning seem possible, although they might prove to be 
complementary rather than exclusive, since organizations are complex realities whose 
dynamics are “overdetermined” and not typically amenable to a mono-causal explanation.’  
 
Adler, 1993: 172 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter serves as the introductory guide to a study on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. We start with a short discussion 
on the salience of interorganizational cooperation in contemporary society. 
Subsequently, we emphasize the significance of formalization – provisionally 
defined as the development and application of contracts, rules and procedures, 
and the efforts made to enforce those – for collaborative relationships. We then 
contend that existing studies on formalization generally take one narrow 
perspective or another, neglecting the fact that managers have no choice but to 
cope with the entire “beast”, and ignoring the fact that most organizational 
phenomena are unamenable to mono-causal explanations, as is paraphrased by 
Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) and Adler (1993). Consequently, an integrative 
perspective on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships has 
hitherto remained absent in the literature. We respond to this lacuna, by 
introducing an integrative research framework for investigating the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. To elucidate each part of the 
framework, we identify six research themes on which we elaborate in the study. 
After clarifying each of these research themes and the research questions 
associated with them, we explain the aim and scope of our inquiry, and we discuss 
the empirical basis for the study. The chapter concludes with an overview of the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Interorganizational cooperation 
 
Drucker (1995) suggests that the greatest change in the way business is being 
conducted is the accelerating growth of relationships based on partnership instead 
of ownership. Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004: 61) even contend that ‘one of the 
most important trends in industrial organization of the past quarter century has 
been the growth of collaboration between independent companies.’ Several other 
researchers have noted that organizations are increasingly forming external 
relationships in the form of strategic alliances, partnerships and outsourcing deals. 
Kang and Sakai (2001), for example, found that the number of interorganizational 
alliances was six times as high in 1999 compared to a decade earlier. The top 500 
global businesses have been estimated to participate in an average of sixty major 
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strategic alliances each now (Dyer et al., 2001), while public reports indicate that 
BP Amoco, Dow Chemical, Hearst, Johnson & Johnson and Sony had more than 
a hundred alliances in their corporate portfolios by 2001 (Bamford and Ernst, 
2003). Large pharmaceutical companies ALSO constitute a major example of the 
hunger for interorganizational cooperation (see Table 1.1). The top 10 in this 
industry has established, on average, 61 new alliances from 2000 to 2003 
(Rasmussen, 2004). At the same time, Goldman Sachs estimates that a typical 
Fortune 1000 organization is already maintaining between 20,000 and 40,000 
contracts (upsidesoft.com, 2005), and a survey by Schifrin (2001) indicates that 
more than eighty percent of the top-level managers interviewed regard strategic 
alliances as a primary growth vehicle for the future. Other types of 
interorganizational relationships are also predicted to grow in volume and number. 
The worldwide market for IT outsourcing, for instance, has been forecast by 
Gartner to grow at an annual compound growth rate of 7.2 percent between 2003 
and 2008 (Caldwell et al., 2004). This suggests that the trend towards 
collaboration can be expected to continue. 
 
 
TABLE 1.1 
Number of alliances top 10 drug development companies (2000-2003) 
Company # of world-wide alliances 
Pfizer 103 
GlaxoSmithKline 88 
Merck 62 
Aventis 57 
Roche 56 
Novartis 56 
Eli Lilly 51 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 47 
Abbott 45 
AstraZeneca 44 
    Source: Rasmussen (2004, based on Recap, March 2004) 
 
 
These examples suggest that organizations rarely create value in isolation 
anymore. Their activities are embedded in complex networks of interorganizational 
relations and in constantly reconfiguring value chains (Wirtz, 2001). Changes in 
communication technologies and an increasing openness of economies have 
amplified the potential value that may be created through interorganizational 
cooperation, permitting organizations to set up closer relationships with partners 
than hitherto possible (Mol, 2005). Take the example of Starbucks Coffee, which 
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has leveraged a brand and a concept by means of a large set of 
interorganizational relationships (see Figure 1.1). Starbuck’s partners include firms 
that facilitate entry into new markets; customers, including United Airlines and 
Westin Hotels; retail formats, such as Mariott, Barnes & Noble and Chapters; and 
producers of complementary products, including PepsiCo and Dreyer’s Ice Cream 
(see Ernst, 2003). Another example constitutes Accenture (see Figure 1.2), which 
has developed relationships in the areas of application infrastructure, business 
intelligence, customer relationship management, data warehousing, enterprise 
integration and management, platforms and supply chain management. 
Nowadays, cooperation is even extended to strategically sensitive areas, such as 
R&D. Boeing, for example, is working with India’s HCL Technologies to co-
develop software for everything from the navigation systems and landing gear to 
the cockpit controls for its upcoming 7E7 Dreamliner jet. Similarly, pharmaceutical 
giants such as GlaxoSmithKline and Eli Lilly are teaming up with Asian biotech 
research companies in a bid to cut the average $ 500 million cost of bringing a 
new drug to the market (Engardio and Einhorn, 2005: 52-53). 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1 
Starbuck’s coffee: Creating value through a set of relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ernst (2003, based on press reports and McKinsey Analysis) 
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What drives these organizations to ally, frequently with their closest competitors? 
Lerpold (2003) and Ariño (2003) have composed excellent overviews of the 
motives for forming interorganizational relationships, which include: reducing 
production and transaction costs (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985); enhancing 
flexibility (Volberda, 1996, 1998; Schilling and Steensma, 2001); expanding 
business activities and exploiting business opportunities abroad (Mohr and Puck, 
2005); augmenting market power through competitive positioning (Kogut, 1988); 
accessing complementary resources and capabilities (Doz and Hamel, 1998; Dyer 
and Singh, 1998); and opening up possibilities to learn, and access, transfer, 
transform and harvest  knowledge (Beamish and Berdrow, 2003; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2004). In addition, interorganizational cooperation has been argued 
to confer status, legitimacy and reputation on organizations (Baum and Oliver, 
1992; Nicholson et al., 2002). In addition, it assists in augmenting identity (Lerpold, 
2003); enables conformance to isomorphic bandwagon behavior (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983); helps organizations respond to networks of competitors (Gimeno, 
2004); and accelerates the pace of organizational growth (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 
2004; Shane, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). 
 
 
FIGURE 1.2 
Accenture: Creating value through a set of relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: composed on the basis of data located at www.accenture.com 
Application 
infrastructure 
Avanade, BEA, 
EMC/Documentum, 
Microsoft 
Business intelligence  
and operation 
Business Objects, 
Cognos, CERA,  
Retek, Hyperion, 
Informatica 
Customer relationship 
management  
Callidus Software,  
Siebel Systems, 
Genesys 
 
Data warehousing 
Teradata (a division of 
NCR), Acxiom, Oracle 
 
Enterprise integration 
and management 
SeeBeyond, TIBCO,  
BEA, Microsoft, 
Oracle, SAP, 
PeopleSoft  
 
Platforms 
EMC, HP, 
Sun 
Supply chain 
management 
Ariba, Aspen Tech,  
i2 Technologies, 
PeopleSoft, SAP 
Manugistics 
 
Others 
Mercury, Meridea,  
Reuters Group, 
Answerthink,  
 
Accenture 
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Moreover, interorganizational relationships afford benefits, in the form of a larger 
volume, diversity and richness of information available to organizations (Koka and 
Prescott, 2002). They may thereby quicken the pace of innovation and reduce the 
risks associated with exploration (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). Interorganizational 
cooperation is further driven by the fact that competition does not take place 
between individual organizations alone anymore (Ireland et al., 2002). Instead, it 
involves constellations of firms (Van Haverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001), or 
cliques (Rowley et al., 2004). In a sense, interorganizational relationships thus 
create ‘new forms of competition that supersede firms and on which firms depend 
for their competitive advantage’ (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 204). Battles among 
airline constellations Star and Oneworld in the early 2000s form a good example 
here (Bamford et al., 2003).  
 
Beyond offering organizations new ways of creating value, external cooperative 
agreements enable organizations to draw ‘their boundaries around narrower 
spheres of activity’ (Whittington et al., 1999: 587), allowing them to focus on their 
core competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Related to this, 
interorganizational cooperation can give way to strategic renewal processes that 
enable organizations to pursue new developments in technologies, products and 
markets (Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Volberda, 
1996; Volberda et al., 2001). It helps them ‘to lower the costs of restructuring and 
transforming business by facilitating learning,’ and it reduces the time to change 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 45). In this respect, Volberda et al. (2001) demonstrate 
that external strategic renewal actions, such as initiating strategic alliances and 
joint ventures, have been more prominent than internal strategic renewal actions 
within five large financial services for the period between 1990 and 1997. Crossan 
and Berdrow (2003) convincingly advance that by outsourcing retail, Canada Post 
Cooperation could develop from a distribution company to an organization 
focusing on network management. Furthermore, Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999), in 
their study of supplier-networks in the Italian packaging machine-building industry, 
suggest that the ability of companies to interact with other organizations enabled 
competence renewal and reduced resistance to change. These and other 
examples show that achieving competitive advantage sometimes becomes 
inextricably linked to interorganizational cooperation (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Larson, 1992), and that the locus of production is often no longer within the 
boundaries of a single organization, but occurs instead at a nexus of relationships 
(Schilling and Steensma, 2001). In fact, ‘the very unit of economic behavior is 
becoming larger than the firm’ (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 5). Accordingly, we are 
challenged to complement the traditional picture of firm driven production and 
growth with a view in which interorganizational relationships are used to organize 
economic activity and to gain competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Koza 
and Lewin, 1998; Larson, 1992). We also also challenged to gradually replace 
traditional definitions of the field of strategic management focusing on 
‘coordination and resource allocation inside the firm’ (Rumelt et al., 1991: 19) with 
definitions emphasizing ‘coordination and resource allocation both within and 
across firm boundaries’ (Madhok, 2002: 547). 
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1.3 Research problem 
 
Thus far, we have concentrated on the virtues of interorganizational cooperation1. 
However, interorganizational cooperation exhibits a ‘mix of promise and peril’ 
(Fryxell et al., 2002: 866). Although managers ‘perceive the need for 
interorganizational cooperation, they find it difficult to manage those relationships 
satisfactorily’ (Madhok, 1995: 57)2. This becomes manifest, for example, when 
one considers that alliance researchers have reported typical failure rates between 
fifty and seventy percent (e.g. Harrigan, 1988; Parkhe, 1993a). It appears that 
many interorganizational relationships do not live up to their expectations (Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005). Problems arise, among others, from inherent conflict, goal 
divergence, asymmetrical objectives and opportunism by one or more partners 
(Doz, 1996; Ireland et al., 2002; Kale et al., 2000). Other issues pertain to cultural 
and organizational differences (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998; Mohr and Puck, 2005), improper partner selection (Ireland et al, 
2002) and deficiencies or breaches of trust (Gill and Butler, 2003). These 
problems are reinforced by variations in expectations regarding the possibilities for 
value creation and partner interaction (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). They are further exacerbated by 
unexpected contingencies, strategic changes by partner organizations and 
permutations in industries or environments, which may trigger instability (Gill and 
Butler, 2003; Yan and Gray, 2001), and cause shifts from cooperative toward 
competitive behavior, possibly leading to the dissolution of relationships. 
 
Park and Ungson (2001) argue that adopting appropriate governance mechanisms 
may alleviate or mitigate these and other potential problems in interorganizational 
relationships, as governance mechanisms are means to infuse order, relieve 
conflict and realize mutual gain (Williamson, 2002). This assertion is supported by, 
among others, a McKinsey study of more than five hundred alliances involving 
large U.S., European, Asian and Latin American companies, revealing that many 
cooperative ventures fail because of unclear decision-making rights (Bamford et 
al., 2003). It also builds on results from a study on alliances in the drug industry by 
Accenture (2003), revealing that interorganizational effectiveness frequently 
suffers from inadequacies in governance and relationship management. 
Congruently, Ernst (2003) even concludes that about half of alliance failures result 
from governance issues. In line with this, Takeishi (2001) claims that the issue of 
how to manage external relationships so as to gain competitive advantage has 
remained unsolved. 
                                                 
1 The question of why firms create interorganizational relationships is by now “standard 
fare” in the literature (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 13). The general argument is perhaps best 
represented by Durkheim, who remarked: ‘the hardness of bronze lies neither in the copper, 
nor in the tin, nor in the lead which have been used to form it, which are all soft and 
malleable bodies. The hardness arises from the mixing of them’ (Durkheim, 1982: 39-40). 
 
2 In this respect, Gomes-Casseres (1996) advances that cooperation is not a natural act for 
companies. Everything in their competitive environment, and in their corporate histories, 
drives them toward win-lose competition and a reliance on internal resources. 
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Following Park and Ungson (2001), we presume that considerable variation exists 
in the governance structures applied to interorganizational relationships. Some 
organizations may, for example, be more skilled than others in designing 
appropriate coordination and control structures (Anderson and Dekker, 2006). In 
this respect, Ring (2002: 145) proposes that ‘one of the elements that makes 
some organizations better at forming and sustaining cooperative relationships is 
that they have a better understanding of the consequences that flow from a need 
to rely, in part, on contract in the governance of cooperative business 
relationships.’ Madhok (2002: 540) adds that ‘governance skills, both within and 
across firm boundaries, can result in performance differences and competitive 
advantage.’ In line with this, Dyer and Singh (1998) indicate that effective 
governance might lead to interorganizational competitive advantage, either by 
lowering transaction costs, or by providing incentives for partner organizations to 
pursue value creation initiatives, such as investing in relation-specific assets, 
sharing knowledge, or combining complementary strategic resources. Moreover, 
Bagley (2005), Ireland et al. (2002) and Mayer and Argyres (2004) note that 
organizations possessing appropriate governance skills for managing and 
controlling interorganizational relationships extend their productive opportunity 
sets. Such organizations are able to address complementary resources and 
technologies from other organizations (Child and McGrath, 2001; Sanchez and 
Heene, 1997), and they may be in a better position to renew themselves, as their 
governance skills enable the internalization of cooperative experiences. In 
summary, the extent to which gains can be obtained from interorganizational 
collaboration appears to depend on the appropriate use of governance 
mechanisms (Sampson, 2004a; Williamson, 2002). 
 
To get those mechanisms right, we need to increase our understanding of the 
processes that are used to design and manage interorganizational relationships, 
and of the forces shaping collaborative agreements (Olk and Elvira, 2001; Osborn 
and Hagedoorn, 1997). This could contribute to improved managerial practices 
and a reduction in cooperative failures (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). In 
particular, several authors have pointed at the significance of formalization – 
provisionally defined as the development and application of contracts, rules and 
procedures, and the efforts made to enforce those – for interorganizational 
relationships. Others have asked for a more integrative view on formalization, in 
which its antecedents and its effects on performance are examined 
simultaneously, and in which effects of timing and context are incorporated (see 
Table 1.2). Given these comments, a critical examiniation of the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships seems timely and warranted. 
Hence, the focal aim of this study is to address the paramount need for broader 
and deeper knowledge of the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships. We define the research problem accordingly: What role does 
formalization play in interorganizational relationships? 
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TABLE 1.2 
Significance of and criticism on interorganizational governance (research) 
Authors Citation 
Masten & 
Saussier  
(2002: 273) 
‘The growth in the analysis of inter-firm contractual relationships that has 
occurred in recent years is an indication of the importance economists 
associate with the issue of contracting and contract design.’ 
  
Grandori & 
Soda  
(1995: 198) 
‘…the whole body of literature on networks shows that the extent to which 
inter-firm relationships are formalized […] is an important dimension of inter-
firm organizing.’ 
  
Thatcher 
(2004: 92) 
‘The growing enthusiasm for partnerships has created great demand for the 
skills required to manage them as well as for scholarship that can shed light on 
what those skills might be.’ 
Reuer 
(1999: 13) 
‘[Deriving value from alliances]… requires companies to select the right 
partners, develop a suitable alliance design, adapt the relationship as needed, 
and manage the end game appropriately.’ 
Zollo & Singh 
(2004: 6) 
‘Generally, it might be possible to achieve synergy only when firms carefully 
design and execute integration processes focused on extracting the gains 
associated with the combination of the two organizations. Accordingly, […] it is 
important to include as explanatory variables the activities necessary to extract 
those rents.’ 
Sampson 
(2004a: 484) 
‘One possible explanation for this performance difference across alliances is 
variation in alliance governance; specifically, whether alliance governance is 
appropriately chosen given the characteristics of the alliance.’ 
Sobrero & 
Schrader  
(1998: 601) 
‘A first reading of the empirical studies collected for the meta-analysis reveals 
the absence of an integrated perspective that simultaneously considers the 
relationships between task characteristics, the contractual and procedural 
dimensions of inter-firm relationships, and the outcome of the relation.’ 
Shapira 
(2000: 64) 
‘The next step should be a more comprehensive perspective on governance. 
As Grandori (1997) suggested, it may be less fruitful to attempt to resolve past 
debates than it is to foster cross-pollination among different perspectives.’ 
Wright & 
Lockett 
(2003: 2074) 
‘Although examples of collaborative agreements are becoming increasingly 
common, our understanding of their operation and management does not 
reflect their expanding role in economic activity.’ 
Anderson & 
Dekker  
(2006: 30) 
‘...a great deal of work is needed to understand management control practices 
that are emerging at the blurry boundaries of firms. This work […] requires the 
researcher to become conversant in a broader body of business research.’  
Stinchcombe  
(2001: 2) 
‘Much of the difficulty we have in dealing with formality is that we lack a 
nuanced definition of what we are talking about, a typology of its varieties, and 
a theory of the mechanisms by which it is caused and has its effects.’ 
Colombo 
(2003: 1226) 
‘More direct and fine-tuned consideration of the specific coordination and 
control mechanisms incorporated in different alliances […] would be very 
useful to gain further insights.' 
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To investigate this problem, we first elaborate on the major theoretical 
perspectives currently prevailing in research on interorganizational governance. 
We advance that most studies on formalization tend to focus either on its 
coordination or its control function (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Madhok, 2002; Salbu, 
1997). We also contend that they typically inquire into formalization’s relationship 
with antecedents, or into its relationship with performance (e.g. see Anderson and 
Dekker, 2006; Leiblein, 2003; Sobrero and Schrader, 1998; Stinchcombe, 2001). 
In general, a first group of inquiries presumes that antecedents of formalization, 
such as complexity, asset-specificty, or measurability, are associated with the 
need or the ability to coordinate and control interorganizational behavior and 
outcomes (Carson et al., 2006; Gerwin, 2004; Helm and Kloyer, 2004). A second 
category of studies focuses on the relationship between formalization and 
performance (Sobrero and Schrader, 1998)3. A visual representation of these 
generic approaches to the research problem is depicted in Figure 1.3.  
 
 
FIGURE 1.3 
Generic framework derived from the literature  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the richness and variety of previous examinations has significantly 
contributed to our understanding, an integrative perspective on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships has remained absent in the 
literature so far (Leiblein, 2003; Sobrero and Schrader, 1998; Stinchcombe, 2001). 
As is the case with research on interorganizational relationships in general (see 
Oliver and Ebers, 1998), studies on formalization have been built on a cacophony 
of seemingly heterogeneous concepts, theories and research results, which 
generally prohibits a clear accumulation of knowledge and conceptual 
consolidation. In order to establish a less fragmented, disjointed and myopic 
perspective on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships, we 
develop an integrative framework of the research problem, which we depict in 
Figure 1.4. In this framework, antecedent variables influence the need and the 
ability to formalize. The degree of formalization that results from these seemingly 
contradictory forces interacts with other governance mechanisms and with 
moderators, in that formalization is more conducive to certain contexts and stages 
                                                 
3 Research on relational governance suffers from similar problems. Saparito et al. (2004: 
400), for example, claims that ‘studies of interfirm trust have focused either on its 
antecedents or its consequences, but not both.’ 
 
Antecedents 
Degree of  
formalization 
Inter- 
organizational 
performance 
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of interorganizational cooperation, than to others. Finally, we believe that 
formalization influences interorganizational performance through both its positive 
and its negative consequences. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.4 
Research framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the research framework presented in Figure 1.4, we define six research 
themes that deserve further inquiry. We selected these themes, because each of 
them promises to extend the generic perspective on formalization prevailing in the 
literature, and because it functions as an arena for joining two or more theories, 
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disciplinary fields, or perspectives on formalization. By doing so, we capitalize on a 
remark by Oliver and Ebers (1998: 573) that ‘there might be a greater opportunity 
for fruitful cross-disciplinary and cross-perspective dialogue than is often realized’ 
in interorganizational research. We also embrace Kogut’s (1988) idea that 
attempts to melt different theories should be encouraged as they facilitate the 
development of richer, more insightful explanations for interorganizational 
phenomena. By investigating the research questions connected to each of the six 
themes, we seek to develop new insights and unite apparently disparate research 
contributions on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
Moreover, we aim to prevent research on formalization in interorganizational 
relationships from degenerating into a chorus of dissonant voices that cause 
confusion among researchers and practitioners. Instead, by offering an integrative 
perspective, we attempt to bring the fragmentation of scholarly discourse to a halt. 
 
1.4 Research themes and questions 
 
The six research themes all build on the generic approach to the research problem 
presented in the literature, but they also stipulate complementary explanations as 
to the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. Each of them 
focuses on a peculiar part of the research problem, as visualized in Figure 1.4. 
The order in which they are discussed is far from arbitrary. We have deliberately 
chosen to start with a theme in which several firm- and relational characteristics 
are being discussed, which are generally acknowledged to influence the degree of 
formalization that is being applied in interorganizational relationships. The first 
theme thereby addresses when formalization is likely to occur. In theme two, we 
subsequently emphasize the functions of formalization, in an attempt to reveal why 
formalization takes place. In theme three, we then investigate how formalization 
influences interorganizational performance. If we highlighted the locations of these 
research themes in Figure 1.4, one would realize that theme one is situated at the 
left, and that we move further to the right with themes two and three. It is also 
clear that we do not touch upon the upper and lower side of the model yet, as 
these aspects are further removed from the generic model on the role of 
formalization prevailing in the literature. In theme four, we attenuate the 
observations from previous chapters, and we highlight that attributes of the 
process of formalization may influence the results from the first three themes. 
Finally, in themes five and six, we further qualify the observations from previous 
chapters by indicating that formalization cannot be regarded in isolation, as it is 
intricately related to other governance forms and mechanisms, such as trust, 
partner selection and equity payments. 
 
As has been memorized before, the common denominator of the six research 
themes consists of their focus on intersections. The first theme – on the need and 
ability to formalize – for example, confronts theories that are primarily concerned 
with the need to formalize with theories focusing on the ability to formalize. In the 
second theme – on the functions of formalization – we explore a range of theories 
attributing distinct virtues to formalization. In theme three – labeled duality & 
dialectic tensions – we reconcile arguments supporting formalizations functions 
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and dysfunctions, and we elucidate how managers may cope with their co-
existence. Theme four – on contract standardization – unites research on 
standardization stemming from the contracting and law literature, investigations on 
interorganizational cooperation emanating from management studies, and 
inquiries into mindfulness, which derive from cognitive psychology. Finally, in 
themes five and six, we capitalize on contributions from various research streams 
to scrutinize formalization’s relationships with other governance mechanisms. By 
combining different theories, disciplinary fields and perspectives on formalization, 
we subvert ‘the provincialism that comes with paradigm confinement’ (Gioia and 
Pitre, 1990: 588) and turn to the production of a more refined and comprehensive 
view on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. In the 
following paragraphs, we introduce each of the research themes and the research 
question(s) associated with them. 
 
1.4.1 Theme one – need versus ability to formalize 
 
In theme one, we deviate from the generic perspectives on the role of contracts, 
rules and procedures in interorganizational relationships by elaborating on the 
tensions that arise between the need and the ability to formalize. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We posit that existing studies generally either focus on the influence of 
antecedents on the need to formalize, or on the influence of antecedents on the 
ability to formalize (see also Carson et al., 2006; Gerwin, 2004; Kirsch, 1997). In 
this respect, Carson et al. (2006) suggest that the main part of the literature has 
paid attention to factors which are presumed to increase the need for formal 
governance, such as asset-specificity, whereas factors representing the ability to 
formalize, such as difficulty of measurement or evaluation, have received far less 
attention (see also David and Han, 2004). In theme one, instead, we capitalize on 
the observation that the extent to which behavior and outcomes are formalized 
appears to depend on parties’ needs as well as their abilities (Helm and Kloyer, 
2004; Kirsch, 1997), and we investigate the concurrent effects of antecedents on 
both the need and the ability to formalize. This promises to shed light on several 
contradictory findings emerging from the literature. An example concerns prior 
cooperation, which is believed to act as a substitute for formalization, because it 
reduces the need for formal governance (Gulati, 1995), and as a complement to 
formalization, because it raises the ability to write more detailed contracts, rules 
and procedures (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). To 
illuminate this and other apparent contradictions, we pose the following research 
questions. 
 
RQ1: To what extent do relationships between antecedents and the ability to 
formalize diverge from their relationships with the need to formalize? 
In this study, the need to formalize indicates that more formalization is 
requisite, desirable, or useful. The ability to formalize concerns one’s capacity, 
competence or position making formalization possible.     
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RQ2: How do the ability and the need to formalize influence the degree of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships? 
 
1.4.2 Theme two – functions of formalization 
 
Theme two is born out of the observation that most studies on formalization tend 
to focus on formalization functioning as a means to coordinate, as a means to 
control, and to a lesser extent as a means to legitimize (see for instance Gulati 
and Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2001; Madhok, 2002; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Salbu, 1997). The mainstream literature thereby generally passes over the fact 
that formalization might have other functions (for notable exceptions see, for 
example, Ariño and Ring, 2004; Lindenberg, 2003; Zollo and Singh, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
However, several authors suggest that alternative explanations and novel 
understandings of formal organizational structures and practices have become 
imperative (see Table 1.3). Meyer and Rowan (1977), for example, note that 
coordination and control are not the only functions of formalization. In a similar 
vein, Hatch (1999) argues that changes in business environments cause 
traditional understandings of organizational structure to break down, thereby 
implicitly calling for alternative views on the functioning of formalization in 
contemporary society. Moreover, Simons (1990) concludes that theorists have to 
open up the meaning of management control to a broader notion. Like others (e.g. 
Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005), he stresses that formal “control systems” may be 
deployed for multiple reasons and purposes.  
 
 
TABLE 1.3 
Demands for alternative explanations of formalization 
Meyer & Rowan 
(1977: 343). 
‘Formal organizations are endemic in modern societies. There is need for 
an explanation of their rise that is partially free from the assumption that, 
in practice, formal structures actually coordinate and control work’  
Hatch 
(1999: 75). 
‘As business becomes more adaptable and flexible in response to shifting 
demands and opportunities in their globalizing markets, traditional 
understandings of organizational structure are breaking down’ 
Simons 
(1990: 142) 
‘Management theorists must strive to understand better the dynamic 
relationship between strategy and management control processes. This 
means […] opening up the meaning of management control to a broader 
notion…’ 
  
Klein Woolthuis 
et al. (2005: 834) 
‘The general conceptualization of contracts as uni-dimensional legal 
safeguarding instruments is wrong. Our cases show that contracts may 
have different functions, which can also be social in nature.’ 
In this study, functions are defined as ‘observed consequences of social 
patterns that change existing conditions in the direction of socially valued 
objectives’ (Blau, 1955: 11). 
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These arguments elicit the question as to whether formalization serves functions 
beyond coordination, control, and legitimacy. Moreover, if this appears to be the 
case, one might wonder how the functions of formalization relate to each other 
and to interorganizational performance (see Luo, 2002; Madhok, 2002), and in 
which contexts, or in which stages of interorganizational development each of 
them is most significant. We capture these considerations in the following 
research questions. 
 
RQ3:  What are the functions of formalization? 
 
RQ4: How do these functions relate to each other? 
 
RQ5: What is their relationship with interorganizational performance? 
 
RQ6:  What is the relative importance of each of these functions in different 
collaborative contexts and stages of interorganizational development? 
 
1.4.3 Theme three – duality & dialectic tensions 
 
In theme three, we deviate from the relatively generic coordination and control 
perspectives on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships by 
explicitly considering a duality inherent in formalization (see Das and Teng, 1998). 
Whereas conventional approaches to the research problem recognize that 
formalization may have positive consequences or functions and negative 
consequences or dysfunctions (Mintzberg, 1994; Luo, 2002; Williamson, 1985), 
they generally presume that managers select the “right” degree of formalization. In 
that case, formalization matches with organization-level and transaction- or 
relational level factors in such a way that transaction costs are minimized 
(Williamson, 1985, 1991), or transaction value is maximized (Foss and Foss, 
2005; Madhok, 2002). These studies offer little guidance on how to cope with the 
tensions that eventuate from the degree of formalization that is actually applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this theme, instead, we explicitly embrace the idea that tensions arising from the 
co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions cannot always be 
solved by spatial or temporal separation (Ring and Van de Ven, 1989), but that 
they have to be managed (Huxham and Beech, 2003). Likewise, we draw 
theorizing away from generic perspectives in which formalization is determined by 
organization- or transaction-characteristics, and we shift towards a perspective in 
which managerial choice receives more attention (Child, 1997). Such a 
perspective leaves room for managerial influence and encompasses discussions 
on how co-existing positive and negative consequences of formalization can be 
In this study, we define dysfunctions as ‘those observed consequences of 
social patterns that change existing conditions in the direction opposite to 
socially valued objectives, or consequences that interfere with the attainment 
of valued objectives’ (Blau, 1955: 11). 
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managed (see Das and Teng, 2000; De Rond, 2003; De Rond and Bouchiki, 
2004). It promises to illuminate which trade-offs managers face when they have to 
decide on the most appropriate degree of formalization for a particular 
relationship, and how they cope with tensions between the functions and 
dysfunctions associated with formalization. To elucidate how more attention for 
managerial choice may enrich our thinking on the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships, we formulate the following research question. 
 
RQ7:  How do managers of interorganizational relationships cope with tensions 
arising from the co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions? 
 
1.4.4 Theme four – contract standardization 
 
Theme four extends generic coordination and control perspectives on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships with an inquiry into one of the 
attributes of formalization. It offers an arena for discussing how the common 
practice of using standard contracts and standard procedures for negotiating and 
contracting influences the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although standard contracts and standard procedures for negotiating and 
contracting are omnipresent (Korobkin, 2003), generic perspectives on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships do not account for 
standardization. Apart from some incidental research in law schools (e.g. Epstein, 
1999; Goetz and Scott, 1985; Kahan and Klausner, 1996, 1997; Korobkin, 2003), 
hardly any inquiries are undertaken on this subject. In this theme, we address this 
imbalance between research and practice by clarifying how standardization 
influences the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We first 
explain why managers of interorganizational relationships deploy standard 
contracts and standard procedures for negotiation and contracting. Subsequently, 
we discuss the disadvantages related to standardizing negotiation and contracting 
practices. Most notably, we exploit the assumption that the application of standard 
procedures is accompanied by relatively low degrees of mindfulness (see Langer, 
1989; Ryle, 1949). This implies that conventional research models, which build on 
the coordination and control perspectives on formalization, might have to be 
adapted. To investigate this issue, we address the following research questions. 
 
RQ8: What are the advantages and disadvantages of using standard contracts in 
interorganizational relationships? 
 
RQ9: What influence does the introduction of standard procedures for negotiating 
and contracting have on the generic research model for formalization? 
 
In this study, we define standard procedures as established methods that are 
followed routinely (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994), and that are created and 
refined over multiple cycles of exchange (Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003). 
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1.4.5 Theme five – the evolution of formalization and trust 
 
In theme five, we assert that most studies in which generic coordination and 
control perspectives on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships 
are adopted pay insufficient attention to the relationship between formal and 
relational governance. Despite the fact that ‘there is a basic question concerning 
the role of formal versus informal approaches to the management of’ 
interorganizational relationships (Heckman, 1999: 142), and that results of existing 
studies ‘suggest a need to explore more carefully and predict more cautiously the 
relationship between formal contracts and relational governance’ (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002: 721). In particular, the relationship between trust and control 
remains far from clear (Maguire et al., 2001; Sydow and Windeler, 2003), and 
much theoretical input is still needed to understand how trust and formalization 
work as governance mechanisms (Bachmann, 2001).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More specifically, the role of formalization and trust during the process of 
relationship development are not well understood (De Wever et al., 2006; Inkpen 
and Curall, 2004), and little attention has been paid to their evolution in 
cooperative relationships (for notable exceptions, see Ferrin et al., 2005; Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005; Serva et al., 2005). As a result, practitioners are frequently 
confronted with conflicting recommendations (see Huxham and Beech, 2003), 
while academics are left with unclear perspectives on the evolution of 
formalization and trust in interorganizational relationships. Considering these 
assertions, this theme investigates the following research question. 
 
RQ10: How do formalization and trust evolve in interorganizational relationships? 
 
1.4.6 Theme six – governance trajectories 
 
Finally, in theme six – labeled governance trajectories – we signal that empirical 
inquiries that are in line with generic coordination and control perspectives on the 
role of formalization in interorganizational relationships tend to be rather static, 
concentrating on only one or a few governance modes in isolation (Geringer and 
Hébert, 1991a; Kirsch, 1997). These studies tend not to explicitly take into account 
the fact that governance mechanisms are strongly interconnected. Generally, they 
either just presume that relationships exist, or they analyse only a few 
relationships between a limited number of governance mechanisms, such as 
formalization and prior cooperation (e.g. see Gulati, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002), or formalization and trust (see Luo, 2002). This is at odds with observations 
that multiple governance mechanisms may have their bearing on 
In this study, trust is defined as ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party’ (Mayer et al., 1995: 712). 
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interorganizational performance, and that managers have various governance 
mechanisms at their disposal for managing interorganizational relationships. 
Reuer (1999), for instance, contends that potential value creation in 
interorganizational relationships not only involves appropriate partner selection, 
but also the adoption of specific interorganizational designs. Moreover, Klein 
(2002: 62) notes that ‘increased contractual specification involves rent-dissipating 
search and negotiation costs.’ Similarly, research on the relationship between 
formal and relational governance mechanisms (see Gulati, 1995; Luo, 2002; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002) gives testimony of the existence of highly intricate and 
dynamic relationships between different governance mechanisms. This urges 
Anderson and Dekker (2006) to suggest that an important direction for future 
research is to investigate larger sets of governance mechanisms simultaneously. 
In this theme, we therefore establish the concept of governance trajectories. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
We address the disparity between managers facing a large number of presumably 
interrelated governance choices, and the limited attention that researchers have 
given to their interconnectedness, by posing our final research question. 
 
RQ11: To what extent are decisions on formalization related to other governance 
decisions? 
 
1.5 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we seek to develop a more integrative 
and comprehensive perspective on the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships than is currently envisaged in the literature (Leiblein, 2003; Sobrero 
and Schrader, 1998; Stinchcombe, 2001). We complement the existing, generic 
model of formalization, which is based on the coordination and control 
perspectives, with insights from various theoretical perspectives and backgrounds 
(e.g. dialectics; sensemaking; mindfulness; law; and, psychology). By doing so, we 
answer calls for integrative theory development in a chaotic research field (Koza 
and Lewin, 1998; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). We also enable researchers and 
practitioners to better define the governance issues with which they are struggling, 
and we help them to position these issues in a broader perspective. 
 
Second, we purport to close the gap between theories of what people do and 
observations of their actual behavior (Jarzabkowski, 2004). We address this hiatus 
by viewing the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships from 
different angles, and by capturing them in six research themes, each with their 
own objectives. The objective of theme one – need versus ability to formalize – is 
to disentangle seemingly paradoxical findings on the relationships between 
In this study, governance trajectories are defined as sequences of interrelated 
decisions that are made to control, direct, or influence the actions and conduct 
of participants in interorganizational relationships during successive stages of 
the life-cycle of interorganizational relationships. 
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formalization and its antecedents. In discussing the need versus the ability to 
formalize, we propose that antecedents of formalization that have been advanced 
by transaction cost economists (e.g. Williamson, 1985, 1991), researchers on prior 
cooperation (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997), behavioral theorists and researchers 
examining dynamic capabilities (Gulati and Singh, 1998) bring about conflicting 
forces. In light of these theories, we expect that factors like asset-specificity, 
complexity, a lack of prior cooperation and a small size of buyer organizations 
aggravate the need for formalization. However, we also believe that these factors 
concurrently decrease the ability to do so. By exploring this apparent contradiction, 
we aim to elucidate how organizations deal with the resulting tensions. In our 
second theme – functions of formalization – we seek to complement views on 
formalization as being a “means to coordinate”, a “means to control” and a “means 
to legitimize”. We draw attention to a perspective that has hitherto remained 
suppositious, in which formalization is viewed as a “means to give and make 
sense”. By doing so, we can explain why formalization is encountered in cases 
where, viewed from more conventional perspectives, one would not expect it. 
 
The purpose of theme three – duality and dialectic tensions – is to demonstrate 
that functions and dysfunctions of formalization are likely to co-exist, and that the 
resulting tensions have to be managed. By analyzing a case study of an alliance 
between two multinationals, we show how managers capitalize on these tensions. 
Our results show the need for reintroducing managerial choice in 
interorganizational governance research. They also contribute to increasing 
managerial awareness of the duality inherent in formalization and the possibilities 
for coping with the tensions that it provokes. The objective of theme four – contract 
standardization – is to illuminate how the standardization of negotiation and 
contracting practices, influences the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships. Whereas contract standardization is ubiquitous in interorganizational 
exchange (see Korobkin, 2003), little academic work is performed in this area. Our 
review of the advantages and disadvantages of contract standardization serves as 
a basis on which researchers and practitioners may decide when and whether 
standardization is appropriate. Theme five – on the evolution of formalization and 
trust – aims to highlight the salience of and the interplay between both governance 
forms in interorganizational relationships. By doing so, this theme attenuates 
views on interorganizational governance that address either formal or relational 
governance, but not both. The purpose of theme six – governance trajectories – is 
to illustrate how different governance choices are related to each other. By 
examining how a number of organization-level and transaction-level factors 
impinge on various governance choices, and by demonstrating how these 
governance choices relate to each other, we illuminate that interorganizational 
management comprises series of governance decisions, which jointly form 
governance trajectories. Our results indicate that researchers and managers 
should view interorganizational governance as a dynamic process rather than a 
static series of decisions. 
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1.6 Scope of the study 
 
The principal factor used to delineate the scope of this study pertains to the forms 
by which economic activities can be organized (see step one in Figure 1.5). We 
exclude pure market-based transactions and vertically integrated forms of 
organization from our investigations. Consequently, the study is restricted to the 
role of formalization in interorganizational relationships, such as buyer-supplier or 
outsourcing relationships and strategic alliances. We define these relationships as 
voluntary initiated formal cooperative agreements between two or more 
organizations that involve exchange, sharing, or co-development, and that include 
contributions by partners of capital, technology, or organization-specific assets 
(e.g. Ariño, 2003; Gulati, 1998; Parkhe, 1993a). Such relationships become 
pertinent when ‘vertical integration is neither economical nor technically feasible 
and arms-length transactions cannot meet demands for customization’ (Anderson 
and Dekker, 2006: 5). 
 
 
FIGURE 1.5 
The organization of economic activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partners in such relationships can exert only limited degrees of control (Gomes-
Casseres, 1996), and they lose the freedom to act independently (Van de Ven and 
Walker, 1984). They have to work from a position that combines features of 
organizations and markets (Stinchcombe, 1985). Although interorganizational 
relationships remain separate entities, for example, they entail higher degrees of 
interdependence than market transactions, making the outcome for any party to a 
transaction ‘fundamentally entwined with the actions of and outcomes for other 
players’ (Child and McGrath, 2001: 1139). As Figure 1.5 shows, the decision to 
cooperate is followed by the selection of a collaborative form or cooperative mode. 
 
   Low                               Degree of formalization                               High 
     Mode 1, Mode 2, ……………………………………………………Mode N    
Mergers and 
acquisitions 
Interorganizational
relationships 
Market 
transactions 1 
2 
3 
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The key issue here is not whether cooperation takes place, but rather the manner 
in which a particular relationship is organized (Heide, 1994). Possibilities include, 
amongst others, buyer-supplier relationships, outsourcing agreements, joint 
research projects, shared new product development, common distribution 
agreements, R&D alliances, joint ventures and franchising (Grant and Baden-
Fuller, 2004). Finally, when a collaborative mode or form is chosen, partners still 
have to choose which degree of formalization is appropriate for governing their 
relationship (Nooteboom, 1999), which is envisaged in step three in Figure 1.5. 
The focus of this thesis is on the latter issue, which concerns the management 
and implementation of interorganizational relationships, something which has 
received little attention compared to the preceding decisions (Sobrero and 
Roberts, 2002). 
 
A second demarcation of the scope of our study relates to the literature that we 
use. Following Anderson and Dekker (2006), we refer to theoretical contributions 
on formalization at the intra-organizational level whenever we believe this is 
appropriate. Taking such a stance is supported by the fact that interaction within 
and between organizations shows several fundamental similarities (Gittell and 
Weiss, 2004; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999), and by the assertion that research 
on the management of partnerships ‘can and perhaps should draw on many 
conventional managerial nostrums developed with hierarchical organizations in 
mind’ (Thatcher, 2004: 121). It also builds on findings from Gittell and Weiss 
(2004) and Hǻkansson and Lind (2004), indicating that various structuring 
practices commonly adopted within organizations are perfectly adequate for 
coordination in interorganizational relationships. In their study of healthcare 
organizations, for example, Gittell and Weiss (2004) conclude that many of the 
same mechanisms that have been found to be effective in linking units within 
organizations are also effective for linking activities across organizations. 
Furthermore, contractual documents used to govern interorganizational 
relationships are often laced with elements of hierarchy (Stinchcombe, 1985), and 
collaborative relationships resemble organizations in that they are frequently 
characterized by their own distinctive organizational systems, rules, routines and 
norms (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Thatcher, 2004). In line with this, Grandori 
(2000: 6) even proposes that ‘a unitary and general theory of governance – 
encompassing both […] internal and external organization – is possible.’ Because 
we also believe that some partnerships have more in common with conventional 
organizations than much of the literature suggests, we do not refrain from referring 
to the intra-organizational literature when it helps us in our understanding of the 
role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
 
Nonetheless, we recognize that one cannot completely equate interorganizational 
structures and structuring practices with their organizational counterparts. There 
may be important differences between organizing activities in organizations and 
organizing them in interorganizational relationships, which influence the role of 
formalization in each. One of the differences playing a role is that organizations 
contain ‘more forces against change.’ They are characterized by ingrained 
interests, established ways of doing things, loyalties among employees, and so on 
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(Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 85). This may result in situations in which formalization 
is met with less opposition than if it were applied within organizations. Besides, 
formalization tends to become imperative for interorganizational cooperation 
unless parties have previously cooperated with each other, because they have few 
pre-existing mechanisms for coordination and control at their disposal (Kirsch, 
1997), and because a ‘tie-breaking authority higher up, and a common ownership 
interest by which to judge which side provides the greatest contribution’ are 
generally lacking (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 92). Moreover, participants in 
interorganizational relationships are more likely to face higher degrees of 
uncertainty and equivocality compared to their counterparts within organizations. 
They lack stable and time-tested governance structures, but also face 
discontinuities in terms of experience, culture, technology and organizational 
practices. An absence of generic understandings then complicates sensemaking, 
and influences the structures and structuring practices that they adopt (Clegg et 
al., 2002a). This is reinforced by the fact that interorganizational relationships tend 
to occur less frequently and are more heterogeneous than other organizational 
activities (Reuer and Zollo, 2005). 
 
In contrast, the zone of acceptance of authority – defined as the willingness to 
accept decisions from others (Simon, 1997: 185) – is probably larger for 
departments cooperating within an organization compared to parties in 
interorganizational relationships, as the latter can opt out more easily. This may 
reduce participants’ willingness to conform to formalities. In addition, compared to 
internal organizational units, interorganizational relationships tend to have a much 
narrower mandate (Reuer and Zollo, 2005), something which reduces the need for 
formalization. Finally, formalization is only one of the many means by which 
control can be achieved in interorganizational relationships (see Klein Woolthuis et 
al., 2005). Participants may use other governance mechanisms, which have little 
significance when activities are organized within organizations, such as efforts 
invested in partner selection, or equity exchange. These differences between 
organizing activities in organizations and organizing activities in collaborative 
relationships have to be kept in mind, as they may influence the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. The differences between partners 
in interorganizational relationships, for example, may influence the balance 
between the need and the ability to formalize (theme 1), and they possibly 
increase the significance of some functions of formalization at the cost of others 
(theme 3). 
 
1.7 Empirical basis 
 
The unit of analysis in our research is the interorganizational relationship. 
Congruent with this, the empirical basis for the study consists of 
interorganizational relationships involving at least one services organization, being 
an IT-organization, a financial institution, or a retail organization. Our focus on 
services organizations is born out of the relative silence in previous research on 
interorganizational relationships including these types of organizations, and the 
increasing tendency towards external cooperation by such organizations. Recent 
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figures of the OECD, for example, demonstrate that alliances involving services 
activities absorb a strongly growing share of total worldwide alliance activity 
compared to manufacturing, marketing and R&D activities (see Figure 1.6). More 
specifically, the number of interorganizational cooperative relationships involving 
services organizations in 2000 was more than five times as high than in 1995 
(Kang and Sakai, 2001). In our empirical investigations, we further restrict 
ourselves to non-equity relationships, as it is now recognized that 
interorganizational cooperation increasingly takes place in less hierarchical forms. 
Although earlier research tended to concentrate on the choice between equity and 
non-equity forms of cooperation (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Heiman and 
Nickerson, 2004; Oxley, 1997; Reuer and Ariño, 2003), the relative importance of 
joint ventures compared to alliances is declining sharply (see Figure 1.7). 
Hagedoorn and Osborn (2002) even ascertain that the percentage of joint 
ventures in newly established R&D partnerships declined from ninety percent in 
1970 to less than ten percent in 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although our focus is on interorganizational relationships involving services firms, 
we do not focus on one particular form of relationship. Although we investigate a 
strategic alliance between a major European-based retailer and a globally acting 
financial service organization, we also inquire into a large number of buyer-
suppliers relationships involving purchases of IT-solutions. We thus deploy a kind 
of empirical pluralism, seeking progress ‘by applying basically the same set of 
theoretical principles to a broad class of empirical phenomena…’ (Buskens et al., 
2003a: 5). We argue that this approach is warranted by the fact that formalization 
seems to play a role in almost any kind of interorganizational relationship, ranging 
FIGURE 1.6 
Purpose of alliances worldwide 
       Source: Kang and Sakai, 2001 
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from licensing agreements to strategic alliances. An indication of the significance 
of formalization for different types of interorganizational agreements can be 
derived from the length of the contracts adopted in these relationships (Hill and 
King, 2004). Below, we present examples of contract lengths for 591 license 
agreements, 336 sales and marketing agreements, 161 manufacturing and supply 
agreements, 73 consultancy agreements, 87 R&D agreements and 137 strategic 
cooperation agreements, which were obtained from onecle.com. A simple word-
count for each of the contracts, followed by a sorting procedure by which 
relationships are ordered according to ascending contract length leads to Figure 
1.8. Descriptive statistics (see Appendix A) reveal that contract length in this 
convenience sample ranges between 217 and 75,608 words. Mean values differ 
significantly between types of relationships, with consultancy agreements having 
the lowest value and strategic cooperation agreements displaying the highest 
value. The large differences in contract lengths, even within different categories of 
relationships, support the core assumption in our research that there is 
considerable variation in the degree of formalization that is being used.  
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               (N= 591, X = 8,729)                                 (N= 336, X = 7,575) 
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               (N= 161, X = 8,893)                                 (N= 73, X = 2,841) 
 
 
   
 
                             
                                  __                                                                             __ 
               (N= 87, X = 9,085)                                 (N= 137, X = 11,844) 
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FIGURE 1.8 
Distribution of contract length (# words) for different kinds of agreements 
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1.8 Structure of the study 
 
In this paragraph, we present a brief outline of the structure of the study (see 
Figure 1.9). The purpose of the first chapter was to introduce the research 
problem and the research questions forming the basis of this thesis. In the second 
chapter, we elaborate on the most common theories used to shed light on the role 
of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We start by providing 
definitions and typologies of formalization and interorganizational performance. 
Subsequently, we discuss various theories underlying the relatively generic 
coordination and control perspectives on the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.9    
Structure of the study 
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In chapter three, we explain the methodological position that we adopt in the 
study, and we offer insights into the approaches that will be taken to tackle the 
research questions. We advance that a thorough understanding of the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships demands a pluralistic 
methodological stance, in which case study and survey methods can be used to 
address different parts of our research problem. These methods help to illuminate 
different research questions and they shed light on different facets of the research 
problem. In chapter four to nine, we comply with Osborn and Hagedoorn’s (1997) 
request to abandon singular, clear-cut descriptions of interorganizational 
cooperation and we replace them with a more robust, sophisticated, 
multidimensional vision. In these chapters, we explore each of the six research 
themes that were identified in chapter one. The chapters are all written along 
similar lines, in that they start with a description of the theme’s relationship to the 
research problem and the research framework presented in Figure 1.4. The 
introductions are followed by descriptions of possible enrichments of, and 
complements to, the generic coordination and control perspectives on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships (as described in chapter two). In 
themes one, four and six we test our hypotheses on a sample of 911 buyer-
supplier relationships. Themes two and four contain theoretical contributions, as 
the research questions posed in these themes are highly exploratory and 
multifaceted in nature, which precludes large-scale empirical testing. In theme 
three, we analyze a case study, as this method is most appropriate for developing 
new insights on the managerial actions that are undertaken to cope with tensions 
resulting from formalization. In chapter ten, we contemplate a synopsis of the 
theory developed and the key findings emanating from the case study and the 
survey-data. Following this, the theoretical and practical implications of the study 
are expounded, after which the limitations of the study and possibilities for future 
research are being addressed. 
 
1.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have set the stage for a study on the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships. We started by explaining the growing significance 
of interorganizational cooperation, and argued that formalization – in the form of 
contracts, rules and procedures – could contribute to improving interorganizational 
performance. To investigate when formalization is appropriate, why it is being 
used, and how it affects interorganizational performance, an integrative 
perspective on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships is 
needed, something which is still absent in the literature. In order to address this 
issue, we devised an integrative research framework and identified six research 
themes that assist us in addressing the research problem. We then emphasized 
the purpose and scope of our inquiry, and we discussed its empirical basis. 
Finally, we explained the structure along which we conduct our investigation. In 
the following chapter, we elucidate how some of the major research streams in the 
literature on interorganizational governance view the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships. 
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2 THEORY: COMMON PERSPECTIVES ON FORMALIZATION 
 
 
‘While different theoretical perspectives or paradigms may be irreconcilable in their own 
philosophical terms, when applied to the study of organizational phenomena they are not 
necessarily incommensurable.’  
Child, 1997: 44 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we develop definitions and typologies of the concepts of 
formalization and interorganizational performance. Subsequently, we describe 
how two of the major research streams in the interorganizational governance field 
view the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We label those 
relatively generic views the “coordination” and “control” perspective, and suggest 
that the first perspective draws its arguments from the behavioral theory of the firm 
and from research on dynamic capabilities, whereas the second perspective builds 
upon transaction cost theory and agency theory. By describing these generic 
perspectives, the chapter aims to elucidate how we tend to look at the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. The chapter serves as a basis, or 
platform, for discussing each of the research themes, which build on and 
complement the coordination and control perspectives depicted here. Although we 
believe that the different theoretical perspectives or paradigms that we describe in 
this chapter and the remainder of the thesis may be irreconcilable in their own 
philosophical terms, we agree with Child (1997: 44) that ‘when applied to the study 
of organizational phenomena they are not necessarily incommensurable.’ 
 
2.2 Definition and typology of formalization 
 
In order to illuminate the role that formalization assumes in interorganizational 
relationships, a clear definition is due. Most concepts ending in “-tion” are 
ambiguous with regard to process and outcome – ‘between the way one gets 
there, and the result’ (Baum and Rowley, 2002: 1). This also accounts for 
formalization, which both refers to the process of codifying and enforcing inputs, 
outputs and behaviors (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; Ouchi, 1979), and to the 
outcomes of this process in the form of contracts4, rules and procedures (Hage 
and Aiken, 1966). The distinction between formalization as a process and 
formalization as an outcome becomes obvious when one considers contractual 
planning – a principal form of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
Contractual planning aims at maximizing value creation, while it recognizes the 
fact that motives of transaction parties necessarily differ and that coordination is 
required to receive information and to assign rights, obligations, risks and 
revenues (Hill and King, 2004). It consists of the ‘process of projecting exchanges 
into the future’ (Macneil, 1980: 4), and includes defining performance, duties and 
                                                 
4 Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) explain that project documentation, change requests forms, 
or notes of staff meetings can also serve as contracts, as they protect participants from 
risks and control their behavior. 
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rights in future circumstances; defining what should happen when parties do not 
hold to agreements; and assessing in how far the contract can be legally enforced 
(Macaulay, 1963). This process of contractual planning eventuates in promises or 
obligations to perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1980), which are 
recorded in formal contracts, representing formalization as an outcome.  
 
Both forms of formalization have two components, being codification and 
enforcement (e.g. Hage and Aiken, 1966). Codification conveys that explicit, 
systematic procedures are involved (Pearce II et al., 1987), which help to create 
perceptual and conceptual categories that facilitate the classification of 
phenomena (Boisot, 1998). It refers to explicitly recording or writing down aspects 
of inputs, outcomes and/or behavior. Enforcement, instead, signifies that codified 
agreements are “in force”. It permits parties to make believable promises to each 
other, so that the execution of agreements can ultimately be exacted (Schwartz 
and Scott, 2003)5. Enforcement does not necessarily mean that partner 
organizations are “forced to comply”. It implies that they act with the process of 
formalization and its outcomes in mind. It seldom takes place by actually 
appealing to courts or authority6. Instead, the sheer existence of these sources for 
ultimate appeal already allow for compliance to formalities by partner 
organizations (Galanter, 1981; Salbu, 1997; Williamson, 1999)7, 8. Agreements 
can also “be in force” because parties want to avoid ruining relationships and 
reputations, or because it is simply most cost efficient (Antia and Frazier, 2001; 
Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003; Klein, 2002). Absent these considerations, situations 
in which formalities are not being contemplated should not be labeled formal 
(Stinchcombe, 2001). To recap, we offer the following definition of formalization. 
                                                 
5 On a macro-economic level, limited enforceability of contracts impairs the efficient 
allocation of resources. It also results in greater volatility of outputs, and it delays the 
diffusion of new technologies (Cooley et al., 2004). There are no reasons to believe that 
similar effects do not apply to interorganizational cooperation. When firms are not able to 
guarantee a certain extent of compliance to agreements by potential partners, they will 
refrain from initiating  relationships altogether, or they are handed over to the whims of their 
partner, which potentially results in more variable expected outcomes of the relationship. 
 
6 Authority is defined here as ‘the power to make decisions which guide the actions of 
another’ (Simon, 1997: 74). This power is ‘recognized as so vested, and […] accepted as 
appropriate not only by the wielder of power but by those over whom it is wielded and by 
the other members of the system’ (Katz and Kahn, 1966: 203). 
 
7 The threat of retaliation will generally deter non-compliance to agreements. From a control 
perspective, possibilities for legal enforcement only need to deal with states in which 
payoffs for deviations from the norm are very high (Eggleston et al., 2000). 
 
8 Friedrich’s “rule of anticipated reactions” seems to be valid here, which suggests that 
expectations and anticipations govern behavior (Simon, 1997: 182). Potential disputes, 
including many that under current rules could be brought to a court, are frequently resolved 
by avoidance, self-help, and the like (Galanter, 1981). 
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Next to a definition, we develop a typology of formalization, which comprises three 
attributes (see Figure 2.1). The first and most obvious attribute refers to the 
degree of formalization applied in interorganizational relationships, ranging from 
high to low. This attribute is still most commonly used by researchers (Makhija and 
Ganesh, 1997). The second attribute pertains to the extent to which formalization 
applies to inputs and outcomes, or to processes (e.g. see Ouchi and Maguire, 
1975; Ouchi, 1979; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Stinchcombe, 2001). Finally, the third 
attribute covers the degree to which formalization has an enabling or a coercive 
character (e.g. see Adler and Borys, 1996). As the last two categorizations are the 
least straightforward, we pay most attention to these attributes, starting with the 
distinction between the formalization of inputs and outputs, and the formalization 
of processes. This distinction derives from the work of Katz and Kahn (1966), 
Simon (1947, 1997) and Stinchcombe (2001), who have examined these concepts 
on an intra-organizational level. Katz and Kahn (1966: 298), for example, propose 
two major categories of policy-making: ‘the formulation of organizational goals and 
objectives, and the formulation of strategies and procedures for achieving and 
assessing progress towards such goals’. In a similar vein, Simon (1997: 307) 
contends that someone ‘may be told what to do, but given considerable leeway as 
to how [he or she] will carry out the task’. Stinchcombe (2001: 51) refers to this 
distinction by stating that ‘abstract versions of procedures and technologies may 
be formulated in terms of their outcomes […], or by the sequence of actions that 
are thought to reliably produce the best results…’ 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Three attributes of formalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formalization concerns the process of codifying and enforcing inputs, outputs, 
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The formalization of expected outcomes of a relationship concerns the clarity with 
which goals are set and with which the scope of the relationship is delineated 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Cheng and Van de Ven, 1996). It entails the inclination, 
determinedness, and means to be able to hold on to this scope, and work 
according to the goals set earlier on (McGrath, 2001). Formalization of inputs and 
outcomes further refers to the codification and enforcement of what is to be 
accomplished (e.g. scope, goals), and by what means this has to be done. 
Formalization of processes, instead, entails the coordination and adjustment of 
activities of interdependent parties (Sobrero and Schrader, 1998). It also 
encompasses the specification and supervision of operational or post-formation 
activities (McGrath, 2001), so that control can be exerted over these (Burns and 
Stalker, 1961). When process formalization is high, contracts or other documents 
specify, for example, terms and clauses concerning how to set up the relationship, 
how to operate and manage the relationship, and how to cooperate and resolve 
conflict between partners (Luo, 2002). Formalization of processes thus refers to 
the codification and enforcement of how outcomes are to be realized9. 
 
The third attribute for categorizing different types of formalization concerns the 
intention behind formalization. In this respect, Adler (1993: 165) has noted that 
‘subsequent generations of researchers have tended to focus on the punishment-
centered form and the associated compliance logic of bureaucracy’ and the 
processes associated with it, such as formalization. In his famous article on the 
NUMMI joint venture between General Motors and Toyota, however, he concludes 
that the performance effects of formalization depends on whether it is designed to 
enforce compliance or to enable cooperation. In a later paper on the formalization 
of workflows in an intra-organizational context, Adler and Borys (1996), distinguish 
enabling types of formalization – designed to enable employees or partner 
organizations to master their tasks – from coercive types of formalization – aimed 
at coercing effort, forcing reluctant compliance, and displacing opportunism10. 
Formalization thus appears to relate, ‘on the one hand, to the constitution of 
meaning, and on the other to the sanctioning of modes of social conduct’ 
(Giddens, 1984: 18). The purpose of the enabling type of formalization is to 
achieve ‘coordination and higher levels of understanding’ (Zollo and Singh, 2004: 
                                                 
9 The distinction between the formalization of inputs and outcomes, and the formalization of 
processes is theoretically important but empirically hard to make. Ultimately, formalization is 
exercised to change behaviors (Kirsch, 1997; Ouchi, 1979). Simon (1997: 39) clarifies that 
there is no essential difference between a desired outcome and a process, but only a 
distinction of degree. A process is an activity whose immediate purpose is at a low level in 
the hierarchy of means and ends, while a desired outcome is a collection of activities whose 
aim is at a high level in this means-end hierarchy. 
 
10 The resemblance between this distinction and the two kinds of bureaucracy described by 
Max Weber is striking. Weber wrote about a “representative” form of bureaucracy, based on 
rules established by agreement, rules which are technically justified and administered by 
specially qualified personnel, and to which consent is given voluntarily. However, he also 
described “punishment-centered” bureaucracies, which are based on the imposition of 
rules, and on obedience for their own sake (Gouldner, 1954: 24). 
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16). It involves motivating participants in interorganizational relationships 
(Lindenberg, 2003), and requires flexibility (Adler and Borys, 1996). Parties have 
to be open to each other’s requests to modify a prior agreement, and they should 
rather work out a new deal than hold each other to the original terms when some 
unexpected situations arise (Bello and Gilliland, 1997). Enabling types of 
formalization also require involvement of parties to the agreement during the 
formalization process, and managerial encouragement concerning the formulation 
of improvements (Adler and Borys, 1996). The distinction between coercive and 
enabling types of formalization is meaningful as formalization’s effectiveness might 
vary with regard to the manner in which rules are initiated, whether by imposition 
or agreement. After all, we prefer ‘agreed-upon, rather than imposed rules…’ 
(Gouldner, 1954: 20). Participants in interorganizational relationships may receive 
contracts, rules and procedures that are devised to enable cooperation differently 
from their coercive counterparts. 
 
2.3 Definition and typology of interorganizational performance 
 
The second major construct in our study concerns interorganizational 
performance. Defining and measuring interorganizational performance is a difficult 
issue (Ariño, 2003; Geringer and Hébert, 1991b; Gray, 2000); a precise and 
consistent definition of collaborative success and failure is still lacking, and the 
diversity of measures that have been used is high (Mohr and Puck, 2005; Yan and 
Gray, 2001). Olk (2002) indicates that researchers have tried to make sense out of 
the breadth of performance measures that are available in several ways. First, 
they have empirically evaluated the compatibility of various measures (e.g. Ariño, 
2003; Geringer and Hébert, 1991b; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Hagedoorn and 
Cloodt, 2003). Second, they have argued that the appropriateness of different 
performance measures varies among contexts (Yan and Gray, 1995) and 
research questions (e.g. Gulati and Zajac, 2000; Reuer and Koza, 2000). Finally, 
they have developed conceptual frameworks to organize different approaches to 
interorganizational performance measurement (e.g. Gray, 2000; Olk, 2002; Park 
and Ungson, 2001). Table 2.1 serves as an example of such a conceptual 
framework. Another illustration is provided by Olk (2002), who utilizes studies on 
organizational effectiveness to organize different approaches to performance 
measurement. Olk indicates that performance can be measured on two levels of 
analysis: the level of the relationship itself and the level of the partner 
organizations (see also Gray, 2000; Yan and Gray, 1995). Besides, he advances 
that one may distinguish performance measures by their purpose or approach. He 
contends that in an optimization approach, all parties use a single criterion for 
evaluation. In a strategic interest approach one goal prevails as well, but a 
dominant coalition may use several representative measures, and goals may 
change. In a multi-interest approach, there are multiple evaluators of 
interorganizational performance, which use different and sometimes conflicting 
criteria. Finally, in the sequential perspective, multiple criteria are used for 
evaluation, which are assumed to be temporally related (Olk, 2002). 
32 
TABLE 2.1 
Overview of performance measures in alliance studies 
Measure Authors Failure rate Operational definition 
Relational level: 
   
Survival (stability) Franko (1971) 24% Liquidation/ownership change  
 Tomlinson (1970) 50% Termination 
 Killing (1983) 30% Liquidation/Reorganization 
 Kogut (1988) 46% Termination 
 Beamish (1987) 45%  
 Porter (1987) 50% Divesture 
 Harrigan (1988) 55%  
 Park & Russo (1996) 67% Dissolution/Acquisition 
    
Duration Harrigan (1988)  Alliance age 
 Kogut (1988)   
 Park & Ungson (1997)   
    
Financial  Tomlinson (1970)  Return on investment 
performance Raffii (1978)  Alliance Returns 
    
Subjective index Killing (1983) 36% Poor-Good 
 Beamish (1987) 61% Mutual Agreement 
 Harrigan (1988) 55% Mutual Agreement 
   
Composite index Parkhe (1993a)  
   
Partner level:    
Achievement Hamel et al. (1989) Conceptual 
Learning Hamel (1991) Case Studies 
Source: adapted from Park and Ungson, 2001 
 
 
Although categorizing interorganizational performance measures can be helpful in 
selecting performance measures for empirical studies, it does not mitigate the 
drawbacks that are associated with individual measures. All measures of 
interorganizational performance appear to have their own problems. Relationship 
mortality, for example, does not account for the fact that termination may indicate 
that partner organizations have attained their strategic objectives, or that they exit 
a relationship in a better competitive shape (Das and Teng, 2000; Gulati, 1998). It 
also does not consider the fact that organizations may pursue an options strategy 
to accomplish their objectives, in which they develop large portfolios of 
relationships, from which only one or a few need to be successful to prosper 
(Vassolo et al., 2004). In such cases, termination of a relationship may hinge on 
the comparative benefits generated in other relationships. Moreover, it does not 
make allowances for gradations of performance (Gulati, 1998), although ‘it is only 
realistic to expect alliances to fail in some respects (e.g. attaining original 
purposes) and to succeed in others (e.g. generating spin-offs)’ (De Rond, 2003: 
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9). In addition, continuation of a relationship is not always in the partner’s best 
interest (Reuer and Koza, 2000), as becomes apparent from a comment issued by 
the divisional president of a US firm, who ended a long-standing joint venture with 
a Japanese firm. He indicated that ‘although the partnership was sound and the 
alliance had been very successful, the alliance no longer fits with firm strategy’ 
(Inkpen and Li, 1999: 35). Another example concerns performance measures 
assessing the degree to which strategic interests of cooperating organizations are 
accomplished. Criticism of these measures centres on the fact that they are 
perceptual (Olk, 2002), and that objectives may change over time (Gill and Butler, 
2003). Besides, such measures are confronted with validity problems, due to a 
deficiency of common objectives, and the co-existence of multiple strategic 
objectives (De Rond, 2003; Larson, 1992; Yan and Gray, 1995). 
 
Another problem with many performance measures is their focus on outcomes of 
relationships. Lately, several researchers have stressed that new insights may be 
drawn by shifting our focus from solely measuring outcome performance to a view 
in which process performance measures are included (Ariño, 2003; Kumar and 
Nti, 1998). These measures can capture the fact that participants in 
interorganizational relationships might simply appreciate collateral experiences 
such as a bold move or a good meeting (March, 1999), and they could account for 
the fact that they do not only judge results, but also the intentions behind the 
behavior of others (Chaserant, 2003). Support for the significance of process 
performance is afforded by De Rond (2003), who found that assessments of 
interorganizational performance and success in two alliances between 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms were based not solely, or even primarily, 
on rational (e.g. economic or strategic) considerations, but rather on cognitive 
processes of individuals in these alliances. A definition of interorganizational 
performance should therefore both capture outcome and process performance. 
Outcome performance then captures the effectiveness and efficiency of a 
relationship, including the degree of overall performance satisfaction, the presence 
of net spill-over effects, the extent to which strategic goals are fulfilled, and parties’ 
adherence to schedules and budgets (see Ariño, 2003; Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2005). Process performance, instead, pertains to the relational quality of 
cooperative endeavors. It entails things such as the ease or smoothness of 
cooperation (Luo, 2002), the extent to which conflicts prevail in the relationship, 
and partners’ satisfaction with coordination and communication processes (Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). We adopt a definition of interorganizational performance that 
captures both aspects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome performance and process performance may influence each other 
(Kumar and Nti, 1998; Zajac and Olsen, 1993), and they may even be inseparable 
(Parkhe, 1993b). Researchers have suggested, for example, that ‘the pattern and 
Interorganizational performance concerns ‘the degree of accomplishment of 
the partners’ goals, […], and the extent to which their pattern of interactions is 
acceptable to the partners’ (Ariño, 2003: 23) 
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quality of interaction between partners throughout the life of the [alliance] 
relationship determines the value created’ (Madhok and Tallman, 1998: 333). 
Findings from Ariño (2003), and Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) support this 
assertion, suggesting that managers may need no complex metrics to evaluate 
interorganizational performance, as these measures are highly correlated. 
Accordingly, we refer to both processes and outcomes when discussing 
interorganizational performance in this study. 
 
2.4 Formalization and interorganizational performance 
 
Evidence on the relationship between formalization and interorganizational 
performance is mixed and narrow (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Sobrero and 
Schrader, 1998), something which might stem from the fact that different 
performance measures are being used in different analyses (Sobrero and Roberts, 
2001, 2002). The most one can say is that the relationship between formalization 
and interorganizational performance is likely to follow a curve-linear path, where 
too little formalization gives rise to chaos and where too much formalization leads 
to rigidity and a loss of creativeness (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Luo, 2002; Mintzberg, 
1994; Scott, 2003). In this respect, Mintzberg (1994: 386) notes that ‘formalization 
is a double-edged sword, easily reaching the point where help becomes 
hindrance.’ The influence of formalization on interorganizational performance has 
further been argued to be contingent on the stage of development of a relationship 
(Jap and Ganesan, 2000), on the type of relationship or the collaborative context 
(Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2003) and on the aim managers have in mind when 
formalizing their relationship (Madhok, 2002). In addition, formalization may have 
distinct effects on a range of performance measures (Sobrero and Roberts, 2001, 
2002), and these effects may be contingent on whether formalization is of an 
enabling or a coercive kind (Adler and Borys, 1996), and on the extent to which it 
pertains to outcomes or processes (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; Ouchi, 1979, 1980). 
Moreover, formalization may entail numerous functions, but also a range of 
unintended consequences that affect performance (Blau, 1955). Furthermore, 
formalization interacts with other governance mechanisms that moderate its 
influence on performance. Finally, formalization is only one of the variables among 
a myriad of factors and processes affecting interorganizational performance 
(Beamish and Berdrow, 2003). It is therefore not an easy task to establish a 
univocal relationship between formalization and interorganizational performance. 
 
2.5 Major theoretical perspectives on formalization 
 
Now that the major constructs in this study have been defined, we pay attention to 
the most common and influential theoretical perspectives in the literature 
describing the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We group 
the main theories on this topic into two broad categories: (1) the ones focusing on 
formalization as a mechanism for coordination, and (2) the ones viewing 
formalization as a means to control (e.g. see Gulati and Singh, 1998; Madhok, 
2002; Salbu, 1997). This distinction is warranted by comments from several highly 
credited researchers. Gulati and Singh (1998: 811), for example, advance that 
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‘firms choose governance structures both to manage anticipated coordination 
costs and to address appropriation concerns.’ Dyer and Singh (1998: 88) add that 
employing ‘governance mechanisms that lower transaction costs or permit the 
realization of rents through the synergistic combination of assets, knowledge, or 
capabilities’ both contribute to achieving interorganizational performance and 
competitive advantage. Formal rules thereby have an incentive function, 
preventing conflicts and opportunistic behavior, and a coordination function, 
comprising elements that bring together individual actions to meet a defined set of 
goals (Avadikyan et al., 2001). The coordination and control perspectives thus 
focus on problems from fundamentally different origins, with control problems 
being rooted in differences in motivation and interest, and coordination problems 
arising from the cognitive limitations of individuals (Gulati et al., 2005). As the 
difficulties that partners may experience in aligning each other’s actions can 
persist even though the partners’ interests may be aligned, both arguments 
emphasizing coordination as well as arguments stressing control for explaining the 
structuring and performance of interorganizational relationships are valid, and they 
deserve to be discussed separately (Gulati et al., 2005; Salbu, 1997). 
Consequently, we distinguish theories that refer to problems of coordination from 
theories emphasizing problems of control to explain the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships. 
 
2.5.1 Coordination perspective 
 
Coordination refers to ‘the organization of goals, priorities, and programs for the 
future, the ordering of the desires and expectations between or among the 
transacting parties, and the adjustment of individual behaviors to accommodate 
the schedules and functions selected for mutual endeavor’ (Salbu, 1997: 332). 
Partner organizations may experience difficulties in aligning each other’s actions, 
which may hamper the realization of interorganizational rents (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998). They therefore require coordination mechanisms 
that help them to decompose tasks, and to establish and communicate the 
activities that have to be completed (Gulati and Singh, 1998). In this sense, 
contracts, rules and procedures can be interpreted as technical aids to managing 
relationships, sometimes ‘in the same way that minutes of a meeting remind 
participants of arrangements that were made’ (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005: 835). 
The coordination function of formalization is of particular significance for 
interorganizational relationships in which tasks have to be continually geared to 
each other and for which joint decision making between interorganizational 
partners is required (Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
 
Support for the coordination function of interorganizational structuring 
arrangements is provided by Gulati et al. (2005), Mayer and Argyres (2004), and 
Ryall and Sampson (2004). In their analysis of 222 procurement relationships at 
the automobile producers Chrysler and Ford, for example, Gulati et al. (2005) 
found that different modes of organizing procurement relationships differed not 
only in the ability to control hazards of opportunistic behavior, but also in their 
capacity to generate coordinated responses to adaptive pressures in the task and 
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transaction environment. In their study of technology alliance contracts, Ryall and 
Sampson (2004) noted that contracts often embodied non-enforceable clauses 
that appeared to serve coordination functions only. They assisted in planning the 
collaboration, setting partner expectations, and reducing misunderstandings and 
unintended consequences. The coordination function of formalization further 
receives support from findings by Lassar and Kerr (1996), who revealed a highly 
significant correlation (0.34, p<0.05) between the extent to which contractual 
restrictions were imposed on distributors by manufacturers of audio speakers, and 
the level of coordination that they attempted to realize for five different distributor 
activities. In addition, Gulati and Singh (1998) found that for a sample of 1570 
alliances announced between 1970 and 1989, governance structures were not 
only influenced by appropriation concerns, but also by anticipated coordination 
costs arising from task interdependence and complexity. As these citations 
indicate, the coordination function of formalization is highly significant in many 
cooperative relationships. This is reinforced by the fact that ‘management 
information and control systems are invariably much less developed across 
organizations than they are within them’ (Thatcher, 2004: 112), rendering 
formalization the primary means to institute coordination. In the following 
paragraphs, we briefly discuss theories focusing on formalization as a means to 
coordinate, including March and Simon’s theory of organizational behavior, and 
the dynamic capabilities view. 
 
March and Simon’s theory of organizational behavior 
March and Simon’s theory of organizational behavior outlines the processes 
through which formalization contributes to rational behavior in organizations, and 
to limiting the negative effects of bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1958; 
Simon, 1947, 1997). From the perspective of organizational behaviorists11, 
formalization enables coordination by supporting rational decision making, ‘not 
only by parcelling out responsibilities among participants, but also by providing 
them with the necessary means to handle them’ (Scott, 2003: 52). Specialized 
roles and rules, and standard operating procedures are viewed as mechanisms 
that restrict the range of decisions organizational participants make, and that 
assist participants in making appropriate decisions within that range (Scott, 2003). 
Moreover, as ultimate goals of organizations can be vague and imprecise, general 
                                                 
11 Although our inquiries do not explicitly refer to the work of Max Weber, organizational 
theorists like March and Simon have built on his insights. We therefore briefly outline some 
of his thoughts here. Weber focuses on the replacement of traditional organizational 
structures with bureaucratic structures. He points at general administrative policies and 
specified procedures, which enable bureaucratic systems to handle complex administrative 
tasks (Scott, 2003). Weber argues that formal rules considerably contribute to 
organizational efficiency. He explains that formalities restrict organizational members’ room 
for egoistic maneuvers and arbitrary decisions, and that rules control organizational 
processes, increase their predictability, and enable the division of labor (Beck and Kieser, 
2003). ‘Bureaucracy is superior, explains Weber, to other historically known forms of 
administration, because of its stability, reliability, the calculability of results which it permits, 
and the large scope of its operations’ (Gouldner, 1954: 25). 
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goals serve as starting points for raising means-ends chains in which goals and 
the means to achieve these goals are subdivided into sub-goals and sub-means 
until a sufficient level of detail is attained (March and Simon, 1958). In this way, 
formalization enhances procedural coordination. It establishes the lines of 
authority, and outlines the sphere of activity and authority of each member (Simon, 
1997), so that the division of labor and interactions between partners become 
more predictable. 
 
In other words, by clarifying boundaries on activities and decisions, formalization 
simplifies decision-making (Galbraith, 1977). It serves the purpose of enabling 
communication, reducing uncertainty about future tasks, and preventing disputes 
on how to achieve tasks (Pondy, 1977). Other arguments for the coordination 
function of formalization, which implicitly or explicitly refer to the work of March and 
Simon, emphasize that formalization gives rise to clear expectations of 
participants in interorganizational relationships (Organ and Greene, 1981; Shenkar 
and Zeira, 1992; Simonin, 1999), and that it helps to translate complex 
interorganizational issues into ‘terms that are clear and understandable’ (Simon, 
1997: 345). In addition, formalization reduces the interdependence and complexity 
of activities as perceived by participants in interorganizational relationships (Singh, 
1997), and renders coordination less dependent on individual actors (Scott, 2003), 
thereby enabling personnel replacements and participation of newcomers in later 
stages of development (De Rond, 2003). This also reduces the risk that things are 
“forgotten” (Argote, 1999; Mintzberg, 1994). Finally, formalization frequently entails 
a common language (Simons, 1990), which enables participants in relationships to 
communicate their goals, and to signal each other’s preferences (Milewicz and 
Herbig, 1996). 
 
Dynamic capabilities 
A second stream of research pointing at the coordination function of formalization 
consists of the dynamic capabilities school. Building on the resource-based view, 
proponents of this school maintain that organizations can be regarded as bundles 
of resources (Rumelt, 1984), and that valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and 
imperfectly substitutable resources can become sources of sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Organizations can capture 
value from combinations of these resources over longer periods of time when they 
are protected by isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984), time compression 
diseconomies to imitation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), or when causal ambiguity 
prohibits copying by competitors (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). From this 
perspective, value is created and rents are earned through the efficient and 
effective development, deployment, allocation, exchange, and utilization of 
resources (Lado et al., 1997). Interorganizational relationships can thus form an 
avenue for the sustained earning of rents by enabling the synergistic combination 
of resources from different organizations (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998). 
 
In order to realize this synergistic potential, partner organizations have to bundle 
their relevant resources and capabilities effectively (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
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This prompts the incurrence of expenditures for effecting and managing  
resources, and it requires capabilities from partners to actively manage resources 
in order to extract value from them (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). This is often not 
an easy task as resources of partner organizations are frequently embedded and 
distributed throughout their organizations, and because many resources have a 
tacit or causally ambiguous character (see Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Simonin, 
1999). Combining these resources requires partners to gear interdependent tasks 
to each other (Colombo, 2003; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1992), something presenting unique coordination challenges (Sampson, 
2004b; Grandori and Soda, 1995). Mechanisms for addressing these challenges 
could include a clear definition of authority relations, allocation of formal 
responsibility for decision-making, and the creation of standardized procedures 
and rules (Colombo, 2003). To make sure that these mechanisms are only applied 
in cases where this is appropriate, partner firms require managerial capabilities 
associated with the formation and management of interorganizational relationships 
(Gulati, 1999; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). These capabilities help them in 
‘adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, 
resources, and functional competencies’ (Teece et al., 1997: 515). They enable 
them to overcome the considerable challenges associated with forming and 
managing interorganizational relationships (Gulati, 1999). 
 
The dynamic capabilities school suggests that resource- or organization-specific 
characteristics determine cooperating organizations’ preferences for particular 
governance structures to coordinate their activities (Chen and Chen, 2003; 
Leiblein, 2003). The term dynamic refers to a firm’s capacity to renew these 
competencies, so as to achieve congruence with regard to changes in the 
collaborative environment, in the relationship, and in the partner organizations 
themselves. In line with this, Madhok (2002) suggests that the reason that firms 
organize similar transactions in different ways is that it is not just transaction 
particulars that matter, but also organizational particulars, including resources, 
governance skills, experience, and the like. This shifts the emphasis away from 
the best generic institutional form for organizing a particular transaction towards 
the best way for a specific firm to organize such a transaction (Williamson, 1991; 
Madhok, 2002). Adherers to the dynamic capabilities school thus affirm the 
possibility that some organizations are more inclined to formalize their 
relationships than others, irrespective of the task characteristics in these 
relationships. Stated otherwise, ‘different firms have different propensities to 
cooperate and [they] also differ in how they cooperate’ (Madhok, 2002:  543). 
Organizations may differ in their ability to select attractive sourcing partners, 
negotiate, and enforce supplier contracts, design systems to manage 
relationships, or to monitor and enforce contractual compliance (e.g. Doz and 
Hamel, 1998; Leiblein and Miller, 2003).  
 
Some organizations, for example, have been found to be more experienced in 
managing joint ventures (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000a), more capable of 
interacting with other companies (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999), or more capable 
of creating value by means of interorganizational relationships (e.g. Dyer et al., 
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2001). These companies develop alliance capabilities, relational capabilities, or 
cooperative competencies (e.g. Draulans et al., 2003; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer 
et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2002; Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000), and they learn how to 
gain access to and transfer knowledge across alliances (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999). In their study of 469 make-or-buy decisions involving 117 semi-conductor 
firms, Leiblein and Miller (2003), for instance, demonstrate that the greater the 
number of prior outsourcing relationships with suppliers of a particular technology, 
the more likely it is that firms decide to outsource in subsequent make-or-buy 
decisions. Here, the asymmetric distribution of alliance managerial capabilities, 
due to, among other aspects, prior experience, encourages some firms to exploit 
them as a source of competitive advantage (Dyer et al., 2001). 
 
Both March and Simon’s behavioral theory and the dynamic capabilities school 
emphasize difficulties associated with combining resources (Teece et al., 1997). 
Each of them concurs that the need for coordination becomes higher when 
transactions entail higher degrees of complexity (see also Colombo, 2003; Gulati 
and Singh, 1998; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004). Furthermore, behavioral theory 
suggests that larger sizes of the cooperating organizations complicate 
interorganizational coordination and that the age of cooperating organizations 
might influence their inclination to formalize (March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 
1947, 1997). Older organizations probably experience a higher degree of 
institutionalization of procedures for interorganizational cooperation. They might 
have developed internal coordination capabilities, which can possibly be extended 
across organizational boundaries (Gittell and Weiss, 2004). Moreover, from a 
dynamic capabilities point of view, one could argue that the possession of more 
legal expertise would lead to higher degrees of formalization, as the ability to 
formalize would rise. A similar argument could be advanced for the influence of 
experience with formalization obtained from other interorganizational relationships 
(see Bagley, 2005; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). 
 
2.5.2 Control perspective 
 
The “control perspective” on the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships alludes to the fact that efforts to control outcomes and behavior 
extend beyond the legal boundaries of individual organizations (Otley et al., 1995). 
It refers to the fact that partners wish to ‘ensure that the other in a relationship will 
perform in accordance with one’s desires or expectations’ (Salbu, 1997: 332). 
Following Ouchi (1979, 1980), control is therefore defined as the process by which 
one entity influences the behavior and output of another entity. It encompasses all 
attempts to ensure that participants in interorganizational relationships, being 
organizations as well as individuals, act in a manner that is consistent with 
meeting the goals and objectives set in these relationships (see Kirsch, 1997). 
Control likewise involves the identification and specification of acceptable 
behaviors or outcomes, and it concerns the evaluation of actual outcomes and 
behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1997).  
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Advocates of the control perspective presume that gaining partial control over a 
partner organization is important, as interests of partners rarely coincide 
(Blumberg, 2001; Buskens et al., 2003a), and because partners are confronted 
with information asymmetry (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lassar and Kerr, 1996; 
Shane, 1996). Such differences between partners offer fertile ground for 
opportunistic behavior (Carson et al., 2006; Williamson, 1985, 1991), and they 
imply that any attempt to collaborate – however promising – contains the seeds for 
its own destruction (Gill and Butler, 2003). Solutions to the problems indicated by 
proponents of the control perspective consist of formalization and monitoring. 
Contractual safeguards, for example, are thought to curb opportunism and raise 
the costs of self-interested activities by changing pay-off structures and incentives 
(Lui and Ngo, 2004; Lassar and Kerr, 1996), and by increasing the transparency of 
relationships and of the objects of monitoring (Reuer and Ariño, 2002). Authors 
emphasizing the control function of formalization primarily draw support from 
transaction cost economics and agency theory. 
 
Transaction cost theory 
Prior research on formalization in interorganizational relationships ‘has been 
primarily influenced by transaction cost economists’ (Gulati, 1998: 302). From a 
transaction cost economics view (TCE), governance is defined as ‘the measures 
the actors involved in exchange use or implement in order to mitigate the risks 
associated with economic exchange’ (Buskens et al., 2003a: 2). TCE explains the 
use of formal governance mechanisms, such as contracts, by pointing out the 
risks to which partners in interorganizational relationships are exposed, and the 
costs that they have to incur to delimit those risks. The theory builds on several 
assumptions, including the belief that man is boundedly rational (Simon, 1947, 
1997) and that human beings may behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1985). 
The first assumption – bounded rationality – concerns the fact that ‘it is impossible 
for the behavior of a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of 
rationality. The number of alternatives he must explore is so great, the information 
he would need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation to objective 
rationality is hard to conceive.’ The human mind simply cannot ‘bring to bear upon 
a single decision all the aspects of value, knowledge, and behavior that would be 
relevant’ (Simon, 1997: 92, 117). Simon therefore argues that people’s behavior is 
rational, given their goals, the information they possess, and their cognitive 
impediments. The latter diminishes their ability to foresee contingencies, potential 
problems, and actions of partner organizations. Human beings thus strive for 
rationality but are restricted in doing so, leading Simon (1997: 88) to contend that 
behavior is ‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.’ Given bounded rationality, it 
is impossible to specify every possible contingency in a formal document (Anand 
and Khanna, 2000a; Williamson, 1985). 
 
The second assumption of TCE concerns the likelihood that partners in 
interorganizational relationships exhibit opportunistic behavior. Williamson (1985: 
47) refers to opportunism as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’. Underlying the 
assumption of opportunism is the idea that cooperating organizations do not have 
coinciding interests, and that they simultaneously cooperate and compete (Adair 
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and Brett, 2005; Ireland et al., 2002; Hamel, 1991; Kale et al., 2000; Khanna, 
1998; Zeng and Chen, 2003). As the primary loyalty of participants in 
interorganizational relationships generally lies with their own organization (Hult et 
al., 2004), and because the optimum outcome for one partner is not the optimum 
for the other (Simon, 1997), frictions may arise. This implies that 
interorganizational relationships are, per definition, fraught with tensions (Madhok, 
1995). Williamson puts adverse selection and moral hazard forward as examples 
of opportunistic behavior. Adverse selection implies that potential partners in 
interorganizational relationships may communicate incomplete or distorted 
information on purpose, in order to make sure that they become a preferred 
partner or can transact against beneficial conditions. Moral hazard refers to the 
difficulty with which parties to a contract can infer ex post what the performance of 
each organization has been in relation to the transaction. Williamson (1985) does 
not argue that all organizations or participants involved in interorganizational 
relationships behave opportunistically, but he notes that there is always a chance 
that they do so, which gives rise to the need for formal safeguards. This implies 
that, however honest and dutiful partners may be, they are not entirely free of self-
seeking behavior (Hendry, 2002), and they may act against the interest of their 
partners when the benefit of doing so is large enough. To recap, transaction costs 
economists believe that transactions are organized so that they ‘economize on 
bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding [them] against opportunism’ 
(Williamson, 1985: 32).  
 
TCE advances that the governance of transactions entails transaction costs, 
comprising: (1) search costs, (2) contracting costs, (3) monitoring costs, and (4) 
enforcement costs (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985). Search costs include the 
costs of gathering information to identify and evaluate potential partners. 
Contracting costs refer to the costs of negotiating and writing an agreement. 
Monitoring costs include costs made to ensure that each party fulfills 
predetermined sets of obligations. Finally, enforcement costs refer to the costs 
connected with ex post bargaining and sanctioning of a partner that does not 
perform according to agreement (Dyer, 1997). TCE has defined several attributes 
of transactions, such as investments in relation-specifc assets, uncertainty, and 
transaction volume and/or frequency, which impinge on these transaction costs. 
We limit ourselves here to discussing the effect of conducting investments in 
transaction or relation-specific investments, as this effect has received most 
empirical support (David and Han, 2004). Asset-specificity refers to durable 
investments undertaken in support of particular transactions, for which the 
opportunity costs are much lower than in best alternative uses or by best 
alternative users, should the transaction be prematurely terminated’ (Williamson, 
1985: 55). As asset-specificity increases, redeployability diminishes, and 
contracting hazards become magnified (David and Han, 2004; Klein et al., 1978; 
Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003). For parties that have performed such 
investments, switching to another partner becomes more costly, and termination of 
the relationship inevitably results in an irrevocable loss of their specific 
investments (Heide and John, 1988). These organizations are also anxious about 
the use of their investments as hostages by partners, making it difficult for them to 
42 
recoup their value (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Solutions to the difficulties posed by 
idiosyncratic investments lie in the deployment of appropriate control mechanisms, 
such as contracts (Dyer, 1997; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Williamson, 1985)12. To 
summarize, TCE assumes that parties are boundedly rational and that they may 
behave opportunistically. This gives rise to a need for governance, which becomes 
larger for relationships in which parties have invested more in transaction- or 
relation-specific assets. The need to install governance mechanisms that curb ex 
post bargaining and hold-up threats13, and that help to ensure that partners make 
efficient ex ante investments (Williamson, 1985) then has to be weighed against 
transaction costs (Heide, 1994). The managerial focus from a TCE perspective is 
thus on limiting vulnerability to opportunistic behavior by partners by choosing 
governance structures that minimize the costs of doing so (Williamson, 1991). 
 
Although transaction cost economics has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of interorganizational cooperation, it has also received criticism. 
TCE has been argued to erroneously treat each transaction as an independent 
event (Doz and Prahalad, 1991), and to neglect the social environment and the 
interconnectedness of transactions (e.g. Batenburg et al., 2003; Granovetter, 
1985). TCE also discounts the fact that transaction “costs” have the character of 
investments – with outlays and benefits spread out over a succession of periods 
(Furobotn, 2002). Furthermore, TCE has been criticized for its normative 
implications, which may entail self-reinforcing cycles of increasing opportunism, 
possibly harming organizations’ performance (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
Besides, TCE focuses on cost minimization of a single party, despite the fact that 
a relationship ensues between multiple partners, and it stresses cost minimization 
over value maximization (Zajac and Olsen, 1993), and control over coordination 
(Gulati, 1998), although organizations seem to take both value creation and value-
claiming decisions into account when forming interorganizational relationships 
(Heiman and Nickerson, 2004). Moreover,  transaction cost theory is a school of 
thought in which transactional attributes alone determine firms governance design 
                                                 
12 We believe a qualification should be made here. Investments in relation-specific assets 
entail the potential to create considerable value for both parties within an interorganizational 
relationship. These returns might be sufficiently large to discourage opportunistic behavior 
by the party that “receives” the investments. To the extent that the specialized assets 
produce greater than normal returns for the receiver, they may therefore create a self-
enforcing contract for the investor (Rokkan et al., 2003), and render formal governance 
mechanisms to curb opportunistic behavior superfluous. 
 
13 The risk of hold-up occurs when partners with malicious intent can use the court to 
enforce literal contract terms in a manner contrary to the intent of the contract. This is one 
of the primary economic lessons from the General Motors – Fisher Body Case. In that case, 
Fisher took advantage of the long-term, cost-plus exclusive dealing contract with GM, as it 
refused to locate an important body plant next to the GM assembly plant after signing the 
contract. As a consequence, Fisher produced very costly (but highly profitable) automobile 
bodies that General Motors was compelled to buy (Klein et al., 1978; Klein, 2000). The 
General Motors – Fisher Body example illustrates that increased contractual specification 
can make things worse (Klein, 2002). 
43 
choices and the efficiency of interorganizational relationships (e.g. Colombo, 
2003), resulting in a rather mechanistic view regarding the origins of formalities 
(e.g. see Child, 1997), in which organizational attributes and capabilities are 
ignored (Madhok, 2002). 
 
Agency theory 
A second theory supporting the control perspective on formalization is labeled 
agency theory. This theory originally described the relationship between the 
owners of organizations, so-called principals, and their employees or agents 
(Berle and Means, 1932). Nowadays, it is used to identify areas of divergent 
interest and means used to align those interests. Agency theorists now focus on 
agency problems, which might occur in any situation involving cooperative efforts 
between two or more parties that have different goals and that require a certain 
division of labor (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Its major strength lies in its focus on 
the reasons for disagreement between interdependent actors, and on the means 
by which it is resolved (Lassar and Kerr, 1996). Agency theorists suggest that 
agency problems arise because principals cannot determine if agents will behave 
or have behaved appropriately. Just like TCE, agency theorists elaborate on moral 
hazard – referring to a lack of effort on the part of an agent, which is hard to detect 
by the principal – and adverse selection – where an agent misrepresents its skills 
or abilities, which are again hard to verify by the principal – to explain the need for 
formal governance. Similarly to TCE, agency theorists attempt to determine the 
most efficient solution for governing relationships, given assumptions about people 
(e.g. self-interest, bounded rationality, and risk aversion), interorganizational 
relationships (e.g. conflict among participants), and information (e.g. information is 
a commodity that can be purchased). They attempt to explain whether, and when 
behavior-oriented contracts are more efficient than outcome-oriented contracts by 
posing a trade-off between the cost of measuring and programming behavior and 
the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). Agency theory’s dichotomous choice between process-based or outcome-
based contracts aligns with Thompson’s (1967) and Ouchi’s (1979) linking of 
known means-ends relationships with behavior control and connecting crystallized 
goals to outcome control (Eisenhardt, 1989b). That is, known mean-ends 
relationships (task programmability) are predicted to lead to behavioral control, 
and crystallized goals (measurable outcomes) are predicted to lead to outcome 
control (Eisenhardt, 1989b). When the costs of monitoring agent behaviors are 
high, the more efficient contract is outcome-based (Lassar and Kerr, 1996), and 
vice versa. Table 2.2 presents an overview of variables affecting the efficiency of 
behavior-based and outcome-based contracts. 
 
In addition to describing the relationship between employees and owners of an 
organization, agency theory is used for analyzing all kinds of relationships ‘that 
mirror the basic agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in 
cooperative behavior, but have differing goals and differing attitudes towards risk’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b: 59). Its application also pertains to interorganizational 
relationships (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lassar and Kerr, 1996; Shane, 1996), as 
partner organizations in such relationships experience conflicts of interest, and 
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information asymmetry. Manufacturers, for example, make trade-offs between the 
amount of control required in their distribution channels and the levels of resource 
commitment and risk they are willing to bear (Lassar and Kerr, 1996). It is 
frequently not obvious to organizations, for instance, as to how large the actual 
costs incurred by their partners are, and which benefits from the relationship 
exactly accrue to them. Furthermore, they do not always have a clear image of the 
efforts their partners put into the relationship, while partners may also abuse the 
responsibilities delegated to them (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), or consume 
resources and rents beyond what has been agreed on (see Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). One of the solutions to these problems advocated by agency theorists 
consists of the formulation of contracts between principals and agents (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Other related means to reduce these 
problems are bounding and monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Through 
bounding, principals receive information from agents on their efforts and on the 
outcomes achieved. Monitoring prompts a more active role from the principal, as it 
encompasses supervision and checking of an agent’s efforts and the outcomes 
accomplished by the principal. 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 
Agency theory: Behavior-based versus outcome-based contracts  
 Behavior-based contract 
is efficient when: 
Outcome-based contract 
is efficient when: 
Monitoring:   
Monitoring ability High Low 
Task observability High Low 
Clarity of outcome measures Low High 
 
Relationship:   
Goal conflict Low High 
Length of relationship Long Short 
 
Risk:   
Outcome certainty Low High 
Source: Lassar and Kerr, 1996 
 
 
Although agency theory and TCE display many similarities, they differ as to the 
independent variables that they use for explaining observed degrees of 
formalization. Whereas transaction costs economics emphasizes variables such 
as asset-specificity and frequency and volume of transactions, agency theorists 
refer to outcome uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty, and programmability of 
behavior. Moreover, ‘while there exist a number of studies that have tried to test 
transaction cost analysis against empirical reality, this is much less true for agency 
theory’ (Swedberg, 2003: 378). Nevertheless, there is support for principal-agent 
hypotheses linking contract form with outcome uncertainty, outcome measurability, 
and task programmability (Eisenhardt, 1989b). According to Eisenhardt, progress 
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in agency theory is most likely to stem from expansion towards richer and more 
complex contexts, inclusion of a broader range of contract alternatives, and use of 
complementary theories or perspectives. 
 
We believe that both the coordination and the control perspective have offered 
valuable insights. However, we also signal that these perspectives are predicated 
on the tenets of only a few major paradigms (Gioia and Pitre, 1990), which might 
lead to illusive explanations, and to erroneous prescriptions for practitioners (see 
Adler, 1993; Huxham and Beech, 2003). A focus solely on these perspectives 
probably does not do justice to the multifaceted nature of the concept of 
formalization. In other words, we believe that these perspectives are helpful, but 
insufficient to illuminate the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships. Consequently, we are ‘forced to crisscross paradigms’ (Narayandas 
and Rangan, 2004: 64), and to develop multiple perspectives on our research 
problem, instead of an “all-encompassing” theory (see Grant and Baden-Fuller, 
2004: 62; Adler, 1993: 172). In the following chapters, we therefore build on the 
coordination and control perspectives presented here, but we also seek to join 
them with competing and complementary views. Such a theoretically pluralistic 
approach is known to have the capability of uncovering rich explanations of 
complex phenomena (Kumar and Seth, 1998), and to bring ‘ample opportunity for 
cross-perspective dialogue and learning’ (Oliver and Ebers, 1998: 570). In doing 
so, we cherish the fact that interorganizational relationships are studied from 
different disciplinary approaches, and that they offer ‘a precious ground of 
common interest and potential dialogue among various branches of the social 
sciences’ (Grandori and Soda, 1995: 183). Our pluralistic approach to 
investigating the research problem in chapter four to nine should therefore not be 
viewed as a search for the truth, but more as a search for comprehension, in 
which different worldviews are illuminated (Gioia and Petri, 1990; Lewis and 
Kelemen, 2002). By viewing our research problem from multiple angles, we are 
able to draw a more differentiated and refined, but also more coherent and 
comprehensive picture of the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships than is currently available in the literature. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have discussed how two main streams in research on 
interorganizational governance look upon the role of formalization in collaborative 
relationships. We started by developing definitions and typologies of the 
constructs that are central to this study, after which we reviewed several theories 
supporting the “coordination” and “control” perspectives on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. Both perspectives presuppose 
that certain antecedents influence the need or the ability to formalize, eventually 
determining the degree of formalization in interorganizational relationships. In 
chapters four to nine we seek to complement the dominant views in the literature 
that have been sketched here, so as to provide a more comprehensive and 
nuanced image of the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
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3  METHODOLOGY 
 
‘If people have multiple identities and deal with multiple realities, why should we expect 
them to be ontological purists? To do so is to limit their capability for sense making.’  
 
Weick, 1995: 35 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the ontological and epistemological predispositions that 
shape our approach to conducting research. We advance that the adoption of a 
pluralistic stance as a way of looking at the nature and relations of being and as a 
way of gaining knowledge about these is most appropriate for investigating the 
research problem. Although we realize that ‘multiparadigm researchers live in a 
glasshouse open to attack’ from researchers tied to single paradigms (Lewis and 
Kelemen, 2002: 259), we believe that adopting such an approach offers a more 
comprehensive, nuanced and accurate picture of the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships than could otherwise be achieved. Building on this 
pluralistic basis we explain why case study as well as survey methods are used to 
investigate the research questions advanced in chapter one. 
 
3.2 Methodological pluralism 
 
Weick (1995: 35) asks himself why we should expect people to be ontological 
purists. He claims that doing so limits ‘their capability for sense making.’ His 
comment refers to the fact that working from a single ontological paradigm 
frequently ‘produces a potentially valuable, but narrow view, incapable of exposing 
the multi-facetted nature of organizational reality’ (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002: 268). 
Deploying single conceptual lense to understand complex phenomena, such as 
formalization, genereally leads to erroneous conclusions, something that became 
very evident in Allison’s (1971) seminal work “Essence of Decision” in which he 
analyzed the Cuban missile crisis in terms of three alternative frames of reference. 
McKelvey (1997) therefore proposes to study organizations as quasi-natural 
phenomena. From his point of view, organizations – or in this case 
interorganizational relationships – are composed of numerous structures and 
processes that are amenable to natural science methods of inquiry and 
justification logic, including prediction, generalization, and falsifiability. 
Nevertheless, they also comprise behaviors directly attributable to human 
intentionality – behaviors and causes that are much harder to understand in terms 
of natural science methods. Accordingly, different methods – accompanied by 
different methodological presuppositions – are regarded as being suitable for 
answering different kinds of research questions (e.g. Yin, 1994), and for making 
‘accessible different sorts of information’ (Azevedo, 2002: 730). Congruent with 
this, we adopt a pluralistic or multi-paradigm approach. 
 
We justify the adoption of such a methodological pluralist perspective by the fact 
that we purport to establish an integrative perspective on the role of formalization 
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in interorganizational relationships. By working from a pluralistic methodological 
stance, we reduce the risk that we highlight only one aspect of the phenomenon 
that we study (Knudsen, 2003; Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999) and we are able to 
provide a richer understanding than any one approach by itselves (Van de Ven 
and Poole 2005). It also enables us to study a great number of theoretical 
alternatives simultaneously, and to provoke discourse and inquiry across a 
number of paradigms (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002), each highlighting different 
facets of the phenomena (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). A pluralistic approach may 
thereby offer a more reliable guide to action than inquiries based on single 
paradigms (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). 
 
Our approaches for studying formalization in this thesis can be classified 
according to the typology of Van de Ven and Poole (2005). These authors 
distinguish ontological views of “organization as things” from ontological views of 
“organization as processes”. They also discern “variance” and “process” 
epistemologies. This renders a two-by-two matrix of possible research approaches 
to studying particular organizational phenomena. As our definition of formalization 
in the previous chapter indicates, our ontological viewpoint covers contracts, rules 
and procedures (formalization as nouns, real entities or things), as well as the 
process of formalization (formalization as a process of organizing). We believe 
these viewpoints are inseparable and have to be investigated in concert. 
Moreover, where Van de Ven and Poole (2005) contend that researchers use 
variance methods or process narratives for their inquiries, we use both 
perspectives in this thesis. We believe that a methodological perspective in which 
natural science methods are advocated is the most suitable point of departure for 
answering the research questions posed in themes one, four and six, which 
respectively deal with “the need versus the ability to formalize”, ”contract 
standardization”, and “governance trajectories”. We deem such an approach 
useful for these three themes, because we attempt to explain formalization and 
other variables by lawful regularities here. In doing so, we do not presume that 
such regularities dominate human agency (Voss, 2003), but we assume that these 
regularities can be distinguished despite the existence of human agency, 
something which indicates a mechanistic approach to organizational analysis 
(Child, 1997). We thus emphasize formalization’s role as a programmer of social 
conduct, which acts on agents like a force of nature, and which compels 
interorganizational participants to behave in a particular way (see Giddens, 1984). 
Adopting such an approach allows us to investigate the research questions posed 
in themes one, four and six by means of large-scale data-analysis14. 
                                                 
14 This approach to research has not remained free of criticism. Piore (1995: 63), for 
example, notes that the basic problem of this methodological stance is its commitment to an 
individualist ethos and its inability to recognize and accord a legitimate place to organic 
groups and cohesive social organizations.’ Others signal that it leads to the lack of attempts 
to seek out underlying causes or generative mechanisms of observed phenomena. The 
most notable criticism of such an approach centres on (1) its conceptualization of agency, 
(2) its inattentiveness to meaning, and (3) the relations it presumes between structure and 
agency (Chia, 1997). Considering the first point, researchers adopting this approach 
presume that the question of what an agent “does” coincides with his or her “intentions” 
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Instead, we concur that the research questions in themes two, three and five 
demand a research approach that is better able to offer insight into individuals’ 
unique interpretations of the phenomenal world, of their attributions of causality to 
events surrounding them, and of interpretations, social constructions, and sense 
makings of others’ behaviors (Chia, 1997). Such an approach entails a process-
based ontology, which ‘opens up the possibilities for rethinking “organization”, or in 
this case formalization, as a process of “world-making” (Chia, 1997: 685), or as ‘a 
ceaseless process of reality construction and maintenance that enables us to 
carve out our otherwise amorphous life-worlds into manageable parts so that we 
can act purposefully and productively amidst a flood of competing and attention-
seeking stimuli’ (Chia, 2003: 136). Adopting such an approach enables us to 
inquire into functions attached to the process of formalization and into the ways in 
which managers cope with the tensions that are brought about when contracts, 
rules and procedures are applied. Particularly in theme two – on the functions of 
formalization - we draw ‘the logic of organizational theorizing away from structured 
entities, outcomes, and end-states, towards the underlying thought-structuring 
processes, which produce these outcomes’ (Chia, 1997: 703). By embracing the 
concepts of sensegiving and sensemaking, we describe formalization in terms of 
structuring processes and practices (Hatch, 1999), which entail the transformation 
of thought and meaning in individuals (Chia, 2003)15. 
                                                                                                                           
(Giddens, 1984). However, the knowledgeability of human actors is always bounded on the 
one hand by the unconscious, and, on the other hand, by unacknowledged conditions or 
unintended consequences of action (Giddens, 1984; McKinley and Scherer, 2000; Weick, 
1995). The second critical note refers to the fact that it keeps theories and findings of the 
social sciences wholly separate from the universe of meaning (Giddens, 1984). In doing 
this, nature becomes ‘a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of 
material, endlessly, meaninglessly’ (Whitehead, 1985: 68). Conducting research on 
structural parameters without considering the intentions that individuals have with these 
structures and the meaning they give them therefore appears inept (e.g. Weick, 1979). The 
third point of criticism concerns the relationship between structure and agency. Although it 
has been argued that structure comprises ‘forces that lie outside the control and often the 
comprehension of place-bound actors’ (Kumar, 1995: 188), and that structures are 
frequently ‘irreducible to the activities of contemporary agents’ (Reed, 1997: 33), structures 
also exist only when they are socially reproduced and transformed (Barley, 1986). It seems 
unrealistic to presume that agents do not influence organizational structures. 
 
15 Criticism also applies to this methodological standing. Reed (1997), for example, 
proposes that a process view on structure – or structuring – leaves us with a conception of 
organization in which properties of structures that ‘can be understood to be relatively 
independent of the agents whose behavior is subject to their influence’ (Layder, 1990: 23) 
are pushed aside by the ‘analytical fascination with the local, contingent, and indeterminate’ 
(Reed, 1997). He proceeds by stating that ‘flat ontologies and miniaturized local orderings 
construct a seductive vision of our social world in which everything and everybody is 
constantly in a ‘state of becoming’ and never in a ‘condition of being’ (Reed, 1997: 29). To 
support his arguments, Reed points at Schumpeter’s warning that ‘social structures, types, 
and attitudes are coins that do not readily melt. Once they are formed, they persist, possibly 
for centuries.’ He remarks that this is ‘conveniently forgotten in a cacophony of celebrations 
to the essential flux, fragmentation, and indeterminacy of social reality’ (Reed, 1997: 26). 
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3.3 Case study method 
 
As the diversity of our research questions call for a pluralistic methodological 
approach, we also utilize alternative forms of investigation, or methods. Some of 
our research questions require investigation by means of an inductive approach. 
Or as Klein (2002: 69) puts it, to increase our understanding of contracts and other 
formalities ‘it is [sometimes] necessary to get one’s hands dirty and discover how 
particular contracts actually work in practice.’ Case studies are needed because 
contracts and other acts of formalization ‘do not constitute a closed universe’ 
(Brousseau and Glachant, 2002: 23). They are embedded in contexts that 
influence their functioning. Furthermore, case studies ‘allow an investigation to 
retain the holistic and meaningful components of real-life events – such as […] 
organizational and managerial processes’ (Yin, 1994: 3). They enable us to get a 
feeling of which variables are involved, how they could be measured, and how 
relationships between the variables might be constructed (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 
1994). Case studies are appropriate here, because organizational processes are 
involved which do not lend themselves easily to quantitative measurements 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998), and because history, processes, and context need to 
be incorporated (Pettigrew, 1990). Adopting the case study approach in research 
on formalization aligns with Simon’s (1997) advice on obtaining insights into the 
structure and functioning of organizations. He suggests that such insights may be 
gained by ‘analyzing the manner in which the decisions and behavior’ of 
employees are influenced (Simon, 1997: 2). Moreover, the case study method 
meets critique of existing research concerning the notable paucity of studies 
penetrating the operational level of interorganizational relationships (Marchington 
and Vincent, 2004; Parkhe, 1993b). Furthermore, the case study approach 
connects to the growing attention for post-formation dynamics and developmental 
processes in interorganizational relationships (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 
1996; Doz and Hamel, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Reuer et al., 2002; De 
Rond, 2003). Finally, it coincides with academic inquiries into the “human” or 
“process” side of formalization (Marginson and Ogden, 2005) and it enables the 
development of perspectives on the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships that are ‘adequate at the analytical levels of meaning and of 
causality’ (see Ranson et al., 1980: 4) 
 
These reasons have led to the use of the case study method in theme three, 
which focuses on a so-called how- question (Yin, 1994), namely: “How do 
managers of interorganizational relationships cope with tensions arising from the 
co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions?” By using the case 
study method, we wish to develop a better understanding of the rationales 
managers have for using a particular degree of formalization, and of the actions 
that they undertake to cope with the tensions that arise between the positive and 
negative consequences or functions and dysfunctions associated with 
formalization. The case study that we discuss concerns a strategic alliance 
between a large European-based retailer (STEADY) and a global financial 
services organization (QUICK) aimed at the integration of financial services in a 
retail context. It is selected for this study as it fulfills three practical and theoretical 
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conditions. First, both companies offered unique access to their documents and 
participants in the relationship. Second, both organizations are large in size, 
something which is often linked to higher levels of formalization (Zeffane, 1989), 
and which enlarges the likelihood that formalization would be an issue in the 
alliance. Third, the alliance under study called upon innovative activities from both 
organizations, while simultaneously high demands for formalization were posed – 
arising from the legitimacy, accountability, and control characterizing financial 
services (see Vermeulen, 2001). This setting offered fertile ground for tensions 
arising from the co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions, which 
are the topic of theme three. 
 
3.4 Survey method 
 
In other parts of the study, we adopt a more deductive research approach, and we 
explore survey data on a large number of interorganizational relationships. This 
method is more appropriate for research questions posed in theme one, four and 
six, as these lend themselves to quantitative tests on cross-sectional data. In 
contrast to the case study method, the survey method is used to attain parsimony 
and external validity (Eisenhardt, 2000). It is a method that is helpful in illuminating 
the prevalence and incidence of certain phenomena (Yin, 1994). More specifically, 
surveys are utilized to establish generalizable relationships between formalization, 
its antecedents, interorganizational performance, moderators, and other 
governance mechanisms. Investigating these relationships requires large samples 
of interorganizational cooperative endeavors, as this reduces the risk that findings 
are the result of highly context-specific or idiosyncratic confounding elements. 
Where the case study sacrifices breadth for depth (Gill and Butler, 2003), the 
survey offers some compensation, enabling us to draw more generalizable 
conclusions. 
 
The data used to answer our research questions in themes one, four and six are 
obtained from a dataset called The External Management of Automation [MAT95] 
(Batenburg and Raub, 1995)16. This dataset captures data on 971 buyer-supplier 
relationships in which small- and medium-sized buyers have purchased IT-
solutions from vendors. The sample includes bilateral contracts; contracts which 
are ‘in some substantial sense incomplete’ (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 35), and 
which involve promises that possibly have their bearing on the partners during a 
longer period of time (Ring, 2002), making at least one of the organizations in the 
relationship dependent on the other (Das and Teng, 2000). Although, at first sight, 
these relationships might resemble market transactions, they often constitute 
interorganizational relationships, as they entail maintenance or warranty 
obligations, delivery of products or services over longer periods, and promises 
                                                 
16 The data set The External Management of Automation has been collected as part of the 
NWO-pioneer program ‘The Management of Matches’ (PGS 50-370) and is available from 
the Steinmetz-Archive (study number P1512). For more details on the data-collection 
procedure, we refer to Anderson and Dekker (2006), Batenburg (1997), Batenburg et al. 
(2003), Buskens (2002), Dekker (2003) and Rooks (2002). 
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regarding product- and service-extensions in future. This means that 
interorganizational participants, have to interact through a series of stages in 
which they select their partners, refine specifications of requirements, and deliver 
goods or services (Bennett and Robson, 2004), acts associated with 
interorganizational cooperation instead of market-based transactions. 
 
We have selected this type of relationship as our object of analysis, for several 
reasons. First, buyer-supplier relationships are becoming more important, due to 
increased competition and a higher pace of innovation, which calls for close 
cooperation between buyers and suppliers (Noorderhaven et al., 1998). Second, 
data could be obtained more easily than data on other types of relationships 
(response rates for surveys under alliance managers, for example, are generally 
below 10 percent). Third, transactions involving the purchase of IT-solutions offer 
an appropriate context to test several of the hypotheses that we develop in later 
chapters, because such relationships generally entail numerous coordination and 
control problems. Buyers face various risks, stemming among other factors from 
the difficulty to remain up-to-date with respect to technological developments, and 
from suppliers that behave opportunistically, painting too rosy a picture of their 
technology, implementation costs, or operational costs (Rooks, 2002). Moreover, 
those relationships are characterized by uncertainty and information-asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers, which complicate the specification of desired 
outcomes and behavior. In addition, such transactions frequently require relation-
specific investments and product customization, which ultimately demand the 
integration and coordination of actions (Anderson and Dekker, 2006). Finally, 
buyers in such relationships regularly face low supplier capability, poor supplier 
performance, loss of control and over-dependence (e.g. Barthelemy, 2001). 
 
The dataset is composed of survey-data from a large stratified sample of IT-
transactions by small- and medium sized enterprises, consisting of five to 200 
employees. It has been developed by researchers from Utrecht University, in 
cooperation with the Federation of Dutch IT (FENIT), the Institute of Small- and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (IMK), and the Association for Society and Business 
(SMO) (Batenburg and Raub, 1995). The sample was drawn from a data-file of 
Directview, a commercial Dutch organization specialized in the marketing of data 
from the IT-branch. Advantages of this data-file were that: (1) it contained an 
estimated eighty percent of all Dutch organizations; (2) its data were checked on 
accuracy and completeness at least once a year; and (3) it captured detailed 
information on the organization’s IT-situation (see Rooks, 2002). The survey 
developers randomly selected firms until at least 15 cases were identified for each 
of 36 cells in a stratified research design. The 36 (4x3x3) cells represented unique 
combinations of three theoretical dimensions: four product groups representing 
two IT product types, each with two levels of complexity (i.e. software versus 
hardware, and standard versus complex products), three levels of network 
embeddedness (i.e. weak, modest, and strong interfirm relations), and three levels 
of the buyer’s expertise (i.e. having one or more full time IT specialists, only part-
time IT employees, or no IT-employees) (Anderson and Dekker, 2006). In an 
additional sampling effort, five industries were selected, namely: (1) food- and 
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stimulants, (2) basic metal products, (3) means of transport industry, (4) 
wholesale, and (5) transport- and storage. Respondents consisted of key 
informants in the buying firm, usually IT managers responsible for the 
organization’s automation. They were first approached in a CATI-interview, to 
solicit cooperation. When a respondent was willing to cooperate, a transaction was 
selected that met the stratification criteria. In total 1239 questionnaires were 
distributed among Dutch small- and medium-sized IT-buyers.  
 
After three reminders, 971 questionnaires were returned by respondents, resulting 
in a “response rate” – calculated as the number of useful responses divided by the 
sum of the number of useful, non-useful, and non-responses (see Groves, 1989) – 
of 78.4 percent. When corrected for the refusals to cooperate during the telephone 
interview, the cooperation-rate still equaled 58.8 percent (see Rooks, 2002), which 
is relatively high compared to other research on interorganizational cooperation. 
The maximum number of transactions with a single supplier (IBM) is thirty and only 
four suppliers accounted for more than ten transactions each. Approximately 25 
percent of the suppliers were part of a larger firm, leaving 75 percent of the 
suppliers independent firms. Non-response analyses were performed to check for 
systematic differences between response- and non-response groups. No 
significant differences were found in the responses per industry and geographical 
region (Batenburg, 1997). After eliminating responses with too many missing 
values, 911 observations remained. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we argued that a comprehensive picture of the role of formalization 
in interorganizational relationships could only be drawn when different kinds of 
research questions – as have been developed in chapter one – can be 
investigated. Methodological pluralism was advanced as a suitable approach for 
addressing our research questions, as it enables us to juxtapose different theories, 
based on diverse methodological points of departure. Congruent with this, we use 
both the case study and the survey method for investigating different parts of our 
research problem. In the next chapter, we address our first research theme, which 
considers tensions that may arise between one’s needs and abilities to formalize. 
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4  THEME 1 – NEED VERSUS ABILITY TO FORMALIZE 
 
 
‘The less was the measurability of supplier performance, the wider the use of inter-firm 
coordination mechanisms’    
Delmestri, 1998: 660 
 
Summary 
Research on the antecedents of formalization in interorganizational relationships 
tends to focus on either their impact on the need to formalize, or their influence on 
the ability to formalize. In this chapter, we reconcile both perspectives by 
proposing that a higher need to formalize is generally accompanied by a lower 
ability to do so. Managers are expected to cope with this apparent paradox by 
investing in information processing and sensemaking activities. We empirically test 
our hypotheses by means of multiple regression analyses on a sample of 911 
buyer-supplier relationships. From the results it accrues that higher levels of asset-
specificity and complexity, smaller firm sizes, and an absence of prior experience 
with the same partner produce gaps between the need and ability to formalize, 
propelling participants in interorganizational relationships to invest in information 
processing and sensemaking activities. Our inquiry integrates previously 
separated perspectives on the relationships between formalization and its 
antecedents. It shows that attempts to establish interorganizational governance 
mechanisms may induce information processing and sensemaking efforts. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we focus on the shaded parts of the research framework as 
depicted in Figure 4.1. We observe that research on formalization in 
interorganizational relationships focuses on either the need, or the ability to 
formalize (see Gerwin, 2004; Helm and Kloyer, 2004). It emphasizes either why 
and when partners are more willing to codify and enforce inputs, outcomes, and 
processes, or whether and when a partner is in the position to do so. Transaction 
cost economists, for example, primarily refer to a high need for formal control 
when considering the effects of investments in relation-specific assets on 
formalization (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Agency theorists, instead, generally focus 
on the ability to formalize, which they proxy by the measurability of output and the 
degree to which behavior can be specified (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Kirsch, 1997; 
Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Ouchi and Maguire, 1975). Due to the co-existence of these 
different lines of reasoning, arguments on the relationships between antecedents 
and formalization tend to point in opposite directions (cf. Vlaar et al., 2005). Being 
unfamiliar with a potential partner, for example, is argued to demand a high 
degree of formal controls (e.g. Gulati, 1995), but also to entail a low ability to 
formalize, due to a lack of knowledge about a partner (e.g. Mayer and Argyres, 
2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The resulting tension between the need to 
formalize and the ability to formalize may explain why researchers have presented 
inconclusive findings on the relationships between antecedents and formalization 
(e.g. Blumberg, 2001). 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The central problem appears to be that situations that call for higher degrees of 
formalziation are often simultaneously marked by lower abilities to do so (Alchian, 
1984; Aulakh and Madhok, 2002). This notion coincides with the idea that 
‘contracts may not work when they are needed most’ (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005: 
825), and it resonates with Delmestri’s (1998: 660) finding that ‘the less was the 
measurability of supplier performance, the wider the use of inter-firm coordination 
mechanisms’ in 18 organizations in the German and Italian machine-building 
industry. It leads us to the following research question: to what extent do 
relationships between antecedents and the ability to formalize diverge from their 
relationships with the need to formalize? This also elicits the question as to how 
the ability and the need to formalize eventually influence the degree of 
formalization in collaborative relationships. We draw on information processing 
and sensemaking perspectives (e.g. see Daft and Lengel, 1986; Thomas and 
Trevino, 1993) to propose that gaps between the need and the ability to formalize 
instigate and propel information processing activities (e.g. acquiring data about 
products, prices, and terms), as well as sensemaking efforts (e.g. attempts to 
reduce ambiguity and reconcile perceptions of partners). We test our hypotheses 
on a sample of 911 buyer-supplier relationships. The results indicate that higher 
abilities to formalize go hand in hand with lower needs to do so, and vice versa. 
Increasing information processing and sensemaking activities during negotiations 
appear to constitute one way to solve this apparent inconsistency. 
 
Need to 
formalize 
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formalize 
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consequences
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consequences
Degree of  
formalization 
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Other 
governance 
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Inter- 
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FIGURE 4.1 
Research framework – theme one 
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The chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it integrates previously 
separate perspectives on the relationships between formalization and its 
antecedents. It encourages researchers and practitioners to consider both the 
need and the ability to formalize when investigating and deciding on the degree of 
formalization that is most appropriate for particular relationships. Second, the 
research supports calls for extending information-processing arguments ‘to 
broader questions of governance choice’ (Carson et al., 2003: 54). It illuminates 
how tensions between the need and the ability to formalize drive efforts by 
participants in interorganizational relationships to process information and to make 
sense of their partners, their relationships, and the collaborative environments in 
which these are embedded. To accomplish these ends, we organize the chapter 
as follows. In the theory paragraph, we distinguish four antecedents of 
formalization, which we derive from transaction cost theory (asset-specificity), 
literature on behavioral theory and dynamic capabilities (complexity), research on 
previous cooperation (prior cooperation with the same partner), and the behavioral 
theory of the firm (size of the buyer). We explain the contradictory influences of 
each of these variables on the need and the ability to formalize. Subsequently, we 
advance that investments in information processing and sensemaking are required 
to enable coordination and control by means of formalization. We then test our 
hypotheses on a sample of 911 buyer-supplier relationships. 
 
4.2 Determinants of the need and the ability to formalize 
 
Academic contributions on the relationships between antecedents and 
formalization, in general, have followed two separate lines of reasoning. The first 
category emphasizes the influence of antecedents on the need to formalize. The 
second category – sometimes starting from the same antecedents – underscores 
their impact on the ability to formalize. The arguments that have been advanced in 
these contributions frequently point in opposite directions, and it appears that 
situations calling for higher degrees of formalization are characterized by lower 
abilities to do so (see Alchian, 1984; Aulakh and Madhok, 2002). Helm and Kloyer 
(2004: 1110), for example, advance that in some situations ‘a contract is needed 
but, as a result of uncertainty, a complete regulation […] in the contract is difficult.’ 
A remark of a manager of a chemical company having a relationship with a 
security firm is illustrative here: ‘All what we had written was that we wanted 
Securiforce to take over our security from January 1999 and that this would be 
reviewed at the end of the year. This was a new ballgame to us, also. It was a 
learning process’ (Marchington and Vincent, 2004: 1048). It appears that the 
ability to formalize is typically lower when topics are new and when organizations 
still have to learn to work together (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Although the need 
to formalize might be apparent, bounded rationality, ambiguity and transaction 
costs may concurrently diminish the ability to formalize (Mukerji, 1998). To assess 
whether relationships between antecedent variables and the need and the ability 
to formalize assume contradictory values, we investigate formalization’s 
relationship with four antecedents featuring prominently in the literature. In 
anticipation of the discussion, Figure 4.2 depicts our hypotheses. 
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FIGURE 4.2 
Antecedents versus the need and the ability to formalize 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investments in relation-specific assets 
Investments are relation-specific when they have the highest potential value in the 
focal relationship; redeployment of these assets outside the relationship 
diminishes their value or is simply impossible (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Williamson, 
1985). A first type of relation-specific investments consists of physical assets, 
including investments in machinery, information systems, buildings and other 
physical assets from which little or no value can be recouped outside the 
relationship (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Another form of asset-specificity concerns 
human-capital, or even broader, intangible-asset-specificity. Relationship-specific 
intangible assets can take the form of operating procedures, which are created 
and refined over multiple cycles of action in the exchange; skills created through 
specific training, learning by doing, and particularistic experience; and knowledge 
created in the context of the exchange (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Subramani and 
Venkatraman, 2003; Zollo et al., 2002). Such relation-specific investments involve 
vulnerability, as partners become more dependent on each other. In this respect, 
Bensaou and Andersen (1999) offer an example of Toyota, which lost a week of 
production when Aisin, its proportioning valve supplier suffered from a factory fire. 
No cars could be produced until alternate suppliers were brought up to speed 
(Nishiguchi and Baudet, 1998), as the specific investments made by Aisin reduced 
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the range of suppliers that were able to provide valves that were equally suited for 
Toyota. In general, asset-specificity has therefore been proposed to create room 
for opportunism, particularly in uncertain environments. Hence, the greater the 
specificity, the more elaborate the governance mechanisms required to constrain 
this opportunism (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999: 462; Joskow, 1996: 105). In 
other words, ‘when asset-specificity is high, firms are likely to be more motivated 
to protect themselves through contractual means’ (Gainey and Klaas, 2003: 215). 
Empirical studies from, among others, Shelanski and Klein (1995), Masten (1996), 
Palay (1996), and Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) support this line of arguments. 
 
We also contend, however, that high investment in relation-specific assets are 
associated with a lower ability to formalize. We advance that the knowledge that is 
linked to such investments, is specific to the relationships concerned as well, and 
thus more difficult to articulate and codify. Drawing up agreements on rights and 
obligations related to such investments is harder than for general purpose 
investments, as it becomes imperative to acquire more knowledge of the partner 
organizations, and as the investments contain characteristics that are likely to be 
new to the cooperating organizations. Unlike more “standardized” investments, 
comparatively little information might be available regarding the characteristics 
and specificities of this type of investment. These assertions are congruent with 
Williamson’s (1985: 211) remark that ‘[I]f measurement problems exist, they are 
assumed to vary directly with asset-specificity.’ The latter indicates that 
investments in relation-specific assets might be of influence on both the need and 
the ability to formalize. We capture this observation in a first set of hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 4.1a: In the context of interorganizational contracting, the extent to 
which parties invest in relation-specific assets is positively associated with the 
need to formalize. 
 
Hypothesis 4.1b: In the context of interorganizational contracting, the extent to 
which parties invest in relation-specific assets is negatively associated with the 
ability to formalize. 
 
Interorganizational complexity 
Partners in interorganizational relationships may also be confronted with high 
complexity (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Complexity can relate, among others, to the 
scope of a relationship (Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Reuer and Zollo, 2005; 
Sampson, 2004a, 2004b), the number of partners involved (Killing, 1988), and the 
degree of technological and organizational interdependency between partners 
(Kumar and Van Dissel, 1996; Thompson, 1967). Researchers have argued that 
complexity entails a higher potential for opportunistic behavior (Oxley and 
Sampson, 2004) and that it demands control in the form of rules, scheduling or 
plans in order to to cope with uncertainty and equivocality (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Moldoveanu and Bauer, 2004; Steensma and Corley, 2000; Thompson, 1967). 
Others have noticed that higher degrees of complexity demand more coordination 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004), implying increases in 
governance costs and administrative overhead (Contractor, 1990; Doz and Hamel, 
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1998; Williamson, 1985). These arguments are consistent with work from Oxley 
(1997) and Sampson (2004a), who found that interorganizational relationships 
move towards more hierarchical governance modes for transactions 
encompassing a wider range of products, technologies, and partners. In other 
words, higher degrees of complexity raise the need to formalize. 
 
At the same time, however, complexity is likely to reduce the ability to formalize. 
Interorganizational relationships that are complex entail complicated mental 
processes such as problem solving, applying discretion and using technical 
knowledge (Van de Ven and Delbecq, 1974). This imposes high cognitive 
demands on the participants in such relationships (Campbell, 1988). Occasionally, 
the number of variables that have to be considered is so large, and the 
interconnections among these variables so intricate, that ‘common sense and 
everyday reasoning no longer provide adequate guides’ (Simon, 1997: 246). In 
such cases, the cognitive limitations of human beings preclude the comprehensive 
representation of complex activity systems by formalities (Simon, 1997). It 
becomes more difficult and costly to monitor activities and specify issues in 
contracts or other formal documents, for instance, when more partners are 
involved with a relationship and when more products or technologies have to be 
included in a contract (Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997). Even if partners know what they 
want in any possible situation, things may be ‘so contingently complex as to resist 
accurate specification,’ or partners may fail in making correct judgments and 
interpretations (Hendry, 2002: 101). Oxley and Sampson (2004: 725), for example, 
indicate that ‘contractual governance of exchanges involving complex, tacit 
knowledge is particularly problematic as contracts are very difficult to specify, 
monitor, and enforce in these circumstances.’ Such relationships entail greater 
uncertainty as to how to evaluate the behavior and performance of partners. 
Gainey and Klaas (2003: 215) show that parties therefore ‘must generally avoid 
specificity in the development of contracts.’ We capture the relationships between 
complexity and the need and the ability to formalize in a second set of hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 4.2a: In the context of interorganizational contracting, 
interorganizational complexity is positively associated with the need to formalize. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2b: In the context of interorganizational contracting, 
interorganizational complexity is negatively associated with the ability to formalize. 
 
Prior cooperation with the same partner 
Many interorganizational relationships involve partners that have previously 
transacted with each other (Kale et al., 2002). Hitherto, however, the literature has 
remained inconclusive regarding the influence of prior cooperation on 
formalization, describing two opposing effects. The first effect advanced in the 
literature consists of a reduced need for formalization (Gulati, 1995; Lui and Ngo, 
2004; Saxton, 1997; Zollo et al., 2002). From this perspective, prior relationships 
can substitute for costly contracts (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). Prior contacts 
among allying organizations can act as a discipline mechanism that supports 
cooperation, as it offers prospects of retaliation in future (Ouchi, 1980; Ryall and 
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Sampson, 2004). Furthermore, prior relationships may have led to the 
development of trust in a partner organization (Gulati, 1995; Macaulay, 1963; 
Saxton, 1997). After all, common histories and webs of connections reduce 
uncertainty (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Larson, 1992), and they assist partners in 
developing deeper knowledge of each other in terms of their interests, needs and 
capabilities. The need to set up contracts subsequently diminishes, because 
parties can make vicarious inferences about likely future behavior of a partner ‘by 
extrapolating a past record into the future’ (Parkhe, 1998: 421). Empirical evidence 
for such an effect of prior cooperation on formalization is found, among others, by 
Ryall and Sampson (2004), Gulati (1995), Madhok (1995) and Luo (2002).  
 
In contrast, other researchers claim that prior cooperation leads to the proliferation 
of formalization. As partners come to know more about each other, their ability to 
formalize increases (e.g. Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Recurring interactions lead to a gradual refinement of knowledge of a partner and 
it increases the ‘awareness of the rules, routines, and procedures that each needs 
to follow’ (Gulati et al., 2000: 210). As organizations sustain their business 
relationships over time, they develop a joint understanding that allows uniquely 
efficient communication in the form of idiosyncratic interaction routines (Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005; Kotabe et al., 2003; McGinn and Keros, 2002; Zollo et al., 
2002). These organizations have developed sets ‘of tacit understandings on how 
to collaborate with each other, how to prevent and remedy misunderstandings, 
and how to coordinate effectively across organizational boundaries’ (Reuer and 
Zollo, 2005: 106-107). In other words, previous contacts between organizations 
presumably lead to the development of specialized skills and routines adapted to 
the partner (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Kale et al., 
2002), and specific knowledge about the partner’s structure, operations, and 
competencies (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). Prior interactions also lead to improved 
monitoring and enforcement of contractual compliance and contracting skills 
(Leiblein, 2003; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Reuer et al., 2002). When parties are 
unfamiliar with each other, instead, relationships are reminiscent of low “plan-
ability” (Miller et al., 2004). This view on the relationship between prior cooperation 
and formalization is supported by empirical findings indicating that contracts 
between familiar organizations are more extensive (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Ryall and Sampson, 2004), and systematically different 
from those in de novo pairings (Anand and Khanna, 2000b). We capture the 
presumed links between prior cooperation and the ability and the need to 
formalize in a third set of hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 4.3a: In the context of interorganizational contracting, prior 
cooperation with the same partner is negatively associated with the need to 
formalize. 
 
Hypothesis 4.3b: In the context of interorganizational contracting, prior 
cooperation with the same partner is positively associated with the ability to 
formalize. 
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Size buying organization 
On an intra-organizational level, the majority of studies on the relationship 
between organizational size and formalization indicate that they are positively 
related (Davila, 2005; Zeffane, 1989). Davila (2005), for example, ascertains that 
the emergence of management control systems in his sample of 95 young, 
technology-oriented Sillicon-Valley firms is largely driven by firm size. Studies on 
the influence of organizational size on governance mechanisms in an 
interorganizational setting are sparse, however, and most of them exhibit non-
significant relationships. Reuer and Ariño (2003) and Oxley (1997), for example, 
find that the size of cooperating organizations has no influence on the use of 
equity- and non-equity governance forms. Overall, we know little about the 
relationship between organizational size and the need and ability to formalize. 
Nonetheless, we expect that interorganizational relationships that involve larger 
buyers exhibit a lower need to formalize, as they generally possess more slack 
resources, which could help them to overcome problems resulting from the 
application of insufficient safeguards (March and Simon, 1958). Besides, large 
buyer organizations are likely to engender higher volumes of future activities, 
making them more attractive to suppliers, and reducing their susceptibility to 
opportunistic behavior by suppliers. After all, suppliers’ expectations of repeated 
business with buyer organizations can act as a discipline mechanism supporting 
cooperation (Ryall and Sampson, 2004), and prospects of retaliation in future 
periods may curb non-cooperative behavior in current periods (Ryall and 
Sampson, 2004b; Williamson, 1985). Findings from Palay (1996) on governance 
choices in 51 transactions between rail freight carriers and their shippers support 
this assertion. Palay ascertains that for 19 transactions opportunistic conduct was 
attenuated by parties’ apparent reluctance to exploit short-term advantages to the 
detriment of long-run relations. 
 
Conversely, we claim that the ability to formalize is higher for large organizations 
compared to small organizations. Large organizations possess more resources 
that they can dedicate to the formalization of their relationships (March and Simon, 
1958). They are also more likely to have exhaustive legal expertise at their 
disposal. Moreover, these organizations are probably able to draw from more prior 
experience concerning negotiations and contracting practices in 
interorganizational relationships, which enhances their ability to identify and 
recognize issues and opportunities, and which promulgates their ability to capture 
these in formal documents. In other words, these organizations are more likely to 
possess contracting capabilities (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Furthermore, many 
large organizations possess alliance departments and formal procedures for 
establishing and maintaining relationships (Bagley et al., 2005; Kale et al., 2002), 
which enhances their ability to formalize. The connections between size of the 
buyer organization and the need and ability to formalize that we advance here are 
captured in a fourth set of hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 4.4a: In the context of interorganizational contracting, the size of a 
buyer is negatively associated with the need to formalize. 
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Hypothesis 4.4b: In the context of interorganizational contracting, the size of a 
buyer is positively associated with the ability to formalize. 
 
4.3 Information processing and sensemaking 
 
Our review of the literature suggests that the ability and the need to formalize are 
influenced by the same antecedents, although in opposite directions. Ironically, the 
very characteristics that propel the need for formalization thus also appear to 
complicate doing so (see Alchian, 1984; Chi, 1994). These factors challenge clear 
definition and verification, complicate assessments of potential complementarity, 
and raise the extent of ambiguity in specification and measurement (Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998). Unless partners undertake strenuous efforts to enhance the ability 
to formalize, formalization will therefore either assume low values or prove to be 
ineffective, as key decision makers have no solid understanding of the 
relationship, lack a common fact base and are unclear about important 
assumptions (see Kaplan and Beinhocker, 2003). Exact stipulations in formal 
documents then need to be postponed until the moment when uncertainty and 
equivocality have decreased sufficiently (Helm and Kloyer, 2004). 
Interorganizational participants do not wait for this to happen, as coordination and 
control are purposeful, goal-oriented activities (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997). 
Instead, they will seek to ameliorate the quality of the information upon which they 
base their decisions (Simon, 1997). Analogue to Thomas and Trevino (1993), we 
therefore presume that they undertake efforts directed at information processing 
(e.g. Galbraith, 1973, 1977; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), and sensemaking (e.g. 
Weick, 1979, 1995, 2001) to reduce uncertainty and equivocality, and 
consequently to improve the ability to formalize (see also Daft and Lengel, 1986; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Ring, 1997) 
 
Information processing refers to the acquiring, interpreting and synthesizing of 
information (Huber, 1991; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). Organizations are reputed 
to process information in order to reduce uncertainty (Daft and Lengel, 1986; 
Galbraith, 1973; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), and to enable coordination and 
control (Galbraith, 1977). Information processing is believed to ameliorate 
expectations about the future value of resources to an organization (Makadok and 
Barney, 2001) and to augment the controllability of issues and situations (Kuvaas, 
2002; Thomas et al., 1993). Daft and Lengel (1986: 555), for example, suggest 
that ‘managers try to find decision rules, information sources, and structural 
designs that afford adequate understanding to cope with uncertainty,’ which is an 
assertion that can be logically extended to the interorganizational level of analysis 
(Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995). Managers experiencing the need to engage in 
more vigilant and deeper examinations of a situation at hand search for 
information (Thomas and McDaniel, 1990; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). By 
acquiring and processing information, they reduce uncertainty (Daft and Lengel, 
1986; Galbraith, 1977), which enables higher levels of formalization. 
 
However, managers are not only concerned with deficiencies of information, but 
also with a lack of clarity and with the existence of equivocality (Carson et al., 
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2006; Daft and Lengel, 1986; Daft and Weick, 1984). The latter implies that 
multiple and conflicting views exist about an issue (Weick, 1979), something which 
cannot be solved by gathering more information. Differences in interpretation of 
information and divergent meanings attached to cues, for instance, can result in 
participants holding conflicting values and developing distinct perspectives on 
interorganizational issues (Gray, 1985). For consensus and action to occur, 
interpretations of the information held by cooperating parties must be synthesized 
and meaning must be communicated (Thomas and Trevino, 1993). Partners 
consequently attempt to remove equivocality from relationships by investing in 
sensemaking activities. These activities are reputed to reduce suspicion about the 
partners’ motives and to remove confusion regarding the partners’ responsibilities 
(Gray, 1985; Thomas and Trevino, 1993). Sensemaking involves the reciprocal 
interaction between information seeking, meaning ascription, and action (Gioia 
and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1979). Efforts directed at sensemaking include, 
among others, asking questions, probing, active detection of information (Daft and 
Weick, 1984), discussion and debate (Daft and Lengel, 1986), and cross-checking 
ones own perceptions and interpretations with those of participants from the other 
organization. Sensemaking efforts also pertain to the information processing 
efforts previously discussed, as managers who have larger amounts of information 
available are presumed to have more raw materials for constructing their 
interpretations (Daft and Weick, 1984; Kuvaas, 2002). This enables them to 
develop more accurate perceptions, and to imbue data and information with 
meaning (Thomas et al., 1993). Sensemaking efforts are particularly manifest 
during the negotiations preceding transactions. The social-psychological 
processes of sensemaking that lie behind the formal bargaining processes 
characterizing negotiations help participants to appreciate the potential for 
transacting with others and they assist in clarifying the nature of 
interorganizational relationships (Ariño and Ring, 2004; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1989). We propose that strenuous information processing and sensemaking 
efforts are elicited in order to enhance interorganizational performance in cases in 
which a low ability to formalize is accompanied by a high need to formalize. In 
these situations, partners gather data and they attempt to reduce ambiguity before 
they enter formal commitments in order to reduce the gap between the information 
required and the information available (Tushman and Nadler, 1978), and to 
enhance participants’ understanding of their situation. After all, ‘commitments and 
formalized arrangements are not developed prematurely, when sensemaking and 
understanding processes are still producing unclear products and the parties are 
ambivalent as to the benefits of a transaction for themselves or their organizations’ 
(Ring and van de Ven, 1989: 183). This leads us to the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 4.5: In the context of interorganizational contracting, the size of the 
gap between the ability and the need to formalize is positively associated with the 
efforts that are invested in information processing and sensemaking. 
 
Hypothesis 4.6: In the context of interorganizational contracting, efforts invested 
in information processing and sensemaking are positively associated with the 
degree of formalization. 
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4.4 Method 
 
Consistent with Poppo and Zenger (2002), we measure relation-specific 
investments by three indicators reflecting the costs related to switching to another 
supplier. Questionnaire items for this variable are concerned with the damage in 
terms of time and money that the buyer would face if the product had to be 
replaced due to malfunctioning. The individual items refer to the need to ‘purchase 
a new product,’ ‘re-educate personnel,’ and ‘re-enter data.’ Jointly, these 
indicators provide an indication of the magnitude of the buyer’s hold-up problem 
(see Dekker, 2003). Cronbach’s α for this scale amounts to 0.75. Complexity is 
measured by two indicators (see Dekker, 2003). First, we develop a count-
measure of the number of products involved in a transaction. Many transactions 
do not comprise the purchase of one, but of multiple products. Eighteen product 
categories are distinguished, including: standard software; network-configurations; 
design; adapted software; mini-computers; training; tailor-made software; 
mainframes; instruction; branch-specific software; computer-directed machines; 
advise; personal computers; peripheral equipment; documentation; work-stations; 
cables; and, support. When products in one of these product categories are 
involved in a transaction, they obtain a score of one. The number of products is 
then calculated as the sum of the values for each product category. In order to 
obtain a normal distribution, we take the square root of this value. The second 
indicator results from subdividing the 18 product types into different product 
categories, each entailing disparate degrees of complexity. The product types are 
divided over five categories (1= most simple product categories, 5= most complex 
product categories). The lowest value for the scale consists of standard products, 
which include standard software packages, personal computers, workstations, and 
peripheral equipment, such as cables and accompanying devices. The highest 
level of complexity consists of tailor-made software and specific design activities. 
A Guttmann-type scale is then developed in which the level of complexity is 
determined by taking the maximum complexity levels presnt in a transaction. 
Finally, overall complexity of a transaction is measured by both the number of 
products transacted and the complexity-level involved with the transaction. 
Cronbach’s α for this measure is 0.71, which is slightly above the guideline of 0.7 
for modest composite reliability (Nunnally, 1978). Consistent with previous 
research (e.g. Dekker, 2003; Kale et al., 2000; Oxley and Sampson, 2004), we 
measure the existence of prior relationships between the same partners by a 
dummy variable, indicating whether the buyer and the supplier had undertaken 
business with each other before or not (0= no prior relationship, 1= prior 
relationship). We recognize that this is a very crude indicator, but believe it 
suffices for our purpose, which is to assess whether prior cooperation influences 
the ability and the need to formalize in opposite directions. Furthermore, following 
previous research (Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Muthusamy and White, 2005), 
we measure size of the buyer by two indicators. The first indicator consists of the 
number of employees of the buyer organization before the transaction. As this 
measure is highly skewed, the logarithm of these values is taken (see Davila, 
2005). The second indicator consists of the turnover of the buyer before the 
transaction (see Heide, 2003). As the distributions of this item is highly skewed, 
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the logarithm is taken of these values. Cronbach’s α for the scale containing both 
items equals 0.73. We measure the ability to formalize in terms of three items. At 
the first item, the respondent had to indicate ‘how difficult it was for his or her 
organization to compare this product with similar products.’ The second item 
referred to ‘how difficult it was for his or her organization to compare the price-
quality ratio of potential suppliers’ The third item indicated whether ‘it was difficult 
or hard for employees to evaluate the quality of this product at the time of delivery’ 
Responses follow a 5-point Likert-scale (1= ‘very easy,’ 5= ‘very difficult’). As the 
ability to formalize is a construct with a positive orientation, the scales were 
reverse-coded. Cronbach’s α for this scale was equal to 0.79. The construct 
validity of this measure is checked by analyzing its correlation with a measure for 
the relative experience of the focal organization with automation compared to 
other organizations in the same industry. Pearsons’ correlation statistic for the 
correlation between both variables is equal to .30 (p<.00), indicating that 
organizations that are relatively more experienced with automation possess a 
higher ability to formalize, something which strongly reinforces our belief that our 
measure for the ability to formalize is appropriate. The need to formalize is not 
measured explicitly. Instead, we measure the actual degree of formalization. In 
case the four antecedents that we investigate exhibit opposite relationships with 
the actual degree of formalization and the ability to formalize, we claim that their 
effects on the need and ability to formalize differ. If a higher level of complexity 
leads to a lower ability to formalize, but also to a higher degree of formalization, for 
example, we infer that complexity must have a positive influence on the need to 
formalize. Hence, we use the degree of formalization as a proxy for the need to 
formalize. We construct this measure from the respondent’s answers regarding 
the presence or absence of 24 contract clauses, including ones on: price 
determination; liability of the supplier; restrictions on product use; price-levels; 
force majeure; nondisclosure by the buyer; up-dating; arbitration arrangements; 
settlement of R&D costs; joint management; technical specifications; termination 
periods; price changes; warranties; insurance by the supplier; payment terms; 
quality (norms); service periods; sanctions for late payment; intellectual property 
rights; the reservation of spare parts; delivery times; protection of the product; and, 
maintenance periods. Individual contract terms receive a value of one when the 
respondents indicated that they were included as a clause in the contract, 
whereas they are coded zero when the subject was not arranged or only arranged 
verbally. Subsequently, the degree of formalization is calculated as a count 
measure of the contractual agreements on the 24 financial, legal, and operational 
issues that were actually covered by the contract. We measure information 
processing and sensemaking activities as the number of days the respondent and 
his/her colleagues jointly spent on drawing up the contract and negotiating with the 
supplier. This conforms with previous research, in which measures of data search 
have been proposed as proxies for ‘mindful’ versus ‘mindless’ cognitive 
processing (e.g. Dunegan, 1993). To obtain a positive normal distribution, we take 
the log of this measure and add a value of one to all observations. We further 
include size of the supplier and financial volume of a transaction as control 
variables. Size of the supplier might influence the need to contract, as larger 
suppliers possess more bargaining power, and as the relative degree of 
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dependence of the buyer on the supplier is likely to become larger. Consistent with 
previous research (Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Muthusamy and White, 2005), 
this variable is measured by one indicator consisting of the number of employees 
at the supplier before the transaction. The response categories are divided into 
five value ranges (1= less than 5; 2 = 5-9; 3 = 10-19; 4 = 20-49; and, 5 = more 
than 50). With respect to financial volume, transaction cost economists suggest 
that organizations deal more cautiously with transactions involving greater 
investment commitment (Chi, 1994; Williamson, 1985), as they generally involve 
higher dependency of an organization on its transaction partner and higher risks 
(Heide and John, 1988). Financial volume is therefore proposed to be positively 
associated with the degree of formalization (Batenburg et al., 2003; Blumberg, 
2001; Yan and Gray, 2001). It is measured as the volume of payments from the 
buyer to the supplier organization (see Heide, 2003), excluding payments for extra 
work (response categories: 1= <€ 11.363, 2= € 11.363 to € 22.726, 3= € 22.726 to 
€ 45.455, 4= € 45.455 to € 90.909, and 5= more than € 90.909). 
 
4.5 Results 
 
To test our hypotheses, we first calculate correlation statistics (see Table 4.1), 
which are consistent with earlier research on the same data (Batenburg et al., 
2003; Buskens, 2002). Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the ability to 
formalize and the actual degree of formalization reveals a significant negative 
relationship (b = -.220; p<.01), providing a first indication that the need and the 
ability to formalize move in opposite directions. To obtain stronger support, we 
regress each of the antecedent variables on the ability to formalize and on the 
actual degree of formalization. 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 
Correlation matrix 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 41 5 6 7 8 9 
Asset-specificity 8.66 3.04 1.00         
Complexity 5.32 2.02 .40 1.00        
Prior cooperation 1 .500 .500 -.15 -.09 1.00       
Size buyer 5.79 .87 .05 .09 .00 1.00      
Size supplier 3.40 1.47 .17 .13 .09 .27 1.00     
Financial volume 2.54 1.46 .37 .43 .-.06 .42 .38 1.00    
Formalization 9.40 2.67 -.39 -.30 .17 .01 .07 -.28 1.00   
Ability to formalize 10.7 5.84 .32 .35 -.13 .11 .35 .42 -.22 1.00  
Info & sensemaking 1.23 .53 .37 .37 -.11 .23 .20 .54 -.31 .39 1.00
1 Correlations with prior cooperation consist of Kendall’s tau-b. Correlations higher than 0.07 are 
significant at the 0.05-level and correlations higher than 0.10 are significant at the 0.01-level. 
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Table 4.2 displays the results. The findings confirm hypotheses 4.1 to 4.4. Where 
asset-specificity and complexity reduce the ability to formalize, they raise the 
degree of formalization, which we believe derives from a higher perceived need to 
formalize. Moreover, relationships between partners that have previously 
cooperated and relationships involving larger buyers entail a higher ability to 
formalize than relationships between unfamiliar partners, or relationships involving 
small buyers. However, the same factors are also associated with lower degrees 
of formalization, indicating lower needs to formalize in these relationships.  
 
To test for hypothesis 4.5, we regress “information processing and sensemaking” 
on the four antecedent variables. The results of this analysis are presented in the 
final column of Table 4.2. Asset-specificity and complexity augment information 
processing and sensemaking efforts. This is congruent with Tushman and 
Nadler’s (1978) assertion that complexity or interdependence between 
organizational units raises information processing requirements. Prior experience 
with a partner, instead, reduces information processing and sensemaking efforts. 
The latter corroborates Ring’s (1997: 296) remark that, in cases where 
cooperative relationships involve partners with prior ties, it seems probable that 
‘actors will not need to rely heavily on sensemaking or understanding processes’ 
(Ring, 1997: 296). Interorganizational relationships among parties who have 
previously cooperated can therefore ‘be expected to evolve more rapidly than 
when reciprocal sensemaking, understanding or committing processes have not 
been employed repeatedly between them in the past’ (Ring, 1997: 296). 
 
 
TABLE 4.2 
Multiple regression analysis: Antecedents of the need to formalize, the 
ability to formalize, and information processing and sensemaking efforts 
  Need to 
formalize 
 Ability to 
formalize  
 Info processing 
& sensemaking 
  B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
          
Constant  4.400 ***  7.055 ***  -.636 *** 
Asset-specificity  .106 **  -.267 ***  .152 *** 
Complexity  .168 ***  -.123 ***  .116 *** 
Prior experience  -.118 ***  .120 ***  -.065 ** 
Size buyer  -.081 **  .095 **  .035  
Size supplier  .251 ***  .018   .000  
Financial volume  .237 ***  -.163 ***  .416 *** 
          
N  569   569   550  
F-value  38.002 .000  24.962 .000  46.852 .000 
R2 – adjusted  .281   .202   .333  
Correlations significant at the 0.05-level (**), and the 0.01-level (***) 
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Size of the buyer does not appear to influence buyers’ information processing and 
sensemaking efforts. This suggests that although smaller firms experience a 
higher need to formalize, and a lower ability to do so compared to larger firms, 
they do not put more efforts into information processing and sensemaking to 
reduce uncertainty and equivocality and to enable formalization. This might be due 
to the limited number of resources that these firms have available. 
 
To test for hypothesis 4.6, we investigate whether information processing and 
sensemaking efforts can explain part of the formalization efforts undertaken in the 
relationships that we study. In Table 4.3, we compare a baseline regression on 
formalization (model 1) with a model incorporating information processing and 
sensemaking as an explanatory variable (model 2). Adding information processing 
and sensemaking efforts as an explanatory variable accounts for an additional 1.7 
percent of the variance compared to the baseline model. The variable assumes a 
highly significant value (b = .170; p<.01). We conclude that information processing 
and sensemaking efforts explain a significant amount of variance in the degree of 
formalization applied in interorganizational relationships 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 
Influence of information processing and sensemaking on formalization 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2 
  B Sig.  B Sig. 
       
Constant  4.400 ***  3.723 ** 
Asset-specificity  .106 **  .080 * 
Complexity  .168 ***  .148 *** 
Prior experience  -.118 ***  -.107 *** 
Size buyer  -.081 **  -.087 ** 
Size supplier  .251 ***  .251 *** 
Financial volume  .237 ***  .166 *** 
Info & Sensemaking     .170 *** 
       
N  569   550  
F-value  38.002 .000  34.411 .000 
R2 - adjusted  .281   .298  
R2 - change     .017  
Correlations significant at the 0.10-level (*), the 0.05-level (**), and the 0.01-level (***) 
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4.6 Discussion 
 
In this theme, we investigated how contradictory findings on the relationships 
between antecedents and formalization that prevail in the literature can be 
reconciled. We argued that similarly to partner selection (Ahuja, 2000) and 
learning (Inkpen, 2000), interorganizational governance efforts depend on parties’ 
needs and their abilities to coordinate and control their relationships. We 
capitalized on the observation that the arguments underlying empirically 
established relationships between antecedents and formalization tend to centre 
either on the need, or on the ability to formalize, but not on both (see Gerwin, 
2004; Kirsch, 1997). This evoked the question as to whether antecedents 
accommodate contradictory forces. In addition, we were interested in how the 
ability and the need to formalize eventually determine the degree of formalization 
in interorganizational relationships, which led to the following research questions. 
 
RQ1: To what extent do relationships between antecedents and the ability to 
formalize diverge from their relationships with the need to formalize? 
 
RQ2: How do the ability and the need to formalize influence the degree of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships? 
 
Key findings  
We proposed that a high need to formalize activities and outcomes tends to co-
exist with a low ability to do so. In particular, we expected this to be the case for 
interorganizational relationships involving significant investments in relation-
specific assets, high degrees of interorganizational complexity, an absence of prior 
cooperation, and small focal organizations. Subsequently, we advanced 
arguments from information processing theorists (e.g. Galbraith, 1973, 1977), and 
from authors on sensemaking (Weick, 1979, 1995, 2001) to explain how 
participants in interorganizational relationships resolve the resulting impasse. We 
proposed that information processing and sensemaking efforts would be higher in 
relationships in which the ability and the need to formalize diverge more strongly 
compared to other relationships. The results corroborated our hypotheses. 
Collectively, they underscore the idea that antecedents that are commonly 
associated with formalization in the literature give rise to multiple, contradictory 
forces, and that tensions between these forces induce participants in 
interorganizational relationships to invest in information processing and 
sensemaking. 
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
Our findings have numerous ramifications for researchers and practitioners. On a 
theoretical level, they indicate that contradictory relationships between 
antecedents and formalization may co-exist. We therefore recommend 
researchers to take into account the ability as well as the need to formalize in 
future research. Moreover, as we found that partners may overcome 
discrepancies between the ability and the need to formalize by investing in 
information processing and sensemaking efforts, researchers should take 
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managers’ tendencies to surmount difficulties to formalize into account when 
investigating the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
Moreover, our findings imply that perversely, the alliances that are particularly 
useful are also especially difficult to manage (Accenture, 2003). Hence, it might 
sometimes be better for practitioners to pursue less complex cooperative 
ventures, or to design their ventures in a modular way – with a small interface 
between the cooperating organizations – so that participants in interorganizational 
relationships are better able to handle the complexity involved with 
interorganizational cooperation. Of course, this does not mean that they should 
just initiate external relationships that are easy to govern. Relationships between 
familiar partners, for example, might render cooperation easier, but their 
performance benefits are frequently overstated, making careful assessments of 
alternative partners advisable (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Furthermore, 
managers should be aware of the fact that investments in information processing 
and sensemaking may facilitate formalization of more sophisticated relationships. 
Without these investments, formalization may become an inadequate means to 
achieve coordination and control. 
 
Limitations and opportunities for future research  
Our research has several limitations, which could be addressed in future research. 
First, we conformed to a widely held tenet in the literature, by paying only limited 
attention to the role of managers in the process of structuring interorganizational 
relationships (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Our focus lay on the task 
characteristics and elements of the external environment that influenced 
organizational structuring activities. Previously, however, it has been remarked 
that such relationships can only be acted upon if participants are able to sense 
and interpret the environment and respond to it (Daft and Weick, 1984; Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994). To obtain better insights into the origins and evolution of 
interorganizational governance (Cardinal et al., 2004; Narayandas and Rangan, 
2004), future research could therefore consider how and on what basis managers 
decide to apply particular degrees of formalization (see also themes two and 
three). Second, we did not empirically disentangle information processing from 
sensemaking efforts, although Jemison and Sitkin (1986) and Thomas and 
Trevino (1993) already explained that an overemphasis on either information 
processing or sensemaking could inhibit interorganizational performance. This 
suggests that investigations of the interplay between both activities might be 
worthwhile. Another avenue for future research could be to replicate this study 
with a sample of interorganizational relationships in which the ability and the need 
to formalize might diverge even more. We expect, for instance, that strategic 
alliances and outsourcing relationships entail more intensive cooperation between 
partners compared to buyer-supplier relations. After all, these relationships ‘bring 
together multiple parties from different organizations with differing goals, cultures, 
and interpretations’ (Thomas and Trevino, 1993: 782). In such relationships, it 
might be even more critical to reduce uncertainty and equivocality, and the effects 
that we have found may become even more pronounced. 
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5  THEME 2 – FUNCTIONS OF FORMALIZATION 
 
‘…the focus in much of organizational theorizing is to homogenize what is essentially a 
pluralistic world. On balance, organizational theorists have tended to emphasize the 
unifying principles that lend cohesion, focus, legitimacy, and identity; the result has been to 
problematize (or often overlook) the variety embedded in pluralism.’ 
 
Glynn, Barr and Dacin, 2000: 726 
 
‘The formal process of negotiating enables, perhaps even forces, the parties to engage in 
sensemaking.’ 
 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1989: 185 
 
Summary 
Research on interorganizational governance focuses primarily on problems of 
coordination, control, and to a lesser extent legitimacy. We develop a 
complementary perspective, proposing that formalization enables 
interorganizational participants to give and make sense of the relationships in 
which they are engaged. Our work is grounded in the governance and 
sensemaking literatures. It illuminates relationships between sensemaking and 
other functions of formalization, and it complements existing perspectives 
concerning formalization’s relationship with interorganizational performance and 
its conduciveness to particular contexts and cooperative stages. Furthermore, by 
illuminating multiple theoretical perspectives on formalization, we attempt to 
‘provide more creative, innovative, and insightful ideas, facilitating new theory 
generation and enhancing the level of disciplinary maturity’ (Robson et al., 2002: 
392) in the interorganizational governance field. The chapter thereby answers 
calls from, among others, Glynn et al. (2000) for advantaging pluralism and 
paradigmatic eclecticism more explicitly in organizational theorizing. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A large variety of functions has been ascribed to formalization, of which Randolph 
Marcy (1859), a U.S. army captain who has written The prairie traveler: A 
handbook for overland expeditions stipulates some examples (Bamford et al., 
2003). Marcy argued that formalization promoted collaboration between colonists 
and other prairie travelers when they were travelling from the East to the West of 
the United States during the 19th century (see Textbox 5.1). However, the 
functions of formalization appear to be more diverse than those surfacing in his 
story. In this chapter, we focus on the functions of formalization, which are closely 
associated with the need to formalize and the positive consequences of 
formalization, forming the shaded areas in the research framework depicted in 
Figure 5.1. The functions ascribed to formalization that are most prevalent in the 
literature are grouped into three broad categories: (1) formalization as a means to 
coordinate, (2) formalization as a means to control, and to a lesser extent (3) 
formalization as a means to legitimize (e.g. Dyer, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Salbu, 1997; Sobrero and Schrader, 1998; Madhok, 2002; Kale et al., 2001). 
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In contrast to these now widely accepted perspectives on the functioning of 
formalization, this chapter focuses on its sensegiving and sensemaking function, 
which derives its theoretical underpinnings from Weick’s (1969, 1979, 1993, 1995, 
2001) theory of sensemaking and from emerging cognitive theories of organization 
and governance (e.g. Lindenberg, 2003; Meindl et al., 1996). We start by noting 
that although ‘formal organizations are generally understood to be systems of 
coordinated and controlled activities’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 340), for which 
information processing is crucial, they are increasingly regarded as systems of 
meaning (Meindl et al., 1996). This implies that research on interorganizational 
relationships not only focuses on interest- and information-asymmetry problems 
anymore, but that it also considers issues relating to “the meeting of minds”, 
sensemaking, and the ways in which participants in interorganizational 
relationships reduce ambiguity and equivocality (e.g. see Carson et al., 2006). 
Sensemaking is central here, because ‘it is the primary site where meanings 
materialize that inform and constrain’ action (Weick et al., 2005: 409, citing Mills, 
2003: 35). Concordant with the significance attributed to sensemaking, and with 
Weick’s pleas for more research on processes instead of structures, increasing 
attention is granted to process dynamics and the evolution of interorganizational 
cooperative endeavors (e.g. De Rond, 2003; De Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004; Doz, 
1996; Narayandas and Rangan, 2004; Reuer et al., 2002; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1989, 1994). 
 
Need to 
formalize 
Ability to 
formalize 
Positive 
consequences
Negative 
consequences
Degree of  
formalization 
 
Antecedents 
Other 
governance 
mechanisms
Inter- 
organizational 
performance 
 
Moderators 
FIGURE 5.1 
Research framework – theme two 
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TEXTBOX 5.1 
Formalization among prairie travellers 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bamford et al. (2003) and Marcy (1859) 
 
 
Following Carson et al. (2006), we believe that shifting the focus of attention from 
formalities, such as contracts, rules and procedures, towards the process of 
formalization could complement our existing understanding of formalization’s 
functioning in interorganizational relationships. In particular, by focusing on 
formalization as a process, we can come to better understand the dynamic 
creation of shared understandings that underlie the logic of exchange (Ariño and 
Ring, 2004; McGinn and Keros, 2002). These considerations raise the following 
questions: what are the functions of formalization? How do these functions relate 
to each other? What is their relationship with interorganizational performance? 
And, finally, what is their relative importance in different collaborative contexts and 
stages of interorganizational development? By critically examining previous 
research on formalization’s consequences and by building upon Karl Weick’s work 
on sensemaking, and Ring and Van de Ven’s (1989, 1994) work on 
interorganizational structuring practices, this chapter discerns a function of 
formalization, which has received little attention in the literature so far: 
‘An obligation should be drawn up and signed by all the members of the association,
wherein each one should bind himself to abide in all cases by the orders and decisions
of the captain, and to aid him by every means in his power in the execution of his duties;
and they should also obligate themselves to aid each other, so as to make the individual
interest of each member the common concern of the whole company’ (Marcy, 1859: 23).
‘In case of failure on the part of any one to comply with the obligations imposed by the
articles of agreement after they have been duly executed, the company should of course
have the power to punish the delinquent member, and, if necessary, to exclude him from
all the benefits of the association’ (Marcy, 1859: 24). Unless a systematic organization
be adopted it is impossible for a party of any magnitude to travel in company for any
great length of time, and for all the members to agree upon the same arrangements in
marching, camping, etc. I have several times observed, where this has been attempted,
that discords and dissensions sooner or later arose which invariably resulted in breaking
up and separating the company’ (Marcy, 1859: 25). 
 
Besides, prairie travelers needed plans and budgets to know not just the requisite food to
bring, but also the amount of water, clothing, bedding, and, of course, arms. Travellers
needed a clear resource budget – from 150 pounds of flour all the way down to four pairs
of socks and a bit of beeswax, as overloading was a real danger. Poor up-front planning
left many pioneers dead on the prairie – starved, frozen, or, more likely, unable to
recover from minor sickness or injury. It also made them face exorbitant prices at
outposts such as Ford Dodge or Council Grove (Bamford et al., 2003: 315). Other
formalities that are required when traversing the prairies with a group of people include
agreements on telegraphic signals, and smoke signals (Marcy, 1859: 227-228). Marcy
notes that these signals, when well understood and enforced, tend to greatly facilitate the
communication of intelligence throughout the camp, and contribute much to its security.
To avoid mistakes, the signals should be written down and copies furnished the
commander of each party.     
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formalization as a means to give and make sense. It thereby contributes to the 
literature in two ways. First, it extends Weick’s concept of sensemaking into a new 
domain, complementing existing views on interorganizational governance. The 
diversity of arguments underlying the sensegiving and sensemaking function of 
formalization demonstrates that researchers on interorganizational governance 
could benefit from more explicitly considering sensemaking in their studies. 
Second, by presenting an integrative framework that embraces conceptualizations 
of formalization as a means to coordinate, control, legitimize and give and make 
sense, we cross the boundaries of narrow theoretical domains (Baum and Rowley, 
2002). We thereby help to reconcile seemingly contradictory perspectives on 
interorganizational governance, and show that a more holistic perspective on the 
functioning of contracts, rules and procedures, and the processes from which they 
arise, offers a richer and more appropriate description of interorganizational 
governance than hitherto available.   
 
We organize the chapter as follows. First, we categorize the prevailing modes of 
thinking on the functioning of formalization in interorganizational relationships by 
distinguishing between its coordination, control, and legitimacy effects. We 
contrast these perspectives with a conceptualization of formalization as a means 
to give and make sense. Subsequently, we illustrate how formalization contributes 
to sensegiving and sensemaking by elaborating on its role in focusing attention, 
reducing ambiguity, and facilitating articulation, deliberation, interaction, and 
learning. In addition, we advance that formalization contributes to a reduction in 
judgment errors, and to more complete and consistent images of 
interorganizational reality. We proceed by suggesting how formalization’s 
sensegiving and sensemaking function relates to its more traditional coordination, 
control and legitimacy functions, and we clarify how it is associated with 
interorganizational performance. Finally, we explain how the relationships between 
formalization’s four functions and interorganizational performance are moderated 
by the exploration and exploitation character of collaborative contexts, and stages 
of development of interorganizational relationships. 
 
5.2 Four perspectives on formalization 
 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the major characteristics of the coordination, 
control and legitimacy perspectives on the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships. It also encompasses the main features of a 
sensegiving and sensemaking perspective on formalization, which is central to this 
chapter. The ubiquity of research on the coordination, control and legitimacy 
functions of formalization stems from a historical preponderance of theoretical 
perspectives in which rationality, computation, anticipation and decision-making 
have prevailed. It is embedded in a rich tradition of cross-sectional governance 
research (see Barley, 1986) and seems to be the result of a manner of thinking in 
which the costs of formalization are justified only by its outputs and ‘not by the 
learning benefits of the codification process itself’ (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 349).
- 
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More specifically, most arguments deriving from these perspectives refer to the 
functions of contracts, rules and procedures, but not to the benefits associated 
with the process of formalization itself (for notable exceptions, see Ariño and Ring, 
2004; Ring and Rands, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1989, 1994; Sampson, 2003; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004). The customary approach has been to focus on the 
structure of exchange, rather than the specifics of the processes of exchange 
(McGinn and Keros, 2002), possibly resulting from a tendency to investigate 
interorganizational relationships that already exists for a while (Ring, 2000). 
 
As is depicted in Table 5.1, articles focusing on formalization as a means to 
coordinate primarily build on March and Simon’s theory of organizational behavior, 
and the more recent dynamic capabilities school (see Colombo, 2003; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Madhok, 2002). Proponents of these schools point to formalization’s 
role in the adjustment and adaptation of partner activities, resources, and 
expected outputs. Authors emphasizing the control function of formalization draw 
support from transaction cost economics and agency theory (Lassar and Kerr, 
1996; Shane, 1996; Williamson, 1985, 1991). They presume that gaining partial 
control over a partner organization is fundamental to interorganizational 
cooperation, as interests of partners rarely coincide (Blumberg, 2001; Buskens et 
al., 2003a), and as each of them may exhibit opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 
1985, 1991). Formalization as a means of gaining legitimacy stems from 
institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Sitkin and Bies, 1993; Walsh and 
Dewar, 1987). From this perspective, interorganizational relationships that omit 
formalities lack legitimate accounts of their activities, and they become vulnerable 
to claims that they are ‘negligent, irrational, or unnecessary’ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977: 350). 
 
Whereas theories focusing on the coordination function of formal governance 
deviate from neoclassical theory by their analytical focus on “friction in production”, 
theories focusing on control depart from neoclassical theory as a result of their 
analytical focus on “friction in exchange” (Madhok, 2002). Furthermore, whereas 
theories focusing on legitimacy deviate from neoclassical theory by their focus on 
“friction in comfort with external activities”, a theory on formalization as a means to 
give and make sense deviates from neoclassical theory by its analytical focus on 
“friction in understanding and cognition” between participants in interorganizational 
relationships. The latter emphasizes the fact that cognitive representations of a 
phenomenon differ from person to person (Porac et al., 2002), and that this might 
result in ambiguity, equivocality, and conflicts in interorganizational relationships. 
This is important, as ambiguity is a fundamental problem inherent in 
interorganizational relationships (Carson et al., 2006), due to the fact that 
relationships are frequently formed in risky, uncertain settings around non-
standard business objectives, posing partners for difficulties considering the 
assessment and comparison of each other’s contributions, gains and 
competencies (Jap, 2001). 
 
Objects of negotiation and formalization, for example, often entail ambiguous 
features and wide ranges of options, calling for participants in interorganizational 
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relationships to jointly frame the relationship, making sense of it as it evolves 
(McGinn and Keros, 2002). Moreover, interorganizational modes of organization 
bring together people from disparate backgrounds and with different experiences 
that are likely to interpret things in different ways (see Vaara, 2003). Therefore, 
recourse to experience will only aid participants in creating meaning to a limited 
extent (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). Consequently, interorganizational initiatives 
entail cognitive reorientations, in which sensemaking plays a central role (Gioia 
and Chittipeddi, 1991). The latter is particularly significant in cross-sector 
collaborations, which ‘bring into tension and conflict extraordinarily complex ways 
of framing problems, as well as divergent knowledge and truth claims based on 
competing disciplinary paradigms….’ (Couchman and Fulop, 2002: 43). Sense has 
to be made of the functional capabilities of potential partners, and of the 
differences between cultures (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997), cognitive frames 
(Nooteboom, 1992), and management styles and philosophies (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998). 
 
By complementing existing perspectives on formalization with a sensemaking 
perspective, we illuminate the socio-psychological processes through which 
participants in interorganizational relationships socially construct or ‘enact’ their 
realities (Vaara, 2003; Weick, 1995). From this perspective, the management of 
meaning is regarded as being critical (Maitlis, 2005), with formalization serving as 
a process of ‘constructive clarification’ (Cardinal et al., 2004: 422). Unlike the other 
perspectives on the functioning of formalization, the sensegiving and sensemaking 
function of formalization does not primarily rest on premises of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1997) or opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985), but it relies on the 
presumption that partners encounter ambiguity and equivocality in their 
interactions, due to differences in background, experience, culture, and 
organizational structure. Whereas the coordination and control perspectives often 
evoke images of organization that centre around computation and information 
processing, the legitimacy and sensegiving and sensemaking perspectives 
emphasize meaning creation (Baum and Rowley, 2002). They stress the social-
psychological processes in which organizational participants come to appreciate 
the potential for transacting with others that lies behind the more formal aspects of 
negotiation and contracting (Ariño and Ring, 2004)17. Moreover, whereas a 
metaphorical expression of the major arguments for the coordination, control, and 
legitimacy functions of formalization respectively focus on: the creation of a large 
pie, appropriation of a considerable piece of that pie, and legitimizing the creation 
of the pie, formalization as a means to give and make sense is best portrayed as 
assisting in envisioning a pie and the processes by which it can be created. 
Hence, in contrast to mainstream research, the sensemaking perspective does not 
presume that participants in interorganizational relationships know ex ante the 
nature of the pie, the size of the pie, and how to assess the processes and 
                                                 
17 In line with this, Hill (2001) has argued that a significant function of contract negotiation 
pertains to parties trying to find out what they want from the transaction and from one 
another. It can be largely understood as a means to reconcile parties’ expectations, future 
actions, and consequent valuations to increase the size of the aggregate pie. 
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resources that create the pie (Jap, 2001). Figure 5.2 presents an integrative 
framework, which incorporates formalization’s functions, their relationship with 
interorganizational performance, and the moderating effects of time and context. 
We elaborate on this framework in the following paragraphs. 
 
5.3 Formalization and sensegiving & sensemaking 
 
The arguments that we use to support formalization’s functioning as a means to 
give and make sense serve as “bridges” between concepts that, at first sight, 
share little in common. After all, formalization is generally linked with routine 
situations, in which processes are standardized and efficiency is aimed for, 
whereas sensegiving and sensemaking are frequently associated with extreme 
conditions or crisis-situations (Weick, 1993; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2001). Whereas formalization is connected to rationality, coercion and 
bureaucracy (Adler and Borys, 1996; Beck and Kieser, 2003), sensemaking is 
usually not. To create a better understanding of the links between both concepts, 
we first have to establish what we mean by sensegiving and sensemaking. 
 
Sensemaking, a concept first coined by Karl Weick (e.g. 1969, 1979, 1993, 1995, 
2001), diverts researchers’ attention away from organizational structures towards 
processes of organizing (see also Hatch, 1999). It highlights action, activity, and 
creating (Weick, 1995), and refers to the reciprocal interaction of information 
seeking, meaning ascription, and action (Thomas et al., 1993). Sensemaking 
derives from the need of individuals to have a sense of identity of self in relation to 
others and to construct a common factual order regarding their social relationships 
(Turner, 1987). Sensemaking processes are therefore not only directed at 
identifying, assimilating and utilizing information, but also at removing its 
equivocality (Weick, 1995), and diminishing participants’ cognitive disorder by 
foreclosing alternative possibilities of meaning or action (McKinley and Scherer, 
2000). They consist of interactive processes by which participants in 
interorganizational relationships construct accounts that allow them to 
comprehend the world and act collectively (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Maitlis, 
2005). Sensemaking thus assists in ‘turning circumstances into a situation that is 
comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard into action 
(Weick et al., 2005: 409, citing Taylor and Van Every, 2000: 40). Concerted with 
sensemaking processes, sensegiving efforts are undertaken to ‘influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others’ (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991: 
442). These efforts consist of, among others, providing descriptions and 
explanations, and creating opportunities for interaction that help others to make 
sense (Maitlis, 2005; Weick, 1995). Sensegiving efforts by some participants in 
interorganizational relationships thus give rise to sensemaking efforts by others. 
Just like direction giving and direction seeking (Barley, 1986), sensegiving and 
sensemaking consist of interactional complements. 
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Sensegiving and sensemaking processes are valuable for interorganizational 
participants because they permit parties with ‘initially different views of the 
purposes and expectations of a relationship to achieve congruency’ (Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1994: 99). This is necessary because ‘in many complex collaborations, 
the nature of the pie, its size, and an assessment of its ingredients may be 
ambiguous’ (Jap, 2001: 86). In line with this, Weick (1995) acknowledges that 
some kind of structure needs to be present to guide action, and to direct attention 
to particular aspects of a situation. Furthermore, he notes that ‘a framework of 
roles, rules, procedures, configured activities and authority relations’ can reflect 
and facilitate meanings (Weick, 2001: 116). Weick also concludes that organizing 
and structuring purport to establish ‘a workable level of uncertainty’ (Weick, 1969: 
40), which conforms to images of formalization as means to reduce uncertainty 
and ambiguity (Carson et al. 2006). He also claims that ‘sensemaking and 
organization constitute one another’ and that they involve ‘labeling and 
categorizing’ (Weick et al., 2005: 410, 411). After all, ‘organization is an attempt to 
order the intrinsic flux of human action, to channel it towards certain ends, to give 
it a particular shape, through generalizing and institutionalizing particular 
meanings and rules’ (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002: 570). Finally, Weick et al. (2005: 
415) state that sensemaking involves the ‘continued redrafting of an emerging 
story so that it becomes more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed 
data, and is more resilient in the face of criticism,’ which is congruent with many 
descriptions of the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
However, Weick (1995: 229) also contends that ‘a little order can go a long way’, 
suggesting that detailed formalization might be superfluous.  
 
Although these assertions suggest that formalization and sensemaking are not at 
odds with each other, a clear conceptualization of the link between formalization 
and sensegiving and sensemaking efforts is not yet available in the literature. Here 
we develop such a conceptualization. We start from the work of Ring and Van de 
Ven (1989, 1992, 1994), which indicates that interorganizational relationships 
differ in significant ways from markets or hierarchies, confronting researchers and 
managers for disparate issues. One of the most remarkable differences is that 
interorganizational relationships resemble new organizations in the making 
(Thatcher, 2004). Especially when partners have not cooperated with each other 
before, they lack institutionalized structures and routines (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002), and they might have trouble in 
evaluating and conceptualizing their relationships, the underlying logics, and the 
contributions of partner organizations. Ring and Van de Ven (1989, 1994) 
therefore advance that cooperating organizations move through three formal 
stages of cooperation, which correspond with informal processes of sensemaking, 
understanding and committing. They presume that the development and evolution 
of interorganizational relationships comprises a repetitive sequence of negotiation, 
commitment and execution stages. Each of these stages is not only assessed on 
the efficiency of economic exchange, but also on the equity or “fairness” of the 
interaction and outcomes in relationships (Husted and Folger, 2004; Tekleab et 
al., 2005). Figure 5.3 depicts Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994: 97) “process 
framework of the development of IOR’s”. 
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FIGURE 5.3 
Ring and Van de Ven’s process framework of the development of IOR’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In light of our argument, the most significant contribution of Ring and Van de Ven’s 
model (1989, 1994) is that formalization may be intricately related to sensegiving 
and sensemaking processes, in which participants in interorganizational 
relationships develop mutual expectations about their motivations, possible 
investments, and perceived uncertainties regarding a business deal that they are 
jointly exploring. During these enactment processes participants create shared 
understandings by lifting equivocal knowledge out of the tacit, private, complex, 
random, and past to make it explicit, public, simpler, ordered, and relevant to the 
situation at hand (Obstfeld, 2004). They ‘come to appreciate the nature and 
purpose of a transaction with others,’ and they become able to ‘assess uncertainty 
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associated with the deal, the nature of each other’s role, the other’s 
trustworthiness […], their rights and duties in the transaction being considered, 
and possible efficiency and equity of the transaction as it relates to all parties’ 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: 98). When considering the link between 
formalization and sensemaking, Ring and Van de Ven (1989: 185) contend that 
‘[T]he formal process of negotiating enables, perhaps even forces, the parties to 
engage in sensemaking.’ In this light, the negotiation of contracts can be seen as 
‘a process of getting to know and understand each other’ (Klein Woolthuis et al., 
2005: 835). A comment from Ring and Rands (1989: 350) serves as an illustration 
here: ‘[The] work involved in drafting and revising the memorandum of 
understanding that was done […] may be viewed as evidence that understanding 
and committing processes between the organizations had been fruitful…’  
 
Although the preceding discussion hints at a strong link between the concepts of 
formalization and sensemaking, Ring and Van de Ven have not offered a 
systematic overview of the relationships between these two constructs. They have 
not explicitly indicated, for example, how formalization could add to sensemaking 
and what the relationship with other functions of formalization might be. 
Furthermore, most of their work remains relatively silent on the performance 
implications of the sensegiving and sensemaking function of formalization, and on 
the conduciveness of this function of formalization to different contexts and 
collaborative stages of development. In the following paragraphs, we further 
illustrate how formalization helps participants in interorganizational relationships to 
give and make sense of the relationships they are engaged in. We do this by 
elucidating how aspects of sensegiving and sensemaking processes discerned by 
Weick (1969, 1979, 1993, 1995, 2001) and other authors (cf. Ariño and Ring, 
2004; Nooteboom, 1992; Ring, 2000; Zollo and Singh, 2004) – such as focusing 
attention, reducing ambiguity, provoking interaction, forcing articulation and 
deliberation, and enhancing the completeness and consistency with which issues 
are covered – relate to the process of formalization. 
 
Focusing attention 
In early stages of cooperation, processes of sensemaking and understanding 
become requisite to develop common ground and to make sure that parties are on 
the same page (Ring, 2000). In this phase, participants in interorganizational 
relationships may not fully understand each other’s competencies, strengths and 
weaknesses, and the projected outcomes of the relationship may not be clear 
(Jap, 2001). In this stage, negotiations turn out to be attempts at mutual 
sensemaking (McGinn and Keros, 2002), in which formalization serves as a kind 
of focusing device (Nooteboom, 1992). It assists participants in forcibly carving 
phenomena out ‘of the undifferentiated flux of raw experience and to fix and label 
them conceptually (Chia, 2000: 517). It also helps them to impose order, 
counteract deviations, connect issues with each other, and hold events together in 
people’s heads, providing them with meaning and direction (Weick, 2001). At this 
stage, formalization assists people in approaching their goals in a more systematic 
way, and it keeps them from focusing on other activities that sidetrack their efforts 
(Delmar and Shane, 2003). 
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Furthermore, formalization helps participants in interorganizational relationships to 
focus their attention by isolating and simplifying the issues with which they have to 
deal (Singh, 1997). As participants can direct their attention to a smaller number of 
activities and issues, and expend their cognitive efforts on restricted problem 
areas containing fewer elements and interdependencies, the cognitive complexity 
that they experience is reduced (Campbell, 1988). At the same time, formalization 
helps managers of interorganizational relationships to discover the amount of 
agreement they have on cause-effect linkages and on preferences for outcomes, 
which coincides with a description of sensemaking in its early stages by Weick 
and McDaniel (1989). The resulting integration and reconciliation of accounts of 
the relationship propagates a common, unitary basis for action (Maitlis, 2005), and 
reduces the co-existence of conflicting ideas and fragmented actions. John Bell, 
Director Corporate Alliances of Royal Philips Electronics, provides an illustration of 
the salience of formalization as a focusing device. He explains that ‘the best you 
can do is have a common understanding at a certain moment, and move in that 
direction’ (source: comment issued at the Strategic Alliances Governance and 
Contracts Conference 2005, Barcelona, Spain). To recap, formalization is argued 
to be one of the means by which participants in interorganizational relationships 
focus their attention and channel others’ attention to specific issues or directions, 
increasing their ability to give and make sense. 
 
Reducing ambiguity 
Our second illustration concerns ambiguity, to which individuals become 
particularly susceptible during role transitions, such as when they come to 
participate in interorganizational relationships. In such situations, individuals 
possess little motivation to act in a particular direction, except, perhaps, to 
ameliorate the clarity of their own situation (Lindenberg, 2003). Formalization is 
one of the modes of organizing by which they can achieve more clarity (Podsakoff 
et al., 1986), as it reduces the extent to which things can be understood or 
interpreted in multiple senses or ways (House and Rizzo, 1972; Weick, 1995). 
Formalization processes are frequently accompanied by extensive problem 
solving activities through which parties try to develop a better understanding of 
their environment (Carson et al., 2006). These activities make the structure of 
relationships among a set of roles and the principles that govern behavior more 
explicit and visible (Scott, 2003), and they afford a framework for participants to 
view their own contributions in light of a greater scope and context (Organ and 
Greene, 1981). They also assist in setting the rules of the game, clarifying the 
identity and positions of stakeholders, and defining the payoffs expected by 
cooperating parties. Formalization thereby ‘provides a set of stable and 
comprehensible expectations’ (Simon, 1997: 19) as to how participants in 
interorganizational relationships are doing and how they will react to what one 
says and does. In that sense, formalization serves both sides in a relationship 
‘with a clear understanding of what to expect from each other’ (Narayandas and 
Rangan, 2004: 73), and it leads to a shared vision on the goals and objectives of a 
relationship (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). This effect of formalization is supported 
by Antoni Valverde, a partner in Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, remarking that 
‘the contracting process is very useful to have parties decide on what they agree 
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upon’ (source: comment issued at the Strategic Alliances Governance and 
Contracts Conference 2005, Barcelona, Spain). 
 
Moreover, formalization may assist partners in assessing the fairness of revenue 
and cost divisions, something constituting an important part of interorganizational 
performance evaluations (Husted and Folger, 2004). Furthermore, it offers 
participants in interorganizational relationships a collective structure from which to 
construct their actions (Weick and Roberts, 1993), and it facilitates the 
concretization of their ideas and expectations. In addition, formalization provides 
parties with a measure of certainty regarding the roles and procedures for making 
decisions and for assessing the area of the relationship on which they can exert 
influence (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). Marginson and Ogden (2005: 437) explain 
that clear goals and well-specified objectives offer managers strong direction and 
a sense of security and clarity, ‘particularly in circumstances where their role is 
fraught with uncertainties.’ In their discussion of the role of budgets in a major UK 
FTSE100 based organization, they offer the following example of a manager who 
copes with ambiguity by holding on to formal budgets: ‘I just don’t know what I 
should be doing half the time. But, at least I know where I stand with the budget. If 
I keep this in order and hit the targets, and make sure my guys are doing the 
same, then no one can argue with that, not even the chief executive’ (Marginson 
and Ogden, 2005: 439). In other words, ambiguity is supposed to be reduced by 
the formal specification of what is and what is not allowed (Carson et al., 2006; Lui 
and Ngo, 2004). This is supported by studies from Adler (1993), Shenkar and 
Zeira (1992), and Simonin (1999), and aligns with a view on formalization as a 
means to give and make sense in interorganizational relationships. 
 
Forcing articulation and deliberation 
On an individual level, the act of synthesizing on paper that is associated with 
formalization forces people to reflect, cogitate, and act heedfully (Weick, 1995; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002). Contracts, rules and procedures are generally given 
‘more deliberation than orders,’ and they are often ‘more carefully expressed’ 
(Gouldner, 1954: 162). After all, the creation of formalities demands that one be 
very clear about the variables and parameters to be taken into account, the 
sequence or priority with which different criteria of decision-making are to be 
invoked, and the process of inference by which decisions are to be made (Katz 
and Kahn, 1966). An illustration is provided by a letter accompanying a royalty 
agreement that was sent to Avi Arad & Associates by Toy Biz Inc. The President 
and Chief Executive Officer of Toy Biz Inc. explained that: ‘In order to insure that 
there are no misunderstandings regarding the royalty stream to Avi Arad & 
Associates it is in everyone's best interest to clarify what I believe to be our 
existing understanding as well as the impact of the contemplated transaction’ 
(source: contract issued between both parties). 
 
Besides forcing parties to articulate their understandings of certain issues in a 
relationship, the sheer creation process of a formal document ‘might have 
unexpected knowledge spill-overs in the understanding of the task’ itself (Zollo and 
Singh, 2004: 12). Zollo and Singh (2004), for example, claim that the cognitive 
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effort made in codifying knowledge raises the extent to which past experience is 
articulated and reflected upon, which possibly results in deeper insights about the 
potential causal factors that are underlying observed outcomes. As formalization 
prompts participants in interorganizational relationships to put stimuli into 
frameworks, it forces them to think deeper, which may add to their understanding, 
and change the mental models that they carry in their heads. Formalization 
enables them ‘to comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and 
predict’ (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988: 51). To recapitulate, formalization includes 
articulation, deliberation, and reflection, which jointly increase the abilities of 
participants in interorganizational relationships to give and make sense.  
 
Provoking interaction and collective learning 
Our fourth illustration revolves around formalization’s role in instigating interaction 
and learning (Avadikyan, 2001; Simons, 1990, 1995). Several anecdotes illustrate 
that formal negotiation and contracting processes involve intense interaction. In 
describing negotiation and contracting efforts in an alliance between Xerox and 
Fuji Xerox, for example, Gomes-Casseres (1996) referred to comments by the 
Xerox executive in charge, who held forth that the negotiating teams left no stone 
unturned. He mentioned that ‘a lot of bright people argued down all the alleys 
looking for potential future problems.’ They spent their time ‘going through all the 
what if… questions,’ and ‘took the agreement apart and put it back together’ 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 27, italics added). Similarly, in his study of strategy 
formulation processes in 15 large US-firms, Simons (1990: 134-135) finds that 
long-range plans and budgets were ‘the focus of a great deal of debate among 
operating managers,’ and that they were used as ‘agendas to discuss tactics, new 
marketing ideas, and product development plans throughout the organization.’ 
These descriptions of formalization resonate with Vaill’s (1976: 77) qualification of 
organizational designs as ‘highly imperfect and tentative representations of what 
the world should be like […], representations whose principal defensible function is 
that they trigger off debate among real men about real problems…’ It appears that 
a primary role of formalization is to spin new stories; set actions in motion; 
announce beginnings, milestones, and ends; and trigger changes of course 
(Avadikyan, 2001; Eccles and Nohria, 1992; Weick, 1995).  
 
By fuelling interaction, formalization helps individuals to ‘express their opinions 
and beliefs, engage in constructive confrontations, and challenge each other’s 
viewpoints’ (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 341). Co-production of formal documents 
might lead participants in interorganizational relationships to share and synthesize 
knowledge, so that implicitly held assumptions might surface (Kotabe et al., 2003). 
Kale et al. (2001: 466), for example, remarked that formal documents enable 
sharing and dialogue, which ‘facilitates creation of insights and ideas to manage 
future alliance situations more effectively.’ Zollo et al. (2002: 703) add that as 
participants in interorganizational relationships work through the operational 
details of a collaborative agreement, they ‘develop a more refined understanding 
of each other’s cultures, management systems, capabilities, weaknesses, and so 
forth’. As formalization entails arguing, listening to one another, working to 
reconcile differences, and commitment to revisiting and updating guidelines for 
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action, it might also lead to deeper knowledge (see Weick, 2004), and common 
frames of meaning (see Weick and Roberts, 1993). Negotiation and contracting 
processes thereby offer ‘an opportunity for the parties to come to know one 
another and their own and the other party’s expectations about the relationship’ 
(Hill and King, 2004: 898). Formalization thus ‘accomplishes part of its purpose not 
just with the words agreed upon,’ but also ‘with the words discussed and ultimately 
rejected’ (Hill, 2001a: 56). Moreover, formalization can lead to learning by acting 
as a target for contraction (Stinchcombe, 2001). By updating formal tools or 
systems, cooperating organizations might be able to form and redefine their 
understanding of the determinants of performance outcomes (Zollo and Singh, 
2004), something which is less likely to take place in cases in which formalization 
is absent, as there is less material available to improve upon. In summary, by 
provoking and shaping interaction, formalization can be instrumental in allowing 
participants in the relationship to learn, anticipate, and adapt over time (Simons, 
1990), helping them to give and make sense. 
 
Enhancing completeness and consistency and reducing judgment errors 
Finally, we wish to illustrate that formalization facilitates sensegiving and 
sensemaking by enhancing the completeness and consistency of the images that 
participants in interorganizational relationships have of the relationships in which 
they are engaged and of the collaborative contexts in which these are embedded. 
Formalization raises the likelihood that relevant information is considered, and 
treated properly (Naur, 1982). It helps to make sure that important elements are 
“taken into account”, and that inconsistencies and incoherences are uncovered 
and eliminated (Avadikyan et al., 2001; Hafsi and Thomas, 1958). In particular, by 
articulating and formalizing issues, developments in people’s mental models 
become more consistent (Forrester, 1975), reducing the likelihood that 
misunderstandings occur and that inadequate perceptions of interorganizational 
reality develop. Consistency is further enhanced by the fact that formalization 
requires that firms adopt relatively unambiguous proxies for desired behavior so 
that deviations are clearly verifiable (Carson et al., 2006). Furthermore, by both 
stimulating forward-looking and backward-looking at the same time (Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000) formalization might lead to the emergence of more coherent 
pictures of interorganizational reality. Formalization’s role in enhancing the 
completeness and consistency with which issues are contemplated by participants 
in interorganizational relationships is reinforced by the fact that formalization 
processes are frequently sensitive to the ideas and interests of multiple persons. 
In as far as formalization involves the input and deliberation of several persons, it 
may result in a more nuanced, consummate, and consistent picture than that 
rendered by non-formal actions (Katz and Kahn, 1966). It may correct, for 
example, for deficiencies in individual thought processes, emanating from our 
position within social space, our tendency towards global and undifferentiated 
thinking, cognitive nearsightedness, and oversimplified notions of causation (Katz 
and Kahn, 1966; Ketokivi and Catañer, 2004). To recap, formalization may 
increase the levels of consistency and completeness with which issues are 
covered, and it may reduce the impact of individuals’ judgment errors, both of 
which facilitate sensegiving and sensemaking. 
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The common denominator of the foregoing illustrations is that they indicate how 
structuring practices, such as formalization, render a clear and well-understood 
image of interorganizational relationships and the collaborative contexts in which 
they are embedded (see Weick, 1993, 1995; Weick and Roberts, 1993). It appears 
that acts of formalization drive patterns of sensemaking (Balogun and Johnson, 
2004), and that they entail the potential to overcome differences in the cognitive 
representations possessed by participants in interorganizational relationships. 
Stated otherwise, formalization serves as a means by which participants in 
interorganizational relationships and other stakeholders give and make sense of 
their relationships and the collaborative contexts in which these are embedded. 
This description of formalization strongly resembles descriptions of sensegiving 
and sensemaking as “guided and controlled” processes. The advantage of such 
forms of sensegiving and sensemaking is that unitary and rich accounts of reality 
can be created, providing ‘common foundations for action’ and enabling ‘the 
emergence of series of actions with a consistent focus’ (Maitlis, 2005: 28). 
 
5.4 Sensemaking versus coordination, control & legitimacy 
 
One of Weick’s remarks suggests that formalization’s sensegiving and 
sensemaking function has a closer affinity with coordination, control, and 
legitimacy than is signified by the word and, as ‘to make sense of something is to 
begin to provide a plausible platform for sharing mental models, coordinating 
activities, and interacting to produce relationships’ (Weick, 2001: 95). This 
assertion is supported by work from Zollo and Singh (2004) indicating that 
formalization entails high cognitive demands in negotiation and contracting 
phases, which could possibly provide the basic cognitive infrastructure permitting 
individuals and groups to effectively integrate and coordinate their behaviors with 
those of others (Bigley and Roberts, 2001; see also Weick and Roberts, 1993). By 
formalizing issues, participants in interorganizational relationships define and 
frame a collaborative situation. They create ‘a solid understanding of the business, 
share a common fact base, and agree on important assumptions’ (Kaplan and 
Beinhocker, 2003: 72). This not only determines what they consider and what they 
ignore, but it also forms the basis for coordination, control, and legitimization 
efforts (see Lindenberg, 2003). After all, collaboration generally requires that 
participants have a view of their shared situation that is ‘fairly detailed, rich, and 
inclusive of the actions of other’ (Dougherty and Takacs, 2004: 578). Similarly, in 
order to achieve coordination, control, and legitimacy by means of formalization, it 
becomes almost imperative that facets of interorganizational relationships are 
clearly represented (Rose and Miller 1992)18, or ‘rendered knowable in a particular 
way’ (Townley, 1998: 193).  
                                                 
18 Rose and Miller (1992: 185) provide a more general account of the representation of 
reality by means of formalities. They contend that economic actors depend upon a huge 
labor of inscription, which renders reality into a calculable form. ‘By means of inscription, 
reality is made stable, mobile, comparable, and combinable, and it is rendered in a form in 
which it can be debated and diagnosed’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 185). 
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Written reports, contracts, rules and procedures represent interorganizational 
reality in a form that is relatively stable, mobile, comparable, combinable, and 
calculable. They enable debate, diagnosis, management, evaluation, and 
programming of interorganizational issues, and help to “bring relationships into 
being” (Clegg et al., 2002; Rose and Miller, 1992). They create a state of the world 
(Hill 2001a), a collective consciousness (Clegg et al., 2002a)19, and a common 
reality (Hardy et al., 2005), by extending cooperating organizations’ ability to 
understand each other’s intentions, actions, and behavior (Aulakh and Madhok, 
2002). Formalization also signals what should be monitored and in which areas 
ideas should be proposed and tested (Simons, 1990), and it contributes to the 
construction of a collective identity. The latter enables participants in 
interorganizational relationships to ‘construct themselves, the problem, and the 
solution as part of a collaborative framework in which the potential for joint action 
is both significant and beneficial’ (Hardy et al., 2005: 63). Formalization aimed at 
sensegiving and sensemaking thus reduces the cognitive disorder experienced by 
interorganizational stakeholders (McKinley and Scherer, 2000). This not only 
increases the extent to which coordination and control become possible, but it also 
augments participants’ comfort with the relationships in which they are involved. 
Consequently, the likelihood that they grant support and resources to these 
relationships increases. In other words, we argue that formalization’s functioning 
as a means to give and make sense enhances the ability of participants to 
coordinate, control and legitimate interorganizational activities and outcomes. 
 
We realize that the development of formal contracts, processes, and procedures 
aimed at coordination of interorganizational activities, control of opportunistic 
behavior by partner organizations, or legitimization of the relationship with internal 
and external stakeholders might have unanticipated side-effects. Attempts to 
coordinate, control and legitimize are likely to lead to new insights, and reduce the 
degree of ambiguity and equivocality experienced by participants in 
interorganizational relationships “retrospectively”. This implies that acts of 
formalization aimed at giving and making sense and acts of formalization 
purported at one of the other functions are closely intertwined. When coordination, 
control, and legitimacy issues are settled by means of formalization, for example, 
the magnitude and number of decisions that can and have to be made is reduced, 
and the number of contingencies that participants in interorganizational 
relationships have to consider becomes severely restricted (McKinley and 
                                                 
19 Clegg et al (2002a), for example, argue that in accomplishing any collaborative project, 
parties to a contract have to interpret contractual documents. As they probably interpret 
these documents differently in first instance, they have to go through negotiation and 
contracting processes collectively to achieve a coherence model in which a collective 
consciousness, a shared understanding, and a common construction of interorganizational 
reality are created. Hardy et al. (2005: 66) notice that such common constructions of reality 
occur when participants ‘negotiate a general agreement regarding the causes, symptoms, 
assumptions, and potential solutions that relate to the issue around which the collaboration 
is formed’ – being an act of formalization. Such common constructions are necessary, as 
communication among participants is contradictory and confusing without them. 
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Scherer, 2000). The more restricted framing of interorganizational relationships 
and the collaborative contexts in which they are embedded significantly reduces 
the ambiguity and equivocality perceived by participants in such relationships, 
which subsequently facilitates sensegiving and sensemaking20. Our description of 
the interrelationships between formalization aimed at sensegiving and 
sensemaking and formalization directed at the other three functions resonates with 
a view of administrative activity as involving a self-fulfilling prophecy (Weick, 1979, 
1995). When levels of formalization aimed at coordinating activities, controlling the 
partner, and legitimizing the relationship are high, it becomes easier for 
participants in interorganizational relationships to give and make sense of the 
relationship and the collaborative environment, which again aids them in their 
efforts to coordinate, control, and legitimize. We capture this in a first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: The higher the extent of formalization aimed at giving and 
making sense of interorganizational relationships and the collaborative contexts in 
which they are embedded, the higher will be the extent of formalization aimed at 
achieving coordination, control, and legitimacy, and vice versa. 
 
5.5 The four functions and interorganizational performance 
 
Distinctions between the four functions of formalization become more pronounced 
when we consider their differential impacts on interorganizational performance. 
With respect to coordination and control, it has been recognized that formalization 
can have both positive and negative performance implications. Too little 
formalization might give rise to chaos, and too much formalization obstructs or 
impedes implementation (Miller et al., 2004), causes rigidity, and entails a loss of 
creativity and flexibility (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Scott, 2003; Volberda, 1998). In this 
respect, Mintzberg (1994: 386) notes that ‘formalization is a double-edged sword, 
easily reaching the point where help becomes hindrance,’ and Luo (2002: 916) 
remarks that ‘there exists an optimal point of contract completeness, after which 
its contribution to performance declines.’ In summary, excessive or dysfunctional 
attempts to coordinate and control are thought to impede interorganizational value 
creation and frustrate attempts to divide costs, risks and benefits. Such effects are 
exacerbated by the fact that formalization can contemporaneously stimulate the 
realization of potential gains by facilitating coordination, and weaken the incentives 
to do so by the focus on separate profit streams (Madhok, 2002). In line with this, 
we suppose that the use of formalization as a means to coordinate or control 
exhibits an inverted u-shaped relationship with interorganizational performance, 
which we capture in our second hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
20 Elfenbein and Lerner (2003: 369) add that contract terms can have multiple effects at the 
same time. They state that ‘contingent payments based on product sales, new subscribers, 
and other measures are included in many contracts. It is possible, that these payment 
systems are merely sophisticated methods of dividing the agreement’s surplus. It is also 
possible, however, that the payment terms themselves provide important incentives to the 
parties and thereby affect the value of the agreement’. 
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Hypothesis 5.2a: The extent to which formalization is used as a mechanism for 
coordination exhibits an inverted u-shaped relationship with interorganizational 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2b: The extent to which formalization is used as a mechanism for 
control exhibits an inverted u-shaped relationship with interorganizational 
performance. 
 
Formalization’s sensegiving and sensemaking function and formalization’s 
legitimacy function, instead, are argued to have a positive relationship with 
performance, although higher levels of clarity, understanding, and legitimacy, and 
lower levels of equivocality are expected to demonstrate diminishing returns. 
Sensegiving and sensemaking efforts assist interorganizational participants in 
realizing the full potential of the relationships they are engaged in. They help to 
envision how value can be created (Ariño and Ring, 2004), and assist in removing 
misunderstandings, information asymmetry, and opportunities for moral hazard 
and opportunistic behavior that potentially disturb equitable value claiming 
activities by parties within interorganizational relationships. Furthermore, 
sensemaking and understanding may lead to a more accurate appreciation of the 
risks involved in a transaction, which should result in the design of more 
appropriate governance structures (Ring and Van de Ven, 1989), and ensue in 
higher interorganizational performance. Ring (2000) adds that interorganizational 
relationships are more likely to be efficient and equitable if parties are careful to 
undertake appropriate levels of sensemaking, understanding, and committing 
processes during the course of negotiating, transacting, and managing their 
relationships (Ring and Rands, 1989; Ring and van de Ven, 1989, 1994). 
Similarly, a certain level of legitimacy is imperative for a prolific and cooperative 
relationship (Kale et al., 2001), as it foresees in a higher availability of resources 
and more commitment to the relationship by interorganizational stakeholders. 
However, when ambiguity and equivocality have been removed to a considerable 
extent already, and when internal and external stakeholders consider the 
relationship as reasonably legitimate, additional sensegiving and sensemaking 
efforts, and further attempts to enhance the legitimacy of a cooperative endeavor, 
are proposed to have only marginal impacts on interorganizational performance. 
More thorough clarification by means of formalization can only lead to small 
refinements in participants’ images of value creation opportunities, while additional 
attempts to legitimize the relationship only reinforce the confidence and validity 
already attributed to it. As benefits are particularly high at low degrees of 
formalization for both the legitimacy function and the sensemaking function, and 
as increases in the degree of formalization lead to higher costs, the net effect of 
both forms of formalization may best be depicted by an inverted u-shaped function 
that exhibits a very steep course of development in the beginning, and a very long 
right-hand tail. These assertions are captured in hypothesis 5.3.  
 
Hypothesis 5.3a: The extent to which formalization is used as a means to 
legitimize an interorganizational relationship has an inverted u-shaped relationship 
94 
with interorganizational performance, exhibiting a very steep course of 
development in the beginning, and a very long right-hand tail. 
 
Hypothesis 5.3b: The extent to which formalization is used as a means to give 
and make sense of interorganizational relationships and the collaborative 
environments in which they are embedded has an inverted u-shaped relationship 
with interorganizational performance, exhibiting a very steep course of 
development in the beginning, and a very long right-hand tail. 
 
5.6 Moderating effects of time and context 
 
The foregoing arguments do not indicate which functions of formalization are most 
conducive to various collaborative contexts and stages of interorganizational 
development. To obtain insights on this issue, we here distinguish between 
exploration and exploitation context and exploration and exploitation stages (Koza 
and Lewin, 1998; March, 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). These moderators 
are simultaneously discussed here, as interorganizational activities tend to shift 
from exploration towards exploitation over time (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
Innovations and new initiatives, for example, eventually require commercialization. 
Furthermore, learning tends to take place, which raises the efficiency with which 
partners jointly deploy their resources (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Zollo et al., 2002). 
Having presumed this, we expect that the need for each of the four functions, and 
the ability to fulfill these needs by means of formalization differ for exploration and 
exploitation contexts, and stages of development. To construct our argument 
further, we have to clarify what we mean by exploration and exploitation. 
Exploration involves innovation, risk taking, building new capabilities, learning, and 
entering new lines of business (Koza and Lewin, 1998). In exploratory contexts 
and stages of development, employees need “slack” to discover, innovate, 
discuss, and experiment (e.g. March, 1991). Partners are primarily assessing each 
other’s competencies and the value of interaction (Jap and Ganesan, 2000), and 
they try to develop understandings of their new situation (Ring, 2000). Exploitation, 
on the other hand, is associated with enlarging the productivity of capital and 
assets by improving and refining existing capabilities and technologies, 
standardization, routinization, and systematic cost reduction (Koza and Lewin, 
1998; March, 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). The general thrust of our 
argument is then, that formalization is focused consecutively on facilitating 
sensegiving and sensemaking, and increasing interorganizational legitimacy in 
exploration stages and contexts, while aiming at coordination and enabling control 
in exploitation stages and contexts. 
 
In exploration stages and contexts, the need for sensegiving and sensemaking 
and the need for legitimacy are most salient, as expectations of prospective 
partners might be incompatible (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), and differences in 
background, experience, and culture can lead to ambiguity, equivocality, and 
conflict (see Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Moreover, in early stages of development, 
multi-organizational projects rarely involve a high degree of coherence and unity of 
purpose (Flyvbjerg, 1998), and participants in the relationship still have to come to 
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appreciate the potential for transacting with each other (Ariño and Ring, 2004). 
Organizations are ‘testing the goal compatibility, integrity, and performance of the 
other, as well as potential obligations, benefits, and burdens involved with working 
together on a long-term basis’ (Jap and Ganesan, 2000: 244). This is even more 
pertinent in cross-sector collaborations, which often ‘bring into tension and conflict 
extraordinarily complex ways of framing problems, as well as divergent knowledge 
and truth claims based on competing disciplinary paradigms….’ (Couchman and 
Fulop, 2002: 43). Especially in these situations, the creation of coherent 
understandings that enable collective action is important and challenging (Maitlis, 
2005; Weick, 1993). In the exploration stage, formalization can thus assist in 
determining whether interorganizational members have a common understanding 
(Simon, 1997), and whether there are decisions that need to be made and what 
those decisions might consist of (Weick, 2001). Besides, formalization can prevent 
parties from simply starting a relationship immediately, without a solid basis. By 
forcing articulation of issues critical to alliance success, such as goals, frameworks 
to deal with unexpected contingencies and explicit expectations of each partner, 
formalization can temper hubris and faddishness, and assist organizations in 
considering the consequences of engaging in a relationship (Sampson, 2003). 
This effect is particularly pronounced for organizations with little common history to 
rely on (see Weick, 2001). Findings from Fryxell et al. (2002) indicating that formal 
controls have a more positive relationship with international joint venture 
performance in younger rather than in older relationship provide support for the 
fact that sensemaking and legitimacy are functions of formalization that are 
particularly relevant in early stages of cooperation. As partners get to know each 
other better and information asymmetries are being reduced, the need for 
signaling and sensemaking diminishes (Heide, 2003). 
 
In the exploitation stage, the basis for the relationship has been defined. In this 
stage, issues become more clear-cut (see Koza and Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2004). Parties to the relationship are likely to have a reasonable picture of 
the business proposal underlying their collaboration, and they have developed 
joint understandings that allow for uniquely efficient communication in the form of 
idiosyncratic interaction routines (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2005; Kotabe et al., 2003; Zollo et al., 2002). They have also come to know more 
about each other’s structure, operations and competencies (Shenkar and Zeira, 
1992), which enhances their ability to formalize (e.g. see Mayer and Argyres, 
2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In this respect, Zollo et al. (2002: 703) note that a 
‘key body of knowledge accumulated during alliance activity concerns the 
partnering organizations themselves’ reducing the need for sensegiving and 
sensemaking in exploitation contexts and stages. This can be illustrated with 
Ring’s (1997) description of collaborations between 3M, NASA and a firm called 
Beta Trading, in which early stages of negotiation and commitment had resulted in 
trust, a free flow of information, speaking the same language, and mechanisms for 
private ordering. Ring (1997: 298) concluded that, as a result, ‘the need for 
extensive sensemaking, understanding, and committing processes during 
administrative phases was […] reduced.’ In general, he notes that once the details 
of a cooperative interorganizational relationship are established in the 
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transactional phases, ‘sensemaking and understanding processes, although 
ongoing, will be less intense than those that occur during transactional phases, at 
least until problems arise’ (Ring 1997: 299). 
 
Conversely, in exploration stages and contexts, interorganizational relationship are 
sometimes hardly amenable to management – that is, installation and 
implementation of coordination and control mechanisms is usually inappropriate – 
as participants in interorganizational relationships still need to form themselves 
cognitive representations of the relationship. In these situations, formalization 
aimed at coordination and control is not very beneficial, because expected returns 
and activities might be highly variable and very unclear (Cardinal, 2001; March, 
1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), and because formalities may discourage 
creative ideas and innovative developments. This assertion coincides with Oxley’s 
(1997) observation that if the purpose of a contract or alliance is the creation 
rather than exploitation of technology, adequate specification of rights will 
inevitably be problematic. Child (1975: 13) adds that ‘in conditions of high 
variability in the environment, successful performance is likely to depend on […] 
avoidance of heavily formalized systems of organization, in so far as these are 
built upon standard procedures and red-tape which tend to shape activities on 
precedence rather than of new changing requirements.’ In these situations, 
interorganizational partners might feel the need for coordination and control, but 
they simply lack the ability to design appropriate formalities (Gerwin, 2004; Helm 
and Kloyer, 2004). Exploitation contexts and stages, instead, are frequently 
associated with the transformation and exploitation of existing knowledge, which is 
facilitated by formalization (Jansen et al., 2005). As the exploitation of simple 
strategies and existing knowledge demands predictability, control, and high 
degrees of conformity, interorganizational partners become more inclined to use 
rules and other formal control mechanisms to attain coordination and control. 
Consequently, we propose that formalization as a means to give and make sense 
has a more positive influence on interorganizational performance in exploratory 
contexts and stages of development, compared to exploitation contexts and 
stages of development. In contrast, we expect that the relationship between 
formalization as a means to coordinate and control is less positive in exploratory 
contexts and stages of development compared to situations characterized by 
exploitation. These assertions are captured in hypotheses 5.4a to 5.4d. 
  
Hypothesis 5.4a: The relationship between the extent of formalization aimed at 
coordination and interorganizational performance is negatively (positively) 
moderated by the degree to which these relationships take place in exploratory 
contexts (exploitation contexts), and the degree to which they are in their 
exploratory stages (exploitation stages). 
 
Hypothesis 5.4b: The relationship between the extent of formalization aimed at 
control and interorganizational performance is negatively (positively) moderated by 
the degree to which these relationships take place in exploratory contexts 
(exploitation contexts), and the degree to which they are in their exploratory 
stages (exploitation stages). 
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Hypothesis 5.4c: The relationship between the extent of formalization aimed at 
achieving interorganizational legitimacy and interorganizational performance is 
positively (negatively) moderated by the degree to which these relationships take 
place in exploratory contexts (exploitation contexts), and the degree to which they 
are in their exploratory stages (exploitation stages). 
 
Hypothesis 5.4d: The relationship between the extent of formalization aimed at 
sensegiving and sensemaking and interorganizational performance is positively 
(negatively) moderated by the degree to which these relationships take place in 
exploratory contexts (exploitation contexts), and the degree to which they are in 
their exploratory stages (exploitation stages). 
 
5.7 Discussion 
 
This theme was born out of the observation that understanding ‘why economic 
agents use contracts […] is crucial to understanding the organization and 
efficiency of economic exchange’ (Masten and Saussier, 2002: 273). It was 
denominated “functions of formalization”, because it concerned the underlying 
reasons or rationales for instituting formal interorganizational structures and 
practices. In this chapter, we have taken issue with the observation that existing 
studies tend to focus either on formalization as a means to coordinate, a means to 
control or a means to legitimize (see for instance Gulati and Singh, 1998; Madhok, 
2002; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Salbu, 1997; Kale et al., 2002), generally passing 
over the fact that formalization might have other functions (e.g. for notable 
exceptions see, for example, Ariño and Ring, 2004; Lindenberg, 2003; Zollo and 
Singh, 2004). Closer inspection of the functions of formalization appeared 
necessary, as several authors suggest that there is a need for alternative 
explanations and novel understandings of formal structures and practices (Hatch, 
1999; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Simons, 1990, 1995). Moreover, as we expected 
that multiple functions of formalization co-exist, it became requisite to examine 
how these functions are related to each other (see Madhok, 2002), how they 
influence interorganizational performance, and in which contexts and for which 
temporal stages each of the functions is most important. We captured these 
considerations in the following research questions. 
 
RQ3:  What are the functions of formalization? 
 
RQ4: How do these functions relate to each other? 
 
RQ5:   What is their relationship with interorganizational performance? 
 
RQ6: What is the relative importance of each of these functions in different 
collaborative contexts and stages of interorganizational development? 
 
Key findings 
By embracing broad conceptual categories, we were able to theorize beyond the 
narrow boundaries of single theoretical lenses supportive of the coordination, 
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control, and legitimacy functions of formalization. We argued that formalization 
assists participants and stakeholders in interorganizational relationships in giving 
and making sense of relationships and the collaborative contexts in which they are 
embedded. We showed how formalization accommodates several distinguishing 
features of sensemaking such as ‘its genesis in disruptive ambiguity [e.g. the 
initiation of a new relationship], its beginnings in acts of noticing and bracketing 
[e.g. writing things down], its mixture of retrospect and prospect [e.g. looking 
forward and looking backward] […, and] its culmination in articulation that shades 
into acting’ [formalization as a basis for coordination and control] (Weick et al., 
2005: 413). We also advanced that formalization’s sensegiving and sensemaking 
function is more pronounced in exploratory contexts and early stages of 
cooperation, whereas the coordination and control functions of formalization 
dominate in exploitation contexts and later stages of development. In conclusion, 
the chapter moves beyond formalization’s functions of coordination, control and 
legitimacy, thereby opening up a new way of thinking about the meaning of 
formalization for the management of interorganizational relationships. 
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
Our description indicates that research on formalization in interorganizational 
relationships may benefit from embracing the inherent qualities of the process of 
formalization itself, and from changing its focus on contracts, rules and procedures 
to an emphasis on the processes from which these formalities originate (see also 
Langley, 1988; Mintzberg, 1994). Besides, our exposition serves to redirect 
researchers’ attention from coercive towards enabling types of formalization (see 
Adler and Borys, 1996; Zollo and Winter, 2002) in which higher levels of 
understanding (Zollo and Singh, 2004) and the constitution of meaning (Giddens, 
1984) take up a more central position, and for which assumptions of opportunism 
and self-interest are no longer imperative. Moreover, as we have shown that 
formalization can assume diverse functions, in future, any act of formalization 
must be considered as ambivalent in the sense that it is a vehicle of several 
functions (Avadikyan, 2001). Consequently, more research attention could be 
directed to the intentions underlying managers’ decisions to formalize, and to the 
interpretations that partners give to each other’s actions. Chalos and O’Connor 
(2004) show that such research is promising. In their study on control mechanisms 
in US-Chinese joint ventures, US partners viewed particular controls to be useful 
for the selective transmission and protection of their knowledge, while Chinese 
partners viewed the same controls as a means to protect their relation-specific 
investments. Furthermore, our conceptualization of formalization rejects common 
beliefs that the degree of formalization necessarily has to be low in uncertain 
situations for which measurability is low (Galbraith, 1973; Lassar and Kerr, 1996; 
Ouchi, 1979; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Shane, 1996; Williamson, 1985). Although 
we acknowledge that this might hold for formalization directed at coordination and 
control, we suggest it does not apply to formalization aimed at increasing 
legitimacy or at enabling sensegiving and sensemaking (see also theme one). We 
even argued that these functions of formalization are probably more salient in 
ambiguous and exploratory contexts, thereby creating a plausible account for acts 
of formalization that appear inappropriate from coordination, control or legitimacy 
99 
perspectives. The co-existence of each of the four functions and their 
interrelationships indicates that formalization tends to serve a number of functions 
at the same time (Foss and Foss, 2005; Madhok, 2002), and that either-or 
discussions on formalization’s functioning are probably unproductive (Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). This implies that researchers and practitioners should not 
let one perspective on formalization rule their thinking. 
 
Limitations and opportunities for future research  
Several opportunities for future research arise. First, we encourage attempts to 
test our framework empirically. Researchers conducting these tests should 
preferably make use of research settings in which surveys, observations, 
interviews and document analyses are combined, because such an approach is 
likely to offer more varied insights on formalization’s functioning. Another avenue 
for further research could be to investigate to what extent escalating momentum in 
interorganizational relationships may prohibit formalization’s sensemaking function 
to come to fruition. Analogue to acquisitions (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986), for 
example, participants in interorganizational relationships may exhibit an escalating 
desire to complete formation processes quickly, which may result in premature 
solutions, limited consideration of integration issues, and a lower chance to attain 
successful outcomes (see Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Finally, our review of the 
functions of formalization shows that there is room for some consolidation, or ‘at 
least some potential for bridges between, and a fruitful dialogue among the 
seemingly diverse contributions to the study of interorganizational relations’ (Oliver 
and Ebers, 1998: 570). In particular, other theories than those described in this 
chapter may be subsumed under the coordination, control, legitimacy or 
sensemaking perspectives distinguished here. 
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6 THEME 3 – DUALITY & DIALECTIC TENSIONS 
 
 
‘From a dialectical perspective, then, specific theories are not in any simple sense to be set 
aside. Rather they are to be superseded in a more encompassing framework.’ 
 
Benson, 1977: 17 
 
Summary 
Generic perspectives on the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships presume that contracts, rules and procedures are directed at 
coordination and control, and that their influence on interorganizational 
performance is contingent upon firm-level and transaction, or relational level 
factors. In response to recent calls for research on dialectics in interorganizational 
relationships (De Rond and Bouchikhi 2004; Vieira da Cunha et al. 2002), a 
complementary perspective on formalization is being developed. We propose that 
alliance managers face a duality when deciding which degree of formalization is 
most appropriate for their relationships, as they simultaneously anticipate various 
functions and dysfunctions of formalization. The actual degree of formalization 
pertaining to collaborative relationships is therefore likely to eventuate in dialectic 
tensions that have to be managed. A case study of an alliance between a major 
European financial services firm and one of the world’s leading retailers reveals 
that alliance managers capitalize on these tensions in at least three ways. First, 
they alternately emphasize different formalization-requirements by each of the 
partner firms. Second, they refer to factors largely beyond their own control when 
justifying their decisions to formalize. Finally, they apply a kind of semi-structures, 
by avoiding concurrent formalization of outcomes and processes. These findings 
illustrate that a dialectic perspective offers a promising complement to existing 
perspectives on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Although originating from studies on an intra-organizational level, researchers in 
the field of interorganizational management have become more and more 
interested in the concept of formalization and its myriad manifestations (e.g. see 
Grandori, 1997; Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sampson, 2003; Williamson, 
1985). Hitherto, the majority of these studies exhibit a rather mechanistic 
character, paying little attention to the issues alliance managers face when 
deciding on the extent to which contracts, rules and procedures have to be 
applied. Explanations of the degree to which contracts, rules and procedures are 
applied in interorganizational relationships derived from, among others, behavioral 
theory, the dynamic capabilities school, transaction cost theory, and agency theory 
all refer to ‘operational contingencies’ (see Child, 1997). These theories 
presuppose that levels of formalization have to be aligned with transaction, 
organization, or contextual characteristics and attributes, in order to guarantee that 
appropriate levels of coordination and control are exercised, and to fuel 
interorganizational performance (e.g. Gulati and Singh 1998; Williamson, 1985). 
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Such perspectives confine management’s role to guaranteeing optimal alignment, 
and they do not explicitly recognize the intervening quality of decision-making 
(Child, 1997). They remain agnostic to the fact that structural situational 
characteristics can only have consequences for the governance of 
interorganizational relations through managerial actions (Noorderhaven et al., 
1998). Barley (1986), for example, found that managerial actions can act as strong 
mediators between structures and contextual and technological characteristics 
that are believed to influence those structures. This provokes the question as to 
how our understanding of the relationship between formalization and 
interorganizational performance would change, if more attention were granted to 
managerial choice. 
 
Consistent with conceptualizations of formalization as being the result of a trade-
off (Galbraith, 1977; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Heide, 1994), and in response to 
recent calls for inquiries into a dialectic perspective on interorganizational 
cooperation (e.g. Das and Teng, 2000; De Rond, 2003; De Rond and Bouchiki, 
2004; Vieira da Cunha et al., 2002), we develop a complementary perspective on 
the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We regard 
interorganizational relationships as a unity of opposites (see Das and Teng, 2000), 
implying that interorganizational managers are confronted with ‘contradictory 
values which compete with each other’ (Van de Ven, 1992: 178). We also 
embrace the possibility that formalization concurrently exhibits functions and 
dysfunctions (e.g. see Blau, 1955; Cardinal et al., 2004; Das and Teng, 1998; Luo, 
2002; Mintzberg, 1994; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In line with this, we argue that 
managers of interorganizational relationships anticipate certain functions and 
dysfunctions of formalization, and that their decisions to formalize eventuate in 
dialectic tensions that demand managerial attention. In this chapter, we therefore 
focus on the areas that have been shaded in the research framework depicted in 
Figure 6.1. We primarily pay attention to the positive and negative consequences 
of formalization and the tension that arises due to their co-existence, and we ask 
ourselves how managers of interorganizational relationships cope with tensions 
arising from the co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions? 
 
By investigating this issue, we make two distinctive contributions to the literature 
on interorganizational governance. First, based on the conceptual framework 
presented in Figure 6.2, we furnish an overview and categorization of the functions 
and dysfunctions of formalization. This overview elucidates the duality with which 
managers of interorganizational relationships are confronted when deciding on the 
level of formalization that is most appropriate for the relationships they manage. 
Our description of this duality offers a more realistic and robust view of 
interorganizational cooperation than is offered in more “traditional” perspectives 
(see Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). We move beyond the coordination and 
control effects of formalization commonly put forward in the literature (e.g. see 
Gulati and Singh, 1998; Madhok, 2002; Salbu, 1997), and illuminate 
formalization’s linkages with cognition and learning, legitimacy, and long-run 
developments. Our review reveals that formalization is still relevant, but has partly 
assumed new meanings (consistent with Vieira da Cunha et al., 2002). 
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Second, and congruent with calls from Hatch (1999) and work by Meyer and 
Rowan (1977), we offer alternative ways of looking at organizational structures 
and structuring practices. We complement coordination and control perspectives 
on formalization, which presume that the level of formalization is contingent upon 
contextual attributes and task characteristics (see Child, 1997), with a dialectic 
perspective, emphasizing management’s role in coping with the tensions 
emanating from formalization’s dual character. Like Katz and Kahn (1966: 222) we 
are both led to an attitude of great respect for formal organization, while at the 
same time we face up to its deficiencies. Our findings suggests that 
interorganizational performance is not solely the resultant of formalization’s 
functions and dysfunctions, but also of managers’ ability to cope with the tensions 
emanating from its inherently dual character. In this sense, introducing a dialectic 
perspective adds an extra theoretical layer to the study of structuring processes in 
interorganizational relationships. Although the interorganizational literature is 
‘relatively void of dialectical approaches’ (De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004: 58), 
juxtaposing such a perspective alongside the mainstream literature provides the 
theoretical depth needed to fully exemplify the competing forces eventuating from 
it (Das and Teng, 2000). A dialectic perspective has the advantage of being 
comprehensive and integrative (Das and Teng, 2000; Quinn, 1988). It enables one 
to address tensions stemming from the simultaneous existence of several 
apparent inconsistencies (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), and resonates with pleas 
for more research on the co-evolution of organizations and their partners (Koza 
and Lewin, 1998; Volberda and Lewin, 2003). 
Need to 
formalize 
Ability to 
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Positive 
consequences
Negative 
consequences
Degree of  
formalization 
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Other 
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Inter- 
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FIGURE 6.1 
Research framework – theme three 
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The chapter is organized according to the following structure. First, based on 
Figure 6.2, we explain what is understood by a dialectic perspective on 
formalization, and we indicate how it differs from the generic perspectives 
currently prevailing in the literature. Subsequently, we provide an overview of the 
functions and dysfunctions of formalization, which stand at the basis of such a 
dialectic perspective. Following this, we present a case study of an alliance 
between a major European financial services organization and one of the world’s 
largest retailers, which has been established to distribute financial services 
throughout a retail channel. The case provides an illustration of the dialectic 
perspective on formalization presented in Figure 6.2. Consistent with De Rond and 
Bouchiki (2004: 67), it demonstrates how alliance managers capitalize on the 
tensions between formalization’s functions and dysfunctions, a process that helps 
to ‘shape an alliance trajectory.’ We show that alliance-managers capitalize on 
these tensions in at least three ways. 
 
6.2 Dialectic versus coordination & control perspectives 
 
Coordination and control perspectives on formalization, in general, have caused 
researchers to strive to determine what are the single best governance solutions 
for particular relationships (Long et al., 2002), and it has led them to argue that a 
particular level of formalization should be used over another, depending upon a 
given activity or context (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Ouchi, 
1979)21. For example, transaction costs economists (e.g. Klein, 2000; Klein et al., 
1978; Williamson, 1985) have put forward that formalization and other governance 
efforts are determined by transaction characteristics such as levels of uncertainty, 
asset-specificity, and the frequency with which partners exchange goods or 
services. Agency theorists, forming another example, have argued that the extent 
of formalization that is applied depends on the measurability of a transaction, and 
on organizations’ abilities to specify tasks (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Furthermore, 
advocates of dynamic capabilities and competence schools (e.g. Colombo, 2003) 
suggest that governance efforts, including formalization, are contingent upon the 
capabilities and competences of the partners involved in a relationship. 
Proponents of several other schools follow similar lines of reasoning, contending 
that the level of formalization applied is determined by, and has to be aligned with, 
transaction, organization, or contextual characteristics and attributes (Child and 
McGrath, 2001; Noorderhaven et al., 1998). 
 
In such studies, differentiation models are used that polarize contradictory 
perspectives in an effort to ascertain which position is correct (Peng and Nisbett, 
1999). Relationship between formalization and context and task characteristics are 
either found or not found, and contradictory perspectives are not allowed to creep 
                                                 
21 Theories generated by administrative researchers exhibit a serious shortcoming in that 
they do not take into account that managers of excellent companies seem to have a 
capacity for dealing with paradox. ‘In order to be internally consistent, theories tend to 
eliminate contradiction’ (Quinn, 1988: 27). 
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in, or they are simply rationalized and solved (Farson, 1996). However, by doing 
so, we fail to sustain the tension inherent in most managerial problems. This can 
lead to schismogenesis, ‘a process of self-reinforcement in which attributes of the 
organization perpetuate themselves until they become dysfunctional’ (Volberda, 
1998: 75)22. Besides, it merely leads to a focus on the origins of structuring 
choices, neglecting arguments of Merton (1957) and Blau (1955) for investigating 
the consequences of structuring choices. In this spirit, Friedberg (2000) calls for 
abandoning the either-or syndrome, and Child and McGrath (2001: 1144) argue 
that scholars ‘must learn to allow contradictions to remain, stepping away from the 
modernist principles of alignment and congruence.’ 
 
Adopting a dialectic perspective, in contrast, denotes awareness of the 
simultaneous presence of opposites, and the replacement of either-or conceptions 
with both-and constructs (Lewis, 2000; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). In line with 
this, formalization is conceptualized separately from its functions and dysfunctions 
(Blau, 1955; Merton, 1957), and from interorganizational performance (see Figure 
6.2). We thus take the position that formalization’s consequences are not 
inherently positive or negative, and that singular functions or dysfunctions do not 
constitute interorganizational performance in its entirety. The latter results in an 
extension of existing conceptualizations of dialectic tensions, in which broad 
terms, such as “competition” and “cooperation,” “stability” and “change”, or 
“flexibility” and “control” are set off against each other (see Das and Teng, 2000; 
De Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004; Volberda, 1996, 1998; Yan and Gray, 2001). 
Moreover, we suggest that alliance managers anticipate various functions and 
dysfunctions of formalization when contemplating on the degree of formalization 
that is most appropriate for the situation at hand. They face a duality, as 
formalization has apparently contradictory effects on interorganizational 
performance (for arguments on the dual character of “flexibility”, which is often 
depicted as formalization’s antipode, see Volberda, 1996). The functions and 
dysfunctions of formalization that they anticipate are expected to be based on 
managers’ knowledge of and experience with formalization, something resonating 
with more general arguments on the effects of previous experience with various 
structuring practices on interorganizational performance (McGahan and Villalonga, 
2003). In the alliance capability literature, for example, it is suggested that the 
influence of alliance experience on interorganizational performance is mediated by 
an organization’s alliance capability (Draulans et al., 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Kale et al., 2002; Zollo and Winter, 2002). We expect that firms with more 
developed collaborative capabilities, and firms that have more experience with 
interorganizational cooperation know better what they are doing when embarking 
on new initiatives. This implies that formalization is not only triggered by objective 
factors, but also by social dynamics (see Barley, 1986). 
                                                 
22 We have to note that ‘thinking about contradiction is not a natural inclination. It requires 
counterintuitive processes’ (Quinn, 1988: 26). The natural tendency for people socialized 
around Western thought is to be “Schismogenic,” a term referring to arguments, theories, or 
perspectives in which one of two opposing but connected values is chosen over another 
(we prefer a pluralistic perspective, witnessing previous chapters). 
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As is depicted in Figure 6.2, we subsequently propose that the level of 
formalization that is actually applied entails several functions and dysfunctions, 
including unanticipated or latent consequences of formalization (see Barley, 1986; 
Blau, 1955; McKinley and Scherer, 2000). These functions and dysfunctions of 
formalization have previously been argued to jointly determine interorganizational 
performance. In particular, several authors have depicted the relationship between 
formalization and interorganizational performance as an inverted curve-linear path, 
presuming that too little formalization gives rise to chaos and that too much 
formalization leads to rigidity and a loss of creativeness (Katz and Kahn, 1966; 
Scott, 2003). In this respect, Mintzberg (1994: 386) notes that ‘formalization is a 
double-edged sword, easily reaching the point where help becomes hindrance,’ 
whereas Luo (2002: 916) suggests that ‘…there exists an optimal point of contract 
completeness, after which its contribution to performance declines.’ In this 
chapter, we reveal that the management of tensions arising from the co-existence 
of functions and dysfunctions of formalization constitutes an additional factor 
influencing interorganizational performance. We suggest that the influence of 
dialectic tensions on interorganizational performance is moderated by alliance 
managers’ abilities to capitalize on these tensions. This coincides with a 
description of managerial efforts directed at reducing the impact of dysfunctions on 
performance by Blau: 
 
‘When a social pattern has a series of consequences, its dysfunctions may be 
looked upon as the social costs of its contributions. Presumably, once the costs 
outweigh the functions, the pattern will be abandoned. Often, however, social 
action is more constructive and less patient. People attack troublesome conditions, 
even if they cannot, or will not eliminate the factors that produced them, and 
without waiting for a negative balance of their consequences’ (Blau, 1955: 13) 
 
By doing so, we do not negect that formalization might have more positive 
contributions to interorganizational performance in certain contexts and for certain 
task characteristics (see, for example, Burns and Stalker, 1961; Frederickson, 
1984; Frederickson and Mitchell, 1984), and that the number and magnitude of 
functions and dysfunctions may change over time (see, for instance, Cardinal et 
al., 2004). However, we presume that some tensions arising from formalization are 
simply inevitable or permanent. They stem from contradictory forces that are 
present simultaneously, beyond the will or power of management, and they have 
to be recognized and managed (Clegg et al., 2002b; Huxham and Beech, 2003). 
Formalization is simply expected to have dysfunctions in almost every situation, 
as ‘…an inevitable set of outcomes of administrative processes are conflict, 
misunderstanding, and changing expectations’ (Ring, 1997: 294). Internal or 
external stakeholders such as boards of directors or financiers, for example, might 
impose high levels of formalization, on a relationship. In that case, formalization 
probably fulfills a control function, but it might be dysfunctional at the same time, 
introducing rigidity in decision-making and provoking attempts of participants in 
collaborative relationships to cover themselves against all kinds of risks, and to 
pass on responsibilities. Similarly, formalization aimed at coordination and control 
has regularly been found to have unintended or unanticipated consequences 
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(Blau, 1955; Cardinal et al., 2004; Mintzberg, 1994), which are hard to circumvent 
or alleviate. It is not unthinkable, for instance, that formalization purported at 
enhancing the stability of a relationship and at minimizing the adverse effects of 
employee turnover (see De Rond, 2003), concurrently leads to distrust by a 
partner organization (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) and a reduction in the partners’ 
ability and willingness to adapt to change (Luo, 2002; Mintzberg, 1994). Congruent 
with this observation, formalization is sometimes presented as an oxymoron 
(Bijlsma-Frankema and Koopman, 2004), reminiscent of contracts, rules and 
procedures that unintendedly take up the character of an iron cage (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). By accepting the co-presence of opposites instead of adhering to 
extremes (Eisenhardt, 2000; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), it becomes possible to 
understand how alliance managers cope with the tensions inherent in their 
structuring choices and how they capitalize on the tensions between the functions 
and the dysfunctions of formalization.  
 
Applying such a view involves the observation of the principles of simultaneity, 
locality, minimality, and generality (Benson, 1977; Vieira da Cunha et al., 2002). 
According to Vieira da Cunha et al. (2002), simultaneity means that we accept 
views that are grounded on the interplay between contradictory forces and not on 
attempts to subdue one view to another. Locality implies that the synthesis 
between two opposing poles of formalization’s effects results from case-by-case 
enactment. This suggests that managers have to cope with tensions in their daily 
activities, and that these cannot be solved or forestalled completely by clever 
organizational design. Minimality conveys that the ability to use the tensions 
between opposite poles derives from maintaining sufficient levels of each of the 
poles in order to avoid one taking over the other. Extreme levels of formalization, 
for example, have been argued to be less desirable than intermediate levels (Luo, 
2002; Mintzberg, 1994). Extremely low or high levels of formalization do not offer 
room for alliance managers to maneuver and cope with tensions, or they create 
tensions of a magnitude that are hardly amenable to management. Finally, 
generality pertains to the fact that the prescriptions used for managing tensions 
have to apply to a large range of situations (Vieira da Cunha et al., 2002). 
 
6.3 Functions and dysfunctions of formalization 
 
In this paragraph, we discern formalization’s functions from its dysfunctions. 
Functions are defined as ‘observed consequences of social patterns that change 
existing conditions in the direction of socially valued objectives,’ whereas 
dysfunctions, conversely, are ‘those observed consequences of social patterns 
that change existing conditions in the direction opposite to socially valued 
objectives or consequences that interfere with the attainment of valued objectives’ 
(Blau, 1955: 11). Before describing the various functions and dysfunctions 
associated with formalization, we note that functions of formalization can turn into 
dysfunctions in case extreme levels pertain. After all, distinctions between 
functions and dysfunctions eventually rest on value judgments (Blau, 1955). 
Formalization directed at coordination and control, for example, can turn into 
formalism, rigidity and inflexibility, while formalization aimed at legitimacy can 
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evoke suspicion and irritation. The distinction we make between formalization’s 
functions and dysfunctions does not become irrelevant, but one has to bear in 
mind that what seems to be a function can easily turn into a dysfunction (see 
Leonard-Barton (1992), and Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) for comparable 
arguments on core competences and core rigidities, and alliance capabilities). 
 
The abundant attention for the dysfunctions of formalization in recent literature has 
led some researchers to argue that ‘the pervasiveness of the view that control is 
inherently negative has limited our ability to further explore how control may help 
solve [the] unique challenges of managing’ (Cardinal, 2001: 31). However, our 
review of the literature on both the intra- and the interorganizational level discloses 
rationales that are commonly brought forward for instigating and for abstaining 
from formal processes and procedures. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the 
functions and dysfunctions of formalization, their elements, and several of the key 
references associated with them. In the remainder of this paragraph, we briefly 
discuss each of formalization’s functions, including those that are advanced in the 
mainstream governance literature, such as coordination and control, and functions 
of formalization that are recognized less often, such as enabling cognition and 
learning, and obtaining legitimacy. Subsequently, we discuss formalization’s 
dysfunctions. 
 
Cognition & learning: formalization as a means to give and make sense 
A first function of formalization involves cognition and learning, as formalization 
serves as a means to give and make sense (for more details, see also the 
previous chapter). This function refers to formalization’s role in providing a set of 
stable and comprehensible expectations to participants in interorganizational 
relationships (see Cooray and Ratnatunga, 2001; Lindenberg, 2003; Shenkar and 
Zeira, 1992; Simonin, 1999). It concerns the fact that formalization adds clarity to 
their jobs (Podsakoff et al., 1986), affords them a collective structure from which to 
construct their actions (Weick and Roberts, 1993), and helps them to view each 
other’s contributions in light of a greater scope and context (Organ and Greene, 
1981). Formalization also reduces levels of ambiguity (Adler, 1993; Lui and Ngo, 
2004; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Simonin, 1999), and acts as a binding 
mechanism, or focusing device (Nooteboom, 1992), holding events together in 
people’s heads, and providing meaning and direction (see Bisbe and Otley, 2004; 
Camillus, 1975; Langley, 1988; Simons, 1990, 1995; Weick, 1995, 2001). It offers 
guidance during search activities (Bisbe and Otley, 2004), and fulfills the basic 
human needs for stability (Piore, 1995; Ring and Van de Ven, 1989), and role 
clarity (Marginson and Ogden, 2005). Specifically, by acting as a ‘generic social 
technology for arresting, fixing, stabilizing and regularizing what would otherwise 
be a wild, amorphous, and hence unlivable world’ (see Chia, 2002: 867) 
formalization offers a means to accomplish clear, orderly, and meaningful 
experiences (Marginson and Ogden, 2005). Achieving stability by means of formal 
governance mechanisms is therefore particularly important in the early stages of 
interorganizational cooperation (Fryxell et al., 2002; Larson, 1992).  
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Besides, formalization facilitates sensegiving and sensemaking by enhancing the 
completeness and consistency with which issues are covered (Camillus, 1975; 
Forrester, 1975; Mintzberg, 1994; Naur, 1982). It also reduces position biases 
(Ketokivi and Catañer, 2004), and cognitive biases or failures made by individuals 
(Katz and Kahn, 1966)23. It might even force people to reflect and think24. After all, 
formalization calls for cognitive efforts (Gouldner, 1954; Katz and Kahn, 1966), 
which might result in deeper insights about the potential causal factors underlying 
observed outcomes (Zollo and Singh, 2004), and which may render 
interorganizational relationships governable in the first place (Rose and Miller, 
1992). With respect to learning, formalities instigate the maintenance of existing 
knowledge, incremental improvement of previous know-how, and the creation of 
totally new knowledge (Avadikyan, 2001). As formalities are more easily replaced 
than individually held or tacit assumptions and routines (Stinchcombe, 2001; see 
also Nelson and Winter, 1982), they may act as targets for contraction (Zollo and 
Singh, 2004). Furthermore, formalization is known to facilitate mind stretching and 
anticipation (Camillus, 1975; see Gomes-Casseres, 1996). It might provoke 
sharing and synthesizing of knowledge sets, implicit assumptions, and mental 
models on the part of participants in interorganizational relationships (Kotabe et 
al., 2003), possibly assisting in the creation of ‘insights and ideas’ for managing 
future alliance situations more effectively (Kale et al., 2001: 466). Formalization 
can thus yield a sense of discovery, and result in new ideas and strategies 
(Simons, 1990). 
 
Coordination: a means to achieve concerted action 
Formalization’s role in ameliorating coordination is an issue that takes up several 
forms (March and Simon, 1958). Formalization allows for coordinated action by 
enabling the division of labor between partners, diminishing their interdependence 
(Singh, 1997). It helps to translate complex problems into ‘terms that are clear and 
understandable’ (Simon, 1997: 345), and it resolves issues of who does what, 
                                                 
23 Ketokivi and Catañer (2004) found that strategic planning may attenuate position bias, 
consisting of managers’ identification with sub goals. In addition, Katz and Kahn (1966) 
argue that formal procedures can be devised to counteract individual biases, arising from 
our tendency towards global and undifferentiated thinking, dichotomized thinking, cognitive 
nearsightedness, and oversimplified notions of causation. Besides, specific formal 
procedures have been developed in organizations to counter immediate pressures in 
problem-solving, and to ensure more penetrating analyses of problems, increased search 
for alternative courses of action, and more adequate assessments of the utility functions of 
such alternative courses (Katz and Kahn, 1966: 295). 
 
24 Many of the beneficial factors that contribute to the effectiveness of writing come about 
partially as a result of a heightened state of awareness (Brody and Park, 2004: 147). Brody 
and Park signal that a number of researchers have posited that using language to label 
experiences helps to structure experience. They further argue that ‘writing induces a state 
of mindfulness and heightened awareness, rendering more explicit the implicit feelings and 
ideas that may have been previously avoided or unexpressed and making connections and 
associations between previously disconnected thoughts, feelings, and aspects of identity’ 
(Brody and Park, 2004: 152). 
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allotting responsibility to the parties involved (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). 
Formalization also enables more efficient information processing (Galbraith, 
1977). In addition, formalization provides a common language (Grimaldi and 
Torissi, 2001; Simons, 1990 1995), and it makes processes in organizations more 
transparent (Walgenbach, 2001). Grimaldi and Torrisi (2001), for example, found 
that the need to communicate and exchange knowledge with external 
organizations experienced by the five software firms they investigated drove these 
firms to invest in formal codification. Formalization also enables participants in 
interorganizational relationships to transfer knowledge, and communicate their 
goals in situations where consensus on meaning might never develop (Balogun 
and Johnson, 2004). 
 
In addition, formalization permits participants in interorganizational relationships to 
check on each other’s perceptions. Besides, formalization is used to signal 
preferred outcomes and behavior, thereby bringing partners’ expectations in 
accordance with each other and eliminating inefficiencies and misunderstandings 
(Milewicz and Herbig, 1996). Marginson and Ogden (2005), for example, notice 
that budgetary procedures have been used by some organizations to signal the 
importance of cost consciousness. Similarly, contractual provisions ‘provide a 
means for one party to signal to the other the absence of undesirable attributes 
and presence of desirable attributes’ (Hill, 2001a: 42). A more dynamic aspect of 
formalization’s coordination function, which is also closely connected to the 
sensegiving and sensemaking function of formalization (see also theme two) 
concerns its role in fuelling interaction processes between participants in 
interorganizational relationships (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Simons, 1990, 1995). 
Analogue to organizations (see Eccles and Nohria, 1992) interorganizational 
relationships in motion resemble ongoing flows of actions and words, which are 
punctuated by events such as strategy planning exercises, or budget meetings. 
Formal documents serve as common bases for discussion (Camillus, 1975), and 
open up issues for scrutiny by making them explicit and visible (Mintzberg, 1994; 
Peattie, 1993). Congruent with these remarks, the purpose of formalities is ‘to 
provide a framework agreement within which on-going discussions and 
negotiations can facilitate’ […] adaptation and coordination (Lorenz, 1999: 313). 
 
Control: a means to exercise restraint or direct influences 
A third function of formalization has control as its common denominator. From a 
control perspective, formalities are necessary as interests of partners to an 
economic exchange rarely coincide entirely (Buskens et al., 2003a), and because 
partners might display opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). Formalization’s 
role in controlling a partner organization has been principally emphasized by 
transaction cost economists (c.f. Masten, 1996; Oxley, 1997; Williamson, 1985), 
and agency theorists (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Lassar and Kerr, 1996; Shane, 1996), 
who recognize that cooperating organizations can be confronted with conflicts of 
interest and information asymmetry. Control is not only emanating from 
formalization as an outcome, but it also results from the process of formalization. 
In particular, the process of negotiating and memorializing the parties’ agreement, 
and monitoring compliance, serves to make forgetfulness, lying, or non-
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compliance more costly. Asking a party the same or similar questions repeatedly, 
as occurs in the process of negotiation, makes forgetting or lying more costly; 
forgetting or lying many times is more difficult than doing so once (Hill, 2001a). 
Besides, when one asks different representatives of a partner the same questions 
during negotiation and contracting processes, this reduces the partner’s 
opportunities for behaving opportunistically. Hill (2001a: 46) offers an example of 
acquisition agreements arguing that ‘if the seller is forgetful or apt to conceal, the 
negotiating process makes being so more difficult, as different representatives of 
the seller are asked the same or similar questions repeatedly.’ 
 
Analogue to the control of a partner organization, formalization’s explicit character 
enables control of deviation from objectives, providing employees with a 
framework in which to put feedback regarding each others progress (Delmar and 
Shane, 2003), and offering managers signals as to when intervention becomes 
necessary (Goold and Quinn, 1990). Similarly, it acts as a mechanism to control 
progress (Weick, 2001; Yavitz and Newman, 1982), and it sometimes permits 
control from a distance (Gouldner, 1954). Moreover, by installing formalities, 
management provides itself with a bargaining instrument; something which can be 
given up as well as given use (see Gouldner, 1954; Langley, 1988). Finally, 
formalization facilitates control by enabling trust building, as it assists in 
demonstrating one’s competence and knowledge, and as it reduces uncertainty 
about one’s motives for engaging in an interorganizational relationship (e.g. Mayer 
and Argyres, 2004 Poppo and Zenger, 2002; also see themes one and four). 
 
Legitimacy: a means to persuade and convince stakeholders 
A fourth function of formalization draws on the concept of legitimacy, stemming 
from institutional theory (Baum and Rowley, 2002). Although much of the literature 
on interorganizational relations assumes that collaborative relationships are 
unimpeded by wide institutional norms governing organizational behavior 
(Marchington and Vincent, 2004), institutional theory indicates that to gain 
acceptance and to obtain resources and commitment, legitimacy has to be 
conferred upon interorganizational relationships. Formalization frequently extends 
a relationship’s legitimacy – here defined as being congruent with recognized 
principles or accepted rules and standards – as it guarantees that 
interorganizational behavior conforms to the expectations of stakeholders, 
reducing their uncertainty and increasing their willingness to contribute to the 
relationship. This is especially important when uncertain conditions prevent 
stakeholders from applying means-ends rationality (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). 
From this perspective, interorganizational relationships in which formalities, such 
as letters of intent, contracts, or formal business plans are omitted, lack 
acceptable accounts of their activities, so that they become less worthy, 
meaningful, predictable, and trustworthy (Suchman, 1995). Meyer and Rowan 
(1977: 350) indicate that such relationships are vulnerable to claims that they are 
‘negligent, irrational, or unnecessary.’ Conversely, managers of interorganizational 
relationships ‘that incorporate societally legitimated rationalized elements in their 
formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and 
survival capabilities’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 352). Meyer and Rowan’s ideas 
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are central to institutional theory, in which organizational arrangements that “make 
sense” and that “play by the rules” are favored (Suchman, 1995: 603). 
Incorporating formal structures and processes simply raises the commitment of 
internal participants and external constituents to interorganizational relationships 
because partners have demonstrated that they are willing and able to conform to 
coercive and mimetic isomorphic institutional pressures (Kale et al., 2001; Sitkin 
and Bies, 1993; Walsh and Dewar, 1987). Similar to nascent organizations, 
interorganizational relationships have to be viewed as being legitimate in order to 
prosper, something that they might pursue by conforming to expectations of others 
regarding the writing of business plans and other formalities. 
 
Creating legitimacy is of significant importance for interorganizational 
relationships, as they are regularly embedded in dynamic and discontinuous 
business environments, which entail high uncertainty and risks. These factors 
complicate assessments of the relationship by internal and external stakeholders 
trying to appreciate the logic underlying them. In such cases, ‘a system to educate 
and communicate with external stakeholders and gain their support and 
appreciation is critical,’ and formal structures and systems are imperative to build 
‘support for alliances among key external stakeholders’ (Kale et al., 2001: 467 
465). This is particularly because stakeholders frequently have little or no record of 
past performance on which to base their evaluations (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002). Due to this uncertainty, stakeholders often find it difficult to appreciate the 
logic underlying these relationships. In these situations, organizations face the 
daunting task of gaining acceptance (Suchman, 1995). In such cases, they can 
gain legitimacy through formalization (Zucker, 1988), as this provides ‘frames 
through which meaning is made, and social action constructed’ (Baum and 
Rowley, 2002: 12). In this way, it becomes easier for stakeholders to value 
cooperative endeavors on their merits. Such relationships “make sense”, and 
avoid being questioned by stakeholders. The procedures and other structures 
characterizing these relationships render them understandable and 
comprehensible (Suchman, 1995). In this respect, Miller et al. (2004: 210) contend 
that the importance of formal planning ‘lies as much in its latent function in 
creating a favorable disposition towards implementation as in its manifest function 
in detailing implementation activities.’ 
 
Long-run effects: formalization as a means to generate rents in the future 
Participants in interorganizational relationships might sometimes not be able to 
pick these fruits of formalization directly. Some of the effects that have to do with 
sensegiving and sensemaking, coordination, control, or legitimacy only surface in 
the long run. This results from the fact that formalities can take on the character of 
an interorganizational memory (e.g. see De Boer et al., 1999), and become a 
repository for interorganizational learning (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Contracts, 
for example, can function as memory traces of past negotiations (Putnam, 2003). 
Formalities store past experience ‘over more time, individuals, and situations’ than 
is possible in human memory (March, 1999: 4), thereby facilitating the leveraging 
of interorganizational expertise in other relationships (Kale et al., 2001), or in 
instances of intra-organizational cooperation. In cases where formalization 
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captures prior learning it can even enhance innovation (Cardinal, 2001). 
Associated with this, formalization reduces the dependence of interorganizational 
relationships on individuals. It diminishes the relative part of memory that is stored 
in human heads (Simon, 1997), making turnover of personnel less disastrous, and 
reducing relationships’ vulnerability to fallible memories (see De Rond, 2003; 
Peattie, 1993; Simon, 1997)25. In line with this, Ring and Van de Ven (1989: 184) 
notice that ‘transactions of long duration require formal institutionalization, which 
permits a transaction to remain in force beyond the time span of the individuals 
who negotiated the transaction’. Evidence for this function of formalization is found 
by Dekker (2003: 100), who suggests that formal governance structures in 
interorganizational relationships serve to ‘guarantee stability and continuity of the 
alliance in the future, in particular to cope with uncertainty about organizational, 
management and personnel changes.’ In his study on three dyadic alliances in the 
Norwegian retail industry, Ness (2002: 29) even argued that: ‘over time, 
contractual elements were more stable than the actual levels of trust’ and that ‘the 
hierarchical mechanisms defined a set of procedures […] presented a sense of 
continuity and predictability in itself’. Finally, in the long-run formalization serves as 
a basis for replication and imitation, as formal structures and systems are highly 
visible, and entail a low degree of tacitness (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Simonin, 
1999). This not only reduces the risk that things are “forgotten” (Mintzberg, 1994), 
but also enables capabilities and technologies to be transferred relatively easy 
across organizations (Lepak and Snell, 1999). 
 
Dysfunctions of formalization 
Attention regarding the dysfunctions of formalization has been abundant during 
the last few decades, possibly as a result of shifting perspectives on organizational 
entities from rational to natural and open systems (Scott, 2003), and heightened 
attendance of interorganizational researchers to issues of trust, social capital, 
flexibility, and relational capabilities. In particular, researchers have emphasized 
formalization’s retarding effect on creativity and innovation, and its role in inhibiting 
flexibility needed for coping with complex, ambiguous and unstable task 
environments (Camillus, 1975; Mintzberg, 1994; Nooteboom, 1999; Volberda, 
1998). Formalization has also been argued to lead to rigid forms of organization 
(Lampel and Shamsie, 2000; Volberda, 1998), as it stifles desirable mutual 
accommodations (Ireland et al., 2002)26, and limits opportunities for adaptation 
(Nooteboom, 1999). Furthermore, formalities such as explicit contracts have been 
found to reduce partners’ commitment to a relationship and to increase the extent 
to which conflicts arise between them (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Formalization 
                                                 
25 ‘Because much of the memory of organizations is stored in human heads, and only a little 
of it in procedures put down on paper (or held in computer memories), turnover of 
personnel is a great enemy of long-term organizational memory’ (Simon, 1997: 233).  
 
26 After all, changes in the environment and the relationship, coupled with the ambiguity and 
uncertainty created by tensions between cooperation and competition in interorganizational 
relationships suggests that optimal governance evolves across time and through partner 
interactions (Ireland et al., 2002; Cardinal et al., 2004). 
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entails the risk of reducing aspirations and performance to minimum standards 
(Gouldner, 1954; Katz and Kahn, 1966), limiting the scope for initiatives that fall 
beyond specifications in agreements (Hendry, 2002). Balogun and Johnson (2004: 
532), for example, found that the introduction of contracts in cooperative 
endeavors sometimes made things worse, ‘with individuals only doing exactly 
what was specified and nothing else.’ Eventually, formalization may gradually 
degenerate into formalism (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Mintzberg, 1994; Scott, 
2003; Starbuck, 1983).  
 
Besides, the extrinsic incentives incorporated in some formalities might lead to a 
reduction in intrinsic motivation by the cooperating partners (Fehr and Falk, 2002; 
Kreps, 1997). In addition, formalization entails the risk that areas of unilateral 
dependence (Lusch and Brown, 1996; Macneil, 1980) and hold-up problems arise 
(Klein, 2000; Klein et al., 1978). Moreover, the costs of writing contracts and other 
formalities, and their necessary incompleteness (Williamson, 1985), as well as 
their limited enforceability (Masten, 1996)27 have led researchers to question 
formalization’s efficacy. Finally, issues like data manipulation, interdepartmental 
and interorganizational strife, and short-termism (Marginson and Ogden, 2005) 
have challenged the advantageousness of formalization. Goals set in formal 
documents, for example, may give rise to unethical behavior, including the 
overstatement and false claiming of accomplishments, when parties are unable to 
reach these goals (Schweitzer et al., 2004). 
 
6.4 Case study 
 
Our exploration of the literature indicates that multiple functions and dysfunctions 
of formalization can be distinguished, and that they can be meaningfully 
categorized. The overview was not meant to be exhaustive, however. It serves as 
a basis for showing how alliance managers cope with the tensions resulting from 
the co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions, as depicted in 
Figure 6.2. In the case study, we demonstrate that formalization’s functions and 
dysfunction indeed co-exist, and that alliance managers find several ways to cope 
with the tensions emanating from their simultaneous occurrence. 
 
Data Collection 
In Textbox 6.1, we capture the most important characteristics of our data 
collection. From June 2002 to July 2004, twenty-two semi-structured interviews 
were conducted. Interview guides were developed (for details, see McCracken, 
1988), which outlined the issues that were to be explored and which served as a 
checklist during the interviews. The majority of the interviews took place with 
participants from STEADY, as the lion’s share of the ninety persons of both 
                                                 
27 Contractual agreements are generally incomplete ‘because of the inability to identify 
uncertain future conditions of because of the inability to characterize complex adaptations 
even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance’ (Goetz and Scott, 
1981: 2). Masten (1996: 10) suggests that courts are not the reliable enforcers of 
contractors’ intentions as sometimes portrayed in both the law and economics literatures. 
117 
organizations that were involved in the relationship worked for STEADY. 
Interviewees included persons that were involved with the relationship for a 
significant period, from one up to more than five years. Of the interviews, all but 
one was tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed ad verbatim, resulting in 458 
pages of interview text. Transcribed interviews were coded in QSR NUD*IST Vivo 
(for more details see Bazeley and Richards, 2000). We used the functions and 
dysfunctions described in the theory paragraph of this chapter to distinguish why 
formalization was applied, and which negative consequences resulted from its 
application. Attempts of managers to cope with the resulting tensions were coded 
under a category labeled “tensions” and observations on interorganizational 
performance were categorized under the heading “performance”. Beyond 
interviews, numerous archival data were collected, including 743 documents 
containing service level agreements, project handbooks, reports, memos, letters, 
web pages, annual reports, agendas, status reports and minutes from meetings. 
During data collection, we developed a database in which all documents stemming 
from the relationship were filed and categorized by author, date, and type. 
 
 
TEXTBOX 6.1 
Overview of key characteristics data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Twenty-two semi-structured interviews held between June 2002 and July 2004. All 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed ad verbatim, resulting in 458 pages 
of interview text. 
• Interviewees included:  
-  Alliance manager (QUICK) 
-  Commissioner on the business side/manager of the alliance (STEADY) 
-  Two project leaders for central IT applications (STEADY) 
-  Project leader for the overall IT project (STEADY) 
-  Project leader for the IT infrastructure (STEADY) 
-  Project leader for the shops (STEADY) 
-  Project leader for the administrative organization (STEADY) 
-  Analyst of customer relationships (STEADY) 
-  Two process and system analysts (QUICK) 
-  Two Service level managers (QUICK and STEADY) 
-  Director shop-systems (STEADY) 
-  In-company legal advisor (STEADY) 
-  System maintenance manager (STEADY) 
-  Customer service manager (QUICK) 
• More than 700 documents were analyzed using QSR NUD*IST Vivo, including 
formal & change requests (13), evaluation reports (9),  spreadsheets (74), memos 
and notes (8), minutes of meetings (178), service level agreements (18), 
conceptual-, functional, technical-, and test-designs (318), presentations (19), 
progress reports (24), interview transcripts (22), and others (82). 
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Congruent with descriptions of case study research by Strauss and Corbin (1998), 
we started our analysis of the data with preconceived notions on the functions and 
dysfunctions of formalization. We used open coding procedures to code each 
piece of text indicating a function or dysfunction of formalization into one of the 
categories that emerged from the theoretical overview. We labeled information 
regarding how the alliance’s management coped with the duality surrounding the 
decision to apply formalities, and the tensions between the functions and 
dysfunctions of formalization emanating from it, under the categories “dualities” 
and “tension management”. Subsequently, we applied axial coding to link similar 
concepts together into more abstract categories. In this step, respondents’ 
remarks on focusing attention and reducing ambiguity, for example, coalesced into 
the category “cognition and learning”. Finally, we followed selective coding 
procedures (see Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to relate the extent of formalization 
applied in the relationship to the categories used during open and axial coding. 
Descriptive and interpretive validity were secured through real-time data collection 
and prolonged engagement with the research site, tape-recording of the 
interviews, producing verbatim transcriptions, and performing accuracy checks 
with respondents. Besides, the reported findings were reviewed and commented 
on during a workshop and in individual feedback-meetings and they were 
continually cross-referenced with other data sources. Moreover, multiple sources 
of evidence enabled us to resolve possible inconsistencies in the answers of 
respondents, and it facilitated triangulation of evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Yin, 1994). 
 
Case Study Description 
The description of the case study is structured as follows. We start with a general 
introduction, in which we explain the objective of the alliance, the way it was 
structured, and interorganizational performance as perceived by participants in the 
relationship. We consecutively describe the functions they attributed to 
formalization, the dysfunctions of formalization that surfaced, and the ways in 
which the alliance’s management coped with the resulting duality and tensions. 
 
The objective of the alliance between STEADY and QUICK was to deliver financial 
services in a retail environment, something which could radically change the 
financial services landscape in the country where the relationship was initiated. 
Potential services related to the provision of savings accounts, insurance 
packages, and financial services that would be integrated into the shopping 
process, like the refunding of packaging deposits, and saving by rounding off 
shopping payments upwardly. Complementarity between the partners’ resources 
seemed high, with STEADY having a retail channel and a huge customer base, 
and QUICK possessing a banking-license, a back-office infrastructure for 
processing financial transactions, and legitimacy as a provider of financial 
services. 
 
Negotiations on the alliance began in March 1999. The first round, which led to a 
contract-frame, took around six months, whereas filling in the complete contract 
took almost a year. Although the negotiations were constructive, the presence of 
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lawyers occasionally led to polarization. The in-company legal advisor of STEADY 
suggested that this was caused by the fact that lawyers are often paid by the hour 
and that they are accustomed to raise objections. The advisor argued that 
providing lawyers with an advisory role instead of a mandate to negotiate would 
have contributed to a smoother development of the negotiations. The in-company 
legal advisor of STEADY also mentioned that exhaustive discussions during 
negotiations were intended to diminish potential problems in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting parallel to the negotiations, a business case was being developed by a 
small group of eight persons, four from each of the two organizations, which was 
finalized in about three months. Besides describing the possibilities for 
cooperation in general, the business case contained the outcomes of several 
major decisions. In particular, the scope of the alliance for the first few years to 
come was clearly defined. Choices were made as to which financial services 
would be provided to STEADY’s customers, and what would be the possible 
follow-up services and projects after the launch of the first round of services. 
During the development of the business case, influence and involvement of the IT-
department and the marketing-department of STEADY were kept to a minimum in 
order to accelerate the development of the alliance and to encourage 
innovativeness. This top-down strategy, accompanied by a high level of 
formalization, was deemed necessary by the alliance’s management to facilitate 
creativity and flexibility on the one hand, while, on the other hand, making sure 
that the pace of development was rapid enough and that things were carried out in 
a rigorous and consistent way. The alliance managers of QUICK and STEADY 
justified the decision by stating: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘As far as I know, the contract has never been changed. Neither were there regular 
renegotiations. Of course, it is a matter of discussing things thoroughly. If you avoid 
speaking about certain issues, it will come up later anyway. That is only a temporary 
reprieve. It is better to bring everything up for discussion instead of thinking that you are 
able to polish it away in a later stage. Just put it on the table and discuss it. Then you 
avoid a lot of problems in the future’ (Interview with in-company legal advisor STEADY, 
30 January 2003). 
 
‘It is my personal conviction that innovation cannot be achieved when everybody within 
a company is allowed to participate. Room needs to be created for innovation. If you get 
everybody involved, there are always persons there who need to sacrifice. They will try 
to slow down the cart and they will organize a lobby in order not to achieve something’ 
(Interview with alliance manager QUICK, 28 January 2003). 
 
‘Formalization removes creativity and flexibility from a project. That is the downside. The 
upside is that it guaranteed that what we developed worked nearly faultlessly’ (Interview 
with alliance manager QUICK, 28 January 2003). 
 
‘I think that to make sure a project proceeds at a certain pace, one has to be clear about 
the desired outcomes […]. We had to formulate what we wanted and how the result 
should look. On the one hand, that infused speed in the project and largely simplified 
decision-making. On the other hand, it increased the risk taken by us as commissioners, 
because if things went wrong, it would clearly be our problem’ (Interview with alliance 
manager STEADY, 6 January 2003). 
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After the business case was finalized, an interorganizational structure was 
designed for the alliance that would be used during the first major project, which 
took more than two years (see Figure 6.3). As can be seen from the chart, the 
alliance was backed up by a reference group consisting of senior managers from 
both STEADY and QUICK, which was used as a soundboard, and which offered 
advice and evaluated the relationship. The organization chart also reveals that the 
alliance included a strong IT-component. Operational activities that took place at 
STEADY were subdivided over six working groups, corresponding to existing 
departments within STEADY. At QUICK, fewer activities needed to be performed, 
and they were therefore concentrated within one working group. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3 
Interorganizational structure of the QUICK-STEADY alliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relative autonomy between both companies and their operational groups was 
facilitated by the early definition of interorganizational interfaces. Although 
communication and coordination predominantly took place by means of formal 
documentation, weekly meetings in which managers of all working groups came 
Reference group 
QUICK & STEADY 
Alliance manager 
QUICK 
Commissioner/alliance 
manager STEADY 
Marketing  
STEADY 
Project manager 
QUICK 
Legal & administrat. 
audits STEADY 
Information  
Technology STEADY
Retail systems  
group STEADY 
Central systems  
group STEADY 
Main office systems 
group STEADY 
IT auditing  
group STEADY 
Work group 
QUICK 
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together guaranteed mutual adjustment. The interorganizational structure has not 
been formally revised over the course of the first project in the alliance, and new 
projects were organized according to similar structures. When no new activities 
were developed, the alliance managers, service level managers, and several other 
key stakeholders in the relationship met each other at least four times a year in 
pre-scheduled meetings, whereas most of the persons involved in the relationship 
had bilateral contacts with participants from the other organization every week. 
 
During different stages of the alliance, both partners worked along formal lines, 
applying a standard methodology. The partners subsequently developed multiple 
versions of a business case, a conceptual design, impact analyses, functional 
designs, and functional detail designs and technical designs for the various project 
groups. The documentation from previous stages served as a basis for 
subsequent phases and compatibility of the documents from various stages was 
continuously monitored. Most activities had a very formal character, while the level 
of formalization grew progressively during the alliance, as can be derived from 
comments of the CRM-analyst and STEADY’s alliance manager respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants from QUICK were not used to acting in such a formal way. However, 
QUICK’s experience with the formal way of working of STEADY, combined with its 
desire to transform itself into a more customer-oriented organization, made it 
gradually adopt a more formal working style. QUICK’s evolution towards an 
organization with a more formal character appeared to be a joint outcome of 
managerial intentionality and environmental effects, hinting at the co-evolution of 
partner organizations and interorganizational relationships (Koza and Lewin, 1998; 
Volberda and Lewin, 2003). Such effects became apparent from the comments of 
several interviewees from QUICK, including the customer service manager, and a 
process and systems analyst. These comments indicate that alliance level 
characteristics can elicit changes and developments at the organization level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘They [formal procedures] are handled strictly. So, also a functional design needs to be 
signed by everybody. And even if somebody comes with a dodge or a trick that requires 
adaptation, then these things need to be changed very formally, via change requests’ 
(Interview with CRM-analyst, 18 November 2002).  
 
‘Of course it started rather vaguely, but it enters a funnel and becomes more and more 
formalized and structured’ (Interview with alliance manager STEADY, 5 August 2002). 
‘Because I came from QUICK, I was working very ad hoc myself and paid little attention 
to recording things; just the things of which I thought that they were really important. 
Because of the alliance, I have started to record and describe everything. If anything is 
added, an instruction is made for it, or an education plan is being developed […]. I have 
adopted many of the working practices of STEADY. I was not used to that way of 
working, but I adopted it’ (Interview with customer service manager, 3 December 2002). 
 
‘And it has led to a little more formalization of things. Nowadays you will see that we 
have agreed on certain procedures, with which people have to comply. You see that the 
organization is maturing. The realization that that was necessary has risen during the 
alliance. STEADY has been the trigger for that’ (Interview with process and systems 
analyst, 12 December 2002). 
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Consistent with previous work on interorganizational performance (Avadikyan, 
2001; Sobrero and Roberts, 2001, 2002), both positive and negative aspects could 
be delineated. However, with only a few exceptions, the interorganizational 
performance that was attributed to the alliance was perceived to be high (for 
examples of comments, see Textbox 6.2). At the beginning of 2001, the first 
financial services were distributed through STEADY’s shops. After one month, 
almost 100,000 customers made use of one or more of the financial services 
offered. At the outset of 2003, this number had almost tripled, leading STEADY’s 
alliance manager to state that ‘the introduction of financial services in a retail 
environment by these two partners was the most successful introduction of a new 
financial service in the last ten years’ (Interview with alliance manager STEADY, 4 
June 2002). In general, respondents regarded the introduction of financial services 
products as having positive performance implications for both organizations. They 
mainly pointed to ameliorated market positions, enhanced images of uniqueness 
and innovativeness, enhanced customer loyalty, and heightened efficiency of 
operations. The respondents also emphasized the difficulty of copying the 
alliance’s business proposition by competitors, due to the unique resource 
combination, technologically sophisticated requirements, and long development 
times. Other respondents mentioned an absence of severe operational problems, 
and the usability of knowledge, experience, and deliverables for other 
interorganizational relationships. Furthermore, both organizations experienced 
some direct improvements in their processes, including the possibility to process 
transactions in parallel, and the introduction of permanent monitoring systems. 
Notwithstanding these positive evaluations, several respondents indicated that the 
initial expectations were not completely met. Besides, interviewees referred to the 
alliance’s detrimental effect on the waiting times experienced by STEADY’s 
customers at the cash register. 
 
 
TEXTBOX 6.2 
Exemplary comments on the alliance’s performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency: ‘STEADY and QUICK are both very cost-conscious companies. So if you see 
how the project is put up [...]. The way in which we have knocked together this 
infrastructure is simply magnificent […]. Other companies [names have been deleted] 
would have spend an amount of money that is probably tenfold as high’ (Interview with 
alliance manager QUICK, 28 January 2003). 
 
End-result: ‘It is very positive that a system has been developed that is reasonably bug-
proof. In other words, that everything has been gone through in a structured way and 
that with respect to IT-issues no or hardly any problems came up at STEADY’ (Interview 
with CRM-analyst, 18 November 2002).  
 
End-result: ‘It resulted in a very stable, robust, reliable environment, that does what is 
should do. I am quite happy about that. And you also see that when considering 
disturbances’ (Interview with overall IT project-manager, 6 January 2003). 
 
Creating an image of uniqueness and innovativeness: ‘I think that has contributed to 
STEADY’s image of renewal. It has shown once again that it is an innovative company 
that can create an innovative product within a short period of time’ (Interview with 
overall IT project-manager, 6 January 2003). 
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TEXTBOX 6.2 
Exemplary comments on the alliance’s performance (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enhancing customer loyalty: ‘Of course it also fits within the strategy of one-stop-
shopping, in which you provide a total package and the client does not need to go to 
other firms. The client does everything in one hand. He can save, shop, and withdraw 
money. On the basis of that strategy it fits perfectly well’ (Interview with service-level 
manager STEADY, 11 November 2002). 
 
Improving efficiency: ‘A positive point is that we now have the possibility to enhance the 
efficiency of processes related to the loyalty program of STEADY. They become 
cheaper, and faster’ (Interview with service-level manager QUICK, 8 November 2002). 
 
Difficulty to imitate: ‘This product cannot be copied. If you take a bag of potatoes, and 
you make a good price, then that is easily copied by a competitor. This is much more 
difficult to copy’ (Interview with CRM-analyst, 18 November 2002).  
 
Possibility of sequel products: ‘What also makes it interesting is that sequel products 
could be introduced in a short period of time, that enable you to create additional 
turnover and margin on few square meters’ (Interview with overall IT project-manager, 6 
January 2003). 
 
Expectations not completely met: ‘The market is more difficult. Interest rates have come 
done to a level at which saving is not regarded to be attractive. Our competitive position 
has become worse, because of the high interest rates of our competitors […]. That 
influences the flow of new customers’ (Interview with alliance manager STEADY, 6 
February 2004). 
 
Loss of productivity: ‘With the current means that we have at the cash register, it means 
that we encounter some productivity losses’ (Interview with director of shop-systems 
STEADY, 28 November 2002). 
 
Loss of productivity: ‘I expect that the alliance has reduced the efficiency of the 
operation in the shops. I have to say that as a consumer I also think ah, shit’ (Interview 
with in-company legal advisor STEADY, 30 January 2003). 
 
Project-management: ‘In terms of project management the final result can be called a 
success, because it suffices the demanded functionality and specifications. We have 
produced what was requested’ (Interview with system maintenance manager, 11 
November 2002). 
  
Experience spin-off: ‘The knowledge and experience that we have built up to do this 
enable us to do similar projects faster and cheaper in future […]. I think we have learned 
a lot from this alliance’ (Interview with overall IT project-manager, 6 January 2003). 
 
Data-encryption spin-off: ‘The knowledge that has been built up with respect to data 
encryption is now possibly deployed again. We are working on a new project in which 
that also plays a role’ (Interview with system maintenance manager, 11 November 
2002). 
  
Calibration of business cases spin-off: ‘we have acknowledged that there are a couple 
of things which require more attention and better organization. Calibration of business 
cases for instance… I am convinced that if the alliance would not have taken place, 
other projects might have been started that were doomed to fail. So that is a spin-off of 
not-effectuated investments or costs that would not lead to successes’ (Interview with 
CRM-analyst, 18 November 2002).  
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In the proceeding paragraphs, it will become clear that the relatively high level of 
formalization applied in the alliance influenced interorganizational performance 
through various functions and dysfunctions. Moreover, it indicates that the 
alliance’s management faced a duality when deciding on the most appropriate 
level of formalization. After the level of formalization was decided on, dialectic 
tensions arose, which were potentially harmful to interorganizational performance. 
However, the alliance’s management eventually capitalized on these tensions, 
thereby enhancing interorganizational performance.  
In this paragraph, we consecutively address each of formalization’s functions that 
have been distinguished in the literature review and in Table 6.1, starting with 
cognition and learning. Where the literature study suggested that formalization 
might help to clarify partners’ expectations and understandings, evidence from the 
case study indicates that limited levels of formalization can have opposite results. 
Comparatively low levels of formalization applied by QUICK at the beginning of the 
relationship were found to raise uncertainty and ambiguity, as witnessed by a 
comment from a process and system analyst from QUICK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the negotiations, different versions of legal documents, including contracts 
and other formal accounts, forced participants from both organizations to make 
sense of the alliance and the collaborative environment. It thereby reduced the 
likelihood that discordant implicit assumptions surfaced when it was too late. Initial 
versions of legal documents gave rise to discussions between the partners, laid 
bare potential conflicts, and tempered extreme confidence in the potential of the 
alliance (for a similar argument, see Sampson, 2003). This is illustrated by 
comments from the project leader for central IT applications, a system 
maintenance manager, a process and systems analyst, and the in-company legal 
counselor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘At the moment you make your plan, you try to limit uncertainties. You describe the 
things that you do not know for certain, possibly with alternative directions for solutions 
[…]. If you do not do that, you can be certain that the final product will not become what 
everybody expects’ (Interview with project leader central applications, 21 November 
2002). 
 
‘Your own understanding of what is there only improves’ (Interview with system 
maintenance manager, 11 November 2002). 
 
‘The conceptual design was probably more for me than what was written on paper…’ 
(Interview with process and systems analyst, 12 December 2002). 
 
‘I can imagine that participants from STEADY sometimes thought: I hope that this will 
turn out all right. It [QUICK] seems a bit of an unguided missile that has started working 
there. If you do not get feedback, at least nothing on paper, or less than expected, or 
different from what you expect… I can quite well understand that that is scary’ (Interview 
with process and systems analyst, 12 December 2002). 
Functions of formalization
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A remark from STEADY’s project leader on the infrastructure side hinted at the 
supportive role of formalization in enabling contraction. 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, formalization appeared to ensure that the specifications for the IT-
system that had to be developed were consummate, accurate, and consistent. 
This finding emanated from a discussion with STEADY’s alliance manager on the 
functions and dysfunctions attached to applying high levels of formalization. 
 
 
 
Besides, formal processes appeared to fuel the interaction processes between 
participants in the relationship. According to the project leader of the 
administrative organization and the project leader of infrastructure at STEADY, 
formalities functioned as simultaneously enabling and constraining structures 
within which agents interacted, triggering debate among participants in the 
relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘The good side is that they [formal documents and procedures] kept us sharp with 
respect to the accuracy and completeness of the specifications’ (Interview with alliance 
manager STEADY, 6 February 2004). 
‘During the process, it worked as a red line from one meeting to another meeting: to 
measure progress, to provide a kind of glue, and to communicate to others within the 
meetings. In my opinion, it is just for the process: keeping everybody on one line. And 
also to inform people and to record what should happen during the project and in the 
long term.’(Interview with project leader administrative organization, 21 November 
2002). 
  
‘The formal documentation helped us to gradually come to decision-making. Like: We all 
agree about that point, we all sign for it, so we proceed again! When you are in a 
continuation trajectory, you make things and change things, for which you have to fall 
back on the things that you have done before […]. If you do not do that in such a 
complex whole, you will lose the overview completely. And I think the project will then 
deteriorate into complete chaos’ (Interview with project leader infrastructure, 15 
November 2002). 
‘Before this project, little bits were described, but in a free-format. We were working on 
developing a standard, which was not finished yet. Many independent documents have 
been produced there, which have led us to state: That should be included for 
subsequent projects!’ (Interview with project-leader infrastructure, 15 November 2002).  
‘By putting it on paper you pave the way for good cooperation. It enables you to 
estimate what issues you will be confronted with and how these need to be resolved. 
Furthermore, it makes clear what you expect from each other. I think many people do 
not realize that. They dislike contracts. In the business-departments they think like this: 
We only use the contracts when things go wrong […]. But they do not realize that it is 
just very important to make sure that nothing will go wrong’ (Interview with in-company 
legal advisor STEADY, 30 January 2003). 
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Formalization’s second function, coordination, appeared from its role in enabling a 
fine-grained division of labor between the partners in the alliance. Formalization 
entailed codification, in the form of documents. These documents subsequently 
served as a basis for the different workgroups in the relationship and as input for 
new rounds of socialization. Comments from the commissioner on the business 
side and the project leader for central applications are illustrative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Related to enabling the division of labor, formalization reduced the perceived 
complexity of activities in the relationship, resulting from the fact that individual 
participants needed to ‘solve’ smaller parts of the ‘problem’ in the alliance. This 
effect of formalization became evident from the response of STEADY’s project 
leader of IT infrastructures when he was asked whether he regarded the alliance 
to be complex or not. 
 
 
 
Besides, formalized documents enabled decoupling of learning from action. This 
can be illustrated with an observation of the author when arriving early for an 
interview, taking a seat in a room with four employees of STEADY. One of the 
employees in the room was new to the alliance. He was busy studying formal 
documents. After a while, he asked ‘is the maintenance of system X performed by 
QUICK?’ One of the other employees replied: ‘No, you can see that from the 
scheme hanging on the wall. Besides, it is described in document Y.’ By studying 
formal documents that were developed during the alliance, the new employee was 
able to learn about it without actively having taken part in it.  
 
The third function, formalization as a means to control, appeared in the form of 
monitoring progress and preventing frequent stretching of the scope of the 
alliance. This became evident from quotes by the overall IT project manager, and 
QUICK’s and STEADY’s service level managers. It appears that by freezing 
requirements and design at early stages, adverse effects of goal changes are 
avoided (Dvir and Lechler, 2004). Moreover, the project leader of retail systems 
indicated that higher levels of formalization by participants from QUICK at the 
beginning of the relationship would have increased the level of trust between both 
‘The people from the business-department can start to work on the business aspects 
[…]. That happens parallel to each other. At the moment we finish the functional 
detailed design, people from the business-side also know exactly how it is going to 
work’ (Interview with business commissioner STEADY, 5 August 2002). 
 
‘After you have made a functional design, it is sent to both the builders and the testers. 
The testers define their test cases while at the same time the builders are building the 
applications’ (Interview with project leader central applications, 21 November 2002). 
‘Complex? No, not really. Because the structure was well devised, it actually was not as 
complex as it seemed. The structure was really good’ (Interview with project leader 
infrastructures, 15 November 2002).  
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organizations, as STEADY would then have been able to base its evaluation of 
QUICK on credible and more extensive information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formalization also seemed to function as a means to extend the internal and 
external legitimacy of the relationship and the activities undertaken in it. In the 
alliance, the mere existence of formalities legitimized rule observation, as became 
clear from a comment from STEADY’s project leader of central applications. 
Besides, the detailed documentation that emerged from formal processes helped 
in legitimizing the relationship towards governmental bodies, as became evident 
from a comment of a service level manager. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, formalization proved to have several effects in the long-run. Amongst 
others, it functioned as a memory device, which became obvious from answers by 
QUICK’s service level manager, STEADY’s service level manager, and one of the 
‘It [formalization] has helped the IT-department to finish things. To say: Ok, this is it. 
Signed and all. In particular, that formal side has helped, because you are working on 
so many things at the same time. It was very handy to have some documents of which 
you can say: that’s finished!’ (Interview with overall IT project-manager, 6 January 
2003). 
 
‘One has to prevent looking backwards by making a list of decisions made. One has to 
look forward by means of an action list. If you keep those sharp, things proceed’ 
(Interview with service-level manager QUICK, 8 November 2002). 
 
‘It is very important that you ensure that agreements and decisions made on designs 
are recorded. That you do not find yourself in the situation that things are brought up for 
discussion afterwards, including things that are decided earlier on. […]. If you do not 
document things well, then every decision causes a new discussion. If you document 
things, and you have commitment, and you confirm together that you are holding on to 
the same thing, then you have the same starting point for the next stage’ (Interview with 
service-level manager STEADY, 11 November 2002). 
 
‘The status [progress] was verbally communicated, but was not supported by 
documents that were put on the table, from which it became evident that that was really 
the status. That would have helped. There would have been less distrust then. It was 
easy to say: we are now at this stage, and in two weeks things are finished’ (Interview 
with project leader retail systems, 15 December 2002). 
‘In the project plan everybody’s tasks and responsibilities were described. Besides, we 
have an organizational chart. In that sense, you can find the responsibilities in the 
organizational chart. Authority for making decisions lay along exactly the same lines. 
That was reasonably clear’ (Interview with project leader central applications, 21 
November 2002). 
 
‘I suspect that the detailed documentation has helped to win institution X over. We said 
Listen, have a look at how precisely we deal with these things. I think that has helped’ 
(Interview with service-level manager STEADY, 11 November 2002). 
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process and system analysts at QUICK on a question as to their reasons for using 
formal documentation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Related to formalization’s use as an interorganizational memory, it reduced the 
vulnerability of the alliance. Formalization diminished the potential instability of the 
relationship caused by personnel changes, and temporary absence of people due 
to illness or holidays. The retail side project leader summarized it as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, formalities served as a basis for replication and imitation, witnessing 
the comments of a system maintenance manager and the retail project leader: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many of the functions of formalization were also attributed to visualization. 
Respondents more than once indicated that they preferred visualization or 
formalization by image, to formalization in words. Perhaps this results from the fact 
that visual aids have a greater capacity for fostering sense making. Properly 
‘There are advantages [of having formal documents] for new projects. We are now busy 
with a new project in which identical control-mechanisms from system A-B will be 
deployed. That is really easy. What happens, and how it is done is well described. It is 
just a matter of replication and adaptation to the new situation…’ (Interview with system 
maintenance manager, 11 November 2002). 
 
‘It is easier for our new project [name omitted], because you know what is there. You 
know that everything has always been well-documented, so you can proceed from that 
easily’ (Interview with project-leader retail, 28 November 2002). 
‘My experience is that if you do not produce action lists, lots of things disappear. 
Because (a) persons forget things, and (b) after a week you might remember that you 
need to do something, but you possibly have a different interpretation of the task than at 
the moment at which the issue originated […]. It is simply a good way to keep people 
sharp’ (Interview with service-level manager QUICK, 8 November 2002). 
 
‘The documentation warrants knowledge preservation, which is electronically accessible 
and on which, in a following project, people can build on. So your knowledge is 
preserved. Because people leave… you name it… Those are not stable factors’ 
(Interview with service-level manager STEADY, 11 November 2002). 
  
‘It is very handy that some things are documented, especially because different persons 
become involved in the trajectory. Because we can agree verbally in a very precise 
manner, but if you are replaced by someone else, we have to start from scratch again’ 
(Interview with process and systems analyst, 12 December 2002). 
‘I think you should be able to agree on producing a certain amount of documentation, if 
it was only for the sake of taking away a little bit of the vulnerability of the organization. 
That not all knowledge resides in the head of one person, as that is what will happen’ 
(Interview with project-leader retail, 28 November 2002). 
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visualized data equip users with pre-processed models of the data enabling higher 
levels of interaction than if they had to make sense of the data in raw form (Sedig 
et al., 2003). 
 
Dysfunctions of formalization 
From the case study, several dysfunctions of formalization also became evident. 
First, participants in the relationship, in particular from STEADY, tried to cover 
themselves against risks emanating from the relationship, by formalizing working 
procedures in detail. This resulted in stiffened and rigid relations between its IT-
departments and the business department, as is manifested in quotes from the 
business commissioner for the alliance at STEADY and a process and systems 
analyst at QUICK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second adverse effect of formalization was the administrative burden it brought 
along. Eventually, this almost changed formalization from a means to formalization 
as an end in itself. Comments from the overall IT project manager and the CRM 
manager are illustrative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management of dialectic tensions 
The alliance managers attempted to cope with these tensions in three ways. First, 
the alliance managers alternately emphasized the disparate levels of formalization 
required by each of the parent organizations. Although it is a more or less 
accepted belief that dissimilar levels of formalization at parent organizations have 
negative effects on performance (e.g. see Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Medcof, 
‘When there was a hitch in the cable, at STEADY people sometimes tried to keep their 
own alley clean […]. At QUICK we say: Some things go wrong and you have to solve 
them, but that can happen. Whereas I had the impression that they thought: They cut 
your head off, if something goes wrong. I have to make sure that it is not my fault’ 
(Interview with process and systems analyst, 12 December 2002). 
 
 ‘Employees from STEADY keep their own alley clean. They are very precise. That 
becomes obvious when one considers the fact that they record everything in the 
minutes. One can also read between the lines in the progress-reports. They put 
problems aside, on the plates of others. Moreover, they connect problems to choices 
that have been previously made by others […]. They also have a standard list with the 
risks of the project, from which you can percolate exactly how they try to cover 
themselves’ (Interview with alliance manager STEADY, 6 January 2003). 
‘The vision is lacking with respect to why something is formalized. It has to be done like 
this because somebody says that it should be done like this’ (Interview with overall IT-
manager, 6 January 2003). 
 
‘One saw tension at STEADY, where behavior was very formal. They did not give any 
space to think about something when it had been previously defined. Exaggerating it a 
bit, it was as follows: Why do you do it like this? We do it like this because it is like this 
on paper. Not because it is best, but it is written on paper. Therefore, we do it like this’ 
(Interview with CRM-analyst, 18 November 2002). 
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1997), in this particular alliance, managers used the differences between both 
organizations to propagate speed in certain areas and stages, and to enhance 
control in others. When QUICK was not working thoroughly and accurately 
enough, STEADY’s performance standards and codification requirements were 
stressed. In situations in which participants from STEADY were moving too slowly, 
they were confronted with the fact that their progress was far behind that of 
QUICK’s employees. At those times, the alliance managers underscored the lower 
needs for formalization by QUICK, including the fact that QUICK was a smaller 
organization, which had to make only minor adaptations to its existing 
infrastructure and processes for the alliance. In sum, the alliance managers used 
the differences between both organizations to increase speed in certain areas and 
stages, and to enhance control in others. When one of the alliance managers was 
asked to comment on how he coped with the different levels of formalization within 
the partner organizations and the tension between the functions and dysfunctions 
inextricably bound up with formalization he stated: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This finding resonates with arguments on the co-evolution of partner organizations 
(see Koza and Lewin, 1998; Volberda and Lewin, 2003) in that both the need and 
the ability to formalize – determined by transaction, organization, or contextual 
characteristics and attributes – and managerial intentionality, represented by 
alliance managers striving to maintain productive tensions between sets of 
functions and dysfunctions – played a role. It seems that managerial intentionality 
reduces the likelihood that vicious circles are formed (see also Volberda, 1998). 
Furthermore, we propose that managers’ recognition of the dangers inherent in 
extreme positions on the formalization continuum, combined with their intention to 
utilize tensions resulting from intermediary positions prolifically, amplifies the 
positive influence of formalization on interorganizational performance. 
‘I think that the dissimilarity between the two firms eventually ensured that the project 
became a success. They were used to a completely different way of working. There was 
much more entrepreneurial spirit within the blood of the persons involved from QUICK 
compared to participants from STEADY. On the other hand, persons from STEADY had 
a much stronger instigation to have everything documented, reported, and crystallized 
out, up to the final detail, compared to participants from QUICK. And this is what 
happened: at points in time that persons from QUICK relied too much on writing on the 
back of a cigar-box for their software development, they were called to order by persons 
from STEADY. On the other hand, when things started to become too bureaucratic 
again with STEADY, persons from QUICK started to say: this is nonsense! You can also 
arrange it in this way. That gave rise to the entrepreneurial spirit again. We sometimes 
have, consciously or unconsciously played the characteristics of the two parties off 
against each other. I certainly did it myself, as I had to take care of QUICK living up to 
its promises. I regularly went to people from QUICK to say: Guys, it’s all okay what you 
are doing, but I want to have it on paper, because I cannot go to STEADY with this 
piece of paper. If you do that here, that is all right with me, but this is an external party, 
so the standard needs to be raised. If we needed something done, we could use QUICK 
to convey strength and speed towards STEADY, whereas STEADY was more of a 
controlling and auditing master that checked whether things were ok’ (Interview with 
alliance manager QUICK, 28 January 2003). 
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The second manner by which the alliance managers coped with the tensions 
between functions and dysfunctions of formalization concerned their explanations 
offered to participants in interorganizational relationships for the level of 
formalization applied. As the selected level of formalization has consequences for 
participants in interorganizational relationships, it demands some explanation (see 
Shaw et al., 2003; Sitkin and Bies, 1993). In the case study, explanations given by 
the alliance managers for the high level of formalization adopted frequently 
referred to factors that were beyond their control. Demands imposed on the 
alliance managers by their own supervisors, for example, were regularly put 
forward during meetings with the project leaders. Besides, the alliance managers, 
on more than one occasion, underlined the fact that financial institutions like 
QUICK had to comply with the demands of regulatory institutions, which 
demanded the application of high levels of formalization. Finally, they suggested 
that any ‘mistakes’ would have an enormous impact on the reputation and image 
of the collaborating organizations. The alliance’s management thus attempted to 
persuade and convince participants in the alliance to work along formal lines by 
accentuating external constraints imposed on the alliance instead of underlining 
their preferences for little interference of pressure groups, or their desire to have 
all departments work according to plans that were devised by themselves. The 
following comments hint in this direction: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alliance managers’ use of this management tactic reveals that factors such as 
accountability, the importance of image, and legitimacy do not only augment the 
need for formalization, but also serve as a pretext by which managers of 
interorganizational relationships are able to institute higher levels of formalization 
‘Before any money is spent, the board wants to know in broad lines what the plan is and 
what the financial consequences are. Ideally, they also want to be able to shoot three 
out of four plans’ (Interview with alliance manager STEADY, 6 January 2003). 
  
‘We have a stick behind the door, because we are a bank now. So, many things cannot 
be discussed anymore, but simply have to happen’ (Interview with alliance manager 
STEADY, 6 January 2003). 
 
‘To guarantee acceptance of the “external institutions” at the end of the trajectory, we 
had to be the “best-behaving boy of the class”. That implied that I wanted to see many 
juridical obligations being carried through in the strictest form’ (Interview with alliance 
manager QUICK, 28 January 2003). 
 
‘For the entire project, we had to obtain the accreditation of an external institution. That 
was a reason for us to say: we do it like this! That was one of the reasons to say: you do 
not need to take the responsibility for this project; we’ll take it!’ (Interview with alliance 
manager STEADY, 6 January 2003). 
 
‘Everyone realized that nothing should go wrong. We could not afford to lose money 
which was put on a savings account... That has to happen once or twice and you are on 
the front-page of a national newspaper and you have a serious problem’ (Interview with 
alliance manager QUICK, 28 January 2003). 
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than would otherwise be accepted by other participants in the relationship. Under 
the guise of demands from supervisory boards, reference groups, or external 
institutions, and by intermittently adducing the magnitude of image risks, the 
alliance managers were able to maintain high levels of formalization. By using 
these arguments, they forestalled the development of insurmountable tensions. 
This finding complements results from earlier studies on justification and 
persuasion as influence tactics in mergers (Steensma and Milligen, 2003). It also 
coincides with observations that, amongst others, auditing systems are easier to 
implement and meeting less resistance when justified externally than when only 
motivated by a desire to improve supervision (Walgenbach, 2001). In summary, it 
reveals that managers attempt to convince and justify their decisions towards 
other participants in a relationship by focusing on factors that are largely beyond 
their control, thereby (partly) masking their true reasons for applying high levels of 
formalization28.  
 
Finally, the alliance’s management tried to reduce the tension arising from the 
application of high levels of formalization by developing a kind of semi-structure. 
Semi-structures are frameworks in which some features are prescribed or 
determined (e.g. responsibilities, project priorities, time intervals between 
projects), but other aspects are not (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Meyer and 
Rowan (1977), who remarked that hospitals and schools had highly specific and 
rigid rules of administration, while the professionals working in them sometimes 
had a high degree of freedom in how they approached their work, already gave an 
example of semi-structures. This kind of semi-structure is akin to the deployment 
of “simple rules”. In such a situation ‘outside the roles and responsibilities that the 
rules define, the individual remains free and autonomous’ (Piore, 1995: 113)29. 
Such an approach was also found in the present case, where clear rules helped 
people to see what they could and should do for the relationship. More general, 
definitions of the business, customers and goals renders people with arenas for 
action but leaves the specific means up to the various teams, thus enabling an 
                                                 
28 One of the “true” reasons that is likely to play a role here has also been advanced by 
Gouldner (1954), in his case study of a Gypsum and mining company. He suggests that 
managers might be unsure of themselves and need something to lean on. After they are on 
the job somewhat longer, “they’re less worried about the rules”. He suggests that the rules 
define the new situation into which they enter, allowing them to make decisions with a 
minimum of uncertainty and personal responsibility. Gouldner adds that there is reason to 
believe that rules have a guilt-relieving role. He quotes the new manager of the factory who 
says “Some of the men probably think I’m a mean cuss, but I’ve got to follow our company 
policy like everyone else. If I don’t, someone else will” (Gouldner, 1954: 94, 95). 
 
29 This coincides with observations on flexibility within structure from Tatikonda and 
Rosenthal (2000: 418), who conclude that: ‘balancing firmness and flexibility, by having 
flexibility within a structure, is both achievable and desirable’. However, it has to be noted 
that this appearance of formalities has a disadvantage in that ‘broad applicability comes at 
the costs of low explicitness’. The wider a clause or rule, the more space there is for 
different interpretations and the lower the enforceability (Blumberg, 2001: 828). 
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open, improvised and energized flow of innovative activities (Dougherty and 
Takacs, 2004: 579). Analogue, syndicates in the venture capital industry apply 
investment agreements that enshrine the rights and obligations of participants, 
rather than specifying behavior (Wright and Lockett, 2003). The managers of this 
particular alliance combined a high level of formalization of inputs and outputs with 
considerable process autonomy. This was done in order to economize on the 
efforts that management had to put into coordinating and controlling activities, 
while it also warranted the experience of sufficiently high levels of achievement 
and fulfillment by participants in interorganizational relationships when performing 
their jobs. Whereas the objectives, goals and expected outcomes of the alliance 
were recorded and enforced strictly, employees were often granted considerable 
latitude in how they accomplished those objectives. This resonates with the 
distinction made between the formalization of outcomes and the formalization of 
processes, or the distinction between behavior control and output control from 
Ouchi (1979), and Ouchi and Maguire (1975). The commissioner on the business 
side at STEADY revealed why they chose to deploy high outcome but low process 
formalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This finding conflicts with assertions of Koza and Lewin (1998: 260) that ‘Ceteris 
paribus, the greater the exploitation intent of an alliance, the greater the reliance 
on output control,’ and ‘ceteris paribus, the greater the exploration intent of an 
alliance, the greater the reliance on behavior and process controls.’ Our findings 
indicate that exploration alliances – the alliance studied here is clearly a case in 
which innovation is of the utmost importance – are not necessarily dominated by 
behavior and process controls. Instead, as contingencies are hard to identify in 
advance, and because this type of relationships requires mutual adaptation over 
time (Madhok and Tallman, 1998), such relationships involve designs for action, in 
‘I believe that you have to make sure that the broad outlines and the detailed 
explanations are provided, so that everyone can solve his part of the puzzle. Everybody 
knows what the input-variables and the output-variables are, and they only have to 
shape the piece of process in between. If you have them participate in thinking out the 
project, you have to invite them all around the table. That is difficult to coordinate and to 
govern as it involves multiple levels, highly specialized employees, people who use the 
opportunity to stress their distinctive features, and departmental politics’ (Interview with 
alliance manager STEADY, 6 January 2003). 
 
‘The role that one chooses as a commissioner is either having them do their work as 
they wish it themselves, with their own control and consultation structures, and 
planning-cycles. In that case, you only provide input as to what you want them to realize 
[outcome formalization]. Or you also stand as a kind of project manager, prescribing 
how they have to work [process formalization]. I have not done the latter, because you 
will not succeed in doing this with two persons. So we had them use their own working 
and planning methods, while providing them with input, telling them how we wanted the 
output to look […]. If you provide them with limited freedom concerning what they 
should do, then you should not also interfere with how they do that, with how they are 
going to structure that process. That will take away all the fun they have in managing 
such a project’ (Interview with alliance manager STEADY, 6 January 2003). 
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which outcomes, accountability for outcomes, and constraint/restraint boundaries 
are demarcated (Haeckel, 2004). Control of behavior is frequently inappropriate in 
these relationships as it takes away the ability of individuals to exercise their 
judgment (Goold and Quinn, 1990), potentially lessening personnel motivation and 
limiting job scope, eventually resulting in boredom, alienation, job dissatisfaction, 
absenteeism, turnover, and reduced output (Nygaard and Dahlstrom, 2002).  
 
6.5  Discussion 
 
We started this chapter by asking how our view on the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships would change if more attention was paid to 
managerial choice. We embraced the idea that dialectic tensions arising from the 
co-existence of positive and negative consequences – or functions and 
dysfunctions – of formalization cannot always be solved (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1989), but instead have to be managed (Huxham and Beech, 2003). We thus 
drew theorizing away from perspectives in which contextual, organization, or 
transaction characteristics determine the degree of formalization and towards a 
perspective in which the role of managerial choice is emphasized (Child, 1997). 
Such a perspective aims to elucidate how managers cope with the tensions 
between the functions and dysfunctions associated with formalization (see Das 
and Teng, 2000; De Rond, 2003; De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004). In line with this, 
we formulated the following research question: 
 
RQ7:  How do managers of interorganizational relationships cope with tensions 
arising from the co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions? 
 
Key findings 
We demonstrated that formalization functions as a means to coordinate and 
control, but also as a means to persuade and convince stakeholders, and as a 
means to give and make sense (see also theme two). Moreover, we described a 
number of dysfunctions associated with formalization, such as its retarding effect 
on creativity and innovation, and its role in inhibiting flexibility needed for coping 
with complex, ambiguous and unstable task environments (Camillus, 1975; 
Mintzberg, 1994; Nooteboom, 1999; Volberda, 1998). The case study showed that 
dialectic tensions between the functions and dysfunctions of formalization were 
inevitable. A high level of formalization became almost imperative as the number 
of employees involved in the alliance was high, and external institutions, such as 
regulatory agencies, were closely watching the movements of the partners. 
Furthermore, the relationships concerned financial services, which engender high 
image risks in case things go wrong. In addition, the issues to be tackled 
contained many interdependencies, entailing high demands for coordination and 
control. Finally, as the relationship involved many novel elements for both parties, 
cognition and learning through formalization played an important role.  
 
At the same time, however, several dysfunctions emerged. We showed that 
alliance managers attempted to cope with the resulting tensions between the 
functions and dysfunctions of formalization in at least three ways (see Figure 6.4). 
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First, they alternated their emphasis on the disparate levels of formalization 
required by each of the partner firms. Second, they justified the level of 
formalization that had been applied by referring to factors that appeared to be 
beyond their control. Third, they applied a kind of semi-structure, emphasizing 
either the formalization of outcomes or the formalization of processes. These 
findings illustrate that introducing a dialectic perspective on formalization in 
interorganizational relationships offers a promising complement to existing 
perspectives. Most importantly, a dialectic perspective elucidates that manager 
are not only preoccupied with taking the “right” governance decisions (Foss and 
Foss, 2005; Madhok, 2002; Williamson, 1985, 1991), but also, and perhaps 
primarily, with managing the tensions emanating from these decisions. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.4 
Three ways of coping with tensions arising from formalization 
 
 
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
The theoretical implications of this inquiry pertain to the design of studies on 
interorganizational structures and structuring practices. The large variety of 
functions and dysfunctions of formalization described in this chapter indicates that 
mono-causal explanations of interorganizational structuring efforts are unlikely to 
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render consummate and accurate pictures of interorganizational reality. We 
therefore suggest that inquiries into the role of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships could benefit from explicitly measuring the motivations, causes, or 
reasons for (not) applying contracts, rules and procedures, something that could 
lead to a more refined image of the drivers of formalization. Such an image could 
explain why formalization is still ‘endemic in modern societies’ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977: 343), and it could complement ‘traditional understandings of organizational 
structure’ that are currently breaking down (Hatch, 1999: 75). 
 
Our research also has several practical ramifications. Managers who are aware of 
the numerous functions and dysfunctions through which formalization influences 
interorganizational performance should be able to strike a balance between formal 
and non-formal approaches towards alliance management. They are in a better 
position to recognize the tensions emanating from formalization, and to ameliorate 
interorganizational performance by finding ways to cope with these tensions. 
These managers do not choose between “control” or “autonomy”. They are able to 
hold and explore opposing views (Eisenhardt, 2000) on the 
(dis)advantageousness of formalization and they appreciate the fact that 
formalization has a broad range of functions and dysfunctions. This enables them 
to counteract the tendency to over-rationalize and it helps them to apply 
formalization in a beneficial way.  
 
Limitations and opportunities for future research  
Although we believe that the chapter has yielded several interesting findings, it 
also contained some major limitations. First, our data did not permit us to compare 
our findings with the results that we would have obtained when a more generic 
model of formalization would have been used to analyze the case (e.g. 
antecedents influencing formalization, which subsequently influences 
interorganizational performance). Although coordination and control perspectives 
on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships neither cover the 
wide range of functions and dysfunctions of formalization, nor the managerial 
aspects that are so significant in a dialectic approach, future studies might 
investigate different perspectives on formalization side by side. Analogue to Baum 
and Rowley (2002) and Madhok (2002), we urge researchers to use multiple 
theoretical lenses for investigating the role of organizational structuring processes. 
We advance that theoretical explanations for observed levels of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships, which solely focus on its ‘coordination’ and 
‘control’ functions, underestimate effects that are less obvious and probably less 
frequently anticipated. The functions discerned in our literature review further 
denote that interorganizational management research might have to pay more 
attention to the process of formalization, and to the voluntaristic, subjective, and 
dynamic qualities of structuring processes (Barley, 1986). The traditional 
preoccupation with formalization’s outcomes (Zollo and Singh, 2004), in the form 
of contracts, rules and procedures, could be complemented with a stronger focus 
on functions related to the process of formalization. 
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Second, we observed that alliance managers’ formalization decisions were 
preceded by incomplete considerations of the entire array of functions and 
dysfunctions that occurred in the case study. Each of the interviewed alliance 
managers only mentioned a few of the functions and dysfunctions of formalization 
that were discerned based on our literature review (see Table 6.1). In particular, 
little reference was made to (sub)functions of formalization that seem harder to 
anticipate, such as ‘forcing people to reflect and think,’ and to (sub)functions that 
influence performance in more remote futures, such as the use of formalities as an 
‘interorganizational memory.’ This suggests that managers apply simplified 
decision-making processes (March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1997) when deciding 
on the level of formalization to be applied in their relationships. This underscores 
the significance of managerial attention during interorganizational governance 
processes (see also theme four), and indicates that research might benefit from 
“bringing the manager back” in interorganizational governance research.  
 
Third, the relationship between formalization and performance that is sometimes 
proposed in the literature, in the shape of an inverted u-curve (Luo 2002), appears 
to be a strong simplification of interorganizational reality. In particular, this 
relationship seems to be moderated by alliance managers’ abilities to cope with 
dialectic tensions emanating from the level of formalization actually applied (see 
Figure 6.4). By conducting additional case studies, the external validity that can be 
attributed to this finding could be enlarged. More general, compelling support from 
other cases could support the further development of a dialectic view on the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
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7  THEME 4 – CONTRACT STANDARDIZATION 
 
 
‘Social psychology is replete with theories that take for granted the “fact” that people think 
[…]. They all start with the assumption that people attend to their world and derive 
behavioral strategies based on current information.’  
 
Langer, Blank and Chanowitz, 1978: 635 
 
‘Mindlessness often overshadows human thought when it comes to actual decision making.’ 
 
Sharps and Martin, 2002: 272 
 
 
Summary 
The application of standard contracts and standard procedures for negotiating and 
contracting is omnipresent in interorganizational transactions. However, only few 
studies on interorganizational governance actually consider how standardization 
influences interorganizational relationships. In this chapter, we present an 
overview of the benefits and drawbacks of contract standardization. A review of 
the literature indicates that standardization enables an efficient and expeditious 
effectuation of transactions. Moreover, standard contracts are considered 
relatively legitimate, robust and easy to interpret compared to tailor-made 
contracts. However, they also tend to be very non-specific. Probably even more 
significant is that the application of standard contracts is frequently preceded by 
negotiation and contracting procedures that hardly contribute to the creation of 
shared expectations. Standardization is therefore argued to prohibit the “meeting 
of minds” and to encourage “mindlessness” during negotiation and contracting 
practices. This assertion is assessed empirically in an analysis of contracting 
practices in 911 buyer-supplier relationships. Structural equation modeling reveals 
that the use of standard procedures for negotiation and contracting generally 
diminishes parties’ attention to the substantive details of a transaction, and that it 
reduces the impact of contracting on interorganizational performance. These 
findings imply that academics can draw more accurate descriptions of negotiation 
and contracting practices if they consider standardization in their research, and 
they urge practitioners to be cautious with contract standardization. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Most research on contracting in interorganizational relationships appears to 
presume that actors are (boundedly) rational, and that they act self-interestedly, 
suggesting that they devise contractual structures that minimize transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1985) and that maximize the value that can be created from 
transactions (Foss and Foss, 2005). These assumptions imply that more complex 
and more risky transactions are governed by more complete and highly specified 
contracts (Williamson, 1985). In practice, this frequently appears not to be the 
case (Eggleston et al., 2000). In this chapter, we offer an explanation for this 
observation by challenging the idea that contracting always occurs mindfully. We 
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do not contest that cooperating parties match firm-level and transaction- or 
relational level factors with governance structures, but we do indicate that the 
standardization of negotiation and contracting processes prohibits 
interorganizational participants from devising optimal governance structures. In 
constructing our argument, we capitalize on the observations from Langer et al. 
(1978) and Sharps and Martin (2002), indicating that we should not take for 
granted the idea that people always behave “mindfully”. In line with this, we 
advance that contract standardization reduces the likelihood that parties achieve a 
“meeting of minds”, one of the most fundamental functions attributed to negotiation 
and contracting processes (Gluck, 1979; Goetz and Scott, 1985). Furthermore, we 
contend that standardization of negotiation and contracting reduces mindful or 
encourages mindless behavior by interorganizational participants. 
 
As contract standardization is omnipresent in practice, but receives only scant 
attention in the literature (Korobkin, 2003), we do not solely underpin these 
assertions here, but we commence by investigating the advantages and 
disadvantages of using standard contracts more generally. Accordingly, we divide 
the chapter into two parts. In part one, we review the literature on standard 
contracts and we develop an overview of arguments for and against their use in 
interorganizational relationships. In part two, we shift the focus from standard 
contracts to standardization as an attribute of negotiating and contracting 
practices. Here, we advance that standard procedures for negotiation and 
contracting involve lower degrees of mindfulness than the formulation of tailor-
made contracts. In other words, we posit that participants in interorganizational 
relationships will act less carefully, critically, purposefully, attentively, and 
conscientiously (Ryle, 1949; Weick and Roberts, 1993) when adopting 
standardized procedures to define their exchanges and to coordinate and control 
their relationships, possibly harming interorganizational performance. The 
extension of generic contracting models in the literature with a factor capturing the 
degree to which negotiation and contracting practices are standardized relates to 
the areas that have been shaded in the research framework depicted in Figure 7.1 
and it is further specified in Figure 7.2. 
 
The chapter’s main contribution is to illustrate that research on standardization, 
which currently pertains to various areas, including global environmental policies 
by multinationals (Christmann, 2004), work programs for building projects (Blyth et 
al., 2004), quality systems (Walgenbach, 2001), and international marketing 
programs (Zou and Cavusgil, 2002), has to be extended to negotiation and 
contracting practices in interorganizational relationships. In the chapter, we take 
some initial steps in this direction, by offering an overview of factors that contribute 
to the rising significance of contract standardization, and by noticing that there are 
several downsides to contract standardization that are easily overlooked. Our 
findings caution practitioners of neglecting the downsides of standardization, and it 
encourages them to consider whether and when mindlessness ambuscades in 
their transactions, and how it can be prevented or mitigated. 
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The chapter is structured accordingly. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with contract standardization. 
Subsequently, we deploy structural equation modeling to assess whether the use 
of standard procedures for negotiating and contracting diminishes the magnitude 
of the relationships between firm-level and transaction or relational level factors, 
formalization, and interorganizational performance on a sample of 911 buyer-
supplier relationships. In the discussion, we elaborate on the implications of our 
findings and on issues that could be addressed in future research. 
 
 
FIGURE 7.2 
Generic research model extended with standardization 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard negotiation and contracting procedures (0, 1)
      -        - 
Firm- and 
relationship 
characteristics 
Formalization 
Inter-
organizational 
Performance 
Need to 
formalize 
Ability to 
formalize 
Positive 
consequences
Negative 
consequences
Degree of  
formalization 
 
Antecedents 
Other 
governance 
mechanisms
Inter- 
organizational 
performance 
 
Moderators 
FIGURE 7.1 
Research framework – theme four 
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7.2 Part I: advantages and disadvantages of standard contracts 
 
We start developing our argument by leveraging the observation that standard 
contracts – here defined as the application of similar contracts or contract terms in 
a range of contractual transactions – have gained wide currency (Korobkin, 2003). 
This was evident already in a study by Macaulay (1963: 58), in which lawyers 
complained that businessmen ‘desire to keep it simple and avoid red tape even 
when large amounts of money and significant risks are involved.‘ However, this 
has not been translated into a well-developed scientific knowledge base, 
witnessing the ‘relative silence’ in the law, contracts, and management literature 
regarding the reasons for and the implications of contract standardization (Kahan 
and Klausner, 1997: 715). Hitherto, it is unclear, for example, what reasons firms 
have for deploying or opting out of standard contracts, and what their effects are 
on interorganizational cooperation (Kahan and Klausner, 1996; Korobkin, 2003). 
 
To investigate these questions, we have to look for the origins of contract 
standardization (see Textbox 7.1). The phenomenon first emerged at the end of 
the nineteenth century. In that period, industrial firms aiming at mass-production 
became more or less forced to use preprinted, standardized contracts, primarily 
for efficiency reasons (Gluck, 1979). Since then, contracts have frequently been 
formulated in line with certain standards, corresponding to conventional patterns 
(Young, 1998). Large enterprises started to apply comparable contracts in 
relationships with different clients and suppliers (Eggleston et al., 2000; Macaulay, 
1963), thereby utilizing knowledge gained in one transaction for managing other 
transactions (Johnson et al., 2004). These contracts contained terms that were 
incorporated irrespective of the characteristics of the transaction or the 
collaborative context (Epstein, 1999). Branch organizations, law and accountancy 
firms and the legislative power also promoted the development and application of 
such terms (Hill and King, 2004). As firms have been committing themselves to a 
steadily proliferating number of interorganizational relationships, a certain degree 
of standardization has now become imperative, rendering the application of 
relatively simple standard contracts the rule rather than the exception (Eggleston 
et al., 2000). The main factors contributing to the rise of standard contracts and 
some major drawbacks of contract standardization are listed in Table 7.1. 
 
 
TEXTBOX 7.1 
Facts on the standardization of contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gluck (1979) and upsidesoft.com 
Origin:  End of the nineteenth century. Result of mass-production  
 
Sources: Prior relationships of the own firm with similar or other partners, 
legislature, branch organizations, law and accountancy firms. 
 
Necessary due to:  A growing number of interorganizational relationships. 
 
Current trend: Application of contract management software. 
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Inherent efficiency of standard contracts 
The motive most commonly advanced for the application of standard contracts 
and standard contract terms derives from the idea that this type of contract is 
inherently optimal (Kahan and Klausner, 1996). The presupposition here is that 
the substance of standard contract terms optimizes the value of a transaction, 
irrespective of the deployment of the same contract clause by other parties, and 
regardless of its application by parties in prior transactions. Proponents of this 
argument suggest that quasi-Darwinian competitive processes eventuate in a 
situation in which clauses that have appeared efficient before are being reused, 
whereas inferior clauses are abandoned and disappear from the scene (Klausner, 
1995). Standard contracts then only entail the relatively low costs connected to the 
mechanical task of formulating and filling out the forms and they can be replicated 
almost without costs in other transactions (Kahan and Klausner, 1997). They are 
associated with exploitation, routinization, systematic cost and complexity 
reductions, and increased efficiency (Sussman, 1999). Because the duplication of 
efforts is circumvented and as the collective experience from earlier transactions is 
fully utilized, the application of standard contract terms entails advantages of 
scale, scope and experience (Klausner, 1995). The development of complex 
contracts, instead, is costly and often becomes complicated due to bounded 
rationality of contracting parties (Goetz and Scott, 1985). 
 
 
TABLE 7.1 
Overview of the advantages and disadvantages of contract standardization 
Advantages References 
Efficiency of the transaction Gluck (1979); Kahan & Klausner (1996) 
Transaction speed and robustness Epstein (1999); Goetz & Scott (1985) 
Exploitation of information asymmetry & 
Prevention of unintended signaling 
Eggleston et al. (2000); Korobkin (2000);  
Hill & King (2004) 
Legitimacy granted to a contract Hill & King (2004); Kahan & Klausner (1996, 1997) 
Unequivocal contract interpretation Goetz & Scott (1985); Pietroforte (1997) 
Network-effects Klausner (1995); Korobkin (1998) 
Disadvantages References 
Low level of contractual specificity Goetz & Scott (1985); Kahan & Klausner (1996, 
1997); Korobkin (2003) 
Limited potential for developing mutual 
expectations and joint understandings 
Gluck (1979); Hill (2001); Ring & Rands (1989); 
Ring & Van de Ven (1989)* 
* Most of these references indicate that non-standardized, intensive negotiation and 
contracting procedures enable sensemaking and are conducive to the “meeting of minds”. 
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Pace and robustness of transactions 
A second advantage of standard contracts is that they can be effectuated quickly 
(Epstein, 1999; Salbu, 1997). Standardization results in comparatively short 
negotiation cycles, and it allows firms to efficiently exchange with multiple 
partners, because it ‘reduces search, monitoring, and enforcement’ efforts 
(Schilling and Steensma, 2001: 1155). Due to standardization, firms can increase 
the pace with which they come to ‘understand and evaluate potential deals, 
something which ultimately enables them to respond more quickly to potential 
opportunities and threats in their environment (Salbu, 1997). Savings in time are 
often just as critical as the relatively low costs associated with standardization, 
because parties may experience high competitive pressures during relationship 
formation processes, or because partners have the desire to introduce new 
products on the market before competitors do so (Klausner, 1995). The 
significance of timesaving benefits is manifest in a remark of Norman Goldfarb, the 
CEO of First Clinical Research, a medical institute in San Francisco. He notes that 
‘reducing contract negotiation means we can get life-saving drugs to the market 
quicker […]. When you figure that every day of delay in approving a drug costs a 
drug company an average of $1.3 million, if we save two weeks, we’re talking 
serious money’ (eyeforpharma.com). Standardized contract terms are also 
generally robust, and of a high quality. After all, earlier formulations ‘bring to bear 
a collective wisdom and experience that parties are unable to generate 
individually’ (Goetz and Scott, 1985: 286), and they are only accepted in the 
business community after they have been exposed to deliberation and reflection 
(Epstein, 1999; Hill, 2001b). As a result, standardized contracts generally exist of 
time-tested and relatively “safe” provisions that minimize the risk of unintended 
effects (Goetz and Scott, 1985), insulate parties from significant downside risks, 
and reduce the chance that things are forgotten during negotiations (Hill, 2001b). 
 
Ability to utilize information-asymmetry and prevent unintended signaling 
Another advantage of standard contracts is that they enable parties in 
interorganizational transactions to maintain beneficial information-asymmetries. 
Although a partner that has more information at its disposal is generally better 
equipped to write detailed contracts, it might not be in its best interest to do so. 
Consequently, an important rationale for applying standard contracts is that the 
best-informed party only has to concede a limited amount of information to the 
other party. This can be highly desirable, as revealing information might enable 
another party to take advantage of the focal organization. Standard contracts thus 
offer parties the opportunity to withhold strategic information (Eggleston et al., 
2000). Moreover, standard contracts signal trustworthiness, and they decrease the 
risk that parties “upset” each other. Instead, when writing tailor-made contracts the 
possibility of some bad event may be raised, possibly damaging the relationship, 
even if the event never occurs, and even if the party had not reacted in the way 
that it describes. In this case, the acceptance of contractual incompleteness by 
transaction parties offers a positive signal, fostering cooperation, and preventing a 
“contractual arms-race” from developing between the partners (Hill and King, 
2004). Instead, when contracts and the contracting processes preceding them are 
considered ‘inscrutably complex, mysterious or ambiguous’, they will tend to deter 
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engagement and confidence, reducing a potential partner’s comfort with and 
confidence in a focal firm (Salbu, 1997: 374). 
 
Enhancing the legitimacy of transactions 
Transaction partners and other stakeholders in interorganizational relationships, 
such as investors, banks, clients, and suppliers are generally familiar with 
standard contract terms (Kahan and Klausner, 1996, 1997). This familiarity 
generally yields them with ‘increased comfort with and confidence in decision 
assessments’ regarding prospective transactions (Salbu, 1997: 373). Standard 
contracts have proven to be valid in earlier transactions and their meaning is 
frequently clearer and less susceptible to differences in interpretation than tailor-
made contracts. Moreover, they are regularly developed by firms with solid 
reputations, such as investment companies and law offices (Klausner, 1995). 
Stakeholders are therefore inclined to believe that standard provisions are 
necessarily the most suitable for interorganizational transactions. These factors 
add to the perceived legitimacy of transactions (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In 
particular, standard provisions are surrounded by ‘an aura of stability and 
objectivity’ (Kahan and Klausner, 1996: 363). Consequently, organizations feel the 
“obligation” to apply standard contract terms, irrespective of their efficiency. In this 
sense, the institutionalization of standard contracts results from pressures caused 
by organizations that have already adopted them, resulting in a form of isomorphic 
behavior (Fiol and O’Connor, 2003). We make the annotation here that the 
legitimacy of standard contracts is dependent on the institutional environment in 
which a transaction is embedded. Whereas a lawyer in Germany comes across 
aggressively if he or she proposes detailed tailor-made contracts, a lawyer in the 
United States is reproached for lacking inspiration and competence in case 
contract provisions are not intensively negotiated. This difference may stem from 
the fact that Germany is less marked by a history of adversarial industrial relations 
(Lorenz, 1999). It is probably also due to the smaller size of the German trade 
community and the more prominent role of branch organizations compared to the 
United States (Hill and King, 2004).  
 
Enabling unequivocal contract interpretation 
Explicitly formulated tailor-made contract terms are also often more liable to 
differences in interpretation than standard contracts. Tailored contracts compound 
costs and uncertainty related to litigation as directly applicable precedents are 
lacking (Hill, 2001a). Standard provisions, instead, are less likely to contain 
ambiguous language and inconsistencies. They have a more consistent meaning 
(Goetz and Scott, 1985; Salbu, 1997), and they are easier to interpret because 
jurisprudence is available and judgments have already been passed about these 
provisions (Kahan and Klausner, 1996, 1997). In the United States, for example, 
the most frequently used contract for the design and construction of buildings is 
made available by the American Institute of Architects (AIA). The primary function 
of these contracts, according to Pietroforte (1997), exists in the acknowledgement 
of generally accepted stages, responsibilities and roles, which results in a 
predictable environment and a common understanding regarding the context of 
interorganizational transactions and the meaning that parties attach to issues 
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included in the contract. In particular, the relative certainty that contract parties 
derive from the use of previously applied standard provisions increases the 
attractiveness of this type of contracts (Goetz and Scott, 1985). After all, standard 
provisions reduce ambiguity, and, consequently, the interpretative burden with 
which stakeholders are confronted and the risk that inconsistent interpretations 
arise (Epstein, 1999; Hill and King, 2004). This is not only helpful during litigation, 
but also reduces the likelihood that parties bring a case to court. It holds both for 
organizations active in civil law countries as well as for  organizations that have to 
adhere to common law. In civil law, legislation is seen as the primary source of 
law. Courts thus base their judgments on the provisions of codes and statutes, 
from which solutions in particular cases are to be derived and they have to reason 
extensively on the basis of general principles, or by drawing analogies from 
statutory provisions to fill lacunae. By contrast, in the common law system, cases 
are the primary source of law, while statutes are only seen as incursions into the 
common law and thus interpreted narrowly (www.wikipedia.org). In both cases, 
standardization can diminish the quivocality surrounding contract interpretation. 
However, in civil law cases, the standard will be derived more directly from the 
law, whereas in common law cases standards are frequently based on prior deals. 
 
Reinforcement of advantages by network effects 
The rationales for adopting standard contracts that have been listed here are 
amplified by the existence of network advantages. Network advantages imply that 
increasing returns to the utilization of standard contracts arise in case more 
organizations deploy such contracts (Klausner, 1995; Kahan and Klausner, 1997). 
In case an ever-growing group of organizations adopts certain contracts, many of 
the advantages of standard provisions that have been discussed previously are 
reinforced. Standard contracts can be applied, for instance, in a larger number of 
transactions, while the costs of legal advice are lower, and the pace with which 
deals can be concluded becomes even higher. The same accounts for the 
availability of jurisprudence, and for the ease with which the meaning of specific 
contract provisions for potential partners can be determined. 
 
Low level of contractual specificity 
Despite the many rationales that one may advance for applying standard 
contracts, standard contracts also have several drawbacks. The most obvious 
drawback of standard contracts is that they are likely to be sub-optimal, because a 
contract provision that was efficient for the situation in which it came into existence 
is not necessarily equally suitable for other transactions (Sussman, 1999). 
Standard provisions might be sub-optimal from the beginning, or organizations 
might simply adopt standardized provisions in situations in which alternative 
contracts are more efficient (Kahan and Klausner, 1996). The development of 
standards is highly sensitive to starting conditions or history-specific components 
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). If in the first instance a standard contract, for 
example, is developed for a transaction between organization A and B, it is likely 
to look different from a first initiative to developing a standard contract engrafted 
on a transaction between organization A and C. This coincidental character of the 
origins of a standard contract undermines the claim that prevailing practices will 
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converge to an efficient solution for commercial problems (Epstein, 1999). 
Furthermore, as standards necessarily have to apply to a range of exchanges, 
they are less likely to do justice to the particularities of individual exchanges. In 
other words, standard contracts frequently do not effectively capture context and 
task characteristics. Their content further tend to diverge from the needs of 
contract parties (Pietroforte, 1997), as adaptations of standards frequently lag 
behind changes in the contexts and conditions with which parties to exchanges 
are being confronted (Goetz and Scott, 1985). Standard contracts thus entail the 
risk of thoughtless or perfunctionary application. In a sense, this involves the 
inappropriate generalization of prior experience towards novel situations (Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005). Freund, who describes a mock merger between 
Suggestive Software Ltd. and Proliferating Products Inc, offers an example. He 
quotes a supervisor lambasting a junior associate in a law firm for having done a 
rotten job in his first draft of an agreement, resulting from the “default” application 
of contract terms. ‘Merry Christmas, Pete. Now look fella, you’ll just have to forgive 
my candor, but time’s short and this draft of the Proliferating-Suggestive 
agreement is an inferior job. The problem is that you just didn’t think. You walked 
out of here, you went into the library, you grabbed that Screwloose binder off the 
shelf, you had a photocopy made of the final contract, and you marked it up for the 
purposes of this draft.’ (Freund, 1975: 500, in Hill, 2001b). The example illustrates 
that the adoption of standard contracts frequently lacks thorough analysis (Kahan 
and Klausner, 1997), and that it locks parties in conventional modes of thought 
(Young, 1998). This reduces the inclination to consider context and task 
characteristics that are peculiar to a transaction when writing contracts. 
 
Limited potential for achieving a “Meeting of Minds” 
A second significant shortcoming of standard contracts is that they are not being 
preceded by a process in which mutual understanding between transaction 
partners is created, and in which expectations are being set. The rise of standard 
contracts has thereby destroyed one of the main functions of the negotiation and 
contracting process, being the possibility for transaction parties to discover what 
they want from a transaction and from each other (Hill, 2001a) and reaching 
mutual understanding (Ariño and Ring, 2004). Gluck (1979: 74) expresses this as 
follows: ‘The important thing to be realized is that, with the development of the 
standard form, the contractual document has drastically changed. While the 
traditional bargained out document was in itself evidence of the understanding, the 
same cannot be said of the standard form document…’ Standard contracts 
destroy the bargaining process (Gluck, 1979), as they reduce communication 
about the contents of a promise, right, or obligation, calling into question the 
reliability of such contracts (Goetz and Scott, 1985). Where non-standardized 
formal negotiation and contracting processes enable or even enforce parties to 
give meaning and make sense of interorganizational relationships and their 
underlying logics (Ariño and Ring, 2004; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), the 
utilization of standard contracts inhibits these processes. Although pure contract 
theoreticians presuppose that all contract provisions are being negotiated and 
read, standard contracts are frequently not read (Eisenberg, 1995; Korobkin, 
2003), and they do not involve fierce negotiations. Consequently, sensemaking is 
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hampered and the development of mutual understandings and shared 
expectations becomes more difficult. This is particularly problematic when 
ambiguity exists between partners, or when relationships do not closely resemble 
market transactions, so that a meeting of minds entails more that reaching 
agreement on product specifications and price. 
 
7.3 Part II: how contract standardization may lead to mindlessness 
 
Now that we have furnished an inventory of the advantages and disadvantages of 
standard contracts, we shift our attention towards the standardization of the 
negotiation and contracting procedures leading up to these contracts. We 
investigate how the standardization of these procedures influences 
interorganizational cooperation. Merriam Webster’s dictionary provides us with a 
useful starting point for investigating this question (www.m-w.com). According to 
the dictionary, a procedure comprises a series of steps followed in a regular 
definite order, and it involves a traditional or established way of doing things. 
Standardization applies when procedures are uniform, well established by usage, 
and widely recognized as acceptable. It attests to a certain "fixedness” or 
homogeneity within external exchanges (Brown and Timmins, 1981). Standard 
procedures then consist of established methods that are followed routinely. They 
comprise a form of abstracted and explicit representation of collective routines 
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994), which are created and refined over multiple cycles 
of exchange (Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003). Such standard procedures are 
frequently rather inertial and relatively invariant to signals and feedback that could 
call for their revision, so that little variety is present among negotiating and 
contracting practices for different exchange relationships30. Contracting parties 
may come to respond to the world in a limited and rigid fashion (see also Luchins, 
1942), overlooking simpler or better solutions to similar problems.  
 
It appears that the application of standard procedures for negotiating and 
contracting involves relatively low degrees of mindfulness. In order to develop this 
argument further, we explain the concept of mindfulness. Mind is a dispositional 
term that denotes a propensity to act in a certain manner or style (Weick and 
Roberts, 1993). It ranges from stupid to intelligent (Ryle, 1949). Mindfulness refers 
to active and fluid information processing, sensitivity to context and multiple 
perspectives, and the ability to draw novel distinctions (Langer, 1989). It implies 
‘noticing, taking care, attending, applying one’s mind, concentrating […], alertness, 
interest, intentness, studying, and trying’ (Ryle, 1949: 136). It is associated with 
                                                 
30 Findings from previous investigations show that standardization of procedures is closely 
related to formalization of the same procedures (Mansfield, 1973). In the National Study, for 
example, Child (1972) found a correlation of .87, whereas in the Aston studies Pugh et al. 
(1969) found a correlation of .83 between both constructs. In our inquiry, however, 
standardization is regarded as an attribute of the negotiation and contracting process (see 
Lillrank, 2003), a process that can be more or less standardized. This is supported by the 
insignificant value for the correlation between formalization and standardization for our 
sample of buyer-supplier relationships (Kendall’s tau-b = .022, p<.429, n=899). 
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actively drawing distinctions and making meaning, and it involves great sensitivity 
to one’s environment, openness to new information, the creation of new categories 
for structuring perception, and awareness of multiple perspectives (Langer, 1989; 
Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000). Mindlessness, instead, involves relying on past 
categories, acting on automatic pilot, not attending to new information, and fixating 
on a single perspective (Langer, 1989). It pertains to cognitive modes that are 
marked by automatic and limited information processing, little attention to detail, 
and restricted building of cognitive representations of task environments 
(Dunegan, 1993). When mindless, individuals exhibit behavior that is largely 
dictated by the past. They operate from a state of reduced attention, which often 
leads to the mechanical use of rule-based behaviors (Fiol and O’Connor, 2003), 
and they pay limited attention to the substantive elements of a situation. This 
causes much of the details of on-going, present situations to go unexamined 
(Langer, et al., 1978), or to be evaluated superficially (Dunegan, 1993). 
 
When procedures are being standardized, mindlessness ambuscades (Burgoon et 
al., 2000; Feldman, 2003; Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000), as the ‘need for 
organizational participants to think’ diminishes (Feldman, 2003: 728). In such 
cases, people behave rather routinely or habitually, and they adopt a less careful, 
critical, and purposeful attitude towards situations (Ryle, 1949). Their behavior 
involves a lack of seeing, taking notice, and being attentive (Dougherty and 
Takacs, 2004), and they work from a narrow focus of attention (Fiol and O’Connor, 
2003), so that procedure-inconsistent information is excluded from consideration. 
This entails the risk that responses to situations are activated in an over-learned 
and automated fashion (Burgoon et al., 2000). As a result, standardized 
negotiation and contracting practices add little to interorganizational participants’ 
comprehension of their situation and it prevents them from constructing meaning 
and building understanding. Standardization of negotiation and contracting 
practices reduces their inclination to make sense of the transactions they engage 
in. Consequently, expectations remain imperfectly articulated, and hubris and 
faddishness may prevail over active consideration of the consequences of 
interorganizational cooperation (Sampson, 2003). This can result in 
misunderstandings, misrepresentations, and misperceptions among transactors 
who are individually under the impression that they are engaged with one another 
in meaningful interactions (Burgoon et al., 2000; Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000). It 
precludes them from getting to know each other, from clarifying their objectives 
and intentions, and from strengthening their relationship. In summary, we suggest 
that the use of standard procedures for negotiating and contracting encourages 
mindlessness. If this is correct, the generic model presented in the literature, in 
which firm-level and transaction- or relational level factors influence formalization, 
and in which formalization subsequently influences interorganizational 
performance (Anderson and Dekker, 2006; Leiblein, 2003; Sobrero and Schrader, 
1998; Stinchcombe, 2001), needs to be modified. We propose that the degree of 
standardization of negotiation and contracting practices moderates both sets of 
relationships. As standardization is argued to lead to mindlessness, firm-level and 
transaction- or relational level factors are no longer considered in great length 
during the negotiation and contracting period, reducing their impact on the degree 
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of formalization reached in a relationship. Similarly, the aspects of the cooperating 
firms and relationships that are covered in contracts are less likely to be helpful 
when things go wrong, and parties are less likely to revert to and depend on those 
contracts in future, diminishing the influence of formalization on interorganizational 
performance. This is captured in hypothesis 7.1. 
 
Hypothesis 7.1: In the context of interorganizational contracting, standardization 
of negotiation and contracting procedures reduces mindfulness, so that the 
associations between firm-level and transaction- or relational level factors and 
formalization, and associations between formalization and interorganizational 
performance become smaller. 
 
7.4 Method 
 
Statistical analysis: Structural equation modeling 
To assess the hypothesized relationships, we specify a structural equation model 
(see Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Such a model consists of a set of linear 
equations that simultaneously test two or more relationships among directly 
observable and unmeasured latent variables (Shook et al., 2004). It allows one to 
test a system of structural equations, where a dependent variable in one 
relationship becomes an independent variable in a subsequent relationship. The 
advantage of structural equation modeling over other statistical techniques is that 
it enables simultaneous estimation of the fit of several structural equations, 
(Bagozzi, 1980), and it accounts for measurement error as well as unobservable 
constructs (Hulland, 1999). The structural model was developed in AMOS 5.0. The 
general form of the equation specifying the relationships between latent variables, 
in this software-program is: 
 
η = Bη + Γξ + ζ  (1) 
 
In which η is a vector of endogenous concepts, ξ is a vector of exogenous 
concepts, B and Γ are matrices of structural coefficients for the endogenous and 
exogenous concepts, and ζ is a vector of errors in the conceptual model. The 
measurement model for the endogenous latent variables in the model equals: 
 
y = Λyη + ε  (2) 
 
In which y is a vector of observed endogenous indicators, Λy is a matrix of 
structural coefficients and ε is a vector of errors in the measurement model. The 
measurement model for the exogenous latent variables in the structural model is: 
 
x = Λxξ + δ  (3) 
 
In which x is a vector of observed exogenous indicators, Λx is a matrix of structural 
coefficients and δ is a vector of errors in the measurement model. For 
identification purposes, scales of multiple indicator constructs are determined by 
fixing the loading of the indicator that a priori (i.e., theoretically) could be expected 
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to best represent that construct at a value of one. Fixed loadings are indicated by 
denoting λ= 1 for the “reference indicator”. Conforming to this general model, and 
based on the literature, we develop a recursive system describing the proposed 
path from antecedents, formalization, and performance. A visual presentation of 
the specified statistical model is presented in appendix B. As can be seen from 
this figure, we only incorporate relationships between antecedents when their 
existence appears highly plausible, making the model more meaningful than 
models in which antecedents are allowed to co-vary freely with each other (see, 
for example, Dekker, 2003). The model is estimated by a maximum likelihood 
procedure for structural equation models (Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999). To test for 
the moderating effects of standard procedures for negotiating and contracting on 
the relationships between antecedents, formalization, and performance, we split 
our sample of buyer-supplier relationships in a sub sample of relationships in 
which standard negotiation and contracting procedures are applied (n=479), and a 
sub sample for which this is not the case (n=420). To test our hypothesis, we 
compare the effect sizes for both sub samples of relationships. 
 
Measurement 
Our model encompasses several firm-level and transaction- or relational level 
factors that, according to the literature, influence formalization, such as 
measurability, relation-specific investments, transaction complexity, reputation, 
firm size, and the existence of alternative options. Measurability, for example, is 
reputed to be positively related to formalization, as managers try to find decision 
rules, information sources, and structural designs that provide adequate 
understanding to cope with measurability problems (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). It is captured by three items. Respondents had to indicate how 
difficult it was for their organization to compare this product with similar products, 
how difficult it was for their organization to compare the price-quality ratio of 
potential suppliers, and to what extent it was difficult or hard to evaluate the quality 
of the product at the time of delivery. Response categories followed a 5-point 
Likert-scale (1= ‘very easy,’ 5= ‘very difficult’). The items are reverse-coded, after 
which a Cronbach’s α of 0.79 remains for the scale, which is above the guideline 
of 0.7 for modest composite reliability (Nunnally, 1978). Relation-specific assets 
concern investments that have the highest potential value in a focal relationship; 
redeployment of these assets outside the relationship diminishes the assets’ value 
or is simply impossible (e.g. Klein et al., 1978; Subramani and Venkatraman, 
2003). According to transaction cost economics, exchanges that involve significant 
relation-specific investments can encounter ‘hold-up’ or ‘opportunism’ problems 
(Williamson, 1985), hence, the greater the specificity of investments, the more 
complex the contract (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999). Consistent with Dekker 
(2003) and Poppo and Zenger (2002), we measure relation-specific investments 
by three indicators reflecting the costs related to switching to another supplier or 
product. The questions concern damages – in terms of time and money – which 
are incurred when transacted products have to be replaced. The items concern 
the ‘purchase a new product,’ the ‘re-education of personnel,’ and ‘re-entry of 
data.’ Cronbach’s α for the scale amounts to 0.75. Transaction complexity relates, 
among others, to the scope of a transaction (Oxley and Sampson, 2004), the 
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number of partners involved, and the degree of technological or organizational 
interdependency between the partners (Kumar and Van Dissel, 1996). 
Researchers have argued that complexity needs to be controlled through rules, 
scheduling or plans (Steensma and Corley, 2000), and that higher degrees of 
complexity call for more coordination (Gulati and Singh, 1998), implying that 
governance costs and administrative overhead rise with the level of complexity 
(Williamson, 1985). Congruent with Dekker (2003), we measure complexity by two 
indicators. The first indicator captures the scope of a transaction. It is a count-
measure of the number of product types involved in a transaction. The second 
indicator measures the degree of interdependency between partners. It is 
measured by dividing the 18 product types into product categories entailing 
divergent degrees of complexity (1= most simple product categories, 5= most 
complex product categories). We measure the overall complexity of the 
transaction by both the number of transactions and the complexity level involved 
with these transactions. Cronbach’s α for this measure is 0.71. Reputation refers 
to a focal organization’s knowledge of the partner’s likely behavior, and of its 
capabilities and resources (Hill, 2001a). As reputation reduces the likelihood that 
partners behave opportunistically, it is believed to reduce the need for relying on 
complex and costly contracts (Eggleston et al., 2000). Congruent with Carson et 
al. (2006), the items we use refer to the importance of ‘the reputation and reliability 
of the supplier,’ ‘the reputation and reliability of the product,’ and ‘the general 
impression of the supplier and its employees’. The resulting scale has a 
Cronbach’s α of 0.73. Concerning firm size, the majority of studies presuppose a 
positive relationship with formalization (Oxley, 1997). We measure the size of a 
buyer by the number of employees (Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Muthusamy 
and White, 2005), and turnover (see also Heide, 2003). As the distributions of both 
proxies are skewed, the logarithm is taken of these values. Cronbach’s α for the 
scale equals 0.73. Alternative options increase one’s ‘ability to exit from existing 
relations’ Palay (1996: 49), thereby offering an alternative to contractual 
safeguards. Cooper and Slagmulder (2004: 17) offer an example of Isuzu, an 
Asian car manufacturer, which ‘used direct competition between its major 
suppliers to ensure that the suppliers were as innovative as possible. When a 
supplier failed to remain competitive, Isuzu punished that firm by awarding it 
slightly less volume than in previous years.’ In these cases ‘interests were secured 
because of the existence of potential alternatives and not necessarily because of 
actual recourse to those substitutes’ (Masten, 1996: 50). Consistent with Jap and 
Ganesan (2000), we measure alternative options by two indicators referring to ‘the 
number of alternative suppliers that could have arranged a similar IT-solution’ and 
‘the number of alternatives for this product’ (1=‘minimal’, 5=‘very high’). 
Cronbach’s α for this scale equals 0.72. The degree of formalization is constructed 
from two proxies. The first proxy is constructed as the sum of 24 technical 
specifications that could possibly be recorded in a contract between a supplier and 
a buyer, such as clauses on the definition of system functions; memory space; and 
system architecture. Respondents were asked to rate to which degree these 
aspects of a transaction were specified or defined in the contract (1= ‘very 
globally’, 5= ‘very detailed’). The second proxy involves the respondent’s answers 
regarding the presence or absence of 24 contract clauses. 
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Price determination Liability supplier Restriction product use 
Price-level Force majeure supplier Non-disclosure buyer  
Up-dating Arbitration arrangement Settlement R&D costs 
Joint management Technical specifications Termination period 
Price changes Warranties supplier Insurance supplier 
Payment terms Quality (norms) Service period 
Sanctions late payment Intellectual property Reserving spare parts 
Delivery time Protection product Maintenance period 
 
Individual contract terms receive a value of one when the respondents indicate 
that they were included as a clause in the contract, whereas they were coded zero 
when the subject was only arranged verbally, or when it was not arranged at all. 
The first proxy for formalization is then calculated as a count measure of these 
contractual agreements. The factor scores for both proxies range between 0.62 
and 0.71, indicating a reasonable fit. Standardization of negotiation and 
contracting procedures applies when procedures are uniform, well established by 
usage, and widely recognized as acceptable. It is captured by a dummy variable. 
Respondents, all from the buyer-side of the dyads, were asked whether a 
standard procedure was used by their firm during negotiations and contracting. 
When respondents answered that this was not or hardly the case, the variable 
received a value of zero, while on all other occasions the value was set to one. 
Finally, interorganizational performance is measured by the extent to which eleven 
different types of problems have occurred in a relationship (1=‘not’, 5=‘into a large 
extent’), and by the types of actions that could be taken to solve these problems 
(0=‘no’, 1=‘yes’). The occurrence of problems is then calculated as the maximum 
value respondents given to one of the eleven problem categories. The extent to 
which corrective actions were undertaken is measured by the number of actions 
that buyers took as a reaction to problems related to the transaction. Cronbach’s 
alpha for the scale is 0.84. Analogue to Rooks (2002), the validity of the measure 
was assessed by regarding its relationship with other performance variables, such 
as the report mark for the product, the report mark for the supplier, and the degree 
to which the buyer would recommend the supplier to other firms. The results 
confirmed our confidence in the validity of this measure. 
 
Problems:  Actions: 
Exceeding delivery period Deliberate with supplier 
Exceeding price / budget Refer to agreements made 
Product incomplete Contact higher management 
Product too slow / too limited Inform other clients of supplier 
Deviance of agreed on specification Postpone payment period 
Incompatibility with other products Postpone payment 
Installation too quick / careless Claim damage 
Support too summarily Call for arbitration 
Service too slow / late Other juridical steps 
Necessary adaptations slow or late Finish relationship 
Insufficient / unclear documentation Defer agreement 
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7.5 Results 
 
Table 7.2 exhibits the correlation matrices for both sub-samples. In order to 
assess the adequacy of the reflective measurement model, checks were 
performed on (1) individual item reliabilities, (2) the convergent validity of the 
measures associated with individual constructs, and (3) discriminant validity 
between constructs (Hulland, 1999). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy equals 0.79, indicating that factor scores could be used as reliable 
indicators of discriminant validity. Appendix C contains factor scores for all items 
on their respective variables, all displaying acceptable coefficient alpha’s (see 
Hulland, 1999). It also exhibits different measures for model fit. Following 
Anderson and Dekker (2006), we assess whether a fixed measurement model for 
both sub samples is appropriate. The model shows configural invariance (i.e. 
items load on similar factors between groups) and metric invariance (i.e. no 
meaningful differences exist in the factor loadings between groups).  
 
 
TABLE 7.2 
Correlation matrices for both sub samples* 
No standardization Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Measurability 9.01 2.70 1.00
Asset-specificity  8.85 3.04 .38 1.00
Complexity 5.53 1.98 .33 .40 1.00
Reputation 11.3 2.13 -.01 .21 .18 1.00
Size buyer 5.84 .86 .04 .12 .17 .04 1.00
Alternative options 5.17 1.89 -.23 -.21 -.16 .01 -.14 1.00
Formalization 62.0 26.2 .08 .31 .42 .32 .20 -.08 1.00
Performance 5.10 1.74 -.14 -.29 -.18 -.10 -.19 .07 -.41 1.00
Standardization Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Measurability 8.22 2.58 1.00
Asset-specificity  8.47 3.04 .40 1.00
Complexity 5.15 2.05 .27 .40 1.00
Reputation 11.4 2.07 .02 .22 .22 1.00
Size buyer 5.75 .89 -.06 -.01 .01 .01 1.00
Alternative options 5.51 1.97 -.27 -.25 -.24 .07 -.08 1.00
Formalization 63.1 27.9 .24 .35 .40 .25 .16 -.18 1.00
Performance 4.87 1.58 -.28 -.23 -.22 -.08 -.26 .09 -.39 1.00
* Correlations with binary variables consist of Kendall’s tau-b. Correlations higher than .072 
are significant at the 0.05-level, whereas correlations higher than .085 are significant at 
0.01-level. N=420 for the sub sample in which no standard negotiation and contracting 
procedures are applied. N=479 for the sub sample in which they are used. 
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Assessing a model’s fit is one of structural equation modeling’s most controversial 
aspects. Most fit indices ascertain whether the covariance matrix derived from the 
hypothesized model is different from the covariance matrix derived from the 
sample. A Chi-square test serves as the most common fit measure (Shook et al., 
2004). In general, a non-significant value for the ration of Chi-square over degrees 
of freedom of less than 3.0 indicates a good fit, meaning that the model is not 
significantly different from the underlying data (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). The 
likelihood ratio Chi-square statistics are 2.29 for the sub sample without standard 
procedures and 1.64 for the sub sample with standard procedures, indicating 
reasonable fits for the models. As fit measures based on the Chi-square statistic 
have often been criticized for being inflated by sample size (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom, 1993), we also calculate other fit measures. The Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation has recently been recognized as ‘one of the most informative 
criteria in covariance structure modeling’ (Byrne, 1998: 112). According to Byrne, 
values less than 0.08 represent reasonable errors of approximation, whereas 
values less than 0.05 indicate good fit. The RMSEAs for both sub samples are 
equal to .055 and 0.043 indicating medium to good fits for both sub samples. In 
addition, MacCallum et al. (1996) recommend that a ninety percent confidence 
interval is reported around the RMSEA value, in order to reflect the precision of 
the estimate. Narrow confidence intervals would argue for good precision of the 
RMSEA. The ninety percent confidence interval for both sub samples ranges 
between acceptable values, indicating that one can be reasonably confident that 
values of the RMSEA do not exceed critical values. Moreover, we provide the 
Normed FIT Index (NFI) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), which range from 
zero to one with values higher than 0.90 indicating an acceptable fit to the data 
(Bentler, 1992). For both sub samples, the NFI is close to 0.90, and high values 
for the CFI – .927 and .952 respectively – lead to the conclusion that an 
acceptable fit to the data exists. A final goodness-of-fit statistic consists of 
Hoelter’s (1983) critical N. This measure differs substantially from the measures 
previously discussed in that it focuses directly on the adequacy of sample size 
rather than on model fit (Byrne, 1998). The purpose of this measure is to estimate 
a sample size that would be sufficient to yield adequate fits for a Chi-square test. 
Hoelter (1983) proposes that a value in excess of 200 is indicative of a model that 
adequately represents the data. In this case, Hoelter’s N equals 239 and 332, 
indicating that results are not influenced by insufficient sample sizes, and that our 
model has adequate power (Shook et al., 2004). 
 
Now that we have assessed that the model adequately fits the data, we proceed 
with testing our hypothesis. To do so, we have to compare the proposed 
relationships between variables for the sub sample in which no standard 
procedures for negotiating and contracting are used with the relationships for the 
sub sample in which they are used. Figure 7.3 visualizes the moderating influence 
of standard procedures for negotiating and contracting on the relationships 
between five firm-level and transaction, or relational level factors and 
formalization, and on the relationship between formalization and 
interorganizational performance. Table 7.3 exhibits the standardized direct effects 
for both sub samples, which are generally consistent with previous research on 
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the same data (see Batenburg et al., 2003; Buskens, 2002). Our hypothesis on the 
moderating effects of using standard procedures for negotiation and contracting is 
only partly supported. From the results it accrues that relationships between 
formalization and asset-specificity, the importance of reputation, transaction 
complexity and the size of a buyer are of a smaller magnitude for the sub sample 
of transactions in which standard procedures for negotiation and contracting have 
been used. This also accounts for the relationship between formalization and 
interorganizational performance. However, the relationship between measurability 
and formalization is of a larger magnitude in the sub sample of transactions in 
which standard procedures were used, contradicting our expectations. We can 
thus conclude that our hypothesis holds, except for this relationship, on which we 
elaborate in the discussion section. 
 
 
FIGURE 7.3 
Moderating effect of standard procedures on relationships between  
formalization, its antecedents and performance                        
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TABLE 7.3 
Comparison of standardized effects for both sub samples 
   No standard procedures Standard procedures 
   B Sig. B Sig. 
Measurability Æ Formalization .110  -.151 ** 
Asset-specificity Æ Formalization .305 *** .220 *** 
Complexity Æ Formalization .414 *** .376 *** 
Reputation Æ Formalization .267 *** .192 *** 
Size Buyer Æ Formalization .254 *** .149 *** 
Formalization Æ Performance -.244 *** -.136 ** 
Correlations significant at the 0.05-level (**), and the 0.01-level (***) 
 
 
To assess the threat of reverse causality – implying that the relationships between 
the proposed antecedents, formalization and interorganizational performance have 
a reversed direction – two procedures have been applied. First, analogue to 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) and in line with recommendations of Shook et al. 
(2004), several alternative recursive models were tested with structural equations 
describing reverse paths. These models eventuated in less acceptable overall fits 
with the data, and rendered several paths insignificant. Second, we compared the 
chronological order with which the constructs appear in the model with the 
chronological order of effects that one would expect in reality. For each 
relationship between two constructs, the reverse of the relationship was specified 
and discussed in order to assess whether this alternative was plausible or not. The 
temporal ordering of variables presumed in our model appeared most plausible. 
 
7.6 Discussion 
 
In this chapter, we elaborated on the standardization of negotiation and 
contracting practices. Although the application of standard contracts and standard 
procedures for negotiating and contracting is widespread, academic studies on 
this subject are still sparse. In this theme, we attempted to redress this imbalance 
between practice and research, and we examined how a discussion of 
standardization in interorganizational governance research could shed new light 
on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We addressed the 
following research questions: 
 
RQ8: What are the advantages and disadvantages of using standard form 
contracts in interorganizational relationships? 
 
RQ9: What influence does the introduction of standard procedures for negotiating 
and contracting have on the generic research model for formalization? 
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Key findings 
We stipulated an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of contract 
standardization. We advanced that the most fundamental drawback of contract 
standardization has to do with the fact that it precludes the creation of shared 
expectations or the “meeting of minds”, and that it encourages “mindless” behavior 
during negotiation and contracting practices. This hypothesis was empirically 
assessed by an analysis of contracting practices in 911 buyer-supplier 
relationships. Structural equation modeling generally supported the idea that the 
use of standard procedures for negotiation and contracting generally diminishes 
parties’ attention for the substantive details of a transaction and that it reduces the 
influence of formalization on interorganizational performance. There was one 
exception, consisting of the relationship between measurability and formalization, 
which was stronger for the subsample with standardized negotiating and 
contracting practices. This may be caused by the fact that standardization of 
negotiation and contracting practices is frequently accompanied by a low degree 
of information acquisition and information processing, which leaves measurability 
problems unsolved, and increases its impact on formalization. When negotiation 
and contracting processes do not follow standardized patterns, instead, 
measurability problems are more likely to be alleviated by the collection and 
processing of information, which then tempers the effect of measurability problems 
on formalization (see also theme one). 
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
The findings of our research imply that transactions and contracts can no longer 
be studied on a case-by-case basis (Goetz and Scott, 1985; Klausner, 1995), as 
procedures in one exchange influence other contracts or parties to other contracts 
(Klausner, 1995). Our findings also exemplify that the process by which formalities 
come about partly determines what role they play in interorganizational 
relationships. In line with previous inquiries (Hatch, 1999; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992), we therefore encourage researchers to complement research on 
organizational structures with inquiries into the structuring processes from which 
they emanate. The results indicate that research on structuring processes requires 
new impetus, and that the logic of interorganizational theorizing should be drawn 
away from structured entities, outcomes and end-states, towards the underlying 
thought-structuring processes, which produce these outcomes (see also Chia, 
1997: 703; Hatch, 1999: 82). We expect that such a shift in attention could explain, 
for example, why ‘human beings can possess high intelligence and yet evince 
frequent lack of intellectual awareness when making decisions’ (Sharps and 
Martin, 2002: 273)31, and why contracts are generally simple, although predictions 
derived from theory suggest they should be complex (Eggleston et al., 2000). Our 
findings also indicate that standard procedures for negotiation and contracting 
may result in a failure to communicate the content of a promise or to define the 
rights exchanged between partners (Goetz and Scott, 1985). By de-
                                                 
31 Sharps and Martin (2002: 272-273) offer the following example: ‘In September 1999, 
NASA lost a Mars orbiter because the scientists working on the mission did not convert 
English units to metric units.’ 
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contextualizing the contracting process, standard procedures reduce the degree to 
which parties can ‘create a bigger transactional pie in a world where parties’ 
incentives are misaligned and [where] they need to coordinate the production of 
information, specify future rights, duties, and procedures, and allocate risks’ – the 
central aim of contracting (Hill and King, 2004: 890). In other words, we ascertain 
that the use of standard procedures for negotiation and contracting potentially 
leads to reduced mindfulness by contracting parties, which diminishes the 
usefulness of interorganizational contracts. This conforms to a description of the 
role of the contract in an alliance between two firms aiming to developing a 
packaging machine by Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005). These authors find that the 
adoption of a standard contract was not accompanied by much thought. As a 
result, ‘the contract did not provide a source to fall back on when the relationship 
broke up’ (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005: 829).    
 
Our analysis has several practical implications as well. First, it indicates that care 
should be taken not to eliminate sensemaking efforts from negotiation and 
contracting processes. Instead, mindfulness should be nourished in order to 
enable participants in interorganizational relationships to grasp new opportunities 
and prevent them from initiating non-sensible relationships. In order to do so, 
standardization of negotiating and contracting processes could be accompanied 
by the hiring of sensitive, attentive and vigilant staff. Organizational departments 
that support and supervise interorganizational governance processes could use 
contract management tools to gather information and prevent non-sensible 
relationships from occurring. A second and related option concerns the 
development of a “contracting capability”. Analogue to “alliance capabilities” – 
which are directed at the institutionalization and adoption of earlier alliance-
experience in novel interorganizational relationships (Draulans et al., 2003; Dyer 
et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2002) – organizations might develop contracting 
capabilities to harness and exploit experiences derived from earlier contractual 
agreements in future collaborative relationships (Reuer and Zollo, 2005). As they 
apply to entire portfolios of contracts, such contracting capabilities stress the 
significance that has recently been attributed to successful relationship 
management on portfolio level (Heide, 2003; Wuyts et al., 2004).  
 
A contracting capability can be created by comparing the contract performance of 
various relationships, or by casting light on entire sets of contractual relationships 
with one partner. Moreover, regular visits of partners could contribute to making 
sense of interorganizational relationships, and to the signaling of issues, problems 
or clues that are not captured in standardized contracting systems. A third 
possibility to restrict mindless contracting consists of the incorporation of 
“sensemaking triggers” in contracts and procedures for negotiating and 
contracting. Sensemaking triggers “force” managers of cooperating organizations 
to ask themselves questions about the underlying logic of relationships, the 
anticipated risks, costs, investments and returns involved, and the possibilities to 
push performance to higher levels. Sensemaking triggers can form the impulse for 
the explication of expectations of both parties, possibly leading to a better 
understanding of the various factors that might play a role in interorganizational 
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relationships (Vlaar et al., 2005). They comprise intentionally manipulated 
elements of contracts and negotiating and contracting procedures that are 
included to elicit more thoughtful, creative and flexible states of mind (Burgoon et 
al., 2000: 112).  
 
Limitations and opportunities for future research  
This chapter contains several limitations, indicating opportunities for future 
research. First, one has to realize that it is impossible to process every piece of 
information mindfully (Langer, 1989). After all, in today’s world the scarce resource 
is typically not information, but the amount of mindful attention that decision 
makers allocate to making the information meaningful (Hansen and Haas, 2001). 
As one cannot mindfully process every piece of information, and as there are 
significant costs associated with creating and maintaining mindfulness, it becomes 
essential to discover ‘when standard operating procedures are appropriate and 
when they are not’ (Karina, 1998: 202). Stated differently, it becomes worthwhile 
to investigate when mindfulness or standardization have the largest payoffs. In this 
respect, standardization is believed to be a very poor strategy, for example, in 
case organizations face unexpected contingencies (Roberts and Bea, 2001). One 
could also investigate how the degree of standardization varies between different 
institutional contexts. Hill and King (2004: 890), for example, argue that German 
contracting ‘cuts short the costly and inefficient “arms race” in which U.S. 
transacting parties and their lawyers too often engage in their negotiation and 
drafting of contracts. It creates and uses “good enough” standardized solutions to 
common problems faced by transacting parties. By some accounts, this results in 
German agreements being one-half or two-thirds the size of otherwise comparable 
U.S. agreements (Hill and King, 2004). This issue receives more attention in 
theme six, where we investigate the antecedents of standard contracts. 
 
Second, our moderating variable was presented as being dichotomous, while it 
might be more accurately described as a continuous variable. In future research, 
negotiation and contracting processes may be depicted and measured as being 
more or less standardized. Third, the chapter offered only few insights into factors 
that influence whether standard procedures and standard contracts are applied, 
and when they ought to be (see theme six). Do prior relationships, for example, 
influence the use of standard procedures? Here, Madhok (1995) has advanced 
that when parties have previously cooperated, the role of the contract is more in 
the nature of a routine or a standard operating procedure. Hill and King (2004: 
926) add that ‘protracted negotiations involved in elaborate customization may be 
more useful for parties coming to know each other for the first time.’ A final option 
for future research concerns the fact that the majority of research on mindfulness 
still pertains to crisis situations in high reliability organizations, including those 
involving flight operations (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001), 
ferries and cruise-ships (Roberts and Bea, 2001) and chemical and nuclear plants 
(Mitroff, 2001; Weick, 2001). The chapter demonstrates that mindfulness may 
influence everyday practices in “normal” organizations, indicating a need for 
incorporating mindfulness in organizational research (see also Feldman, 2003; 
Fiol and O’Connor, 2003; Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
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8  THEME 5 – EVOLUTION OF TRUST & FORMALIZATION 
 
 
‘While there are numerous examples in the literature where control chases out trust and 
situations in which trust seems to remove the necessity for control, there are equally as 
many examples of trust and control being complementary, or going hand in hand.’ 
 
Bachmann et al., 2001: v 
 
Summary 
In this conceptual chapter, we develop an integrative perspective on the evolution 
of formalization and trust in interorganizational relationships. First, we sketch how 
trust and formalization are associated with interorganizational performance. In the 
second part of the chapter, we discuss how trust and formalization evolve in 
interorganizational relationships. We argue, among others, that both governance 
forms tend to develop along self-reinforcing paths, and we advance that levels of 
trust and formalization in early stages of cooperation are crucial to the unfolding of 
both governance modes in later stages of development. We capture our 
assertions in tentative propositions and in an integrative conceptual framework, 
which reconcile hitherto fragmented views on the evolution of formalization and 
trust in interorganizational relationships. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Due to a significant increase in the number of alliances, outsourcing relationships 
and other forms of inter-firm exchange, and the control problems associated with 
these relationships, issues of interorganizational governance have attracted 
growing attention from academics and practitioners (e.g. Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Kale et al., 2002; McEvily et al., 2003a). The corresponding literature distinguishes 
several governance forms by which cooperating parties can achieve control, 
primarily emphasizing trust and various forms of formalization (Bijlsma-Frankema 
and Koopman, 2004; García-Canal et al., 3003; Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002). Over time, different theoretical perspectives on the significance of trust and 
formalization and on the interplay between them have emerged. In particular, one 
can distinguish contributions that illuminate: (1) how trust and formalization act as 
substitutes (e.g. Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Das and Teng, 2001; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Inkpen and Currall, 2004); (2) how trust and 
formalization function as complements (e.g. Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Deakin 
and Wilkinson, 1998; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sitkin, 
1995); (3) the effects of trust and formalization on interorganizational performance 
(e.g. Luo, 2002; Kern, 1998; Sydow and Windeler, 2003); and (4) the self-
reinforcing character of both governance forms (e.g. Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; 
Inkpen and Curall, 2004; Zand, 1972).  
 
Despite these contributions, the relationship between trust and formalization 
remains far from clear (Maguire et al., 2001; Sydow and Windeler, 2003), and 
much theoretical input is still needed to understand how they work as governance 
mechanisms (Bachmann, 2001). In particular, their role as emerging and evolving 
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concepts in the process of relationship development is not well understood (De 
Wever et al., Forthcoming; Inkpen and Curall, 2004), and little attention has been 
paid to the evolution of trust and formalization during cooperative relationships (for 
notable exceptions, see Ferrin et al., 2005; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Mayer 
and Argyres, 2004; Serva et al., 2005). In line with this observation, calls have 
been issued for a more integrative approach towards theory development and 
more dynamic representations of the trust-control nexus (Bijlsma-Frankema and 
Costa, 2005; Bijlsma-Frankema and Koopman, 2004). This chapter therefore 
addresses the following research question: How do trust and formalization evolve 
within interorganizational relationships? This question pertains to the shaded 
areas in the research framework depicted in Figure 8.1. 
 
The chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it transcends current 
work by making initial steps towards systematically integrating a range of 
contributions on the role of trust and formalization in interorganizational 
relationships (see Bachmann, 2004; Bachmann et al., 2001; Bijlsma-Frankema 
and Koopman, 2004; McEvily et al., 2003a). We shift the attention from one-sided 
views on the performance implications of trust and formalization – either 
emphasizing positive or negative effects – towards a perspective in which 
intermediate levels of both governance forms are considered most conducive to 
interorganizational performance. Moreover, we advance that there is not only a 
need for basic levels of trust and formalization, but we indicate that extreme 
values of both governance forms have to be circumvented too. Furthermore, we 
explain that trust and formalization can act as substitutes as well as complements, 
thereby reconciling different arguments on the relationship between both 
governance forms, and explaining why empirical research has not yielded decisive 
support for one stance over the other (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005). 
Second, we describe how trust and formalization evolve in interorganizational 
relationships, something which has received little attention in the literature so far 
(Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). We argue that both 
governance forms tend to develop along self-reinforcing paths, and we indicate 
why levels of trust and formalization in early stages of cooperation are crucial to 
the development of both governance modes in later stages of development. By 
doing so, we extend prior research with a dynamic perspective on the role of trust 
and formalization in collaborative relationships.   
 
The chapter is organized as follows. We start with a definition of trust and 
formalization, after which we discuss how both governance forms relate to 
interorganizational performance from a static perspective. In the second part of the 
chapter, we develop a more dynamic perspective, capturing the evolution of trust 
and formalization. We elaborate on, among others, the significance of starting 
conditions – being the initial levels of trust and formalization – and indicate that 
there is a high propensity for self-reinforcing paths to develop. We conclude with a 
brief summary, limitations of our study and opportunities for further research. 
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8.2 The influence of trust and control on interorganizational performance: A 
static perspective 
 
To facilitate a comprehensive and coherent description of the influence of trust 
and formalization on interorganizational performance, proper definitions of these 
concepts are required. Rousseau et al. (1998: 395) define trust as ‘a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.’ This definition implies that 
trust involves choice (Luhmann, 1988), and the existence of risk (Mayer et al., 
1995). Nooteboom (1999: 203) explicitly addresses these points in his definition of 
trust, stating that it ‘entails that one does not expect to be harmed by a partner 
even though she has both the opportunity and the incentive to be opportunistic.’ 
This indicates that trust consists of a subjective state of positive expectations (Das 
and Teng, 2001), and that the partner and its behavior are the objects of trust 
(Inkpen and Currall, 1997). In this chapter, we further focus on the trust that 
managers of interorganizational relationships have in their partners, or trust at the 
micro-level (e.g. see Dodgson, 1993). Accordingly, following Mayer et al. (1995: 
712) we define trust as ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party.’ Expectations of trustworthiness then encompass an actor’s belief in 
the ability of a partner to accomplish a task, its belief in the goodwill or positive 
intentions of the partner towards the trustor, and its perception that the trustee 
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adheres to acceptable values (Mayer et al., 1995; Serva et al., 2005). The second 
governance form that we discuss, formalization, is considered to be a regulatory 
process by which elements of a system are made more predictable (Das and 
Teng, 2001). It aims at establishing reliability by codifying and enforcing inputs, 
outcomes, and/or interorganizational activities (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 
2005; Ouchi, 1979). The principal exponent of formalization in interorganizational 
relationships consists of contractual planning, a process of ‘projecting exchanges 
into the future’ (Macneil, 1980: 4). This process includes: defining performance, 
duties, and rights with regard to future circumstances; defining what should 
happen when parties do not hold to agreements; and assessing in how far the 
contract can be legally enforced (Macaulay, 1963). It eventuates in promises or 
obligations that are laid down in formal contracts (Macneil, 1980).  
 
As becomes clear from these definitions, trust and formalization differ in their 
underlying mechanisms. Trust resides with individuals, while formalities are 
external mechanisms of control (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). Besides, where 
trust is built on positive assumptions about a partner’s willingness and ability to 
cooperate, formalization is based on the negative hypothetical possibility regarding 
a partner’s behavior and actions (Bachmann, 2001). We argue that both 
assumptions are valid, implying that other-oriented behavior – motivated by joint 
interests – and more egoistic, self-interested behavior co-exist. Or, as Dasgupta 
(1988: 53) stated ‘we are all at once both egoists and altruists,’ implying that 
interorganizational governance structures are fraught with tension, in that potential 
gains offer incentives to sustain relationships, while profit appropriation 
concurrently weakens such incentives (Foss and Foss, 2005; Gulati and Singh, 
1998; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Madhok, 1995; Madhok, 2002). 
 
In assessing the influence of trust and formalization on interorganizational 
performance, we consider both the outcomes achieved within a relationship, and 
the conduct of partners and the interaction between them (Ariño, 2003; Madhok 
and Tallman, 1998). Outcome performance captures the effectiveness and 
efficiency of relationships, including the extent to which strategic goals are fulfilled 
(Ariño, 2003; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005), and whether parties adhere to 
schedules and budgets. Following Madhok and Tallman (1998) and Chaserant 
(2003), outcome performance is believed to be influenced by the conduct of 
partners and the interaction between them, in the form of relational quality (Ariño, 
et al., 2001), the ease or smoothness of cooperation (Luo, 2002), the extent to 
which conflicts prevail within the relationship, and partners’ satisfaction with 
interorganizational processes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). This conceptualization 
of interorganizational performance is supported by findings from De Rond (2003) 
on two alliances between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, which indicate 
that performance assessments are based on rational considerations (e.g. 
economic or strategic), as well as on cognitive processes of individuals within 
these relationships. 
 
Now that we have defined the core concepts in this study, we continue with an 
assessment of the relationships between trust, formalization, and 
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interorganizational performance. Congruent with De Wever et al. (Forthcoming), 
Figure 8.2 depicts the level of interorganizational performance as a curvilinear 
function of the level of trust that managers have in a partner. We assume that 
basic levels of trust and formalization function as prerequisites for 
interorganizational cooperation as they help to generate and maintain interaction 
and social order (Bachmann et al., 2001; Inkpen and Curall, 2004; Luhmann, 
1979; Reed, 2001). In particular, ‘[I]n the face of unknown conditions, unintended 
consequences, existing zones of uncertainty, and the prevailing dialectic of 
control, social interaction always requires some trust’ (Sydow and Windeler, 2003: 
79). Otherwise, interorganizational relationships would be pervaded by very high 
levels of uncertainty, causing managers to continually question the motives and 
competences of their partners (Das and Teng, 2001; McEvily et al., 2003a). In 
such cases, managers become less willing to take risks, and they refrain from 
sharing perspectives and knowledge (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; March and Olsen, 
1975). This makes it harder for them to alleviate the problems emanating from 
functional, organizational, and cultural differences (Mohr and Puck, 2005). It also 
complicates the handling of conflicts, and it obstructs the expression of diverging 
views (Child and Rodrigues, 2003). 
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However, whereas trust is commonly accepted to have a variety of positive effects 
(Dirks and Ferrin, 2001) it is also known to have inescapable downsides 
(Anderson and Jap, 2005; Carson et al., 2003; Jeffries and Reed, 2000; McEvily et 
al., 2003b). Even if trust has been established successfully, it remains a fragile 
mechanism (Dodgson, 1993). Eventually, ‘the trustor can never completely rule 
out that the trustee sees it as advantageous to cheat’ (Lane and Bachmann, 1997: 
229). It appears that, if the incentives are there, even a trustworthy party can be 
relied upon to be untrustworthy (Dasgupta, 1988). ‘Over-trusting’ partners can 
become easy targets for exploitation by greedy partners (Wicks et al., 1999; Zeng 
and Chen, 2003). In this respect, Anderson and Jap (2005: 78) advance that ‘while 
cosy relationships sound good in theory, such relationships also provide an 
opportunity for covert activities designed to systematically cheat a partner.’ 
Similarly, Langfred (2004) argues that, under certain conditions, trust can be 
harmful, as it reduces the inclination to guard against opportunistic behavior (e.g. 
to monitor and safeguard), and as it encourages actors to suspend judgment of 
others. This could manifest itself in giving others the benefit of the doubt when 
uncertainties arise or potential conflicts emerge, and giving second chances more 
frequently (Hoetker, 2005). Trust may also be based on systematic biases, which 
can result in flawed and costly judgments (Jeffries and Reed, 2000; McEvily et al., 
2003b), and in problem denial. Managers asking themselves ‘Our partners are so 
trustworthy; how could they be exploiting us?’ may be reminiscent of such cases 
(Anderson and Jap, 2005: 76). 
 
In fact, trust may results in a situation in which ‘one takes the relation for granted 
and does not continuously think about opportunities to gain extra advantage from 
it, nor does one consider the other to do so’ (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005: 816). 
Anderson and Jap (2005) offer an example of such complacency in their 
description of a relationship between an automaker and one of its suppliers. One 
of the partners invested heavily in this relationship, which eventuated in a high 
level of mutual trust. This was abused by the supplier, which ‘cut corners in a 
calculating manner, weighing the costs, benefits, and risks as though it were 
pricing an insurance policy’ (Anderson and Jap, 2005: 77). Such examples show 
that trust sometimes ‘binds and blinds, making economic actors insufficiently 
vigilant and excessively vulnerable’ (McEvily et al., 2003b: 98). High levels of trust 
can thus lead to naiveté and a take-it-for-granted mind-set in which relationships 
are put on “cruise control” (Anderson and Jap, 2005). This is particularly likely to 
occur when high degrees of ambiguity reduce the accuracy with which 
assessments of a partner’s trustworthiness can be made (Carson et al., 
Forthcoming). Several authors have therefore concluded that both very low and 
very high levels of trust may have harmful consequences (Anderson and Jap, 
2005; Barnes, 1981; Fisher and Ury, 1981; Kern, 1998; Langfred, 2004; Wicks et 
al., 1999). Over-investments in trust may lead to the misallocation of precious 
resources and to participants taking unnecessary risks, whereas under-
investments in trust may cause parties to miss out on opportunities to create cost 
savings or develop new organizational capabilities (Wicks, Berman, and Jones, 
1999). In line with this, Langfred (2004: 391, 393) argues that ‘a little skepticism 
never hurt anyone’ and that it is important to ‘balance the study of the benefits of 
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trust with the acknowledgement that those benefits have limits.’ Collectively, these 
observations suggest that intermediate levels of trust might yield the most 
favorable performance outcomes. 
 
Figure 8.3 displays a similar pattern for the relationship between 
interorganizational performance and formalization. At low levels of formalization, 
chaos is likely to reign, whereas high levels of formalization are associated with 
rigidity (Luo, 2002; Mintzberg, 1994; Volberda, 1998). Basic levels of formalization 
form a precondition for people to engage in transactions (Dasgupta, 1988), making 
them willing to transact with external partners in the first place, and thereby 
expanding their set of options for value creation (Johnson et al., 2002; Malhotra 
and Murnighan, 2002). Irrespective of the level of trust, certain levels of 
formalization are necessary to endow participants in interorganizational 
relationships with guidance (Weick, 2001), and to enable them to coordinate their 
work (see Langfred, 2004). In this respect, Dyer and Chu (2003: 64) notice that ‘it 
seems that even for high-trusting relationships, it is necessary to spend some 
effort up-front to make sure that the responsibilities of each party are clearly 
spelled out.’ If this is impossible, economic actors might simply refuse to 
participate in interorganizational relationships (Bachmann, 2001). 
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Support for these assertions is provided by Hoecht (2004), who finds that legal 
control instruments such as detailed contracts were considered as normal “rules of 
the game” in the collaborative-private research projects that he investigated, and 
that they were not relaxed even if parties had a long cooperative history. Just like 
very low levels of formalization, excessively high levels of formalization are 
considered detrimental to interorganizational performance. They result in 
‘cumbersome, overregulated, and impersonal processes that individuals are 
forced to adhere to’ (Beck and Kieser, 2003: 794). Excessive formalization of 
governance structures and monitoring of safeguards lead to conflict and 
disagreement among parties (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). They have a retarding 
effect on creativity and innovation, and inhibit the flexibility that is needed for 
coping with complex, ambiguous and unstable task environments (Mintzberg, 
1994; Nooteboom, 1999; Volberda, 1998). Excessive levels of formalization have 
further been argued to stifle desirable mutual accommodations (Ireland et al., 
2002; Nooteboom, 1999), and to easily degenerate into formalism (Balogun and 
Johnson, 2004; Mintzberg, 1994; Starbuck, 1983). They may result in areas of 
unilateral dependence (Lusch and Brown, 1996; Macneil, 1980), hold-up problems 
(Klein et al., 1978), and high transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Similar to trust, 
intermediate levels of formalization thus appear to be most conducive to 
interorganizational performance. We have captured these arguments in our first 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 8.1: Compared to very low and very high levels of trust and 
formalization, intermediate levels of both governance forms have a more positive 
influence on interorganizational performance. 
 
The relationships between trust, formalization and interorganizational performance 
that we have depicted here merit some qualification, as they are expected to be 
contingent on the nature of economic exchanges and on the legal regime in which 
these take place. Interorganizational relationships that deal with clear-cut issues 
and in which the focus is on standardization, routinization, and systematic cost 
reductions (Koza and Lewin, 1998; March, 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), 
for example, generally do not require high trust environments. Conversely, in 
exploration contexts adequate specification of rights will inevitably be problematic 
(Oxley, 1997), and the scope of relationships cannot be clearly defined in 
advance, as tasks are non-routine in nature (Hoecht, 2004), performance is often 
ambiguous, and behaviors cannot be observed (Das and Teng, 2001; Dirks, 2000; 
Sitkin and Roth, 1993; Sitkin and Stickel, 1996). Although the trust-based mode of 
governance is probably also more risky in these situations, as difficulties to detect 
opportunistic behavior may increase a partner’s incentive to abuse trust (Carson et 
al., Forthcoming), it may provide the only option for leveraging the resources that 
are critical to competitive advantages (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; Bijlsma-Frankema 
and Koopman, 2004; McEvily et al., 2003b; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). 
 
Trust is also argued to be more appropriate than formalization if partners are 
highly interdependent (Wicks et al., 1999), or when environments are volatile 
(Carson et al., Forthcoming). In a similar vein, different institutional environments 
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give rise to distinct relationships between trust and formalization (Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 1998). The institutional environment in Slovenia, for example, has been 
found to generate more trust than that in Bosnia. Consequently, actors from 
Bosnia tend to rely more on contracts (Rus and Iglič, 2005). Another example 
constitutes a comparison of the British and the German system. In the UK, written 
contractual agreements are frequently the result of exhaustive negotiations in 
which each party attempts to impose conditions upon the other, rendering 
contracts a signal of low trust. In Germany, instead, contracts are used to reassure 
partners of the common, or shared legal principles to which they adhere, thereby 
fostering trust (Bachmann, 2001). These examples indicate that the relationships 
between trust, formalization, and interorganizational performance that we have 
depicted here, are probably contingent on the nature of economic exchanges and 
on the legal regime in which these take place, something which strongly deserves 
to be addressed in future research (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005). 
 
8.3 Towards a dynamic perspective: The evolution of trust, formalization, 
and interorganizational performance 
 
Thus far, we have depicted a rather static image of the role of formalization and 
trust in interorganizational relationships. Building on our discussion in the first part 
of the chapter, Figure 8.4 presents a framework of the evolution of formalization 
and trust in interorganizational relationships. We start our explanation of the 
framework by noticing that interorganizational governance is not static (Bijlsma-
Frankema and Costa, 2005). Relationships unfold and managers continually 
update their expectations and assessments of the levels of trust and formalization 
prevailing at a particular moment, while they also attempt to bring about desirable 
changes (Wicks et al., 1999). Following Doz (1996), Ferrin et al. (2005), Klein 
Woolthuis et al. (2005) and Ring et al. (2005), we will argue that starting conditions 
– here defined as initial levels of trust and formalization – leave strong imprints on 
the development of cooperative relationships. They influence the level of 
performance that is achieved in early stages of a relationship, and they shape 
managers’ re-assessments of their partners’ trustworthiness and of the 
appropriateness of formalization. 
 
The influence of starting conditions on interorganizational performance 
As we have seen in the first part of the chapter, trust and formalization are most 
conducive to interorganizational performance at intermediate levels. Starting 
conditions then influence the development of both governance forms in 
subsequent stages by their effect on interorganizational performance and each 
other. In particular, we suggest that in cases where interorganizational 
performance is relatively low – either in terms of achieved outcomes or in terms of 
the conduct of a partner – managers are more likely to experience a reduction in 
the perceived trustworthiness of their partner, as well as a higher willingness to 
increase the level of formalization. 
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FIGURE 8.4 
 A framework of the evolution of formalization and trust 
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very low or very high levels in the beginning of a relationship, initial performance 
levels are therefore more likely to be low. Managers might then blame the partner, 
and accordingly perceive that their partner is less trustworthy (March and Olsen, 
1975). They may also experience an urge to act, which translates itself into a 
heightened level of formalization (Sitkin and Bies, 1993). A low level of trust in the 
beginning may, for example, lead to quantitatively and qualitatively low levels of 
communication, which results in poor outcome performance and negative 
assessments of the interaction with a partner, possibly leading to even lower 
levels of trust in future (see also Ferrin et al., 2005). If we assume that low and 
high levels of trust and formalization in early stages of cooperation lead to 
relatively low levels of initial interorganizational performance compared to that for 
intermediate levels of both governance forms (hypothesis 8.1), then the following 
hypotheses hold (see also Figure 8.4). 
 
Hypothesis 8.2a: Compared to intermediate levels of trust and formalization, low 
and high levels of both governance forms reduce the perceived trustworthiness of 
a partner in subsequent stages of development. 
 
Hypothesis 8.2b: Compared to intermediate levels of trust and formalization, low 
and high levels of both governance forms increase the perceived need for 
formalization in subsequent stages of development. 
 
Complementarity between trust and formalization 
Starting conditions also influence the evolution of trust and formalization through 
complementarities in development, as an increase in the level of one of them may 
result in a higher level of the other (Dekker, 2004). In this respect, Poppo and 
Zenger (2002: 708) argue that ‘well-specified contracts may actually promote more 
cooperative, long term, trusting exchange relationships.’ Formalization may 
increase trust by providing people with objective rules and clear measures on 
which to base their assessments of others (Das and Teng, 1998; Sitkin, 1995). It 
may augment trust by increasing one’s knowledge of another party’s disposition, 
information, abilities, and available options (Dasgupta, 1988), and by narrowing 
down the domain and severity of risk (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Formalization 
also facilitates trust building through ongoing discussions and negotiations, which 
allow partners to learn from, and about each other (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), 
and to better understand each other’s perspectives (Inkpen and Currall, 2004; 
Sitkin, 1995). Formalization further enhances trust by promoting information flows, 
and by spreading the costs of conflict, monitoring, and uncertainty (Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 1998; Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002; Sitkin, 1995). Finally, 
formalization minimizes implementation-related problems, and raises the reliability 
of the organization proposing the mechanisms (Sitkin and Roth, 1993). Child and 
Möllering (2003) therefore advance that the introduction of rules and standards 
can be depicted as a strategy for active trust development. Jointly, these 
observations indicate that formalizations provide interorganizational participants 
with predictability, reliability and security from which trust can develop (see 
Knights et al., 2001; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). 
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Similarly, higher levels of initial trust enable higher levels of formalization in 
subsequent stages. Trust not only serves as a precondition for partners to engage 
in the expensive and specific investments required to draft detailed contracts, but 
it is also needed to enable ‘open communication and negotiations on the details of 
the contract, including the thorny sensitive clauses like relationship termination’ 
(Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005: 831). Trust further facilitates high levels of 
information sharing (Dyer and Chu, 2003) and it drives the development of 
elaborate knowledge-sharing routines between partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998), 
thereby functioning as a ‘lubricant of economic exchange’ (Knights et al., 2001: 
312). When low levels of trust prevail, instead, little information is exchanged 
between partners, reducing their ability to observe and learn about each other 
(Maguire et al., 2001), and diminishing their ability to capture aspects of the 
relationship in various forms of formalizations, such as contracts, rules and 
procedures. Accordingly, we propose the following (see also Figure 8.4). 
 
Hypothesis 8.3a: Higher levels of trust facilitate a focal manager’s ability to 
formalize aspects of the relationship in subsequent stages of development. 
 
Hypothesis 8.3b: Higher levels of formalization increase a focal manager’s ability 
to rely on trust in a partner in subsequent stages of development. 
 
Substitution of trust, formalization, and expected net benefits 
Trust and formalization can also act as substitutes. After all, they consist of 
‘functionally equivalent strategies for absorbing uncertainty and dealing with the 
freedom and indeterminacy of other agents’ (Knights et al., 2001: 329; see also 
Reed, 2001). From a substitution perspective, both governance forms entail a 
reduction of uncertainty and complexity, while they increase the perceived 
predictability of social actors’ future behaviors (Luhmann, 1979; Nooteboom, 
2002). In other words, trust and formalization are considered as alternate routes 
for arriving at stable orders to which social actors can orient their behavior 
(Layder, 1997). When partners lose their trust in each other, procedures will 
become more formal and they need to invest more resources to monitor the other 
party’s actions and to enforce contracts (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Inkpen and Currall, 
2004). In these cases, collaboration requires more effort and processes assume 
an emergent or even engineered instead of an embedded character (Ring et al., 
2005). High levels of trust, instead, render formalization redundant, as the 
behavior of partners is already perceived as being predictable. In these cases, the 
presence of trust may reduce managers’ inclination to apply formalization to guard 
against opportunistic behavior (Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Zaheer et al., 1998). In a 
similar vein, high performance expectations can substitute for both trust and 
formalization. Managers may initiate and maintain relationships with others, even 
when trust in the partner is absent and formalization cannot be established, as 
long as they expect that the net benefits of a relationship exceeds the potential 
losses (Parkhe and Miller, 2000; Ring et al., 2005). An example consists of the 
KLM-Northwest Airlines alliance in 1995 and 1996. These firms jointly exploited 
their ability to coordinate pricing and scheduling for many years. Although their 
relationship was characterized by boardroom fights, distrust, discord, and 
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accusations of infidelity, the relationship was sustained as it resulted in hundreds 
of millions of dollars in profits for both firms (Maler, 1997). This leads us to the 
following hypotheses (see also Figure 8.4). 
 
Hypothesis 8.4a: Higher levels of trust reduce a focal manager’s need to 
formalize aspects of the relationship in subsequent stages of development. 
 
Hypothesis 8.4b: Higher levels of formalization reduce a focal manager’s need to 
trust a partner in subsequent stages of development. 
 
Hypothesis 8.4c: Higher expectations of net benefits increase the likelihood that 
partners remain involved in a relationship in subsequent stages of development, 
even if levels of trust and levels of formalization are low. 
 
The influence of trust on re-assessments of trust 
In this section, we argue that initial expectations of a partner’s trustworthiness 
have a strong impact on the evolution of trust and formalization, as initial 
expectations affect the inferences that we make later on (March and Olsen, 1975; 
Weick, 1995). Managers make sense of acts of formalization by their partners in 
ways that minimize the discrepancies between their expectations and their 
observations, so as to experience stable and predictable impressions of their 
interaction partners. Congruent with work from Kahneman and Tversky (1973), a 
partner’s behavior is likely to be interpreted such as to reinforce preconceptions of 
its trustworthiness (March and Olsen, 1975). Consequently, initial levels of trust 
strongly influence whether formalization by the partner results in a spiral of 
decreasing trust, defensive behavior, conflict, and increased emphasis on 
monitoring and control (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), or whether formalization is 
interpreted as a signal of commitment and as an expression of trust in the partner 
organization (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Low expectations of trustworthiness, 
for example, may lead potential trustors to interpret the behavior of others and the 
initial outcomes achieved in a relationship in a less favorable light than would be 
the case if levels of trust were high (Kramer, 1994). When levels of trust are 
already low, attempts to formalize convey a sense of even lower trust, because it 
suggests that partners’ goodwill or competences are thrown into doubt (Das and 
Teng, 1998, 2001). The way in which trust develops, may then resemble a kind of 
self-fulfilling prophecy in which initial expectations influence subsequent trust 
building (Adobor, 2005). This implies that it becomes very difficult to build trust 
through experience in some cases, as low levels of trust may either initially 
prevent people from engaging in collaboration, or because it leads to behaviors 
that further reduce trust. Gambetta (1988: 234) therefore remarks that once trust 
decreases, ‘it soon becomes impossible to know if it was ever in fact justified, for it 
[i.e. trust] has the capacity to be self-fulfilling.’ 
 
These assertions are congruent with Zand’s (1972) spiral reinforcement model, in 
which particular levels of trust are reinforced over time. The model suggests that 
when participants in interorganizational relationships encounter low levels of trust, 
they will hesitate to reveal information, reject influence, and evade control. ‘This 
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short cycle feedback will reinforce the originator’s low trust’ (Zand, 1972: 230) and 
cause partners to fall into spirals of suspicion (Anderson and Jap, 2005). In such 
cases, increases in formalization that are intended to restore trust across 
organizational boundaries are perceived as being signals of low trust (Bernheim 
and Winston, 1998; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). An increase in formalization may then 
introduce a sense of distance and differentness between partners, alienating them 
from each other, and inducing suspicion and undermining commitment 
(Avadikyan, 2001; Hoecht, 2004; Liebeskind and Oliver, 1998; Sitkin and Stickel, 
1996). Such reactions were evident, for example, in a longitudinal study of 
interorganizational relationships by Van de Ven and Walker (1984) who found that 
excessive formalization and monitoring led to conflict and reduced trust among 
cooperating parties. 
 
In such cases, formalization does not contribute to safeguarding a relationship, but 
it becomes destructive, undermining the development of trust (e.g. Lewicki et al., 
1998; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). It discourages partners from contributing to a 
relationship, and provokes human fights and aversions to change (Bijlsma-
Frankema, 2004). In such cases, formalization gives rise to a low trust 
atmosphere, which is frequently reciprocated with even more formal constraints, 
possibly eventuating in a relation that is locked-up in formalities (Nooteboom, 
1999; Parkhe, 1993). Congruent with these arguments, Sitkin and Roth (1993: 
367) contend that the application of contracts, bureaucratic procedures, or legal 
requirements, can lead to an “inflationary spiral” of increasingly formalized 
relationships. They argue that, due to the imposition of psychological and 
interactional barriers and owing to thwarted efforts to achieve congruent values, a 
need for more contracts, rules and procedures develops (Sitkin and Roth, 1993), 
possibly resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Macaulay, 1963; McEvily et al., 
2003b). Van Marrewijk (2004) offers an example in his analysis of Unisource, an 
alliance of Swedish Telia, Dutch KPN Telecom, Swiss Telecom, and Spanish 
Telefónica. He clarifies that as trust did not develop, the partners turned to more 
formalization mechanisms. This slowed down decision-making processes, 
diminished the competitiveness of the alliance, and further deteriorated trust and 
commitment. Anderson and Jap (2005) also reveal that a significant portion of the 
more than 200 industrial partnerships they studied exhibit the forming of 
dysfunctional spirals of suspicion. 
 
Conversely, when participants in interorganizational relationships initially 
experience high levels of trust in a partner, which is frequently the case in new 
cooperative endeavors (Ferrin et al., 2005), attempts to increase the level of 
formalization may be regarded as a symbol of the sharing of values and an 
articulation of communal norms and customs (Zucker, 1988). Each party then 
presumes that the other party is acting in good faith and both will interpret 
behaviors more positively (Adobor, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). In these situations, the 
willingness to formalize, signals commitment to a partner (Klein Woolthuis et al., 
2005). It indicates that parties care about the relationship and that they intend to 
put efforts in achieving the objectives that were set for the relationship (Serva et 
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al., 2005). The higher levels of trust that ensue, enable parties to capture other 
aspects of the relationship in formalizations (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). In such cases, higher levels of formalization contribute to the 
development of trust, which subsequently opens up new possibilities for applying 
formalizations. This leads us to the following hypothesis (see also Figure 8.4). 
 
Hypothesis 8.5: Higher levels of trust entail more positive interpretations of a 
partner’s attempts to formalize, increasing the likelihood that trust is further 
reinforced in subsequent stages of development. Conversely, lower levels of trust 
involve more negative interpretations of a partner’s attempts to formalize, 
increasing the likelihood that trust deteriorates in subsequent stages of 
development. 
 
The influence of formalization on re-assessments of trust 
We also propose that higher levels of formalization in the beginning of a 
relationship make a partner’s trustworthiness easier to assess. Formalization 
helps to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of partners and it assist in 
creating shared expectations (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). It thereby facilitates the 
assessment of a partner’s behavior and of its contributions to the outcomes that 
have been accomplished in a relationship (Carson et al., Forthcoming), but also 
broadens the domain of expectations that can be violated by one of the partners in 
a relationship (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). In contrast, when formalization is 
initially low, much room is left for widely different perceptions and frames against 
which meaning is made. Such a situation occurred in an alliance between Ciba 
Geigy and Alza, where the absence of reasonably detailed contractual 
agreements led to ‘growing suspicions and tensions as each partner was 
searching for clues in the behavior of the other’ (Doz, 1996: 68). The lack of a 
clear agreement made it hard for these partners to assess each other’s 
trustworthiness. Finally, we maintain that if formalization is high in early stages of 
cooperation, a partner’s ability to extend trust beyond initial levels becomes low. 
After all, trust can only develop when parties have an opportunity to refrain from 
cooperation (Inkpen and Currall, 2004). When initial levels of formalization are 
high, partners experience limited autonomy in shaping their behavior, which 
makes it more difficult for them to demonstrate their goodwill and/or competence, 
leaving them with fewer opportunities to develop trust (Doz, 1996; Malhotra and 
Murnighan, 2002). This is reinforced by the fact that the imposition of 
formalizations may provoke negative feelings and opportunistic behavior, 
something which calls for even more formalization, and which further diminishes 
trust (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). These assertions lead us to our final hypothesis 
(see also Figure 8.4). 
 
Hypothesis 8.6a: Higher levels of formalization facilitate the assessment of the 
trustworthiness of a partner in subsequent stages of development. 
 
Hypothesis 8.6b: Higher levels of formalization complicate the extension of trust 
beyond the level prevailing in the beginning of a relationship. 
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8.4 Discussion 
 
In this conceptual chapter, we developed an integrative perspective on the 
evolution of trust and formalization in interorganizational relationships. To arrive at 
such a perspective, we first elaborated on the influence of trust and formalization 
on interorganizational performance. In the second part of the chapter, we 
introduced dynamics and we argued that trust and formalization tend to develop 
along self-reinforcing paths. Building on the work of other researchers (Doz, 1996; 
Ferrin et al., 2005; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005), we indicated that starting 
conditions – being the levels of trust and formalization in early stages of 
cooperation – have a significant impact on the development of both governance 
modes and of interorganizational performance in later stages of development. Our 
assertions were captured in tentative propositions and in an integrative conceptual 
framework, which reconciles hitherto fragmented views on the evolution of trust 
and formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
 
These arguments have significant implications. They show academics that mono-
causal explanations for observations on both governance forms provide 
incomplete accounts of reality (see also Bachmann, 1998), and that an integrative 
approach has to be taken to fully understand the evolution of trust and 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. After all, different levels of trust, 
formalization, and performance appear to be intricately related, which renders 
conceptualizations of governance in which trust and formalization vary 
independently inappropriate (see also Möllering, 2005). Our arguments also 
indicate that it is interorganizational performance that matters and that neither trust 
nor formalization should become ends in themselves. High levels of trust or 
formalization have sometimes been depicted as ideal states, but we have shown 
that rigidity and naiveté lure around the corner, and that intermediate levels of both 
governance forms are probably most conducive to performance. Therefore, 
inquiries into the factors influencing trust and formalization should be 
accompanied by assessments of interorganizational performance. Third, we have 
argued that starting conditions – being the levels of trust and formalization in early 
stages of cooperation – strongly influence how interorganizational relationships 
evolve. Our model supports Doz’s (1996: 77) argument that early “small” events 
and initial conditions characterizing interorganizational cooperation ‘have a 
disproportionate importance in establishing, or not, a self-reinforcing cycle of […] 
trust and commitment.’ This raises several points.  
 
First, it suggests that organizations might be better off when they decide to refrain 
from interorganizational cooperation in cases where starting conditions are 
unfavorable. They may also benefit from breaking off relationships characterized 
by negative self-reinforcements in earlier stages. Although this may seem obvious, 
we wish to emphasize it here, because many relationships persist although 
prospects are bad (Inkpen and Ross, 2001). We suggest that this may partly 
derive from the fact that partners do not recognize the significant impact of starting 
conditions on the development of interorganizational relationships, believing that 
they are able to counter self-reinforcing developments, even if they are not. 
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Second, although our description suggests that similar starting conditions lead to 
similar outcomes, they may cause divergent reactions by partners, due to 
differences in interpretation between managers (March and Olsen, 1975). 
Interpretation processes are fraught with potential missteps and errors as well as 
systematic biases, so that the same starting conditions may lead to different 
performance outcomes for comparable relationships. The development of trust is 
contingent, for example, on the ability of trading partners to “read” each other, and 
on their ability to “signal” trustworthiness (Carson et al., 2003). The latter suggests 
that the ambiguity surrounding the intentions that partners have with formalizations 
and their ability to communicate those intentions should receive more attention 
from researchers and practitioners (see also Carson et al., Forthcoming; Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005; Serva et al., 2005). Practitioners have to realize, for 
instance, that acts of formalization by their partners do not necessarily imply that 
they are not trusted. To prevent misunderstandings from occurring, they can 
inquire into each others’ reasoning behind acts of formalization, or they may 
explain their own acts more clearly to partners. 
 
Several avenues for further research can be identified. First, we developed a 
framework in which different actors react similarly when being confronted with 
certain levels of and changes in trust, formalization, and performance. Research 
by Ferrin et al. (2005) and Serva et al. (2005) indicates that this approach may be 
further refined by distinguishing the actions and reactions from one party from 
those of another party, so that the reciprocal nature of trust-building becomes 
illuminated. Although we believe the dynamics depicted in our framework would 
remain intact, incorporating actions and reaction of multiple parties could offer 
better insights into the extent to which starting conditions influence the evolution of 
the relationship. This would lead to a double-loop model, in which trust-
expectations and acts of formalization by one party influence the development of 
trust and acts of formalization by another party. Second, more attention could be 
paid to the negative aspects or dysfunctions of trust, and the positive aspects or 
functions of formalization, so that a more balanced perspective on these 
governance forms develops. Positive sentiments surrounding most research on 
trust (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001) and the negative connotation that some people have 
with formalization (Beck and Kieser, 2003) may be replaced by images of both 
concepts that are closer to reality. A third promising research direction could be to 
investigate the extent to which our model is contingent on exchange 
characteristics and on the institutional contexts in which relationships are 
embedded. Little systematic attention has been paid to such factors, although they 
may explain a relatively large share of the variance in trust and control (Bijlsma-
Frankema and Costa, 2005). Sitkin and Stickel (1996), for example, have revealed 
that the level of formalization should match with the nature of the task performed, 
to prevent escalating cycles of trust deterioration from developing. Finally, 
research efforts could focus on the interventions that managers undertake to make 
sure that trust and formalization do not degrade or escalate beyond appropriate 
levels. Insights in how self-reinforcing cycles can be broken, and how trust can be 
repaired could further advance our understanding of the evolution of trust and 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
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9  THEME 6 – GOVERNANCE TRAJECTORIES 
 
 
‘Despite a clarion call for further examination of multiple control mechanisms, few empirical 
studies have investigated this issue.’  
Jap and Ganesan, 2000: 227-245 
 
Summary 
Interorganizational governance efforts – attempts to coordinate and control 
activities and outcomes in external collaborative ventures – are composed of 
multiple, interrelated decisions that are taken over a relationship’s life cycle. Not 
withstanding this multi-dimensionality, academic studies on interorganizational 
governance frequently pertain to only one or a few governance choices. Little 
attention is paid to the interrelationships between governance choices, and to the 
dynamics characterizing value creation and value claiming activities in 
interorganizational relationships. We challenge this deficiency by conceptualizing 
interrelated governance decisions made during different stages of a collaborative 
relationship as “governance trajectories”. We propose that the decisions 
embedded in these trajectories possess dissimilar organization-level and 
relational-level antecedents, and that decisions made in earlier stages of 
cooperation affect decisions made later on. Analyses of six governance decisions 
for a sample of 911 buyer-supplier relationships support our arguments. By 
challenging the conventional focus on singular governance decisions, and by 
replacing it with the concept of governance trajectories, the chapter contributes to 
a more comprehensive and dynamic picture of interorganizational governance. 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Interorganizational relationships are believed to consist of several stages, 
including a search and selection phase, a negotiation phase, and a contracting 
phase (see Buskens, et al., 2003a; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Reuer, 1999, 2000; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004). These three stages in an interorganizational relationship’s 
life-cycle (see De Rond, 2003; Jap and Ganesan, 2000) correspond with different 
governance decisions aimed at the coordination and control of interorganizational 
activities and outcomes. Despite the distinction between these three stages, 
studies on series of successive governance decisions are still rare in the literature 
(Anderson and Dekker, 2006; Long et al., 2002; Narayandas and Rangan, 2004). 
In particular, most of the research on exchanges between organizations treats 
them as discrete events instead of as mechanisms for managing ongoing 
relationships (Dwyer et al., 1987). Moreover, ‘there has been little work that 
examines the simultaneous use of multiple mechanisms to structure exchange 
relationships’ (Jap and Ganesan, 2000: 228; see also Lusch and Brown, 1996). 
Research on interorganizational governance is generally centered on static 
typologies, paying little attention to the origins and evolution of interorganizational 
governance (Cardinal et al., 2004; Narayandas and Rangan, 2004). This is due, 
among others, to the precedence that has been given to analytical precision and 
theoretical rigor over rich descriptions of reality (Zollo and Singh, 2004). It also 
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derives from researchers’ attempts to determine single best controls (Long et al., 
2002), and the presumption that one mechanism should be used over another 
depending upon a given activity or context (Cardinal, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). Such an “overly rational 
conceptualization” of managerial attention and action only leads to correct 
conclusions when single governance decisions are compared (Long et al., 2002). 
It does not take into account that managers use distinct governance mechanisms 
to accomplish the same function (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Miller et al., 2004), 
and that they have to address a complex array of organizational functions and 
contingencies (Cardinal, 2001; Cyert and March, 1963; Kirsch, 1997; Long et al., 
2002). It also remains agnostic to the fact that different governance mechanisms 
may complement or substitute one another (Anderson and Dekker, 2006). The 
resulting gaps in our understanding of interorganizational governance are 
significant, given that governance systems are widely acknowledged to be 
ubiquitous and critical to the functioning of organizations and interorganizational 
relationships (Buskens et al., 2003a; Cardinal, 2001; Cardinal et al., 2004; Cyert 
and March, 1963; Reuer and Ariño, 2003; Ring, 2002). To address this issue, we 
focus on the following research question: To what extent are decisions on 
formalization related to other governance decisions? This question concerns the 
areas that have been shaded in the research framework depicted in Figure 9.1.  
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To investigate this question, we propose the concept of “governance trajectories”, 
which we define as sequences of interrelated decisions that are made to control, 
direct, or influence the actions and conduct of participants in interorganizational 
relationships during successive stages of an interorganizational life-cycle. 
Adoption of the life-cycle concept underscores the importance of distinct phases of 
collaboration as elements of value creation (Reuer and Zollo, 2000: 171). 
Examining how organizations govern collaborative relationships during multiple 
stages of cooperation offers a broader, more realistic perspective on 
interorganizational governance (Cardinal, 2001; Narayandas and Rangan, 2004). 
We recognize that it is virtually impossible to conduct an exhaustive study of 
interorganizational governance arrangements, because organizations have a large 
number of potential governance mechanisms at their disposal (Heide and John, 
1990). However, a review of the literature suggests that interorganizational 
governance trajectories at least comprise decisions with respect to: 
 
(1) The type of partner selected (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Ryall and Sampson, 2004);  
(2) Exhaustiveness of selection efforts (e.g. Luo, 1997; Nielsen, 2003);  
(3) Advance payments (e.g. Helm and Kloyer, 2004);  
(4) Exhaustiveness of negotiations (e.g. Ariño and Ring, 2004; Korobkin, 2000);  
(5) Use of standard contracts (e.g. Epstein, 1999; Korobkin, 2003), and;  
(6) Completeness of the contract (e.g. Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
 
By means of binary logistic regressions and multiple regression analyses on a 
sample of 911 buyer-supplier relationships, we demonstrate that each of these 
governance decisions can be explained by disparate sets of explanatory variables, 
and we describe the interrelationships between various governance decisions. In 
doing so, the chapter contributes to the interorganizational governance literature in 
several ways. Although other studies have begun to examine combinations or 
portfolios of control modes (Kirsch, 1997), our research is one of the first 
endeavors to explore sequences of interrelated governance decisions made 
during successive stages of an interorganizational life cycle (other examples are 
Heide (2003) and Wathne and Heide (2004)). By proposing the concept of 
governance trajectories, we move the analytic focus from the application of 
singular governance mechanisms, towards series of governance decisions. The 
chapter thereby differs from earlier governance analyses with the same or similar 
data in which either single governance decisions were studied (see Buskens, 
2000), or in which interorganizational governance was measured by additive 
measures capturing multiple governance decisions at once (Batenburg et al., 
2003). Besides, the chapter diverts the primary focus in governance research from 
studying contracts to inquiries into other means of coordination and control. 
Interorganizational relationships are thereby portrayed as organizational forms that 
– either simultaneously or over time – operate distinct governance mechanisms for 
similar (Bradach and Eccles, 1989), or different functions (Avadikyan et al., 2001). 
Although examinations of contract completeness have proliferated (Masten and 
Saussier, 2002), inquiries into other governance decisions, such as those 
concerning advance payment of suppliers, or the use of standard-form contracts, 
are much scarcer. Similarly, limited research efforts have been devoted to partner 
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search and selection processes (e.g. Blumberg, 2001; Buskens et al., 2003b; Hitt 
et al., 2000), despite their influence on the mix of skills and resources available to 
interorganizational relationships (Geringer, 1991), and organizations’ apparent 
quests for a suitable partner. Finally, our research renders empirical support for 
the assumption that governance decisions are intricately related to each other, 
and that governance decisions made early on in a relationship influence 
successive decisions. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we propose the concept of governance 
trajectories. We argue that governance decisions embedded in these trajectories 
have disparate antecedents, and that they possess significant interrelationships 
with each other. To test our assertions, we subsequently analyze 911 buyer-
supplier relationships in the Netherlands involving IT-suppliers and small- and 
medium-sized buyers. We conclude with a summary of the major findings. 
 
9.2 Theory on interorganizational governance decisions 
 
Organizations govern their interorganizational relationship by directing the 
behavior and performance of participants in interorganizational relationships 
towards the production of actions desirable to the relationship or to themselves. 
They attempt to restrict the occurrence of problems arising from goal divergence 
and asymmetrical objectives (Buskens et al., 2003a; Doz, 1996; Ireland et al., 
2002; Kale et al., 2000), by pursuing partial control over a partner’s resources and 
behavior (Blumberg, 2001), and by limiting their potential for opportunistic 
behavior (Williamson, 1985). Besides, governance efforts may be directed towards 
minimizing coordination costs resulting from the complexity and uncertainty 
involved in managing a cooperative relationship (Park and Ungson, 2001), and at 
reducing the variability in partners’ expectations about the value that can be 
created in the relationship (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). In other words, 
governance efforts in interorganizational relationships are both aimed at control 
and coordination. They contemporaneously affect value creation and value 
appropriation (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Wang, 2003; Heiman and 
Nickerson, 2004).  
 
Hitherto, most governance research has devoted attention to contracting 
practices. However, Heide and John (1990) have demonstrated that governance 
can be accomplished in a more discriminating way, and that different mechanisms 
are available that are more or less sensitive to the specific problems at hand. 
Several governance mechanisms have been proposed to help circumvent, 
mitigate, or alleviate coordination and control problems. These include, among 
others, exhaustive partner selection efforts (Ireland et al., 2002), equity exchange 
between partners (Oxley, 1997), and partner negotiations (Adair and Brett, 2005; 
Ariño and Ring, 2004). In fact, organizations implement a variety of mechanisms 
or processes to ensure that tasks are conducted in a way that is consistent with 
organizational goals (Heide, 1994; Kirsch, 1997). The assumption prevails that 
these and other governance mechanisms are related to each other. In this regard, 
Klein (2002: 62), for instance, pointed out that ‘Increased contractual specification 
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involves rent-dissipating search and negotiation costs.’ Others suggest that 
multiple governance mechanisms, including the selection of appropriate partners 
and alliance designs, jointly warrant value creation in interorganizational 
relationships (Reuer, 1999).  
 
However, not every governance mechanism may serve coordination and control in 
the same way. Whereas partner selection efforts may be primarily directed at 
selecting a partner with appropriate knowledge and capabilities, drafting a contract 
might be predominantly involved in the mitigation of opportunistic behavior of a 
partner. Moreover, it has been noticed that different governance mechanisms are 
used to facilitate coordination and control during successive stages in 
interorganizational relationships. In her study of information systems development 
projects, for example, Kirsch (1997) ascertains that stakeholders implement a 
portfolio of control modes containing a mix of overlapping and redundant 
mechanisms. By deploying multiple governance mechanisms, managers develop 
competencies across an entire collaborative process, which makes them better 
equipped to capitalize on a wide array of opportunities for achieving efficiency and 
effectiveness during an entire relationship (Cardinal et al., 2004; Simons, 1995). 
These assertions have led scholars to argue that research efforts should be 
redirected from examining singular forms of governance to evaluating more 
complex governance systems (Long et al., 2002). Although research has been 
conducted into possible links between formal governance, prior experience, and 
trust (see for instance Gulati, 1995; Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), and on 
relationships between partner selection criteria and other governance decisions 
(Nielsen, 2003), inquiries into larger series of governance decisions have 
remained absent in the literature up until now. In this chapter, we adopt the life-
cycle metaphor of strategic alliances (De Rond, 2003; Reuer, 2000; Van de Ven, 
1992) as a means to develop a more dynamic and integrative perspective on 
interorganizational governance. 
 
9.3 Sequences of governance decisions 
 
Congruent with descriptions of interorganizational development along the life-cycle 
of an interorganizational relationship, we propose that various governance efforts 
are embedded in governance trajectories. We define these trajectories as 
sequences of interrelated decisions that are made to control, direct, or influence 
the actions and conduct of participants in interorganizational relationships during 
successive stages of an interorganizational life cycle. We discern three 
cooperative stages in which governance efforts are known to be ubiquitous, 
including a partner selection stage, a negotiation stage, and a contracting stage. 
Each stage entails at least two decisions. During the partner selection stage, for 
example, decisions are made on the selection of a familiar or an unfamiliar 
partner, and on the exhaustiveness of partner selection efforts. In the negotiation 
stage, decisions pertain to advance payments of suppliers or other partners and to 
the exhaustiveness of negotiations. Finally, in the contracting stage, collaborating 
parties decide whether to use standard-form contracts or not, and they determine 
how complete contracts should be, both forming decisions on formalization. The 
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six governance decisions distinguished depend on different sets of antecedents 
and on preceding governance decisions. In light of recent debates on the factors 
determining relationship efficiency and effectiveness (Colombo, 2003; Heiman and 
Nickerson, 2004; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Madhok, 2002; Oxley, 1997; Reuer and 
Zollo, 2005; Takeishi, 2001), we include both firm-level and transaction- or 
relational level factors as explanatory variables of governance choices. In Figure 
9.2., we depict the three governance stages, the decisions associated with them, 
and their relationship with antecedents and interorganizational performance in an 
integrative conceptual framework. Consonant with life-cycle theories, we pay 
attention to the starting conditions, functional end-points, and the processes of 
change between them (Van de Ven, 1992). We briefly elaborate on each 
governance stage and the decisions associated with it here, starting with the 
partner selection stage. 
 
Partner Selection Stage 
After an organization has made the decision to engage in an interorganizational 
relationship, the selection of an appropriate partner is the next critical event (Hitt et 
al., 2000). Partner selection refers to acts involved in identifying potential 
exchange partners and assessing their quality and intentions (Buskens et al., 
2003; Gulati, 1995; Rangan, 2000). The general purpose served by partner 
selection is to ‘proactively solving potential governance problems’ (Wathne and 
Heide, 2004: 75). Partner selection is crucial to interorganizational performance as 
it affects the complementarity of allying firms and their combination of strengths 
and weaknesses (Doz and Hamel, 1998). Partner selection primarily entails two 
governance decisions. First, a focal organization has to decide whether it is 
desirable and possible to work with a familiar partner or not. Second, a decision 
has to be made as to the amount of effort that is invested in selecting a partner 
(Buskens et al., 2003). Concerning the first decision, it is recognized that 
organizations show a propensity to initiate interorganizational relationships with 
partners with which they have previously cooperated (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999; Kale et al., 2002). Cooperation with familiar partners is generally 
preferred above cooperation with organizations that are less well known to the 
focal organization, as partners that have previously cooperated have had the 
opportunity to build up interorganizational trust and a good reputation (Gulati, 
1995; Macaulay, 1963). Prior relationships simply serve as repositories for 
information on a partner. They reduce the focal organization’s uncertainty about a 
partner’s intentions, interests, reliability, resources, and capabilities (Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999; Li and Rowley, 2002; Rangan, 2000; Saxton, 1997). Focal 
organizations can, for example, ‘make vicarious inferences’ about likely behavior 
of their partners in new collaborative ventures by extrapolating past records into 
the future32 (Parkhe, 1998: 421).  
                                                 
32 Batenburg et al. (2003: 170) found support for the significance of the evaluation of 
previous exchanges with familiar partners for partner selection in novel transactions. In the 
same data-set as the one that is being used in this study, they found that hardly any of the 
cases in the data consists of business partners with a negative shared past. This suggests 
that searching for another partner is the most likely response to a problematic transaction. 
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In line with this, Hoetker (2005) promulgated that organizations particularly opt for 
cooperation with familiar partners when moderate levels of uncertainty apply. 
Moreover, familiar partners frequently intent to maintain a profitable relationship 
during long time horizons, which reduces their scope for opportunistic behavior 
(Lui and Ngo, 2004; Madhok, 1995; Palay, 1996; Ryall and Sampson, 2004). 
Besides, organizations are known to select familiar partners routinely, without 
engaging in exhaustive evaluation processes (Li and Rowley, 2002), as there are 
more certain rewards for exploiting existing relationships opposed to developing 
new relationships (March, 1991). The decision to select a familiar partner helps 
these organizations to circumvent the evaluation of potential partners with 
unknown characteristics and less predictable behavior (Li and Rowley, 2002), and 
it prevents these organizations from selecting partners based on technical criteria 
(Hoetker, 2005). Finally, although the motives or inducements for selecting a 
familiar partner might be obvious, organization- and relational characteristics can 
prohibit the selection of a familiar partner. The opportunities for selecting familiar 
partner may be restricted and opportunities to collaborate in general are not 
equally available to all organizations (Ahuja, 2000). Focal organizations, for 
example, might not have had prior relationships in a certain business area. We 
therefore conceptualize the selection of a familiar or an unfamiliar partner as an 
explicit governance decision, which is influenced by several relation- and 
organization-level characteristics. 
 
The second governance decision in the partner selection stage concerns the 
extent to which search and selection efforts are employed for assessing whether 
an organization would be an appropriate partner for a particular cooperative 
endeavor. Although the efforts put in partner selection comprise a distinct decision 
in the alliance formation process (Geringer, 1991; Nielsen, 2003), analysis of 
search and selection efforts has been a rather neglected topic in the 
interorganizational governance literature (Blumberg 2001; Nielsen, 2003). Search 
and selection efforts have only recently attracted systematic attention in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on interorganizational network formation and 
dynamics (Buskens et al., 2003b). Despite a lack of clarity and insufficient solid 
empirical evidence, researchers have maintained that partner selection is a major 
variable in the formation and operation of interorganizational relationships 
(Blumberg, 2001; Buskens et al., 2003b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Nielsen, 
2003). It reputedly assist in assessing the overall viability of interorganizational 
relationships (Geringer, 1991), and to reduce the occurrence of problems and 
conflicts of interests that stem from cultural, organizational, resource, and strategic 
misfits (e.g. see Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Luo, 
1997). In his analysis of 116 international joint ventures, for example, Luo (1997) 
revealed that partner selection influenced financial returns, local market 
expansion, export growth, risk reduction, and overall performance33. 
                                                 
33 One should not forget that, similar to formalization, search and selection efforts both have 
positive and negative effects on interorganizational performance. Beyond some level, the 
accumulation of more information and the expenditure of more time on deliberation can 
involve costs that offset advantages, and so diminish profits (Furobotn, 2002: 92). 
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Negotiation stage 
This stage typically encompasses activities concerned with relational positioning, 
identification of the problem that has to be solved, generation of solutions, and 
reaching of agreement (Adair and Brett, 2005). During negotiations, proposals for 
cooperation are exchanged between partners (Putnam, 2003), and participants in 
interorganizational relationships work towards agreement on key issues of the 
relationship. During this stage, organizations have to at least make decisions on 
whether a supplier or another partner has to be paid in advance, and on what the 
appropriate length or exhaustiveness of negotiations with a partner should be. 
With respect to the first decision, we note that equity exchange between partners 
has received abundant attention. In particular, the alliance literature is infested 
with articles on the choice between equity and non-equity relationships (see Gulati 
and Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997). However, other types of cooperation, such as 
buyer-supplier relationships, also entail decisions on equity transfer. Buyers and 
suppliers jointly decide whether advance payments for products and services are 
made. Advance or up-front payments minimize the risk of hold-up experienced by 
a supplier (Helm and Kloyer, 2004). When higher risks are anticipated, advance 
payment becomes more probable. Therefore, advance payment is likely to be 
dependent on factors such as the financial volume associated with a transaction 
and the financial strength of both parties. Advance payments may subsequently 
influence successive governance decisions, as they pose additional risks for 
buyers, aggravating their dependence on suppliers. 
 
Next to advance payments, this stage is reminiscent of a focus on formal 
bargaining processes surrounding the logic of a business proposal (Ariño and 
Ring, 2004). Bargaining is defined as the process whereby in the face of 
resistance parties rearrange their mutual distributions of obligations, benefits, and 
burdens (Dwyer et al., 1987: 16). The extent of these negotiations is conceptually 
different from search and selection efforts and from contractual issues. Search 
and selection efforts, for example, might improve one’s ability to negotiate, 
whereas partners might not be able to lay down issues that are fiercely negotiated, 
due to bounded rationality and the existence of a plethora of unforeseen 
contingencies. Furthermore, they might be reluctant to lay down certain outcomes 
of their negotiations, as these might lead to hold-up problems (see Klein, 2002) or 
high transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). The extent of negotiations thus forms a 
separate means to coordinate and control in interorganizational relationships. 
 
Contracting stage 
In the contracting stage, parties have to make decisions on formalization. In 
particular, parties have to choose whether standard contracts are being applied 
and how complete contracts have to be. On the one hand, standard contracts 
lower the efforts required to specify or compose contracts, and they enable fast 
interaction with a broad range of partners. Furthermore, the clarity of terms in 
standard contracts can reduce the strain on interpretive practices, and minimize 
the risk of inconsistent interpretations of contract clauses (Epstein, 1999). On the 
other hand, standard contracts have been argued to preclude active buyer 
involvement and flexibility. They are reputed to reflect the contract-issuing 
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organizations’ requirements, possibly leading to dissatisfaction on the part of 
partners. Standard contracts between hardware or software suppliers and buyers, 
for instance, usually benefit suppliers (e.g. Asner, 1983; Nevers, 1987). In general, 
standard contracts initiated by suppliers merit scrutiny, as buyers are boundedly 
rational, and mainly consider contracting terms that are salient when relationships 
commence. Besides, buyers often fail to read the terms in standard form 
contracts, as the usual content of standard contract terms makes them unlikely to 
attract a buyer’s attention, and because search and deliberation costs, which are 
necessary to understand the contract terms, are high (Eisenberg, 1995). This 
endows suppliers with the ‘incentive to draft non-salient contract terms to their own 
advantage’ (Korobkin, 2003: 1207). The foregoing assertions indicate that the 
decision for application of standard or non-standard contracts is a significant one. 
 
The second decision in this stage concerns the degree of contract completeness. 
Formal contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions in 
the future (Macneil, 1980). The act of contracting has two dimensions: codification 
and enforcement (e.g. see Hage and Aiken, 1966). The process of codification 
creates perceptual and conceptual categories that facilitate the classification of 
phenomena (Boisot, 1998). Enforcement refers to a situation in which things that 
are laid down are “in force”. Contract completeness has frequently served as a 
proxy for the extent to which participants in interorganizational relationships 
attempt to coordinate and control interorganizational activities and outcomes (e.g. 
Anand and Khanna, 2000b; Masten and Saussier, 2002). Although higher levels of 
contract completeness facilitate coordination and control, they also entail higher 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985), and reduced flexibility (Luo, 2002; Mintzberg, 
1994). This dilemma heightens the salience of contract completeness decisions. 
 
Interrelationships between governance decisions 
Relatively little is known about why and in what way governance mechanisms are 
combined (Kirsch, 1997). Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) introduced the notion of 
governance inseparability to describe situations where there are 
interdependencies between governance decisions. Leiblein adds that ‘a firm’s past 
and current governance decisions constrain [and enable] the range and types of 
governance mechanisms that it can adopt in subsequent exchanges.’ Although 
these and other researchers have presumed that there are potential 
interdependencies across individual governance decisions (Heide, 2003), it is 
unclear as to what the nature of these interdependencies is. As we wish to support 
our conceptualization of governance trajectories, we are interested in whether, 
and to what extent decisions on interorganizational governance are related within 
a single relationship. In this respect, Avadikyan et al. (2001: 1448) suggests that 
the life of an interorganizational relationship should be considered as ‘a 
succession of [value] allocation and creation problems and the events taking place 
within a given phase have strong impacts on the following periods.’ Authors have 
suggested that some governance decisions might serve as constraints on 
subsequent attempts to develop particular types of governance (Heide, 1994). 
Others have demonstrated that governance decisions made at the beginning of 
relationships influence governance decisions made later on. The selection of a 
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familiar partner, for example, has been found to influence contract completeness, 
as the need to reduce opportunistic behavior is probably lower (Gulati, 1995), 
whereas the ability to contract is probably higher (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Similarly, higher selection efforts might enhance partners’ abilities to record certain 
issues, heightening levels of contract completeness. It appears that combinations 
of governance mechanisms generate positive synergy or negative tensions 
(Cardinal, 2001), making examinations of how governance decisions relate to 
each other highly pertinent (Heide, 1994; Reuer, 2000). The six governance 
decisions that have been identified here should each at least possess one direct 
link with another governance decision, for the concept of governance trajectories 
to be of any value. In fact, if governance decisions are independent from each 
other, investigations of singular decisions remain appropriate. We formally state 
this in our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 9.1: each of the six governance decisions in the selection, 
negotiation, and contracting stages at least influences, or is influenced by one 
other governance decision in the same governance trajectory.  
 
Antecedent sets of governance decisions 
We are interested in whether the antecedents of the six governance choices 
differ34. If this appears to be the case, the value of studying entire governance 
trajectories would increase as opposed to investigating singular governance 
decisions. After all, in their efforts to coordinate and control, organizations are 
likely to deploy those governance mechanisms that fit most with the characteristics 
of the organization and the specific relationship (Colombo, 2003; Madhok, 2002). 
Coordination and control requirements that cannot be fulfilled by a particular 
governance mechanism might be accomplished through other governance 
mechanisms, dependent on the organizations involved in the relationship and the 
cooperation’s characteristics. Examining the relationship between antecedents 
and a range of governance decisions appears to offer a more comprehensive 
picture of partners’ governance efforts in this case. Conversely, when each of the 
governance mechanisms discerned has the same set of antecedents, 
investigating singular governance decisions suffices. In this case, results from 
analyses of one governance decision can serve as a basis for inferences about 
relationships between the same set of antecedents and other governance 
decisions. 
 
Consistent with prior work (e.g. Chen, 2003; Reuer and Zollo, 2005; Saxton, 
1997), and in line with recommendations by Colombo (2003), Heiman and 
Nickerson (2004), Madhok (2002), Reuer and Zollo (2005) and Takeishi (2001), 
we include both firm-level and transaction- or relational level factors as 
explanatory variables of governance choices. This conforms with Williamson’s 
(1999: 1103) argument that rather than ask the question what is the best to 
organize X, which is the traditional transaction cost query, the question to be put 
                                                 
34 Explanations underlying the use of different governance mechanisms have rarely been 
empirically investigated (for an exception, see Kumar and Seth, 1998). 
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instead is 'How should firm A […] organize X?’ It also aligns with findings from 
McGahan and Villalonga (2003) that governance forms depend on enduring firm 
characteristics. This distinction indicates that not only do transaction particulars 
matter, but also firm characteristics, like resources, governance skills, and 
experience (Madhok, 2002). However, ‘little has been done specifically in 
examining the effect of partner characteristics on the choice of alliance forms’ 
(Chen, 2003: 115). Colombo’s (2003: 1224) therefore remarks that ‘bringing the 
consideration of firms’ idiosyncratic capabilities into the governance question […] 
is a valuable complementary addition to more traditional arguments based on TCE 
and other contractual theories.’ The effects of most of these antecedents on each 
of the governance decisions are intuitively straightforward; antecedents influence 
the need for coordination and control, or the ability to do so by means of the 
governance mechanism in question (Gerwin, 2004; Helm and Kloyer, 2004), or 
both. Based on existing literature, we distinguish several relational-level and 
organization-level antecedents that have been found to relate to one or more of 
the six governance decisions. Relational-level antecedents include the financial 
volume, complexity, and asset-specificity involved in a relationship, and the 
measurability of inputs, outputs and behavior. Organization-level variables 
predicting governance decisions include the sizes of the organizations involved, 
their expertise with respect to legal issues and the goods or services exchanged, 
and their experience with other interorganizational relationships. As some context-
structure boundaries might be more salient predictors of structure and 
performance than others (Khandwalla, 1974) and because multiple contextual 
factors might have conflicting implications for the appropriate structure of an 
organization (Child, 1997), we take into account several antecedent variables of 
formalization here. When different governance strategies are found to be 
appropriate under different conditions, this would provide support for the fact that 
interorganizational governance is a heterogeneous phenomenon, subject to 
systematic variation (Heide, 1994; Macneil, 1980). It would not imply that 
‘conditions’ for applying different governance mechanisms are mutually exclusive 
(Grandori, 2000), since antecedent sets of various governance decisions may 
partly overlap. However, as long as entire sets of antecedents of different 
governance decisions do not coincide, this would demonstrate the efficacy of the 
concept of governance trajectories. We therefore propose that the six governance 
decisions have disparate sets of antecedents. 
 
Hypothesis 9.2: each of the six governance decisions in the selection, 
negotiation, and contracting stages is associated with different sets of 
organization-level and relational-level antecedents. 
 
9.4 Method 
 
We notice that gathering longitudinal data to examine process dynamics across 
stages is extremely hard. Analogue to Jap and Ganesan (2000), we therefore 
examine data that have been collected at one point in time, and we classifiy 
variables along different stages of a relationship. Subsequently, we perform 
ordinary logistic regression to explain the variation in governance mechanisms 
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that are measured on continuous scales, and we apply logistic regression 
analyses to predict the application of governance mechanisms that are measured 
on dichotomous scales. Although our results are generally consistent with other 
research based on the same data (see Batenburg et al., 2003; Buskens, 2002), 
we shift the analytic focus from the application of singular governance 
mechanisms towards series of governance decisions. Our analysis differs from 
these studies, because they either involve a smaller number of governance 
mechanisms (Buskens, 2002), or because they reduce the governance 
mechanisms that we distinguish to one additive measure (Batenburg et al., 2003). 
  
Measurement 
Consistent with previous research (e.g. Kale et al., 2000; Oxley and Sampson, 
2004), prior cooperation is measured by a dummy variable, indicating whether the 
buyer and the supplier have undertaken business with each other before or not 
(0= no previous relationship, 1= previous relationship). With respect to partner 
selection efforts, most inquiries have focused on the type of selection criteria 
organizations apply in different contexts (e.g. Hitt et al., 2000; Nielsen, 2003). 
However, since interorganizational relationships vary as to the contexts and 
settings in which they take place, the tasks concerned, and the organizations 
involved, attempting to identify a universal list of criteria that organizations should 
employ when seeking an appropriate partner seems futile (Hitt et al., 2000). To 
secure a higher external validity of our findings, we use the number of men-days 
spent by a buyer on the selection and comparison of suppliers and their products 
as a proxy for selection efforts. The distribution of responses in terms of this 
indicator ranges from zero to three hundred days and is highly peaked and 
skewed. Most buyers had only spent a day or two on supplier and product 
selection, while a few invested a substantial amount of time. The variable is 
therefore subjected to a double square root transformation, rendering a normal 
distribution (see also Dekker, 2003). The decision as to whether or not to pay a 
supplier in advance is measured by a dummy variable (0= no advance payment, 
1= advance payment). The exhaustiveness of negotiations between buyers and 
suppliers was measured by the extent to which 24 financial, legal, and operational 
issues were discussed by the buyer and supplier during negotiations on the 
transaction on a three-point scale (1=little, 2=normal, 3= a lot). Issues included 
were: price determination; liability of the supplier; restrictions on product use; 
price-levels; force majeure; nondisclosure by the buyer; up-dating; arbitration 
arrangements; settlement of R&D costs; joint management; technical 
specifications; termination period; price changes; warranties; insurance by the 
supplier; payment terms; quality (norms); service periods; sanctions for late 
payment; intellectual property rights; the reservation of spare parts; delivery times; 
protection of the product; and, maintenance periods. The variable consists of a 
count measure of the values for all terms, implying that a minimum value of 24 and 
a maximum value of 72 could be obtained. The decision to apply a standard form 
contract or a tailor-made contract is measured by a dummy variable (0=tailor-
made contract, 1= standard form contract). The final governance decision, 
contract completeness, is constructed from the respondent’s answers regarding 
the presence or absence of 24 contract clauses. Individual contract terms receive 
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a value of one when the respondents indicated that they were included as a 
clause in the contract, whereas they are coded zero when the subject was only 
arranged verbally, or when it was not arranged at all. Subsequently, contract 
completeness is calculated as a count measure of the contractual agreements on 
the 24 financial, legal, and operational issues that were actually included in the 
contract. All of the scales have satisfactory reliability and have undergone multiple 
validity tests. To circumvent duplication we refer to the method sections of themes 
one and four for the measurement of the following variables: financial volume, 
interorganizational complexity, asset-specificity, firm size, importance of 
reputation, and alternative options. We elaborate on the measurement of the other 
antecedents and control variables in Textbox 9.1.  
 
 
TEXTBOX 9.1 
Overview and measurement of antecedents and control variables 
 
Transaction-level variables 
 
Measurability of inputs, outputs, or behavior in a relationship often connects to high 
uncertainty (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). It has been suggested to complicate the design of 
appropriate contracts (Blumberg, 2001; Ouchi, 1979; Ouchi & Maguire, 1975; 
Eisenhardt, 1989b). It refers to the fact that ‘even though management defines 
bureaucratic measures as both legitimate and effective, it may, nevertheless, be unable 
to implement these patterns’ (Gouldner, 1954: 146). In contrast, others put forward that, 
if necessary, managers ‘try to find decision rules, information sources, and structural 
designs that provide adequate understanding’ to cope with low measurability and 
uncertainty (Daft & Lengel, 1986: 555). The influence of measurasbility on governance 
decisions has therefore remained ambiguous. The degree of measurability is captured 
by three items. At the first item, the respondent had to indicate ‘how difficult it was for 
his or her organization to compare this product with similar products.’ The second item 
asked ‘how difficult it was for his or her organization to compare the price-quality ratio of 
potential suppliers’ The third item asked whether ‘it was difficult or hard for your 
employees to evaluate the quality of this product at the time of delivery’ Responses 
follow a 5-point Likert-scale (1= ‘very easy,’ 5= ‘very difficult’). As the ability to formalize 
is a construct with a positive orientation, the scales were reverse-coded. Cronbach’s α 
for this scale was equal to 0.79. The construct validity of this measure is assessed by 
analyzing its correlation with the focal organization’s relative experience with 
automation compared to other organizations in the same industry. Pearsons’ correlation 
statistic for both variables is equal to .30 (p<.00), indicating that organizations that are 
relatively more experienced with automation possess a higher ability to formalize, 
something which strongly reinforces our belief that our measure is appropriate. 
 
Organization-level variables 
 
Organization-level variables influencing governance decisions consists of the buyer’s 
legal expertise, its expertise concerning the transacted goods or services, and expertise 
derived from other relationships. For example, as buyers with legal expertise are likely 
to be better able to negotiate and contract, their possession of legal expertise is 
proposed to increase the extensiveness of negotiations and the completeness of 
contracts. Buyers with legal experts are further assumed to be aware of the downsides 
of standard contract usage, which reduces the likelihood that those are used. This 
resonates with findings from Leiblein and Miller (2003), from their study on 469 make-
or-buy decisions of 117 semi-conductor firms, which show that organization-level 
characteristics, like experience with a certain domain, influence governance decisions.  
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TEXTBOX 9.1 (continued) 
Overview and measurement of antecedents and control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.5 Results 
 
We argued that if governance decisions at various stages of cooperation are 
influenced by different antecedents, and if they show an association with at least 
one other governance decision in the same relationship, this would support our 
conceptualization of sequences of governance decisions as governance 
trajectories. Before we can draw any conclusions, we have to proceed through 
several steps. First, we offer several descriptive statistics of the data used in our 
analyses. The three dichotomous governance decisions show significant variance, 
witnessing the distribution of values displayed in Figures 9.3 to 9.5. It appears 
that, in about half of the cases in our sample a familiar partner is selected. 
Advance payment of a supplier occurs in around 25 percent of the cases, whereas 
standard contracts are used in the majority of the relationships studied. The extent 
of selection efforts, negotiations, and contract completeness are not visualized, as 
they exhibit normal distributions. Table 9.1 depicts correlations between the six 
governance decisions (Appendix D presents the remainder of the correlations). 
 
Organization-level variables 
 
Buyers may differ in their ability to select attractive sourcing partners, negotiate, and 
enforce supplier contracts, design systems to manage relationships outside of the 
hierarchy, or to monitor and enforce contractual compliance (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 
2000a; Ring, 2002), and they might be more or less capable of interacting with other 
companies or in creating value in interorganizational relationships (Dyer et al., 2001; 
Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). The buyer’s legal expertise is measured as a dummy 
variable indicating whether the buyer has employees or departments with legal 
expertise or not (0= no, 1= yes). The buyer’s expertise concerning the transacted goods 
or services is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the buyer has 
employees or departments with IT expertise or not (0= no, 1= yes). Finally, the extent to 
which the buyer has experience with how to manage interorganizational relationships is 
proxied by the extent to which it has few or many connections with other organizations 
(Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). It is measured by a question indicating whether the 
buyer has any relationships or cooperative agreements with other organizations with 
respect to R&D, purchasing & sales, or transport (0= no, 1= yes). 
 
Control variables 
 
Perceived dependence was measured by one indicator, described as ‘the respondent’s 
estimation, before the transaction, of the buyer’s dependence on the supplier.’ The 
response categories ranged from 1=‘very small’ to 5=‘very large’. First user group 
describes whether the buyer belonged to the first group of users of the product in its 
industry (1= belonged to the first user group, and 0= did not belong to the first user 
group). Age of the supplier and the respondent measures the number of years the 
supplier is active in the IT-branch, and the age of the person answering the 
questionnaire respectively. 
194 
Familiarity is associated with lower selection efforts, fewer instances of advance 
payment, less exhaustive negotiations, and less complete contracts. The 
correlations between the other governance mechanisms all favor a 
complementarity view on governance mechanisms. Selection efforts, advance 
payment, exhaustiveness of negotiations, and contract completeness exhibit 
positive relations with each other, while they correlate negatively with the 
application of standard contracts. 
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In order to answer our research question, we now perform binary logistic 
regression analyses (for dichotomous governance decisions) and multiple 
regression analyses (for governance decisions with a continuous character). We 
first perform binary logistic analyses on the three dichotomous governance 
decisions, after which we undertake multiple regression analyses on the remaining 
governance variables, which are measured on continuous scales. As we require 
the combined results from these analyses for rejecting or accepting our 
hypothesiss, conclusions can only be drawn after both analyses are performed. 
 
 
TABLE 9.1 
Bivariate correlations 
 Mean SD 11 2 31 4 51 6 
Prior cooperation 1 .50 .50 1.00    
Selection efforts 1.58 .710 -.18 1.00    
Advance payment 1 .26 .441 -.10 .15 1.00    
Exhaustiveness negotiations 40.2 7.86 -.13 .38 .14 1.00   
Standard contract 1 .70 .46 .02 -.16 -.16 -.16 1.00  
Contract completeness 10.7 5.84 -.13 .41 .21 .58 -.10 1.00 
 1 Correlations with binary variables consist of Kendall’s tau-b. Correlations higher than .072 
are significant at the 0.05-level. Correlations higher than .085 are significant at 0.01-level. 
 
 
Binary logistic regression analyses 
The objective of the binary logistic regression analyses is to correctly predict 
decisions concerning collaboration with a familiar or an unfamiliar partner, 
advance payment of a supplier, and the application of standard contracts. 
Predictions of these decisions for particular interorganizational relationships are 
based on the values of organization- and relation-level antecedents, which were 
distinguished earlier. The prediction equations equal: 
 
 
Prob (Y) =        e B0 + B1 · FINANCIAL VOLUME + B2 · COMPLEXITY + … + … + B15 · AGE RESPONDENT     
                   1 + e B0 + B1 · FINANCIAL VOLUME + B2 · COMPLEXITY + … + … + B15 · AGE RESPONDENT     
 
Table 9.2 exhibits a compilation of classification and fit statistics for the analyses 
of each of the three dichotomous governance decisions. The analysis of the 
decision to select a familiar or an unfamiliar partner, for example, encompasses 
420 observations. In 215 instances, previous cooperation had taken place, 
rendering 51.2 percent of predictions as being correct if no explanatory variables 
were included in the analysis. Instead, the model predicts 65 percent of the cases 
correctly. Nagelkerke R2, an alternative measure of the amount of explained 
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variance for binary logistic regression analyses equals .174. The p-value of the 
Hosmer-Lemehow test indicates that all models adequately fit the data (see 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). 
 
 
TABLE 9.2 
Compilation of classification and fit statistics 
 
 
Table 9.3 displays the results from the binary logistic regression analyses. Higher 
degrees of asset-specificity ex post are associated with a lower likelihood that a 
familiar partner is selected. This finding suggests that buyers in interorganizational 
relationships might benefit from relation-specific investments, which they have 
made in earlier transactions with the same supplier. Congruent with arguments 
from Lane and Lubatkin (1998), Dyer and Singh (1998) and Zollo et al. (2002), we 
thus suggest that organizations tend to select familiar partners for their 
collaborative ventures because this reduces investments required for developing 
knowledge-sharing routines and partner-specific knowledge, which are likely to 
have already taken place in prior exchanges between these organizations. Or in 
Williamson’s (1999: 1103) words, in such cases ‘the alignment calculus will be 
tilted in favor of the form that possesses such specialized’ capacity.  
Prior cooperation: predicted  
 
  
  No Yes   % Correct 
Prior cooperation: observed  No 132 73 64.4 
  Yes 74 141 65.6 
Overall Percentage   65.0 
Hosmer-Lemehow test .773 
Nagelkerke R2 .174 
Paid in advance: predicted  
 
  
  No Yes   % Correct 
Paid in advance: observed  No 285 13 95.6 
  Yes 92 27 22.7 
Overall Percentage   74.8 
Hosmer-Lemehow test .285 
Nagelkerke R2 .148 
Standard contract: predicted  
 
  
  No Yes   % Correct 
No 50 82 37.9 Standard contract: observed   
Yes 25 239 90.5 
Overall Percentage  73.0 
Hosmer-Lemehow test  .269 
Nagelkerke R2  .193 
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TABLE 9.3 
Results binary logistic regression analyses 
 Prior cooperation Advance payment Standard contract 
 B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B)
Financial volume -.147  .864 .392 *** 1.480 -.291 *** .747
Complexity -.085  .918 .102  1.107 -.146 ** .864
Asset-specificity -.120 *** .887 -.005  .995 .020  1.020
Measurability .091 ** 1.096 .014  1.014 .013  1.013
          
Size buyer .006  1.006 -.037  .964 -.467 *** .627
Size supplier .002  1.002 .014  1.014 .386 *** 1.471
Legal expertise .013  1.013 .196  1.216 .103  1.108
Other relationships .014  1.014 .385  1.470 -.022  .978
IT-expertise -.392  .675 -.195  .823 .187  1.205
     
Importance reputation .107 * 1.113 .010  1.010 .027  1.028
Alternative options .106 * 1.112 -.072  .930 -.078  .925
Perceived dependence .249 ** 1.283 .186 * 1.204 -.216 ** .805
First user group -.497 ** .609 .338  1.402 .280  1.324
Age supplier .339 *** 1.404 -.339 *** .712 -.039  .962
Age of respondent -.010  .990 .014  1.014 -.023  .978
Constant 1.058  .057 -2.593 *** .075 5.165 *** 175.0
    
Nr. of observations †  420  417   396
Hosmer-Lemehow test  .773 .285   .269
Nagelkerke R2  .174 .148   .193
† Due to the fact that the number of observations per variable was large, cases with missing values 
were excluded listwise. Correlations significant at the 0.10-level (*). Correlations significant at the 
0.05-level (**). Correlations significant at the 0.01-level (***). 
 
 
This finding thus lends support for Williamson’s (1985) description of the 
“fundamental transformation” phenomenon. Williamson argues that in the 
presence of relation-specific investments – in this case, investments that have 
been conducted in previous exchanges – partners can create higher gains from 
trade if they stay together than if they separate. If partners have already 
committed to each other through previous investments in coordination 
mechanisms, which aid in the governance of subsequent interactions, for 
example, they have to invest less during new transactions with the same partner 
(Sobrero and Roberts, 2002). Relation-specific assets thus foster long-term and 
repeat relationships (Brown et al., 2004). 
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In relationships marked by higher measurability, higher importance of reputation, 
and larger numbers of alternative options, cooperation with a familiar partner is 
more likely, suggesting that buyers revert to suppliers they know when 
assessments of product or service quality are more difficult, or when products are 
highly standardized. The positive relationship between measurability and the 
selection of a familiar partner corroborates with Hoetker’s (2005) finding that 
notebook computer manufacturers tend to opt for more hierarchical governance 
choices when uncertainty increases. In this chapter, higher measurability appears 
to be associated with the selection for a familiar partner, suggesting that 
uncertainty reduction stemming from learning (see also Williamson, 1999) was 
one of the factors influencing partner selection. The positive association between 
the selection of a familiar partner and perceived dependence suggests that 
organizations are some occasionally forced to work with a familiar partner, 
possibly due to lock-in effects or relation-specific investments made earlier on. 
This could explain why organizations turn to familiar partners for new cooperative 
endeavors even though partner-specific experience has been found to adversely 
influence interorganizational performance (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Klein 
Woolthuis et al. (2005) offer an example of this effect in their description of a 
cooperative relationship between FoodCom, a large producer and seller of 
specialty foods, and Processor, a firm specialized in developing a wide range of 
food ingredients. They remark that ‘the reason that the partners did cooperate 
again was due to FoodCom’s dependence on Processor’s specialist knowledge, 
for which FoodCom had very few alternative partners to turn to’ (Klein Woolthuis et 
al., 2005: 823).  
 
When the buyer belongs to the first user group in its industry, cooperation with a 
familiar partner also becomes less likely, as previous cooperation has probably 
never taken place between any of the potential partners. Finally, the older the 
supplier, the more likely it is that the partners have cooperated before. The odds 
ratios indicate that the most influential antecedents consist of age of the supplier, 
first user group, and perceived dependence. The odds that a buyer selects a 
familiar partner, for example, decrease by a factor .609 when it belongs to the first 
user group of a product in its industry. These findings suggest that the selection of 
a familiar partner is not only determined by a focal organization’s ability to discern 
capable and reliable partners, or the routinized and standardized selection of 
partners (Li and Rowley, 2002), but also by the availability of familiar partners (see 
also Singh and Mitchell, 2005), which is partly determined by the age of a familiar 
partner, and whether the focal organization belongs to the first user group. 
Moreover, it is influenced by the difficulty on the part of the focal organization to 
break away from a familiar partner, as indicated by investments in relation-specific 
assets performed during earlier interactions, and the perceived degree of 
dependence on a familiar partner. Our findings reveal that collaborations between 
familiar partners are probably reminiscent of lower degrees of asset-specificity, 
and higher degrees of measurability and perceived dependence. They are also 
more likely to involve older supplier organizations. 
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The decision to pay a supplier in advance or not was found to be predicted by the 
financial volume involved in a relationship and the perceived dependence of a 
buyer on a supplier. Both variables had a positive relationship with ex ante 
payment. In contrast, the supplier’s age had a significant negative influence on the 
likelihood that the decision was taken to pay a supplier in advance. The odds 
ratios indicate that the most influential antecedent of advance payment consists of 
the financial volume involved in a relationship. When the financial volume 
increases one level, the odds that advance payments are made grows by a factor 
1.480. This indicates that suppliers primarily demand advance payments from their 
buyers when the financial volume associated with an interorganizational 
relationship carries significant costs and/or risks if not passed on to the buyer. 
Antecedents of the use of standard contracts consist of financial volume, 
complexity, size of the buyer, and perceived dependence. These are all found to 
have a negative association with the use of standard contracts. Besides, the size 
of a supplier is found to have a positive influence on the use of standard contracts. 
Here, the odds ratios indicate that the most influential antecedents consist of size 
of the buyer and size of the supplier. This might be explained by the fact that 
larger suppliers possess more resources and experience to develop standard 
contracts, and that they have better opportunities for leveraging standard contracts 
over a larger number of transactions. Given that standard contracts are generally 
beneficial to suppliers (Korobkin, 2003), our finding that larger buyers show 
stronger resistance to the application of standard contracts, is not surprising. 
 
Multiple regression analyses 
The three other governance decisions pertain to the efforts put into partner 
selection processes, the exhaustiveness of negotiation processes, and the level of 
contract completeness. As these variables are measured on continuous scales, 
multiple regression analyses are performed. The models are specified accordingly: 
 
Y = β0 + β1 • Financial volume + β2 • Complexity +…+ β15 • Age + ε 
 
Table 9.4 displays the results of the regression analyses. Approximately thirty 
percent of the variance in selection efforts is explained by the specified 
antecedents (R2 adjusted = 0.297). Consistent with previous work on partner 
selection (Buskens, 2002; Buskens et al., 2003), selection efforts are influenced 
by financial volume, importance of reputation, and the prevalence of other 
relationships between a buyer and external organizations, which have a significant 
positive association with selection efforts. Investments in relation-specific assets 
tend to increase the exhaustiveness of firms’ selection efforts, something 
consistent with previous findings (e.g. Heide and John, 1990). Measurability 
appears to have a negative effect on search and selection efforts, which is 
congruent with descriptions of partner selection efforts as being driven by 
uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004). Finally, a supplier’s age also negatively 
influences search and selection efforts, which can be explained by the fact that 
older suppliers have better-known accomplishment records, while they might also 
be perceived as being less risky business partners. 
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TABLE 9.4 
Results multiple regression analyses 
 
Selection 
efforts 
Negotiation  
efforts 
Completeness 
contract  
           B Sig.            B Sig.             B Sig. 
Financial volume .323 *** .136 ** .231 *** 
Complexity .032  .122 ** .080 * 
Asset-specificity .140 *** .117 ** .068  
Measurability -.184 ** -.037  .095 ** 
   
Size buyer .054  -.011  -.044  
Size supplier .056  .114 ** .304 *** 
Legal expertise .068  .062  .094 ** 
Other relationships .089 ** .019  -.002  
IT-expertise .034  .025  -.039  
   
Importance reputation .113 ** .243 *** .160 *** 
Alternative options .011  -.065  -.082 * 
Perceived dependence -.053  .145 *** .067  
First user group -.016  -.040  -.080 * 
Age supplier -.089 * -.122 ** -.068  
Age of respondent .024  -.080 * .043  
Constant -.421  22.6 *** -2.87  
   
Number of observations † 406 419 419  
R2 adjusted   .297 .246 .309  
† Due to the fact that the number of observations per variable was large, cases with missing 
values were excluded list-wise. Correlations significant at the 0.10-level (*). Correlations 
significant at the 0.05-level (**). Correlations significant at the 0.01-level (***). 
 
 
Considering negotiation exhaustiveness, almost 25 percent of the variance is 
explained by the specified antecedents. Financial volume, complexity, asset-
specificity, size of the supplier, importance of reputation, and perceived 
dependence are found to have a significant positive association with the extent of 
negotiations. Age of the supplier and age of the respondent exhibit a significant 
negative relationship to negotiation exhaustiveness. Finally, more than thirty 
percent of the variance in contract completeness can be explained by the 
specified antecedents. Financial volume, complexity, measurability, the 
importance of reputation, legal expertise, and the size of the supplier have a 
significant positive relationship to contract completeness. The existence of 
alternative options and membership of a first user group have a negative 
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relationship to contract completeness. The latter conforms with findings of Gainey 
and Klaas (2003) indicating that partners that are less experienced and 
knowledgeable about a certain type of relationship find it more difficult to avoid 
incomplete contracting. 
 
We now extend previous work by researchers using the same database 
(Batenburg et al., 2003; Buskens, 2002), by assessing whether previous 
governance decisions influence subsequent governance decisions. We perform 
hierarchical analyses in which we add preceding governance decisions in the 
analyses one at a time. In appendix E, we furnish an overview of the relationships 
between the antecedents and the six governance decisions. In the models with 
extensions b, c, d, e and f, we added the governance variables familiarity with a 
partner, selection efforts, advance payments, negotiation efforts, and standard 
contract as explanatory variables for subsequent governance decisions. It appears 
that the decision to cooperate with a familiar partner has a negative effect on 
selection efforts, negotiation exhaustiveness and contract completeness. The 
latter corroborates findings from Anand and Khanna (2000b) who suggested that 
contracts between familiar organizations are systematically different from the ones 
in de novo pairings. It conforms with an observation from Klein Woolthuis et al. 
(2005: 828) that some firms do not fear opportunism when negotiating and 
contracting, because of their earlier experience with the other party. Our finding 
might also be an indication of the fact that a higher familiarity between partners 
shifts their focus from value appropriation concerns to value creation issues (Koka 
and Prescott, 2002). Selection efforts, in turn, positively influence the extent of 
negotiations and contract completeness, while they exhibit a negative relationship 
to the use of standard contracts. This confirms Rooks’ (2002) assertion that 
search and selection is a potential mediator of the relationship between 
antecedents and formalization. Searching, screening, and selecting suppliers and 
products helps to assess the reliability and level of competence of a potential 
supplier, thereby reducing the risk of a transaction, and possibly reducing the need 
for formalization. Our findings imply, however, that the ability to formalize has a 
more significant influence. Advance payment does not appear to be influenced by 
other governance decisions, but it does itself influence the degree of contract 
completeness. Finally, the exhaustiveness of negotiations reduces the use of 
standard contracts and propagates contract completeness. In Figure 9.6, we have 
depicted the interrelationships found between the governance decisions and the 
relationships between sets of significant antecedents and each of the governance 
decisions. It appears that each of the governance decisions discerned in the 
chapter at least influences one other governance decision in the same governance 
trajectory, which leads us to accept hypothesis 9.1. Moreover, the six governance 
decisions discerned are all associated with different sets of organization-level and 
relational-level antecedents, supporting hypothesis 9.2. 
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Financial volume +  Financial volume +  Complexity + 
Asset-specificity +  Perceived dependence +  Importance reputation + 
Measurability +  Other relationships -  Perceived dependence + 
Importance reputation +     Size supplier + 
Other relationships +     Age of the respondent - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset-specificity -  Financial volume +  Financial volume - 
Measurability -  Size supplier +  Complexity - 
Importance reputation +  Legal expertise +  Size buyer - 
Alternative options +  IT-expertise -  Size supplier + 
Perceived dependence +  Age of the respondent +  Age of the respondent - 
First user group -       
Age supplier +       
(4)
Extensiveness 
negotiations 
(1)
Prior 
cooperation 
(2)
Selection 
efforts 
(6)
Contract 
completeness
(5)
Standard  
contract 
(3)
Advance  
payment 
-
-
+
-
+
+
+ -
-
-
FIGURE 9.6 
Relationships between governance decisions and sets of antecedents 
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9.6 Discussion 
 
In theme six, we noticed that although findings from empirical investigations of 
interorganizational governance frequently concentrate on single governance 
modes in isolation (Kirsch, 1997), and that most studies on interorganizational 
governance are not integrative across mechanisms, with each study considering 
one or two rather than a range of mechanisms (Geringer and Hébert, 1991a). 
However, examining only one or two governance mechanisms at a time is at odds 
with the observations that multiple mechanisms are strongly interrelated and that 
they all have their bearing on interorganizational performance. Reuer (1999), for 
instance, contends that potential value creation in interorganizational relationships 
warrants appropriate selection of partners, alliance designs, and adaptations by 
the partners. The disparity between managers facing a plethora of presumably 
connected governance choices and the attention that researchers have given to 
the connections between these choices leads us to our final research question. 
 
RQ11: To what extent are decisions on formalization related to other governance 
decisions? 
 
Key findings 
We investigated this question by introducing the concept of governance 
trajectories. We proposed that these trajectories are composed of multiple 
interrelated governance decisions, which are each predicted by different sets of 
antecedent variables. Findings on a sample of 911 buyer-supplier relationships 
support our assertions, and they suggest that governance efforts can no longer be 
conceptualized as one-time events. It appears that managers govern their 
relationships during multiple stages of developments, and that the decisions they 
make early on in a relationship influence the decisions they make in later stages. 
Moreover, congruent with evidence from, among others, Chalos and O’Connor 
(2004), interorganizational governance decisions appear to be influenced by 
different sets of antecedents. This implies that although certain context- and task-
characteristics might prohibit the application of particular governance 
mechanisms, they might not restrict the utilization of others. We therefore 
recommend managers to take multiple governance mechanisms, task-
characteristics and contextual attributes into account when deciding on how they 
want to govern their relationships. Beyond supporting our conceptualization of 
governance trajectories, the results from our analyses encompass various findings 
related to each of the six governance mechanisms, on which we briefly elaborate 
here. The negative relationship between investments in relation-specific assets 
and the selection of a familiar partner confirms earlier findings and assertions on 
the significance of developing partner-specific skills and routines (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Gulati and Wang, 2003; Kale et al., 2002; Kotabe et al., 2003; Luo, 2002; 
Zollo et al., 2002). Besides, the positive relationship between measurability and 
the selection of a familiar partner coincides with arguments that familiar partners 
develop joint understandings that allow uniquely efficient communication, and 
which tend ‘to help mitigate coordination, conflict resolution, or information-
gathering problems’ (Zollo et al., 2002: 703). Collectively, our findings suggest that 
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the selection of familiar partners is not only determined by a focal organization’s 
ability to discern capable and reliable partners, or by the routinized and 
standardized selection of partners (Li and Rowley, 2002), but also by the 
availability of partners (see also Singh and Mitchell, 2005), and by the difficulty of 
the focal organization to break away from a familiar partner. Consistent with work 
from Ahuja (2000), this indicates that both inducements and opportunities – or 
needs and abilities – influence governance choices. 
 
As far as we are aware, the decision to pay a supplier in advance and the decision 
to apply standard contracts have seldom been analyzed empirically. Advance 
payment of a supplier was found to hinge primarily on the financial volume of a 
transaction, while the selection of standard contracts appeared to be influenced 
mainly by firm sizes. In addition, we analyzed factors predicting the efforts put into 
the selection of partners for a transaction. Although more and more attention is 
paid to partner selection in the empirical literature, most attention has been paid to 
selection criteria, which differ per context and task characteristic (Geringer, 1991), 
and which complicate the generalization of findings from these studies. Our 
findings on the factors determining selection efforts can be more easily 
extrapolated to other interorganizational relationships, as they have a universal 
character. Particularly interesting was the observation that buyers that have more 
external relationships tend to exhibit more selection efforts, which suggests that 
these organizations are probably more aware of the significance of partner 
selection efforts compared to more inward looking companies. Regarding the 
exhaustiveness of negotiations and contract completeness, we observed that 
investments in relation-specific assets had a significant positive relationship with 
the exhaustiveness of negotiations, but no relationship with contract 
completeness. This contrasts with empirical studies from, among others, 
Shelanski and Klein (1995), Masten (1996), and Rindfleisch and Heide (1997). It 
could indicate that buyers realize that they have to make relation-specific 
investments, but that they find it difficult to protect themselves against these risks 
by writing complete contracts. Another explanation would be that relation-specific 
investments are relevant to broad level governance choices, but not to narrower 
choices such as the level of contract completeness (see also Carson et al., 2006). 
Moreover, measurability was found not to be associated with negotiation 
exhaustiveness, whereas it did exhibit a positive relationship with contract 
completeness. This indicates that higher degrees of measurability might not 
influence the need for coordination and control, but only the ability to do so. 
Furthermore, in line with arguments from Colombo (2003), Madhok (2002), and 
Reuer and Zollo (2005) organization-specific factors were found to influence 
governance decisions. Both negotiation efforts and contract completeness were 
positively influenced by supplier size, while the presence of legal expertise on the 
part of the buyer raised contract completeness. Finally, we elucidated how 
different governance decisions influence each other. It appeared that the decision 
to cooperate with a familiar partner has a negative effect on selection efforts, 
negotiation exhaustiveness and contract completeness. Selection efforts, in turn, 
positively influence negotiations and contract completeness, while they exhibit a 
negative relationship to the use of standard contracts. Advance payment is not 
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dependent on other governance decisions, but it does drive the degree of contract 
completeness. Finally, the exhaustiveness of negotiations reduces the use of 
standard contracts and propagates contract completeness. 
  
Theoretical and practical implications 
Our research departed from prior studies by simultaneously considering the 
application of multiple governance mechanisms along different stages in 
interorganizational relationships. Several theoretical and practical implications can 
be discerned. First, our findings imply that researchers might benefit from shifting 
their attention from studying singular governance decisions to investigating series 
of governance decisions. As we have shown, intricate relationships exist between 
governance decisions, while each of these decisions is influenced by different sets 
of antecedents. This suggests that more fine-grained analyses of managers’ 
attempts to coordinate and control interorganizational behavior and outcomes are 
needed. Managerial implications predominantly concern managers’ awareness of 
the effects of governance decisions made in earlier stages of cooperation on 
decisions and outcomes in later stages of cooperation. It appears that managers 
might use interdependencies between governance decisions deliberately (Heide, 
2003). They may invest more in partner selection, for instance, to increase their 
ability to negotiate with potential partners, to use better-tailored contracts, and to 
enhance contract completeness. 
 
Limitations and opportunities for future research  
Our research entails several limitations, which could be addressed in future 
research. First, we did not include interorganizational performance in our 
analyses. Performing path-time analyses, which was beyond the scope of this 
chapter, could well elucidate how sequences of governance decisions jointly 
influence interorganizational performance. Future studies might measures the 
performance effects related to the different governance mechanisms and 
governance decisions. These measures could refer to the interaction process 
between partners, and to the outcomes of interorganizational relationships (for a 
further elaboration on this distinction, see Ariño, 2003). Another possibility is to 
explicitly specify and measure the functions and dysfunctions mediating the 
relationship between each governance mechanism and interorganizational 
performance. Furthermore, Cardinal et al. (2004: 426) have advanced that 
effective controls be in a state of constant rebalancing, like the effective guided 
missile whose trajectory is rarely correct. Although we acknowledged the 
significance of time, dynamics related to the continuous balancing of controls were 
not included in this chapter. Inquiries into day-to-day adaptations in formalization 
might offer us the opportunity to ascertain how we can make sure that contracts, 
rules and procedures achieve their targets. Finally, our data did not permit us to 
investigate the influence of network characteristics on organizations’ attempts to 
coordinate and control their interorganizational activities. Recent empirical studies 
(cf. Rowley et al., 2004) reveal that including network variables in 
interorganizational governance can offer valuable new insights. 
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10  REFLECTION AND DISCUSSION 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
We started this thesis by indicating that interorganizational cooperation has 
become an important phenomenon in today’s business environment. However, we 
also advanced that collaboration is marked by many problems, which have to be 
addressed, and which may be circumvented or alleviated by adopting appropriate 
governance mechanisms. In particular, a need arose to increase our 
understanding of the forces shaping collaborative agreements (Olk and Elvira, 
2001; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997) and of the processes that are used to design 
and manage interorganizational relationships. Such an understanding could 
contribute to improved managerial practices and a reduction in cooperative 
failures (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). In particular, we noticed that several 
authors have pointed at the significance of formalization for interorganizational 
relationships. These authors have called for a more integrative view on 
formalization in which its antecedents and performance effects are studied 
contemporaneously, and in which the effects of timing and context are 
incorporated (see Table 1.2). Their arguments indicated a need for broader and 
deeper knowledge of the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships, 
which was the focal point of this study, and which led to the following definition of 
the research problem: What role does formalization play in interorganizational 
relationships? 
 
To investigate this research problem, we extended and refined the generic model 
on formalization that is prevalent in the literature (see Figure 10.1), and we 
undertook inquiries into six research themes that each focused on part of our 
research framework (see Figure 10.2). As the framework shows, the themes and 
the various perspectives underlying them are not incompatible, but they offer 
complementary explanations as to what the role of formalization is in 
interorganizational relationships. In this final chapter, we do not only present a 
synopsis of the key findings for each research theme, but we also discuss how 
these findings collectively contribute to an integrative picture of the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships. After summarizing the main 
arguments and findings, we elucidate the theoretical and practical implications of 
the study. Finally, we pay attention to limitations of the thesis, which eventuate in 
several opportunities for future research. 
 
 
FIGURE 10.1 
Generic framework derived from the literature  
 
 
 
 
Antecedents 
Degree of  
formalization 
Inter- 
organizational 
performance 
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10.2 Major research questions and findings for all themes 
Need to 
formalize 
Ability to 
formalize 
Positive 
consequences
Negative 
consequences
Degree of  
formalization 
 
Antecedents 
Central to theme one: 
How managers cope 
with tensions between 
the need and the ability 
to formalize. When gaps 
arise between both, 
firms tend to invest in 
information-processing & 
sense making (e.g. time 
spent on partner 
selection / negotiation), 
to enable formalization 
Central to theme three: 
How managers cope 
with tensions arising 
from the co-existence of 
formalization’s functions 
and dysfunctions. They 
may (1) emphasize the 
different requirements of 
firms, (2) refer to factors 
that appear to be beyond 
their control, and (3) 
adopt semi-structures. 
Central to theme two: 
Formalization as a 
means to give and make 
sense of relationships or 
collaborative contexts. 
The sensegiving and 
sensemaking function of 
formalization is depicted 
as a complement to its 
coordination, control and 
legitimacy functions that 
prevail in the literature. 
 
Moderators 
Central to theme four: 
How standardization of 
contracting procedures 
influences relationships 
between formalization, 
its antecedents, and 
interorganizational 
performance. We argued 
that standardization 
inhibits the “meeting of 
minds” and induces 
mindless behavior. 
Other 
governance 
mechanisms
Central to theme five: 
The co-evolution of 
formalization and trust. 
Intermediate degrees of 
both governance forms 
appear most conducive 
to performance and 
starting conditions have 
a fundamental impact on 
the evolution of trust and 
formalization in later 
stages of development. 
Central to theme six: 
Formalization’s relation 
to other governance 
decisions. Formalization 
is partly influenced by 
decisions taken during 
partner selection and 
negotiation stages, while 
different relational- and 
firm-characteristics are 
conducive to different 
governance decisions. 
FIGURE 10.2 
Research framework – contributions of the six themes 
Inter- 
organizational 
performance 
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Theme one – need versus ability to formalize 
In theme one, we investigated how the ability and the need to formalize eventually 
influence the degree of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We 
noticed that the literature reveals contradictory findings regarding the direction of 
several relationships between antecedents and formalization, which have to be 
reconciled. This led to the following research questions. 
 
RQ1: To what extent do relationships between antecedents and the ability to 
formalize diverge from their relationships with the need to formalize? 
 
RQ2: How do the ability and the need to formalize influence the degree of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships? 
 
Our findings extend previous theoretical work on formalization by underscoring the 
idea that antecedents that are commonly associated with formalization 
(investments in relation-specific assets, interorganizational complexity, 
cooperation with an unfamiliar partner, and small focal organizations) give rise to 
multiple, contradictory forces. In particular, they may increase the need to 
formalize activities and outcomes, but they concurrently diminish the ability to do 
so. From our results, it accrues that tensions resulting from the co-existence of 
these forces induce participants in interorganizational relationships to invest in 
information processing and sensemaking activities, in order to make sure that 
formalization can be applied appropriately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme two – functions of formalization 
The second theme was born out of the observation that understanding why 
economic agents use formalities, such as contracts, ‘is crucial to understanding 
the organization and efficiency of economic exchange’ (Masten and Saussier, 
2002: 273). It was denominated “functions of formalization”, because it concerned 
the underlying reasons or rationales for instituting formal interorganizational 
structures and practices. We observed that existing studies tend to focus either on 
formalization as a means to coordinate, or on formalization as a means to control 
(see for instance Gulati and Singh, 1998; Madhok, 2002), and into a lesser extent 
on formalization as a means to gain legitimacy (see Kale et al., 2002; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). These studies generally pass over the fact that formalization might 
have other functions (e.g. for notable exceptions see, for example, Ariño and Ring, 
2004; Lindenberg, 2003; Zollo and Singh, 2004), and that there is a need for novel 
understandings of formal structures and practices (Hatch, 1999). We also 
expected that multiple functions of formalization co-exist, so that it became 
Main finding theme one 
Antecedents that are commonly associated with formalization may increase the 
need to formalize activities and outcomes, while they concurrently diminish the 
ability to do so. Firms then tend to invest in information processing and 
sensemaking to facilitate formalization 
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requisite to examine how these functions are related to each other (see Foss and 
Foss, 2005; Madhok, 2002), how they influence interorganizational performance, 
and in which contexts or for which temporal stages each of the functions is most 
important. This led to the following research questions. 
 
RQ3: What are the functions of formalization? 
 
RQ4:   How do these functions relate to each other? 
 
RQ5:   What is their relationship with interorganizational performance? 
 
RQ6:  What is the relative importance of each of these functions in different 
collaborative contexts and stages of interorganizational development? 
 
By theorizing in broad conceptual categories, we were able to look beyond the 
narrow boundaries of single theoretical lenses supportive of the coordination, 
control and legitimacy functions of formalization. We believed that shifting 
attention to other functions of formalization could open up a new way of thinking 
about the meaning of formalization for the management of interorganizational 
relationships. Based on Weick (e.g. 1979, 1995, 2001) and Ring and Van de Ven 
(1989, 1994), we argued that formalization assists participants and stakeholders in 
interorganizational relationships in giving and making sense of the relationships 
that they are engaged in, and of the collaborative contexts in which those 
relationships are embedded. We explained that formalization’s sensegiving and 
sensemaking function underlies its other functions, and that its relationship with 
interorganizational performance differs from that of other functions of 
formalization. We also advanced that formalization as a means to give and make 
sense is more pronounced in the beginning of interorganizational relationships, 
and in exploratory contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme three – duality & dialectic tensions 
In theme three, we embraced the idea that dialectic tensions arising from the co-
existence of positive and negative consequences – or functions and dysfunctions 
– of formalization are hard to solve (Ring and Van de Ven, 1989), and may have to 
be managed instead (Huxham and Beech, 2003). By emphasizing managerial 
choice (Child, 1997), we aimed to elucidate how managers cope with the tensions 
arising from the co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions (see 
Das and Teng, 2000; De Rond, 2003; De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004). In line with 
this, we formulated the following research question: 
Main finding theme two 
Formalization does not only support coordination, control and legitimacy but it 
also assists participants and stakeholders in interorganizational relationships in 
giving and making sense of the relationships they are engaged in, and of the 
collaborative contexts in which those relationships are embedded. 
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RQ7:  How do managers of interorganizational relationships cope with tensions 
arising from the co-existence of formalization’s functions and dysfunctions? 
 
A review of the literature revealed how formalization functions as a means to 
coordinate, as a means to control, as a means to persuade and convince 
stakeholders, and as a means to make sense. It also highlighted a number of 
dysfunctions associated with formalization, including, for example, its retarding 
effect on creativity and innovation, and its role in inhibiting flexibility needed for 
coping with complex, ambiguous and unstable task environments (Camillus, 1975; 
Mintzberg, 1994; Nooteboom, 1999). By means of a case study of a cross-
industrial strategic alliance, we illustrated that managers attempt to cope with the 
resulting tensions between functions and dysfunctions of formalization in at least 
three ways. First, they alternate their emphasis on disparate levels of formalization 
required by each of the partner. Second, they justify formalization by referring to 
factors that appear to be beyond their control. Third, they use a kind of semi-
structure, emphasizing either formalization of outcomes or formalization of 
processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme four – contract standardization 
In theme four, we observed that the use of standard form contracts and standard 
procedures for negotiation and contracting is widespread (Korobkin, 2003). 
Nonetheless, hardly any inquiries have been made into the influence of contract 
standardization on interorganizational cooperation, apart from some incidental 
research in law schools (e.g. Epstein, 1999; Kahan and Klausner, 1996, 1997; 
Korobkin, 2003). In theme four, we redressed this imbalance between research 
and practice by examining how a discussion of standardization could shed new 
light on the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We addressed 
the following research questions: 
 
RQ8: What are the advantages and disadvantages of using standard contracts in 
interorganizational relationships? 
 
RQ9: What influence does the introduction of standard procedures for negotiating 
and contracting have on the generic research model for formalization? 
 
To investigate these questions, we reviewed the literature and developed an 
overview of the factors that explain why managers deploy standard contracts and 
standard procedures for negotiation and contracting. Motives pertained to the 
efficiency of transactions; transaction speed and robustness; exploitation of 
Main finding theme three 
Although managers may make the “right” decisions, in that they select an 
appropriate degree of formalization for the prevailing firm, task and contextual 
characteristics, they are inevitably confronted with tensions between the 
functions and dysfunctions of formalization, with which they have to cope.  
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information asymmetry and prevention of unintended signaling; the legitimacy 
granted to standardized formalities; benefits of unequivocal interpretation; and, 
network-effects. Subsequently, we elaborated on the disadvantages of 
standardizing negotiation and contracting practices, such as low levels of 
contractual specificity, and a limited potential for developing mutual expectations 
and joint understandings. Following this, we exploited the assumption that 
standard procedures are accompanied by lower degrees of care and vigilance 
(Weick, 1979, 1995), proposing that the degree to which interorganizational 
negotiation and contracting processes are standardized moderates the 
relationships between formalization, its most common antecedents, and 
interorganizational performance. From our results, it accrues that standard 
procedures for negotiation and contracting might eventuate in a failure to 
communicate the content of a promise or to define the rights exchanged between 
partners (Goetz and Scott, 1985). Moreover, by de-contextualizing the contracting 
process, standard procedures reduce the degree to which parties can ‘create a 
bigger transactional pie in a world where parties’ incentives are misaligned and 
[where] they need to coordinate the production of information, specify future rights, 
duties, and procedures, and allocate risks’ is the central aim of contracting (Hill 
and King, 2004: 890). In other words, we find that the use of standard procedures 
for negotiation and contracting potentially leads to reduced mindfulness by 
contracting parties, which may eventually diminish the usefulness of contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme five – evolution of trust & formalization 
In theme five, we noted that despite significant theoretical contributions on the 
significance of trust and formalization for interorganizational cooperation, the 
relationship between trust and control remains far from clear (Maguire et al., 2001; 
Sydow and Windeler, 2003), and that much theoretical input is still needed to 
understand how trust and formalization work as governance mechanisms 
(Bachmann, 2001). In particular, we observed that little attention has been paid to 
the evolution of formalization and trust during cooperative relationships (for 
notable exceptions, see Ferrin et al., 2005; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Serva et 
al., 2005). Therefore, we investigated the following research question. 
 
RQ10: How do formalization and trust evolve in interorganizational relationships? 
 
Building on the work of other researchers (Ferrin et al., 2005; Klein Woolthuis et 
al., 2005), we indicated that intermediate levels of formalization and trust are 
probably most conducive to interorganizational performance. We also advanced 
that starting conditions – being the levels of trust and formalization in early stages 
of cooperation – are crucial to the development of both governance modes in later 
Main finding theme four 
Whereas standardization of negotiation and contracting procedures is known to 
have many advantages, it may also reduce mindfulness by contracting parties. 
Standardization may thereby diminish the usefulness of contracts.   
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stages of development. Our assertions were captured in an integrative conceptual 
framework (see Figure 8.4), which reconciles hitherto fragmented views on the 
evolution of formalization and trust in interorganizational relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme six – governance trajectories 
In theme six, we signalled that empirical investigations of governance problems in 
interorganizational relationships frequently concentrate on single governance 
modes in isolation (Kirsch, 1997); most studies on interorganizational governance 
are not integrative across mechanisms, with each study considering one or two 
rather than a range of mechanisms (Geringer and Hébert, 1991a). This appears to 
be at odds with the observation that several governance mechanisms are strongly 
interrelated and that multyiple mechanisms have their bearing on 
interorganizational performance (Klein, 2002; Reuer, 1999). The disparity between 
managers facing a plethora of presumably connected governance choices and the 
attention that researchers have given to the connections between these choices 
led us to our final research question. 
 
RQ11: To what extent are decisions on formalization related to other governance 
decisions? 
 
We investigated this question by introducing the concept of governance 
trajectories. These trajectories consist of multiple interrelated governance 
decisions that are influenced by different sets of antecedent variables. Our 
findings suggest that governance efforts should no longer be conceptualized in the 
form of one-time events, as managers govern their relationships during multiple 
stages of development, and as decisions that they make early on in a relationship 
influence the decisions they make in later stages. Moreover, congruent with 
Chalos and O’Connor (2004), interorganizational governance decisions were 
influenced by different sets of antecedents, indicating that optimization occurs at 
the level of series of governance decisions and sets of context- and task-
characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main finding theme five 
Intermediate levels of formalization and trust are probably most conducive to 
interorganizational performance and starting conditions – being the levels of 
trust and formalization in early stages of cooperation – are crucial to the 
development of both governance modes in later stages of development. 
Main finding theme six 
Governance efforts should no longer be conceptualized in the form of one-time 
events, as governance decisions are interdependent and as optimization of 
governance solutions occurs for series of governance decisions and sets of 
context and task characteristics. 
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10.3 Theoretical and practical implications 
 
Our study has several theoretical and practical implications. First, our results 
indicate that “the manager” has to be brought back into research on 
interorganizational governance. This became apparent, among others, from theme 
one and theme three. In theme one, for example, we found that managers can 
influence the extent to which tensions between the need and the ability to 
formalize preclude formalization, by putting more or less efforts in information 
processing and sensemaking. In theme three, we elaborated on the tensions 
between the functions and dysfunctions of formalization, revealing how managers 
might cope with them. The findings from both themes indicate that shifting 
research attention from investigating the “right” degree of formalization – when 
taking into account the characteristics of relationships and organizations (Foss 
and Foss, 2005; Madhok, 2002; Williamson, 1985, 1991) – towards investigating 
how managers make sure that the actual degree of formalization that is applied 
has a positive influence on interorganizational performance could be valuable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second theoretical implication concerns formalization’s functioning in 
interorganizational relationships. Whereas researchers have called for ‘more 
systematic attention’ for the coordination function of formalization (e.g. Carson et 
al., 2006: 36; see also Mayer and Argyres, 2004), we provoke researchers to 
conduct inquiries into four major functions of formalization. In theme two, we 
clarified that formalization may not only function as a means to coordinate, as a 
means to control or as a means to legitimate, but also as a means to give and 
make sense of interorganizational relationships, and the collaborative contexts in 
which they are embedded. By facilitating sensegiving and sensemaking, 
formalization enables a “meeting of minds”, thereby contributing both to value 
creation (parties are able to envision a larger pie for the relationship) and value 
appropriation (it is more obvious to both parties which share of the pie they may 
eat). Explicitly distinguishing the sensegiving and sensemaking function of 
formalization from its coordination, control and legitimacy functions enables 
researchers and practitioners to state more explicitly why formalization takes place 
and through which of its functions formalization contributes to interorganizational 
performance. Nonetheless, as theme four on contract standardization indicates, 
the sensegiving and sensemaking function of formalization described in theme two 
may become endangered by standardization of negotiation and contracting 
procedures. The latter demands that researchers ask themselves whether it is 
formalization as an outcome, or formalization as a process that contributes most to 
interorganizational performance (see also chapter 3). 
 
 
 
“The manager” has to be brought back into research on interorganizational 
governance. Research attention should shift from the “right” degree of 
formalization towards the managerial efforts that are required to make sure that 
formalization has a positive influence on interorganizational performance. 
Researchers are advised to consider four major functions of formalization 
(coordination, control, legitimation and sensegiving and sensemaking), and to 
ask themselves whether it is formalization as an outcome, or formalization as a 
process that contributes most to interorganizational performance. 
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A third theoretical implication regards the interplay between formalization and 
other governance forms. In themes five and six, we have demonstrated that 
formalization is intricately related to other governance mechanisms, and therefore 
hard to isolate. Changes in trust, for example, may lead to changes in 
formalization (theme five), but decreases in selection efforts may do so as well 
(theme six). Moreover, theme five has shown that these changes can be positive 
as well as negative, dependent on the dominance of substitution or 
complementarity effects, and on the interpretation that managers give to the 
actions of a partner. Furthermore, changes in the degree of formalization may 
themselves trigger changes in other governance mechanisms, like trust. The 
intricate interrelationships between formalization and other governance 
mechanisms complicate assessments of formalization’s relationship with 
interorganizational performance. In case governance mechanisms other than 
formalization are not explicitly included in the analysis of interorganizational 
performance, they may still influence the result. When researchers find a positive 
relationship between formalization and interorganizational performance, for 
example, this may be due to the higher selection and negotiation efforts that 
preceded it, or to particular levels of trust that enabled it. The inability to include 
entire governance trajectories in our analyses and the difficulties we face in 
mapping the evolution of formalization, trust and other governance forms may lead 
to spurious findings, erroneous interpretations, and faulty recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A fourth theoretical implication of our findings concerns the notion that prescription 
based on generic models of the research problem – e.g. antecedents influence 
formalization, which subsequently influences interorganizational performance – 
should be regarded with caution. The findings from all themes cast substantial 
doubt over the tenability of such conventional models, showing that these may 
have little normative value (see also Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). Managers may 
not match firm-level and transaction or relational level factors with formalization as 
predicted by theories such as transaction cost economics or agency theory, 
because these models do not account for: (1) variation in managerial responses to 
gaps between the need and the ability to formalize (theme one); (2) variation in the 
functions that managers seek to fulfill by deploying formalization (theme two); (3) 
variation in managers’ capabilities to diminish the tensions between the functions 
and dysfunctions of formalization (theme three); (4) the use of standardized 
procedures for negotiation and contracting, which diminishes the strength of 
associations between antecedents and formalization (theme four); (5) the 
relationship between trust and formalization, and their co-evolution during 
collaborative relationship (theme five); and, (6) the availability of other governance 
mechanisms, which may show a better fit with firm-level and transaction or 
relational level factors than formalization (theme six). 
 
Intricate interrelationships between formalization and other governance 
mechanisms complicate assessments of formalization’s relationship with 
interorganizational performance. 
Prescription based on generic models of the research problem – e.g. 
antecedents influence formalization, which subsequently influences 
interorganizational performance – should be regarded with caution. 
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A final theoretical implication concerns researchers’ allegiance to single research 
paradigms. Our results show that research on formalization may strongly benefit 
from moving beyond the confines of theoretical streams, crossing the domains of 
theories, schools of thought and even scienctific disciplines. Although the use of 
multiple theories across the research themes may seem to lead to theoretical 
incommensurability on first sight, it has also led to Figure 10.2 and to the insights 
associated with each of the research themes. This study thereby clearly shows 
that a pluralistic approach to interorganizational governance research promises to 
lead to richer and possibly more meaningful insights on the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships than has hitherto been attained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our research also entails several practical implications. First, it shows managers 
that, to be effective, formalization generally has to be accompanied by information 
processing and sensemaking efforts. Such efforts reduce the tensions between a 
low ability to formalize and a high need to formalize, as they reduce uncertainty 
and ambiguity and because they assist in capturing aspects of the relationship 
more proficiently in formal documents than would otherwise be possible (see 
theme one). Second, the study elucidates that formalization can be utilized for 
other means than coordination and control. It also functions as a means to 
legitimate and as a means to give and make sense. Practitioners can use this 
knowledge to discuss more meaningfully about the rationales they have for 
formalization, or to justify attempts to formalize even in cases when coordination 
and control may in first instance be hard to attain by means of contracts, rules and 
procedures (see theme two). Third, our study indicates that managers should not 
only be working on getting the degree of formalization “right” (Foss and Foss, 
2005; Madhok, 2002; Williamson, 1985, 1991), but also, and maybe even 
primarily, on managing the tensions that arise from the degree of formalization that 
eventually prevails. We recommend practitioners to develop strategies for 
circumventing, alleviating or mitigating the dysfunctions of formalization (see 
theme three). Fourth, managers may consider the use of standard contracts and 
standard procedures for negotiation and contracting in their relationships. 
Although we have illuminated multiple advantages of standardization, we have 
also explicated that standardization can prohibit a “meeting of minds” between 
partners, and we made clear that it could entail “mindlessness”. These results 
imply that researchers have to consider attempts to standardize with caution (see 
theme four). Fifth, in our treatise on the relationships between formalization, trust 
and interorganizational performance, we elucidated that these constructs are 
intricately related and that changes in one of them are likely to elicit changes in the 
others. In particular, we have clarified that starting degrees – or initial degrees of 
formalization and trust – have disproportionate impacts on the evolution of 
collaborative relationships. We have also explicated that very low and very high 
levels of formalization and trust are probably less conducive to interorganizational 
Research on formalization may strongly benefit from moving beyond the 
confines of theoretical streams, crossing the domains of theories, schools of 
thought, and even scienctific disciplines. 
217 
performance than intermediate levels. Jointly, these observations signal to 
managers that it is of uttermost importance to establish intermediate degrees of 
formalization and trust in interorganizational relationships quickly, so as to prevent 
the development of self-reinforcing cycles of trust-deterioration and formalism (see 
theme five). Sixth, it appeared that formalization is only one of a range of 
mechanisms that can be deployed to achieve coordination, control and possibly 
other functions of formalization. We therefore recommend managers to consider 
their full array of governance options when making decisions on formalization. 
Furthermore, they have to be aware of the fact that some governance 
mechanisms are more conducive to particular sets of firm-level and transaction or 
relational level factors than others, and that they enable or constrain the use of 
other governance mechanisms (see theme six). 
 
If we consider the managerial implications of our study across the six themes, we 
can say the following. First, formalization appears to require more managerial 
efforts than just the codification and enforcement of outcomes and activities in 
contracts, rules and procedures. It also entails a need for investing in information 
processing and sensemaking, and it requires managerial attention so that the 
tensions between formalization’s functions and its dysfunctions can be addressed 
(see theme one and theme three). Second, as formalization has multiple functions 
that are not only linked to formalization as an outcome, but also to formalization as 
a process (see chapter three and theme two), managers may have to pay more 
attention to how they shape and attenuate the process of formalization. The 
degree to which managers standardize this process, for example, may have 
significant consequences for the performance implications of formalization (see 
theme four). Although parties utilize comparable contracts, rules and procedures 
in similar relationships, the processes that have led up to these formalities may 
differ, leading to other effects on interorganizational performance. As Simons 
(1990, 1995) has proclaimed, managers may therefore have to pay more attention 
to the character of the formalization process itself. Third, formalization does not 
stand on itself, but appears to be intertwined with other forms of governance, such 
as trust and partner selection (see themes five and six). This indicates that 
practitioners may need to consider entire governance systems or governance 
trajectories when thinking about formalization in their collaborative relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managerial implications across themes 
 
Formalization requires information processing and sensemaking efforts, and 
managerial attention for the tensions between its functions and dysfunctions. 
 
As formalization has multiple functions that are not only linked to formalization 
as an outcome, but also to formalization as a process, managers have to pay 
more attention to how they shape and attenuate the process of formalization.  
 
Formalization is intertwined with other forms of governance, and practitioners 
may need to consider entire governance systems or governance trajectories 
when thinking about how to govern their collaborative relationships. 
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To summarize, we believe that managers should consider our entire research 
framework when contemplating on how to govern their relationships (see Figure 
10.2). They could proceed according to the following steps. 
 
(1) Identify the needs for coordination, control, legitimacy, and sensegiving and 
sensemaking in the relationship (see theme two). 
(2) Identify through which mechanisms these needs can be fulfilled (see theme 
five and theme six). 
(3) Identify whether there is a gap between the need for formalization and the 
ability to do so. If a gap exists, think of ways in which information can be 
processed and sensemaking can be facilitated, so that uncertainty and 
ambiguity are reduced (see theme one). 
(4) Consider how the formalization process should look like. Think, for example, 
of the persons that should be involved in the process, and assess whether the 
process should be standardized or not (see theme four). 
(5) Initiate the formalization process, but make sure that possible tensions 
between its functions and its dysfunctions are managed (see theme three). 
(6) Attempt to establish intermediate degrees of trust and formalization at the 
beginning of relationships. Then assess and monitor whether self-reinforcing 
spirals of trust-deterioration and formalism do not occur (see theme five). 
(7) Finally, continually reassess the previous six steps to make sure that: (a) the 
degree of formalization is appropriate for your needs; (b) there are no 
mechanisms that could fulfill those needs better; (c) gaps between the need 
and the ability to formalize are reduced; (d) attributes of the formalization 
process fit your needs; (e) tensions between formalization’s functions and 
dysfunctions do not hamper interorganizational performance; and (f) changes 
in the degrees of trust and formalization influence each other, and 
interorganizational performance favorably. 
 
10.4 Limitations and future research 
 
In interpreting this study, some caveats have to be kept in mind, which may be 
addressed in future research. The first limitation of our study is that each of the six 
themes in our framework has been investigated separately. Some of these themes 
were treated conceptually (themes two and five), while others have been 
investigated by means of a case study (theme three), or a survey (themes one, 
four and six). Although we believe that this approach has been fundamental to the 
development of an integrative perspective on the role of formalization in 
interorganizational relationships, we are also aware of the fact that various parts of 
the framework have not been empirically tested yet. We believe that future 
research should include further empirical testing so that the relevance and validity 
of various parts of our framework can be assessed. An experimental research 
approach may offer a high potential here, as it: (1) guarantees variation in certain 
factors through manipulation; (2) limits idiosyncrasies or variation due to external 
factors; (3) allows researchers to use multiple means to capture the values for the 
variables they are interested in and to assess the relationships between those 
variables, including observations, surveys and interviews; (4) enables researchers 
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to capture dynamics;  and (5) allows them to test our entire framework in a single 
study. The latter is almost impossible through any other method of inquiry. In 
future research, experiments could be designed that enable a comparison 
between various collaborative projects, each with distinct relational and sub-group 
characteristics, initial degrees of formalization and trust, et cetera. Researchers 
can ask participants in these experiments why they apply certain degrees of 
formalization, referring to both their needs and their abilities to formalize (theme 
one). They can also have participants rate the degree to which formalization fulfills 
any of the four functions distinguished in our study (theme two). They may further 
develop several measures of collaborative performance, and ask participants in 
the experiment why they think they have performed better or worse than other 
groups (themes two and three). In addition, they may code and analyze scripts 
that capture collaborative dynamics in order to find out how leaders (e.g. 
managers) attempt to reduce gaps between the need and the ability to formalize, 
and how they cope with tensions between the functions and the dysfunctions of 
formalization (theme one and three). Moreover, researchers could manipulate 
each of the collaborative group’s activities by introducing standard solutions for 
solving tasks (theme four). In addition, they can distinguish several rounds of 
cooperation, after which they measure how trust, formalization and 
interorganizational performance evolve (theme five). Finally, they can offer 
participants other means to achieve the functions that we attributed to 
formalization, and assess when managers use these means, why they do it and 
how it influences formalization (theme six).  
 
A second limitation of our study concerns the extent to which we have capitalized 
on our own definition and typology of formalization. In chapter three, we defined 
formalization as the process of codifying and enforcing inputs, outputs and 
activities (Ouchi, 1979), and the outcomes of this process in the form of contracts, 
rules, standard policies, procedures and regulations (Hage and Aiken, 1966). We 
also distinguished three attributes of formalization, being (1) the degree of 
formalization that is applied (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997), (2) the extent to which it 
pertains to inputs and outcomes, or to processes (e.g. Ouchi, 1979; Koza and 
Lewin, 1998), and (3) its enabling or coercive character (e.g. see Adler and Borys, 
1996). Although we have emphasized different parts of this definition and typology 
throughout our study, we have not used it as much and as explicitly as we could 
have done. The distinction between processes and outcomes of formalization, for 
example, was highly evident in theme four, where we distinguished between 
standard contracts (formalization as an outcome) and standardized negotiation 
and contracting procedures (formalization as a process), but it was not made 
explicit in many of the other themes. It also emanated in theme three, where 
alliance managers used the distinction to cope with the tensions arising from the 
co-existence of the functions and dysfunctions of formalization. Although these 
examples indicate the significance of our definition and typology of formalization, 
we believe that future research could benefit from using them more proactively. By 
doing so, researchers could even draw more refined and detailed pictures of the 
role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. 
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A third limitation, and in our view one of the major opportunities for future 
research, concerns the extent to which we have focused on aspects of 
formalization that have the potential to bridge disciplines of strategic management, 
law and contracting, and cognitive psychology (see Figure 10.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study, examples already abound. Information processing, sensemaking, 
mindfulness and trust, for example, are concepts that have their roots in cognitive 
psychology, but which have been applied here to study management processes 
(see themes one, two, four, and five). Similarly, in theme four, contract 
standardization (a topic in the law and contracting literature), has been connected 
to mindlessness (a concept stemming from cognitive psychology) and to the 
governance of interorganizational relationships (an issue in the strategic 
management literature). However, this thesis is still limited in the extent to which it 
has explored the cross-sections between these three disciplines. We suggest that 
parts of Figure 10.3 in which the literatures show a potential for convergence offer 
highly promising avenues for further research. An example of such an area 
consists of the reasons and causes of contract incompleteness (see Eggleston et 
al., 2000). Whereas most of the law and contracting literature presumes that 
parties to a relationship record and enforce outcomes and activities in a way that 
FIGURE 10.3 
Major opportunities for future research
 
Strategic 
Management 
 
 
 
    Law & 
Contracting 
 
 
 
        Cognitive 
           Psychology 
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minimizes transaction costs, cognitive psychology suggests that managers may 
not be able to do so, due to, among others, bounded rationality, memory 
problems, and fears of upsetting a partner. At the same time, the strategic 
management literature suggests that partners withhold information from contracts 
on purpose, as they may use information-asymmetry to capture most of the value 
that is being created in a relationship. Another example in which the three 
disciplines come together revolves around the utilization of the law and legal 
instruments to develop new business strategies. As Bagley (2005) convincingly 
promulgates, organizations may use changes in these areas proactively. 
Managerial cognition, in particular managers’ legal astuteness, or their ability to 
recognize and pursue the opportunities that arise from legal changes, may be a 
key element here (Bagley, 2005). In summary, we believe that this study has 
contributed to bridging the literatures on strategic management, law and 
contracting, and cognitive psychology, but we also think that there are still many 
promising opportunities that could enrich our research framework and that deserve 
to be addressed in future research. These examples elucidate that the role of 
formalization in interorganizational relationships continues to merit substantial 
academic attention. 
 
10.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the findings and implications emanating from 
our study the role of formalization in interorganizational relationships. We have 
elaborated on six research themes, each associated with their own research 
questions and focusing on a particular aspect of the research problem. We 
presented the key findings emanating from our study, the theoretical and practical 
implications associated with our findings, and the limitations of our investigations 
from which opportunities for future research ensued. A red thread that has been 
weaving its way through this discussion is that formalization is a multifaceted 
concept, which deserves to be investigated from multiple perspectives. 
Researchers studying formalization and managers putting it into practice should 
clearly identify which aspect of formalization they are dealing with, and they have 
to prevent placing too much emphasis on one perspective at the cost of others 
(Heiman and Nickerson, 2004). We are confident that the integrative framework 
that we have presented in this study and our elaboration on each of its 
components in the six research themes will offer them a fertile basis from which to 
develop and enrich their thinking. 
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DUTCH SUMMARY / NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Interorganisatorische samenwerkingsverbanden – waaronder allianties, joint 
ventures, leveranciers- en outsourcingsrelaties – zijn van toenemend belang voor 
het concurrentievermogen van ondernemingen. Deze samenwerkingsverbanden 
krijgen daarom steeds meer aandacht van onderzoekers en managers. Hoewel 
het belang van interorganisatorische relaties algemeen wordt onderkend, blijkt ook 
dat managers het moeilijk vinden om dergelijke relaties te managen (Madhok, 
1995), getuige de hoge faalpercentages die worden toegedicht aan dergelijke 
relaties (Harrigan, 1988; Parkhe, 1993a). Ernst (2003) schat dat ongeveer de helft 
van de allianties faalt door beheersingsproblemen. Deze bewering wordt 
ondersteund door studies van McKinsey (Ernst et al., 2003) en Accenture (2003). 
In overeenstemming hiermee, suggereren Park en Ungson (2001) dat de 
problemen die tot falen of slechte interorganisatorische prestaties leiden deels zijn 
te voorkomen door geschikte beheersingsmechanismen toe te passen.  
 
In lijn hiermee hebben verscheidene onderzoekers gewezen op het belang van de 
beheersing van interorganisatorische relaties (Dyer en Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 
2002; Madhok, 2002; Ring, 2002; Takeishi, 2001). 540). Dyer en Singh (1998) 
geven bijvoorbeeld aan dat een effectieve beheersing van interorganisatorische 
relaties kan zorgen voor een interorganisatorisch concurrentievoordeel door 
investeringen in relatie-specifieke midelen, het delen van kennis, of het 
combineren van complementaire middelen te faciliteren. Dergelijke claims wijzen 
op het belang van een beter begrip van interorganisatorische beheersing (Olk en 
Elvira, 2001; Osborn en Hagedoorn, 1997) en meer onderzoek naar 
interorganisatorisch management (Hutt et al., 2000; Ireland et al., 2002). Bijdragen 
in dit onderzoeksveld kunnen leiden tot een afname van interorganisatorische 
problemen (Barringer en Harrison, 2000). Verscheidene auteurs hebben specifiek 
gevraagd om een integraal beeld van de rol van formalisering – voorlopig 
gedefinieerd als het bestaan en de toepassing van contracten, regels en 
procedures – in interorganisatorische relaties (zie bijvoorbeeld Sobrero en 
Schrader (1998), Stinchcombe (2001) en Thatcher (2004) in Tabel 1.2). De 
voorgaande overwegingen hebben geleid tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag: 
Welke rol speelt formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties? 
 
Een visuele representatie van dit onderzoeksprobleem is weergegeven in een 
onderzoeksraamwerk (zie Figuur 1.4). Dit raamwerk bouwt op de in de literatuur 
dominante perspectieven op formalisering, welke focussen op functies als 
coördinatie en controle (zie bijvoorbeeld Gulati en Singh, 1998; Madhok, 2002). 
Vanuit deze perspectieven wordt onderzoek verricht naar ofwel de antecedenten 
van formalisering, ofwel de relatie tussen formalisering en interorganisatorische 
prestaties (Anderson en Dekker, 2006; Sobrero en Schrader, 1998; Stinchcombe, 
2001). Hoewel eerder onderzoek een belangrijke bijdrage heeft geleverd aan het 
verkrijgen van inzicht in de rol van formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties, 
ontbreekt het in de literatuur tot op heden aan een integraal beeld. Met het oog op 
de ontwikkeling van een dergelijk beeld hebben we zes onderzoeksthema’s 
gedefinieerd, elk gericht op de beantwoording van een aantal onderzoeksvragen. 
Hieronder schetsen we kort de onderzoeksvragen behorende bij de zes thema’s, 
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de belangrijkste bevindingen per thema en de theoretische en praktische 
implicaties van ieder thema afzonderlijk. Vervolgens gaan we in op 
overkoepelende theoretische en praktische implicaties van het gehele onderzoek.  
 
Thema één – de behoefte versus de mogelijkheid tot formalisering 
In dit thema worden tegengestelde bevindingen in de literatuur betreffende de 
invloed van antecedenten op formalisering onderzocht. We vooronderstellen dat, 
net als bij partner selectie (Ahuja, 2000) en leren (Inkpen, 2000), inspanningen 
gericht op interorganisatorische beheersing enerzijds afhankelijk zijn van de 
behoeften en intenties van partijen (need to formalize) en anderzijds van de 
mogelijkheden die deelnemers aan interorganisatorische relaties hebben om 
uitkomsten en processen te coördineren en te controleren (ability to formalize). 
Het lijkt erop dat bestaande argumenten voor relaties tussen antecedenten en 
formalisering uitgaan van ofwel de behoefte om te formaliseren, ofwel de 
mogelijkheid om dit te doen, maar niet van beide (zie Gerwin, 2004; Kirsch, 1997). 
Dit roept de volgende vragen op. 
  
OV1:  In welke mate bestaan relaties tussen antecedenten en formalisering uit 
tegengestelde krachten? 
 
OV2:  Hoe beïnvloeden discrepanties tussen de behoefte en de mogelijkheid tot  
formaliseren de mate van formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties? 
 
Bevindingen. Onze resultaten gaven aan dat hoge investeringen in relatie-
specifieke middelen, een hoge mate van interorganisatorische complexiteit, 
samenwerking met een bekende partner en samenwerking met kleine afnemers 
gepaard gaan met een hoge behoefte en een beperkte mogelijkheid tot 
formalisering. Met behulp van de begrippen “informatieverwerking” (zie 
bijvoorbeeld Galbraith, 1973, 1977) en “zingeving” (Weick, 1979, 1995, 2001) 
verklaarden we vervolgens hoe deelnemers aan interorganisatorische relaties 
omgaan met de resulterende impasse. De spanning tussen de behoefte en de 
mogelijkheid tot formaliseren zorgt ervoor dat partners inspanningen doen om 
informatie te vergaren en te verwerken en betekenis te geven aan relaties. Deze 
inspanningen zijn hoger naarmate de behoefte en de mogelijkheid tot formaliseren 
een sterkere discrepantie vertonen. 
 
Theoretische en praktische implicaties. Op theoretisch niveau betekenen onze 
resultaten dat onderzoek naar formalisering zowel de behoefte tot formaliseren als 
de mogelijkheid tot formaliseren dient te beschouwen, evenals de mate waarin en 
de wijze waarop managers zich inspannen om de kloof tussen beide te dichten. 
Voor managers bevestigen onze bevindingen dat de relaties die het meest nuttig 
zijn waarschijnlijk ook het meest meoilijk te managen zijn (Accenture, 2003). Dit 
betekent dat het in sommige gevallen misschien beter is om minder complexe 
relaties te initiëren, of om modulaire relaties met nauwe interfaces tussen 
organisaties op te zetten. In meer geavanceerde relaties dient geïnvesteerd te 
worden in informatie verwerking en zingeving, zodat formalisering mogelijk wordt. 
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Thema twee – functies van formalisering 
Het tweede thema is voortgekomen uit de observatie dat een beter begrip van de 
redenen die partijen kunnen hebben om contracten, regels en procedures te 
gebruiken cruciaal is voor een goede beschrijving van de functionering van 
samenwerkingsverbanden (Masten en Saussier, 2002). We signaleren dat het 
merendeel van de studies naar formalisering ervan uitgaat dat contracten, regels 
en procedures ingezet worden als middel om processen en uitkomsten te 
coördineren, te controleren en/of te legitimeren (zie bijvoorbeeld Gulati en Singh, 
1998; Kale et al., 2002; Madhok, 2002). Ze besteden weinig aandacht aan 
mogelijke andere functies van formalisering, ondanks het feit dat verschillende 
auteurs hebben aangegeven dat er alternatieve verklaringen voor formele 
structuren en processen nodig zijn (Hatch, 1999; Meyer en Rowan, 1977; Simons, 
1990, 1995). In dit thema onderscheiden we naast de coördinatie-, controle- en 
legitimiteitsfunctie van formalisering een zogenaamde “sensemaking en 
sensegiving functie”. We vooronderstellen dat deze vier functies van formalisering 
naast elkaar kunnen bestaan, maar signaleren dat er onduidelijkheid bestaat over 
de wijze waarop deze functies met elkaar samenhangen (zie Madhok, 2002), op 
welke wijze ze interorganisatorische prestaties beïnvloeden en in welke contexten 
en voor welke ontwikkelingsfasen van relaties elk van deze functies het meest 
belangrijk is. We hebben deze overwegingen gevat in de volgende 
onderzoeksvragen. 
 
OV3:  Wat zijn de functies van formalisering? 
 
OV4:  Hoe hangen de functies van formalisering met elkaar samen? 
 
OV5:  Hoe verhouden ze zich tot interorganisatorische prestaties? 
 
OV6:  Wat is het relatieve belang van de diverse functies van formalisering in 
verschillende fasen van interorganisatorische ontwikkeling en in diverse 
collaboratieve contexten? 
 
Bevindingen. In dit thema beschreven we hoe formalisering kan bijdragen aan 
“sensegiving en sensemaking”, een functie van formalisering die tot op heden 
weinig aandacht heeft gekregen in de managementliteratuur (voor uitzonderingen, 
zie bijvoorbeeld Ariño en Ring, 2004; Ring en Van de Ven, 1989, 1994). We lieten 
zien dat formalisering stakeholders helpt om zin geven aan de relaties waar ze bij 
betrokken zijn en aan de collaboratieve omgevingen waarin deze relaties ingebed 
zijn. We suggereerden bovendien dat formalisering ten behoeve van “sensegiving 
en sensemaking” belangrijker is in het begin van interorganisatorische relaties en 
in exploratieve contexten. We verwachtten daarnaast dat andere functies van 
formalisering beter vervuld kunnen worden naarmate “sensegiving en 
sensemaking” heeft plaats gevonden en dat de relatie tussen deze functie van 
formalisering en interorganisatorische prestaties afwijkt van de relatie tussen 
andere functies van formalisering en prestaties. 
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Theoretische en praktische implicaties. Deze studie complementeert de in de 
literatuur dominante perspectieven op de functies van formalisering met een beeld 
van formalisering als een middel om “sensegiving en sensemaking” te 
bewerkstelligen. Dit beeld pleit voor meer aandacht voor de processen waaruit 
formaliteiten ontstaan (zie ook Langley, 1988; Mintzberg, 1994) en voor een 
grotere nadruk op vormen van formalisering, waarin de ontwikkeling van begrip 
(Zollo en Singh, 2004) en betekenis (Giddens, 1984) een meer centrale positie 
innemen (zie ook Adler en Borys, 1996; Zollo en Winter, 2002). Ons onderzoek 
suggereert bovendien dat formalisering ten behoeve van “sensegiving en 
sensemaking” prevaleert in interorganisatorische relaties gekarakteriseerd door 
onzekerheid, ambiguïteit en vernieuwing. Dit vraagt om nader onderzoek, omdat 
het in schril contrast staat met literatuur waarin wordt voorspeld dat de mate van 
formalisering noodzakelijkerwijs laag is in situaties waarin onzekerheid en 
beperkte meetbaarheid en beschrijfbaarheid van processen en uitkomsten 
bestaan (Galbraith, 1973; Lassar en Kerr, 1996; Ouchi, 1979; Poppo en Zenger, 
2002; Shane, 1996; Williamson, 1985). 
 
Thema drie – dualiteit & dialectische spanningen 
In thema twee zijn het duale karakter van formalisering – voortkomend uit de 
coëxistentie van haar functies en disfuncties – en de dialectische spanningen die 
hieruit voortvloeien onderwerp van discussie. We omarmen het idee dat 
spanningen niet altijd kunnen worden opgelost (Ring en Van de Ven, 1989), maar 
moeten worden gemanaged (Huxham en Beech, 2003). We benadrukken daarom 
de rol van “managerial choice” bij formaliseringsbeslissingen (Child, 1997) en 
onderzoeken hoe managers kunnen omgaan met de spanningen tussen de 
functies en disfuncties van formalisering (zie Das en Teng, 2000; De Rond, 2003; 
De Rond en Bouchiki, 2004). We formuleren de volgende onderzoeksvraag: 
 
OV7:  Hoe gaan managers van interorganisatorische relaties om met de 
spanningen voortkomend uit de coëxistentie van functies en disfuncties die 
geassocieerd worden met formalisering? 
 
Bevindingen. Door middel van een literatuuronderzoek en een case studie van 
een crossindustriële strategische alliantie toonden we aan dat een groot aantal 
functies en disfuncties gerelateerd aan het gebruik en de ontwikkeling van 
contracten, regels en procedures naast elkaar kunnen bestaan. We lieten zien dat 
alliantie managers op tenminste drie wijzen omgaan met de dialectische 
spanningen die hieruit voortkomen: (1) ze benadrukken afwisselend de mate 
waarin de ene dan wel de partner de behoefte tot formalisering heeft in hun 
communicatie naar deelnemers aan interorganisatorische relaties; (2) ze proberen 
het door hen ingestelde of nagestreefde niveau van formalisering te 
rechtvaardigen door te refereren naar factoren die zij ogenschijnlijk niet zelf 
kunnen beïnvloeden; en (3) ze passen semi-structuren toe, waarin ofwel de 
formalisering van uitkomsten ofwel de formalisering van processen wordt 
benadrukt. Deze bevindingen illustreren dat de introductie van een dialectisch 
perspectief op interorganisatorische beheersing een veelbelovende aanvulling 
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vormt op coördinatie- en controlebenaderingen in onderzoek naar de rol van 
formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties. 
 
Theoretische en praktische implicaties. Het door ons beschreven dialectisch 
perspectief op formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties benadrukt dat 
managers zich niet alleen bezighouden met het nemen van de “juiste” 
beheersingsbeslissingen, maar ook en misschien voornamelijk met het managen 
van de hier uit voortvloeiende spanningen. Het toont aan dat onderzoek waarin 
“de manager” wordt teruggebracht in interorganisatorische beheersings-
vraagstukken tot waardevolle inzichten kan leiden. Deze studie laat bovendien 
zien dat managers die zich bewust zijn van de talloze functies en disfuncties 
waardoor formalisering interorganisatorische prestaties beïnvloedt, zich in een 
betere positie bevinden om de spanningen te onderkennen die voortvloeien uit 
formalisering en beter met deze spanningen om moeten kunnen gaan. Deze 
managers kiezen niet tussen “controle” en “autonomie”, maar appreciëren het feit 
dat formalisering een breder scala van functies en disfuncties met zich meebrengt. 
Ze zijn mogelijk in staat gelijktijdig tegengestelde perspectieven te hanteren en te 
ontwikkelen (Eisenhardt, 2000) en beperken de tendens tot overmatige 
rationalisering van beslissingen betreffende de structuur en structurering van 
interorganisatorische relaties. 
 
Thema vier – contractstandaardisering 
In het vierde thema merken we op dat het gebruik van standaardcontracten en 
standaardprocedures tijdens onderhandelingen en contractbesprekingen 
wijdverspreid is (Korobkin, 2003), maar ook dat de invloed van standaardisering 
op interorganisatorische samenwerkingsverbanden grotendeels onontgonnen 
terrein is voor onderzoekers. Om een beeld te krijgen van de invloed van 
standaardisering op de rol van formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties, 
besteden we aandacht aan de volgende onderzoeksvragen. 
 
OV8:  Wat zijn de voor- en nadelen van het gebruik van standaardcontracten in 
interorganisatorische relaties?  
 
OV9: Wat is de invloed van de introductie van standaardprocedures voor 
onderhandelingen en contract besprekingen op het generieke 
onderzoeksmodel (gebaseerd op coördinatie- en controle perspectieven) 
voor studies naar formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties? 
 
Bevindingen. Door middel van een literatuuroverzicht toonden we aan dat de 
motieven of redenen voor standaardisering samenhangen met: de efficiëntie, de 
snelheid en de robuustheid van transacties; de exploitatie van informatie 
asymmetrie; het voorkomen van onbedoelde signalen; de legitimiteit die wordt 
toegekend aan relaties; de mate waarin eenduidige interpretatie van formaliteiten 
mogelijk is; en het bestaan van netwerk-effecten. De nadelen van 
standaardisering bestaan uit de lage mate van contractuele specificiteit en het 
beperkte potentieel voor de ontwikkeling van wederzijdse verwachtingen en de 
creatie van gemeenschappelijk begrip. We onderzochten vervolgens de assumptie 
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dat het toepassen van standaardprocedures samengaat met een verlaagde mate 
van zorgvuldigheid, waakzaamheid en oplettendheid (Weick, 1979; 1995). Met 
behulp van analyses op een steekproef van 911 klant-leverancier-relaties laten we 
zien dat de associaties tussen formalisering, haar meest algemene antecedenten 
en interorganisatorische prestaties worden afgezwakt door een hogere mate van 
standaardisering van interorganisatorische onderhandeling- en contracterings-
processen. Standaardisering kan dus leiden tot de-contextualisatie, een 
inadequate communicatie van toezeggingen, rechten en plichten (Goetz en Scott, 
1985) en beperkte mogelijkheden van partijen om een grotere “transactie-taart” te 
realiseren (Hill en King, 2004: 890). Het gebruik van standaardprocedures 
resulteert hiermee mogelijk in een beperkte staat van “mindfulness” bij 
contractpartijen, waardoor het nut van formalisering sterk wordt gereduceerd. 
 
Theoretische en praktische implicaties. De bevindingen impliceren dat studies 
naar interorganisatorische beheersing zowel gericht zouden moeten zijn op 
formalisering als een uitkomst alswel op formalisering als een proces (zie ook 
hoofdstuk twee; Chia, 1997: 703; Hatch, 1999: 82). We verwachten dat dergelijke 
studies kunnen verklaren waarom ‘human beings can possess high intelligence 
and yet evidence frequent lack of intellectual awareness when making decisions’ 
(Sharps en Martin, 2002: 273) en waarom contracten over het algemeen 
eenvoudig zijn, terwijl voorspellingen vanuit de theorie aangeven dat ze complex 
zouden moeten zijn (Eggleston et al., 2000). Op praktisch niveau betekenen onze 
bevindingen dat de negatieve effecten van standaardisering moeten worden 
gecompenseerd door bijvoorbeeld oplettende en waakzame medewerkers aan te 
trekken, of door “contracting capabilities” te ontwikkelen (analoog aan “alliance 
capabilities”; zie Kale et al., 2002), waarbij organisaties ervaringen uit eerdere 
onderhandeling- en contracteringsprocessen exploiteren in toekomstige relaties 
(zie Mayer en Argyres, 2004). Deze oplossing onderschrijft het belang dat wordt 
toegeschreven aan het management van interorganisatorische relaties op portfolio 
niveau (Heide, 2003; Wuyts et al., 2004). Ten slotte kunnen partijen “sensemaking 
triggers” in contracten en contractbesprekingen inbouwen, zodat meer 
doordachte, creatieve en flexibele “states of mind” worden opgeroepen (Burgoon 
et al., 2000: 112). Sensemaking triggers “dwingen” managers om na te denken 
over de onderliggende logica van relaties, de risico’s, kosten, investeringen en 
opbrengsten van samenwerkingsverbanden en de mogelijkheden om prestaties te 
verhogen (Vlaar et al., 2005). 
 
Thema vijf – formele versus relationele beheersing  
In thema vijf richten we ons op de wisselwerking tussen formalisering en 
vertrouwen. Onderzoeksresultaten suggereren dat er een behoefte is om de 
relatie tussen formele en relationele beheersing beter te beschrijven en 
voorspellen (Poppo en Zenger, 2002). Er bestaat voornamelijk onduidelijkheid met 
betrekking tot de evolutie van formalisering en vertrouwen gedurende 
samenwerkingsverbanden  (De Wever et al., 2006; Ferrin et al., 2005; Inkpen en 
Curall, 2004; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Serva et al., 2005). In dit thema staat 
daarom de volgende onderzoeksvraag centraal. 
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RQ10: Hoe ontwikkelen formalisering en vertrouwen zich in interorganisatorische 
relaties? 
 
Bevindingen. In dit thema hebben we een integraal perspectief ontwikkeld op de 
evolutie van formele en relationele beheersing in interorganisatorische relaties. 
We beweerden dat intermediaire niveaus van formalisering en vertrouwen een 
positievere invloed uitoefenen op interorganisatorische prestaties dan extreme 
waarden, omdat de laatsten chaos, achterdocht, rigiditeit en naïviteit met zich mee 
kunnen brengen. We suggereerden bovendien dat de aanbevolen mate van 
formalisering en vertrouwen wisselt voor interorganisatorische met uiteenlopende 
transactiekarakteristieken en voor relaties in verschillende contexten. Vervolgens 
gaven we aan hoe beide mechanismen vanuit een dynamisch perspectief zowel 
als substituut (als een van beide toeneemt, neemt de behoefte aan de ander af) 
alswel als complement kunnen fungeren (als een van beide toeneemt, wordt de 
mogelijkheid om de ander te ontwikkelen vergroot). Daarna introduceerden we 
een raamwerk waarin de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen en formalisering is 
beschreven (Zie Figuur 8.4). We suggereerden dat deze ontwikkeling grotendeels 
afhankelijk is van de initiële niveaus van formalisering en vertrouwen in relaties 
(zie ook Ferrin et al., 2005; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005) en van de interpretaties 
die deelnemers aan interorganisatorische relaties geven aan formaliseringsacties 
door hun partners. 
 
Theoretische en praktische implicaties. De argumenten die naar voren zijn 
gebracht in deze studie tonen allereerst aan dat dat een integraal perspectief op 
de evolutie van formele en relationele beheersing in interorganisatorische relaties 
bij kan dragen aan ons begrip van beheersingsvraagstukken (zie ook Bachmann, 
1998). De ontwikkeling en de relaties tussen formalisering, vertrouwen en 
interorganisatorische prestaties zoals beschreven in dit thema blijken immers veel 
gecompliceerder en verfijnder te zijn dan de voorstelling die er vaak van wordt 
gegeven in de literatuur. De studie wijst er ook op dat we ervoor moeten waken 
dat vertrouwen en formalisering doelen op zich worden. We kunnen een hoge 
mate van vertrouwen ambiëren in onze relaties, maar uiteindelijk zijn het de 
interorganisatorische prestaties die er daadwerkelijk toe doen. 
 
Thema zes – beheersingstrajecten 
In thema zes gaan we verder in op relaties tussen beheersingsmechanismen. 
Hoewel empirische onderzoeken zich vaak op één of slechts enkele 
beheersingsmechanismen concentreren (Geringer en Hébert, 1991a; Kirsch, 
1997), zijn er dikwijls meerdere mechanismen nodig om waardecreatie te 
realiseren (Reuer, 1999). Deze beheersingsmechanismen lijken bovendien 
onderling met elkaar verbonden te zijn (Klein, 2002). De kloof tussen de veelheid 
aan beheersingsbeslissingen die worden gemaakt in interorganisatorische relaties 
en de beperkte aandacht die onderzoekers geven aan de relaties tussen deze 
beslissingen leidt tot onze laatste onderzoeksvraag. 
 
OV11:  In welke mate zijn formalisering en andere beheersingsbeslissingen in 
interorganisatorische relaties aan elkaar gerelateerd? 
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Bevindingen. Om deze vraag te onderzoeken introduceerden we het concept 
“governance trajectories.” Dergelijke trajecten bestaan uit meerdere aan elkaar 
gerelateerde beheersingsbeslissingen, welke beïnvloed worden door verschillende 
sets van antecedenten. Resultaten van onze analyses op een steekproef van 911 
buyer-supplier relaties geven aan dat managers proberen om relaties op 
verschillende manieren te beheersen gedurende opeenvolgende 
ontwikkelingsfasen en dat de beheersingsbeslissingen die ze in het begin van een 
relatie nemen invloed hebben op latere beslissingen. Bovendien blijkt dat diverse 
karakteristieken van de relatie, de partners en de collaboratieve context het 
gebruik van beheersingsmechanismen op diverse wijzen beïnvloeden. 
 
Theoretische en praktische implicaties. Onze bevindingen tonen aan dat de 
inspanningen die managers doen om coördinatie, controle, legitimiteit en 
zingeving te bewerkstelligen in interorganisatorische relaties gelijktijdig onderzoek 
vereisen naar meerdere beheersingsmechanismen en de connecties tussen deze 
mechanismen (zie bijvoorbeeld ook thema vijf). Managementimplicaties betreffen 
voornamelijk het bewustzijn bij managers dat ze de beschikking hebben over een 
groot aantal mechanismen om interorganisatorische relaties te beheersen en dat 
beheersingsbeslissingen in verschillende fasen van interorganisatorische relaties 
elkaar beïnvloeden. Lagere selectie-inspanningen worden bijvoorbeeld 
geassocieerd met minder intense onderhandelingen, het gebruik van 
standaardcontracten in plaats van contractueel maatwerk en een lager niveau van 
contractcompleetheid. Een integraal beeld – in de vorm van het concept 
beheersingstrajecten – stelt managers in staat beheersingsbeslissingen in een 
groter kader te plaatsen. 
 
Thema-overstijgende theoretische implicaties van de studie 
De studie heeft ook verschillende thema-overstijgende theoretische implicaties. 
Thema één en thema drie geven aan dat “de manager dient te worden 
teruggebracht” in onderzoek naar interorganisatorische beheersing. In thema één 
vonden we bijvoorbeeld dat managers de mate kunnen beïnvloeden waarin 
spanningen tussen de behoefte en de mogelijkheid tot formaliseren 
interorganisatorische prestaties beperken. In thema drie lieten we zien hoe 
managers omgaan met de spanningen tussen de functies en de disfuncties van 
formalisering. Onze bevindingen impliceren dat de aandacht van onderzoekers 
niet alleen zou moeten worden gericht op de “juiste” mate van formalisering – 
gezien de karakteristieken van relaties en organisaties (Foss en Foss, 2005; 
Madhok, 2002; Williamson, 1985, 1991) – maar ook op de wijze waarop managers 
ervoor zorgen dat formalisering een positieve invloed heeft interorganisatorische 
prestaties. 
 
Een tweede theoretische implicatie betreft de functies van formalisering in 
interorganisatorische relaties. Waar sommige onderzoekers vragen om meer 
systematische aandacht voor de coördinatie functie van formalisering (e.g. Carson 
et al., 2006: 36; see also Mayer en Argyres, 2004), wijst ons onderzoek op de 
noodzaak om maarliefst vier hoofdfuncties van formalisering te bestuderen. Door 
de coordinatie-, controle-, legitimiteit- en zingevings functies van formalisering 
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expliciet van elkaar te onderscheiden, zullen onderzoekers beter in staat zijn om 
betekenisvolle conclusies te trekken over de rol van formalisering in 
interorganisatorische relaties. Thema vier geeft aan dat attributen van het 
formaliseringsproces, zoals standaardisering, van invloed kunnen zijn op deze 
functies en dat onderzoekers zich moeten afvragen of formalisering als uitkomst, 
of formalisering als proces de grootste bijdrage aan interorganisatorische 
prestaties levert (zie ook hoofdstuk drie). 
 
Een derde theoretische implicatie betreft de wisselwerking tussen formalisering en 
andere beheersingsmechanismen. In thema vijf en zes hebben we laten zien dat 
formalisering nauw verbonden is met andere beheersingsmechanismen en dat het 
daar moeilijk van is te isoleren. Veranderingen in formalisering kunnen 
bijvoorbeeld het gevolg zijn van een reductie of toename van vertrouwen (thema 
vijf), maar ook van verschillende niveaus van partner selectie (thema zes). De 
complexe relaties tussen formalisering en andere beheersingsmechanismen 
zorgen ervoor dat het effect van formalisering op interorganisatorische prestaties 
moeilijk is vast te stellen. Wanneer onderzoekers bijvoorbeeld een positieve relatie 
vinden tussen formalisering en prestaties, dan kan dit bijvoorbeeld ook het gevolg 
zijn van investeringen in informatieverwerking en zingeving (thema 1), hoge 
niveaus van vertrouwen die formalisering hebben mogelijk gemaakt (thema vijf) en 
relatief grote selectie en onderhandelingsinspanningen (thema zes). Omdat het 
moeilijk is om gehele beheersingstrajecten in analyses mee te nemen en vanwege 
het feit dat de evolutie van formalisering, vertrouwen en andere 
beheersingsmechanismen lastig in kaart te brengen is, bestaat er het gevaar dat 
onderzoek naar de effecten van formalisering op interorganisatorische prestaties 
leidt tot schijnbevindingen, verkeerde interpretaties en foutieve aanbevelingen. 
 
Een vierde theoretische implicatie van het onderzoek betreft de waarde die moet 
worden gehecht aan onderzoek waarin de mate van formalisering wordt 
voorgesteld als een functie van ondernemings- en transactie-karakteristieken. De 
bevindingen in alle zes de thema’s geven aan dat prescriptie op basis van 
generieke modellen uit de literatuur – modellen waarin antecedenten formalisering 
beïnvloeden en waarin formalisering vervolgens interorganisatorische prestaties 
beïnvloedt – dienen met voorzichtigheid te worden betracht. Onze resultaten 
trekken de houdbaarheid van dergelijke modellen in twijfel en laten zien dat hun 
normatieve waarde vaak zeer beperkt is (zie ook Ghoshal en Moran, 1996). De 
mate van formalisering is niet slechts afhankelijk van ondernemings- en 
transactie- of relationele karakteristieken, zoals voorspeld door bijvoorbeeld de 
transactiekosten theorie of agency theorie, maar is ook onderhavig aan: (1) 
variatie in de reactie van managers op discrepanties tussen de behoefte en de 
mogelijkheid tot formaliseren (thema één); (2) variatie in de functies die managers 
met formalisering wensen te vervullen (thema twee); (3) variatie in de 
vaardigheden van managers om de spanningen tussen functies en disfuncties van 
formalisering te managen (thema drie); (4) attributen van het formaliseringsproces 
die de sterkte van de associaties tussen antecedenten en formalisering 
beïnvloeden (thema vier); (5) de invloed van vertrouwen op formalisering, en vice 
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versa, gedurende de evolutie van samenwerkingsverbanden (thema vijf); en (6) de 
beschikbaarheid van andere beheersingsmechanismen (thema zes). 
 
Een laatste theoretische implicatie betreft de loyaliteit van onderzoekers aan één 
of enkele theoretische en methodologische paradigma’s. Wij geloven dat onze 
resultaten het startsein vormen voor meer onderzoek naar formalisering waarin de 
grenzen van theorieën en zelfs wetenschappelijke disciplines vervagen. Waar de 
theorieën en methoden in de verschillende onderzoeksthema’s in eerste instantie 
misschien zijn gebaseerd op conflicterende assumpties en uitgangspunten, daar 
blijkt het gebruik van een veelheid aan perspectieven in ons onderzoek ook te 
leiden tot de inzichten verbonden met de zes onderzoeksthema’s en Figuur 10.2 
Deze studie toont daarmee aan dat een pluralistische onderzoeksaanpak in 
studies naar interorganisatorische beheersingsproblemen mogelijk tot rijkere en 
waarschijnlijk ook betekenisvollere inzichten met betrekking tot de rol van 
formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties leiden dan tot nu toe geschetst. 
 
Praktische implicaties van de studie 
Deze studie heeft ook verschillende praktische implicaties. Thema één impliceert 
dat formalisering over het algemeen vergezelt dient te gaan van inspanningen 
gericht op informatie verwerking en sensemaking. Dergelijke inspanningen 
verminderen de spanningen tussen een beperkte mogelijkheid om te formaliseren 
en een hoge behoefte aan formalisering, omdat ze onzekerheid en ambiguïteit 
reduceren en omdat ze ervoor zorgen dat partijen beter in staat zijn om aspecten 
van de relatie te vatten in formele documenten. Thema twee suggereert dat 
formalisering niet noodzakelijkerwijs dient als middel om coördinatie, controle, of 
legitimiteit te bewerkstelligen. Het functioneert ook als een middel om betekenis te 
geven aan interorganisatorische relaties en de context waarin deze zijn ingebed. 
Managers kunnen deze kennis gebruiken om hun motieven voor formalisering uit 
te leggen aan partners en personeel. Thema één en drie geven aan dat managers 
niet alleen aandacht moeten besteden aan het realiseren van de “juiste” mate van 
formalisering (Foss en Foss, 2005; Madhok, 2002; Williamson, 1985, 1991), maar 
ook en misschien wel voornamelijk met het managen van de spanningen die 
hiermee samenhangen. We adviseren managers om strategieën te ontwikkelen 
waarmee de mogelijkheden voor formalisering worden vergroot en waarmee de 
disfuncties van formalisering kunnen worden vermeden of worden gemanaged. 
Thema vijf impliceert dat managers de effecten van standaardisering en de 
geneigdheid tot het vertonen van “mindless” gedrag in interorganisatorische 
relaties dienen te onderkennen. De nadelen van standaardisering wijzen erop dat 
managers voorzichtig moeten zijn met standaardisering. Thema vijf suggereert dat 
het erg belangrijk is dat managers snel intermediaire niveaus van formalisering en 
vertrouwen opbouwen, zodat een afbrokkeling van vertrouwen en formalisme in 
de toekomst kan worden voorkomen. Thema zes geeft aan dat managers naast 
formalisering hun volledige pallet aan mogelijkheden om coördinatie, controle, 
legitimiteit of zingeving te bewerkstelligen dienen te beschouwen. Ze dienen 
daarin rekening te houden met het feit dat sommige beheersingsmechanismen 
meer geschikt zijn voor bepaalde karakteristieken van hun onderneming of de 
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relatie waarin ze participeren dan andere en dat de toepassing van sommige 
beheersingsmechanismen het gebruik van andere kan bevorderen of beperken. 
 
Onze studie heeft ook enkele thema-overstijgende praktische implicaties. Ten 
eerste blijkt formalisering méér managementinspanningen te vergen dan de 
codificatie van verwachte uitkomsten en activiteiten in contracten, regels en 
procedures en de afdwinging hiervan. Om succesvol formalisering toe te passen, 
dienen managers ook investeringen te doen in activiteiten gericht op informatie 
verwerking en het geven van betekenis aan de relatie en de omgeving waarin 
deze is ingebed. Bovendien vereist formalisering continue aandacht van 
managers zodat spanningen tussen de functies en disfuncties van formalisering 
kunnen worden gemanaged. Ten tweede heeft formalisering meerdere functies, 
welke niet alleen verbonden zijn met formalisering als uitkomst, maar ook met 
formalisering als proces (zie hoofdstuk twee). Managers zouden derhalve meer 
aandacht moeten besteden aan de wijze waarop het formaliseringsproces plaats 
vindt en hoe dit proces beïnvloed wordt ( zie ook Simons, 1990, 1995). Thema vier 
laat bijvoorbeeld zien dat de mate waarin dit proces wordt gestandaardiseerd 
significante consequenties kan hebben voor de invloed van formalisering op 
interorganisatorische prestaties. Ten derde blijkt uit thema vijf en zes dat 
formalisering niet op zichzelf staat, maar sterk verbonden is met andere 
beheersingsprocessen, zoals vertrouwen en partner selectie. Dit wijst erop dat 
managers gehele beheersingssystemen of beheersingstrajecten in ogenschouw 
moeten nemen als ze nadenken over de beheersing van hun relaties. 
 
Limitaties en vervolgonderzoek 
aangestipt, welke zouden kunnen worden opgepakt in vervolgonderzoek. De 
eerste beperking van onze studie is dat de zes thema’s in ons raamwerk apart van 
elkaar zijn onderzocht. Sommige van deze thema’s waren conceptueel van aard 
(thema’s twee en vijf), terwijl anderen onderzocht zijn middels de case study 
methode (thema drie), of de survey methode (thema één, vier en zes). Hoewel we 
geloven dat deze aanpak fundamenteel is voor de ontwikkeling van een integraal 
beeld van de rol van formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties, beseffen we 
ook dat verschillende onderdelen van ons raamwerk nog empirisch getest dienen 
te worden. Een experimentele aanpak lijkt hiervoor heel geschikt. Een tweede 
beperking van deze studie betreft de mate waarin we gebruik hebben gemaakt 
van de definitie en typologie van formalisering zoals weergegeven in hoofdstuk 
twee. We definieerden formalisering als ‘the process of codifying and enforcing 
inputs, outputs, and activities (Ouchi, 1979), and the outcomes of this process in 
the form of contracts, rules, standard policies, procedures and regulations (Hage 
en Aiken, 1966). We onderscheidden verder drie attributen van formalisering, 
zijnde: (1) de mate van formalisering (Makhija en Ganesh, 1997); (2) de mate 
waarin formalisering slaat op inputs en uitkomsten, of op processen (Ouchi, 1979; 
Koza en Lewin, 1998); en (3) het “enabling” of “coercive” karakter van 
formalisering (Adler en Borys, 1996). Hoewel de verschillende onderdelen van 
deze definitie en typologie naar voren zijn gekomen in deze studie, hebben we het 
nog niet zo expliciet en systematisch gebruikt als zou kunnen. We geloven dat 
Bij de interpretatie van deze studie dienen enkele beperkingen te worden
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vervolgonderzoek zou kunnen profiteren van een meer pro-actief gebruik van 
onze definitie en typologie van formalisering. Dit zou kunnen leiden tot een nog 
verfijndere en gedetailleerde beschrijving van de rol van formalisering in 
interorganisatorische relaties. 
 
Een derde beperking en naar onze mening één van de grootste mogelijkheden 
voor vervolgonderzoek betreft de mate waarin we de nadruk hebben gelegd op 
aspecten van formalisering die het potentieel hebben om de vakgebieden 
strategisch management, recht en cognitieve psychologie dichter bij elkaar te 
brengen (zie ook Figuur 10.2). Concepten als informatie verwerking, 
“sensemaking”, “mindfulness” en vertrouwen hebben bijvoorbeeld hun wortels in 
cognitieve psychologie, maar zijn hier toegepast op management processen (zie 
thema’s één, twee, vier en vijf). Een ander voorbeeld bestaat uit contract 
standaardisering, oorspronkelijk een onderwerp uit de contracten en rechten-
literatuur. In thema vier is dit construct in verband gebracht met mindlessness, een 
concept dat voortkomt uit de cognitieve psychologie en met de beheersing van 
interorganisatorische relaties, een onderwerp in strategisch management. Wij 
geloven dat veelbelovende richtingen voor vervolgonderzoek geconcentreerd zijn 
rond de gebieden in Figuur 10.2 waar deze drie disciplines convergeren. Een 
voorbeeld van een mogelijk onderwerp bestaat uit de redenen die er kunnen 
bestaan om contracten incompleet en relatief simpel te houden (zie Eggleston et 
al., 2000). Waar de meerderheid van de contributies in de rechten literatuur 
verondersteld dat partners uitkomsten en activiteiten formaliseren op een 
zodanige wijze dat transactiekosten worden geminimaliseerd, daar suggereren 
cognitief psychologen dat partners mogelijk niet in staat zijn om te formaliseren 
vanwege “bounded rationality”, geheugen problemen en angst om de partner 
onnodig van zijn stuk te brengen. Tegelijkertijd geeft de literatuur over strategisch 
management aan dat partners mogelijk doelbewust  informatie weglaten uit 
contracten, om te profiteren van informatieasymmetrie en om het grootste deel 
van de waarde die wordt gecreëerd in een relatie naar zich toe te trekken. Een 
ander voorbeeld waarin de drie onderzoeksgebieden bij elkaar komen betreft het 
gebruik van contractuele instrumenten en wettelijke bepalingen om 
ondernemingsstrategieën te ontwikkelen. Bagley (2005) geeft overtuigend aan dat 
organisaties veranderingen in wet- en regelgeving pro-actief kunnen gebruiken om 
nieuwe ondernemingsstrategieën te ontwikkelen. Management cognitie en 
juridische scherpzinnigheid – de mogelijkheden van managers om de kansen die 
voortvloeien uit juridische veranderingen te herkennen en na te jagen, vormen hier 
sleutelelementen (Bagley, 2005). Samenvattend stellen we dat deze studie heeft 
bijgedragen aan de overbrugging van de disciplines strategisch management, 
recht en cognitieve psychologie, maar we verwachten ook dat er nog een groot 
aantal andere mogelijkheden bestaan waarmee het raamwerk dat we in deze 
studie hebben gepresenteerd zou kunnen worden verrijkt, zaken die het verdienen 
om in vervolgonderzoek te worden geadresseerd. De voorbeelden die we zojuist 
hebben gegeven, tonen aan dat de rol van formalisering in interorganisatorische 
relaties ook in de toekomst de aandacht verdient van academici. 
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CONCLUSIE  
In deze studie hebben we geprobeerd om een coherent beeld te scheppen van de 
rol van formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties. We hebben dit gedaan door 
in te gaan op zes onderzoeksthema’s. Hieruit bleek dat formalisering een 
veelzijdig concept is, dat dient te worden bezien vanuit meerdere perspectieven. 
Onderzoekers en managers dienen zich bewust te zijn van het gezichtspunt of 
perspectief dat ze innemen wanneer ze zich bezighouden met formalisering. Ze 
doen er goed aan niet teveel de nadruk te leggen op één enkel perspectief. Ons 
integrale raamwerk en de discussie van ieder van haar componenten in de zes 
onderzoeksthema’s biedt onderzoekers en managers een vruchtbare basis om het 
beeld dat ze hebben van de rol van formalisering in interorganisatorische relaties 
verder te ontwikkelen en te verrijken.  
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APPENDIX A: CONTRACT LENGTH FOR DIFFERENT AGREEMENTS 
 
 Type of agreement 
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Mean (# words) 8729 7575 8893 2841 9058 11844 
Std. Deviation 7480 6832 9454 2438 7120 12201 
Median 6961 5868 6927 2176 6815 7097 
Minimum 421 127 256 262 217 423 
Maximum 65286 38168 75608 14288 28865 64834 
N 591 336 161 73 87 137 
Source: data were obtained from onecle.com and analyzed by the author 
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APPENDIX C: FACTOR SCORES, DIRECT EFFECTS, AND MODEL FIT 
 
Factor scores: 
subsample without standard procedures Estimate S.E. Sign. 
Stand. 
Estimate 
Actions <--- Performance 1.226 .130 .000 .888 
Problems <--- Performance 1.000   .819 
Asset-specificity 1 <--- Asset-specificity .907 .084 .000 .704 
Asset-specificity 2 <--- Asset-specificity .934 .084 .000 .748 
Asset-specificity 3 <--- Asset-specificity 1.000   .660 
Measurability 1 <--- Measurability .659 .060 .000 .573 
Measurability 2 <--- Measurability 1.090 .076 .000 .853 
Measurability 3 <--- Measurability 1.000   .804 
Alternative suppliers <--- Alternative supply 1.248 .242 .000 .801 
Alternative products <--- Alternative supply 1.000   .695 
Number of employees <--- Size buyer .610 .155 .000 .735 
Turnover <--- Size buyer 1.000   .891 
Reputation 1 <--- Reputation 1.457 .143 .000 .866 
Reputation 2 <--- Reputation 1.000   .614 
Reputation 3 <--- Reputation .933 .090 .000 .664 
Complexity level <--- Complexity 1.000   .813 
Number of products <--- Complexity .490 .044 .000 .750 
Legal specifications <--- Formalization 3.162 .363 .000 .621 
Trans. specifications <--- Formalization 1.000   .710 
Direct effects between latent variables: 
subsample without standard procedures Estimate S.E. Sign. 
Stand. 
Estimate 
Alternative supply <--- Complexity -.124 .043 .004 -.201 
Asset-specificity <--- Alternative supply -.262 .084 .002 -.203 
Asset-specificity <--- Complexity .391 .058 .000 .493 
Measurability <--- Asset-specificity -.297 .077 .000 -.307 
Reputation <--- Complexity .128 .031 .000 .271 
Measurability <--- Alternative supply .198 .078 .011 .159 
Measurability <--- Complexity -.152 .057 .007 -.198 
Formalization <--- Measurability .504 .325 .120 .110 
Formalization <--- Asset-specificity 1.347 .386 .000 .305 
Formalization <--- Complexity 1.453 .311 .000 .414 
Formalization <--- Reputation 1.976 .482 .000 .267 
Formalization <--- Size buyer 2.084 .597 .000 .254 
Performance <--- Measurability .397 .078 .000 .319 
Performance <--- Formalization .067 .018 .000 .244 
Model fit: subsample without standard procedures 
 RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE NFI CFI HOELTER 
Default model .055 .047 .064 .130 .879 .927 239 (.01) 
Saturated model  1.000 1.000  
Independence model .175 .169 .180 .000 .000 .000 39 (.01) 
Chi-square = 315.624. Degrees of freedom: 138. Chi-square/degrees of freedom = 2.29 
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APPENDIX C: FACTOR SCORES, DIRECT EFFECTS, AND MODEL FIT 
 
Factor scores: 
subsample with standard procedures Estimate S.E. Sign. 
Stand. 
Estimate 
Actions <--- Performance 1.075 .103 .000 .855 
Problems <--- Performance 1.000   .837 
Asset-specificity 1 <--- Asset-specificity .859 .071 .000 .708 
Asset-specificity 2 <--- Asset-specificity .852 .071 .000 .708 
Asset-specificity 3 <--- Asset-specificity 1.000   .706 
Measurability 1 <--- Measurability .621 .048 .000 .592 
Measurability 2 <--- Measurability 1.002 .054 .000 .865 
Measurability 3 <--- Measurability 1.000   .855 
Alternative suppliers <--- Alternative supply 1.405 .216 .000 .847 
Alternative products <--- Alternative supply 1.000   .670 
Number of employees <--- Size buyer 1.042 .552 .059 .951 
Turnover <--- Size buyer 1.000   .624 
Reputation 1 <--- Reputation 1.874 .210 .000 .892 
Reputation 2 <--- Reputation 1.000   .523 
Reputation 3 <--- Reputation 1.156 .119 .000 .645 
Complexity level <--- Complexity 1.000   .908 
Number of products <--- Complexity .456 .032 .000 .792 
Legal specifications <--- Formalization 3.701 .390 .000 .684 
Trans. specifications <--- Formalization 1.000   .673 
Direct effects between latent variables:  
subsample with standard procedures  Estimate S.E. Sign. 
Stand. 
Estimate 
Alternative supply <--- Complexity -.163 .036 .000 -.302 
Asset-specificity <--- Alternative supply -.247 .082 .003 -.180 
Asset-specificity <--- Complexity .327 .047 .000 .442 
Measurability <--- Asset-specificity -.398 .065 .000 -.427 
Reputation <--- Complexity .098 .021 .000 .289 
Measurability <--- Alternative supply .223 .072 .002 .175 
Measurability <--- Complexity -.039 .041 .352 -.056 
Formalization <--- Measurability -.661 .292 .023 -.151 
Formalization <--- Asset-specificity .899 .334 .007 .220 
Formalization <--- Complexity 1.133 .223 .000 .376 
Formalization <--- Reputation 1.709 .534 .001 .192 
Formalization <--- Size buyer 1.586 .570 .005 .149 
Performance <--- Measurability .461 .074 .000 .385 
Performance <--- Formalization .037 .018 .034 .136 
Model fit: subsample with standard procedures 
 RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE NFI CFI HOELTER 
Default model .043 .035 .051 .930 .915 .958 332 (.01) 
Saturated model  1.000 1.000  
Independence model .177 .172 .183 .000 .000 .000 38 (.01) 
Chi-square = 258.923. Degrees of freedom: 138. Chi-square/degrees of freedom = 1.64 
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Making Sense of Formalization in
Interorganizational Relationships
Beyond Coordination and Control
Strategic alliances, buyer-supplier relationships, joint ventures and
other forms of interorganizational cooperation increasingly stand at
the basis of the competitive advantage of organizations. Although
formalization – in the form of contracts, rules and procedures – is
considered to be of significant importance for these relationships, an
integrative framework of its role has hitherto remained absent in
the literature. Drawing on conceptual developments, an in-depth
case study and survey data, this study provides such a framework. Six
main research findings emerge. First, tensions between the need and
the ability to formalize can be reduced by investing in information
processing and sensemaking. Second, formalization has functions
beyond coordination and control, such as increasing legitimacy and
enabling sensemaking. Third, managers are not only occupied with
the “right” degree of formalization, but also with managing tensions
between its functions and dysfunctions. Fourth, the contribution of
formalization to interorganizational performance declines, when it
is accompanied by standardization, due to a reduction in the degree
of “mindfulness” by contracting parties. Fifth, levels of formalization
and trust in early stages of cooperation have a large impact on the
evolution and performance of interorganizational relationships,
with intermediary levels of both governance forms exhibiting more
positive effects than extreme levels. Finally, decisions on formalization
are contingent upon the use of other governance mechanisms, which
may substitute or complement each other. These findings and the
integral framework to which they are connected promise to enrich
the understanding that researchers and practitioners have of the
role of formalization in interorganizational relationships, and enable
them to utilize formalization so that it contributes to performance.
ERIM
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ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From
a variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu-
nity is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront
of creating new business knowledge.
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